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 Explaining Pandemic Response
Scott L. Greer, Elizabeth J. King,  
and Elize Massard da Fonseca
The COVID-19 pandemic created unpre ce dented and turbulent 
mixtures of po liti cal, social, economic, and epidemiological forces. It has caused 
the world to pause and think about how and why some countries have fared worse 
than other countries in addressing the threat of SARS- CoV-2, and in many cases 
fared far worse than expected. In putting many dif er ent po liti cal systems to the 
test, it has caused many to ask why dif er ent countries did what they did.
A novel coronavirus was recognized as an emerging public health threat in 
Wuhan, China, in late 2019, but the year 2020  will be remembered for the shock 
that the virus administered to essentially  every po liti cal system in the world. By 
spring 2020, COVID-19 had governments around the world scrambling to address 
a virus for which much remained unknown scientifically, but which was ravaging 
through the inequities in socie ties and exposing gaps in public health systems and 
social policy structures. Higher- income countries  were not immune, and in fact 
many appeared to be the least prepared (or willing) to respond to the pandemic.
Many countries did take decisive and abrupt action, sometimes unsurprising 
and sometimes quite out of character. Governments put their entire economies 
into the equivalent of a medically induced coma, shutting businesses, schools, and 
social lives and sometimes keeping them alive with unorthodox social policy mea-
sures. The response varied worldwide. Although we may not know the long- term 
efects of  these varying responses, a comparative analy sis of the public health and 
social policies can tell us a lot about how and why governments respond the way 
that they do.
As of this writing, the pandemic is far from over. Many lessons have  been 
drawn; some might be learned. Nonetheless, the politics of COVID-19  during the 
“first wave” of the pandemic warrant a multidisciplinary and multinational analy-
sis. This knowledge can be useful as the world continues to fight COVID-19 and is 
equally impor tant for thinking about other ongoing and  future infectious disease 
pandemics.
This book is about what governments did to respond to COVID-19 and why 
they did it. It covers the first ten months of the pandemic, the first wave that struck 
the globe between December 2019 and September 2020. We conceptualized the 
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idea for this book in February  2020, aiming to bring together regional experts 
to try to identify what approaches to controlling the COVID-19 pandemic  were 
being implemented and to explain the diferences among countries’ responses. As 
the pandemic continued to expand, so did the number of experts ready to contrib-
ute to this comparative analy sis of the public health and social policy response to 
COVID-19. The book is or ga nized according to how COVID-19 and the responses 
unfolded.  After an overview of the role that the World Health Organ ization 
(WHO) has played and a comparative analy sis of global response  there are a 
series of country case studies. We start with Asia and conclude with Africa, fol-
lowing roughly the order in which the pandemic hit.
This first year of the COVID-19 pandemic has also once again highlighted the 
importance of interdisciplinary analy sis to understanding global health threats 
and their solutions. This book brings together po liti cal scientists and other social 
scientists, public health experts, and medical professionals to analyze critical 
decisions made in vari ous countries and globally. Governments from the small-
est town’s mayor to the grandest national leader made impor tant decisions, often 
with incomplete information. That gives us an opportunity to understand bet-
ter their leadership, public health decision- making, and politics. Previously, the 
small number of comparative studies connecting po liti cal regimes with health 
mostly focused on big and slow- moving health outcomes such as infant mortality 
(Kavanagh & Singh, 2020). COVID-19, by contrast, presented a fast- moving, sud-
den shock to almost  every po liti cal system in the world. As such, it presented a 
challenge for adapting theories that tend to ignore crises that are “neither mun-
dane nor militarized” (Lipscy, 2020).
 There is a long tradition of using exogenous shocks such as financial crises to 
understand politics and decision- making (Bermeo & Bartels, 2014; Gourevitch, 
1986; Hall, 1989). This edited volume is a contribution to that lit er a ture as well as 
to our specific understanding of politics and health. It joins what  will soon be a 
number of eforts to understand pandemic response (Capano et al., 2020; Colfer, 
2020). Public health and health policy lit er a ture has only a tenuous connection 
with po liti cal science, to the detriment of both (de Leeuw et al., 2014; Fafard & 
Cassola, 2020; Gagnon et al., 2017; Greer et al., 2017, 2018). We hope that if some 
good comes out of the pandemic of 2020, which was disastrous for most of the 
world, perhaps it  will be in showing not just that politics  matter to health, but 
how, when, and why they  matter.
Explaining Pandemic Response
This book is a work of comparative politics and public policy. That means we are 
trying to understand the policy decisions made by governments in response to 
COVID-19 in the first months of the pandemic. We focus on the period of Decem-
ber 2019 to September 2020, which covers what many have labeled the “first wave” 
of the pandemic. During this time, public health response was relying on non- 
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pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to prevent the spread of the virus. Vaccina-
tion campaigns had yet to start in most places in the world, and  there was  great 
uncertainty about when vaccine clinical  trials would be complete and the vaccines 
would be authorized for use.
Understanding Government Responses
We divided health policy responses into two broad categories. One is health pol-
icy, comprising public health policy and healthcare policy. In 2020 public health 
policy primarily meant NPIs and the construction of test- trace- isolate- support 
(TTIS) systems. NPIs are public health actions to slow or stop the spread of 
disease that do not involve vaccines or medicines (Markel et al., 2007). In 2020 
prominent NPIs included hand washing, social distancing, travel restrictions, 
school closures, restrictions on businesses or closures of activity in places or sec-
tors (“lockdowns”), mask mandates, and restrictions on working and socializing. 
NPIs could be extremely broad, efectively closing entire cities, sectors, or coun-
tries, or could be relatively  limited. TTIS systems are a package of interventions 
(Rajan et al., 2020): testing extensively (to find  people with virus), contract tracing 
(to find out whom they might have infected and from whom they caught it), iso-
lation (keeping infected  people away from the public and opportunities to infect 
 others), and support (ensuring that infected  people have what they need to isolate, 
e.g., income, food, support for dependents while their caregivers  were in isolation, 
a secure place to live). Together, NPIs and TTIS systems  were the core of the suc-
cessful eforts to manage the pandemic. In successful cases as diverse as Vietnam 
and New Zealand, they efectively eliminated COVID-19.
Healthcare responses refer to the ways governments tried to manage the 
impact of the pandemic on their health systems.  There  were first- order prob lems 
such as procuring and distributing personal protective equipment (PPE) or cre-
ating and managing stafed hospital beds in time. (It is an axiom of health care, 
but not widely appreciated, that finding somebody with the right training to staf 
a hospital and appropriate specialist equipment is harder than finding a frame 
and mattress.)  There  were second- order prob lems in responding to the disrup-
tion, from protecting healthcare workers’ own health and helping them with 
the additional demands on their time, to maintaining income flows to within 
the healthcare sector in the absence of elective procedures, to the backlog of 
untreated prob lems and procedures among  people who could not or would not 
seek medical attention during a pandemic wave. The Eu ro pean Observatory on 
Health Systems and Policies’ Health Systems Response Monitor provides exten-
sive description of  these complex prob lems and solutions. All of  these prob lems 
 were made more difficult by the characteristic complexity of healthcare systems, 
with their complicated payment structures,  legal arrangements, and interest- 
group and territorial politics.  There  were, of course, a variety of other govern-
ment responses, ranging from demo cratic backsliding to massive corruption, 
which individual chapters discuss as is relevant.
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It is tempting to want to ask for more— for an explanation of the course of 
the pandemic in dif er ent countries, for an explanation of the timing, scale, and 
impact of dif er ent waves, and ultimately for an explanation of the sickness and 
death it caused. That quest  will occupy many social scientists of many dif er ent 
fields for years to come, but it is not certain that we  will ever have clear answers 
to  these questions.
The Politics of Pandemic Data
 There are two major reasons why COVID-19 deaths, or even excess mortality, 
cannot presently be used in comparative po liti cal analy sis. The first is the politics 
of data. Mea sur ing the pandemic is not as easy as it might seem. Widely used 
data such as infections or deaths attributable to COVID-19 are endogenous to the 
politics of the pandemic  because governments make policy decisions that influ-
ence testing and attribution of deaths. As with many diseases, the ultimate cause 
of death from COVID-19 may be something  else, such as pneumonia or a heart 
attack exacerbated by virus. Professionals or governments, in some cases, decide 
to register  these  causes of death as COVID-19, and  others decide to register 
 these as pneumonia or heart attack deaths.  These decisions about official  causes 
of death introduce discrepancies in the data, which make it difficult to compare 
across contexts. Belgium, for example, has very efficient death recording systems 
and established guidance to attribute deaths to COVID-19 when uncertain. It has 
also regularly topped international COVID-19 statistics as a country with a par-
ticularly severe and lethal outbreak, but it is not entirely clear how much of that 
is due to its reporting versus reporting systems in other countries. Moreover, in 
many cases around the world  people have died without being tested. In short, 
data about COVID-19 specifically are problematic within countries and hard to 
compare between even countries that test extensively.
Furthermore, many observers’ self- taught short courses in epidemiology dur-
ing 2020 turned out to be incomplete. Some metrics that are useful for epide-
miological purposes have been misused during the pandemic. Test positivity, for 
example, is the percentage of tests that are positive. It is not a mea sure of inci-
dence (new infections) or prevalence (infections); it is a mea sure of the extent 
to which testing is giving an accurate picture of  actual prevalence. If it is above 
3% or at most 5%, all it tells us is that sampling bias among administered tests is 
severe enough to call any further results into question. Test positivity of 10%, for 
example, did not mean 10% prevalence; it meant that prevalence was unknown 
and prob ably underestimated. Test positivity was a perfect example of a statistic 
that was routinely misunderstood despite prob lems that social scientists should 
immediately understand. It is an instrument for calibration and interpretation of 
reporting more than a statistic about COVID-19.
The best data for po liti cal scientists are prob ably excess mortality. This is a 
statistic that simply calculates the number of deaths in a given period and com-
pares them to the number of deaths on average in that same period in a given 
year. Excess deaths calculations are also based on the data that governments are 
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most likely to collect,  because core public activities including taxes, military ser-
vice, and disbursements such as pensions or conditional cash transfers all work 
better if  there is a list of births and deaths. For example, if  there are an average 
100 deaths on a given day over the last ten years in a specific country, then  there 
are 120 deaths on that day in 2020, the data show 20 excess deaths in that country on 
that day. We would provisionally conclude that something— prob ably COVID-19— 
explains the diference (especially if NPIs mean we should expect a reduction of 
other  causes of death, such as workplace accidents or drunk driving). Excess mor-
tality, unlike any statistic recording COVID-19, has the im mense advantage of not 
being endogenous to the same po liti cal pro cess we are studying.
The drawback is that it is a slow statistic, with information filtering slowly 
through a web of individual doctors and local governments over weeks or some-
times months. That makes it useful for po liti cal scientists or other writers of after- 
action reports, rather than governments in a crisis. Also, despite their undeniable 
usefulness, many states do not efectively collect death data, or they collect them 
for just a few places. Not only is gathering this data costly, it might also be unhelp-
ful to some. Although a pension scheme may function better as a pension scheme 
if deaths are recorded, better death data might undermine  those whose income 
depends on fraudulent pensions— the very plot of Gogol’s Dead Souls.
Health surveillance in low- and middle- income countries lacks sufficient 
 human and other resources (Ibrahim, 2020). For instance, in Brazil, as in other 
developing countries, disease notification is usually handwritten to then be 
entered into the health information system, where it undergoes further review 
before it is disclosed. The pro cess is directly influenced by the availability of 
qualified professionals. A delay in this pro cess may bias the data interpretation. 
The number of cases and official “new” deaths disclosed daily by the Brazil-
ian Ministry of Health represented information that was entered in the system 
over the previous twenty- four hours and does not necessarily represent recent 
infections.
All of  these points come back around to what we might term, in its strongest 
form, “Trench’s Law,”  after its formulator Alan Trench: data are useful or compa-
rable but not both (Greer, 2019). Data are expensive to collect and maintain. We 
should therefore expect that they  will be designed to serve the interests of power-
ful forces in politics. They may have public health in mind; they may even have 
international comparability in mind. But we cannot assume so. Viewed this way, 
much of the creativity of quantitative social science is in repurposing data to shed 
light on issues that did not interest its creators, and much of the po liti cal energy of 
social scientists and activists goes into persuading power ful  people to create data 
of use to social science (Herrera, 2010).
 Hazards of Attribution
The second reason why policy is a better dependent variable than deaths or infec-
tions is the difficulty of attributing mortality outcomes to par tic u lar  factors. A 
vast diversity of social practices, economic structures (such as tourism or ser vice 
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sector dependence), travel patterns,  labor protections and economic structures, 
 family structures, pre- existing population health, and demographics influenced 
what happened in the pandemic (see Jarman, chapter 3, this volume). Each of  these 
phrases contains an enormous number of issues and empirical prob lems, from dif-
ferential ways of socializing to dif er ent ways of staffing elder care homes to dif er-
ent numbers of indigent day laborers. Public policy decisions are only part of the 
puzzle. And understanding public policy decisions is enough of a challenge, as this 
book shows.
In par tic u lar, the prob lem of compliance with NPIs and public health guid-
ance is a tricky one. Even in relatively authoritarian socie ties with strong state 
coercive capacity, it is hard to ensure a high level of compliance with restric-
tions on working, socializing, traveling, and mask wearing, let alone personal 
hygiene. Compliance is partly an efect of policy and of the consistency and 
quality of public health communication, but it depends on much  else, from the 
extent of coercion used to existing cultural norms. In China, once mobiliza-
tion for containment was ordered, local officials immediately  were placed  under 
enormous pressure from higher- level authorities to put the quarantine in place 
both at the provincial level and at the neighborhood level (Shih, chapter 4, this 
volume). Japa nese policy seemingly gained extremely good compliance, allow-
ing comparative weak NPIs to work better than they would elsewhere (Nagata 
et al., chapter 8, this volume). Brazil, Rus sia, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom all had serious compliance issues early in the pandemic (Massard et al., 
chapter 27; King & Dudina, chapter 24; Singer et al., chapter 26; Williams et al., 
chapter  12, this volume). Was this  because their governments did not inspire 
confidence,  because they  were culturally “freedom- loving  people” (as a UK minister 
said when excusing noncompliance),  because of confused government messaging, 
a combination, or something  else? Greeks— a population with historically low 
trust in government— certainly complied surprisingly well early in the emer-
gency (Petelos et al., chapter 21, this volume).  Later in summer and in the autumn 
of 2020, when many countries found they faced compliance prob lems,  were they 
attributable to policy, politics, or the sheer exhaustion that historically attends 
pandemics as they drag on? And how and when do governments take their esti-
mation of likely compliance into mind when developing NPIs? It is clear that 
policy and compliance with policy do not have a  simple relationship, which is 
another reason to shy away from eforts to explain overall pandemic outcomes 
in any  simple way. We set out to answer  these questions through the analy sis of 
COVID-19 responses from around the world.
Approach and Chapters
The book begins with a chapter on the WHO by Kavanagh et al. and a chapter by 
Jarman, which synthesizes and pre sents what governments have done in the pan-
demic and consequences. Each country chapter in this book has the same basic 
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structure, which was designed to explore the hypotheses published in June 2020 in 
concise form by the editors (Greer et al., 2020b). Each chapter introduces the spe-
cific country and salient points in its story. Then the health mea sures and the social 
policy mea sures are presented. A fourth section explains why the government made 
 those decisions. Each chapter concludes by highlighting key lessons and questions 
about the country, the politics of the pandemic, and what the pandemic has taught 
us. The chapters are grouped by geo graph i cal region, loosely following the pro gress 
of the pandemic from Asia through Eu rope to the Americans and Africa.
Certain chapters are devoted to only one country. Comparative chapters on 
Southern Eu rope, German- speaking Eu rope, Central Eu rope, Central Asia, and 
three African states also explore comparative themes that arose. The Eu ro pean 
Union (EU) and WHO, as international organ izations, are not strictly comparable 
to any country, but the pandemic has already changed them and taught us much 
about their politics.
Hypotheses
What hypotheses from existing lit er a ture, developed and tested before the pan-
demic, shed light on decision- making in the pandemic? We drew our hypotheses 
from the broad comparative politics lit er a ture on the assumption that, although 
COVID-19 is efectively unpre ce dented in the modern world, the po liti cal systems 
that are responding to it and showing themselves in its light are known entities. 
 There is no need to reinvent the wheel. As de Waal writes, “Although the pathogen 
may be new, the logic of social response is not, and it is  here that we can see his-
torical continuities” (2020). Historical continuities, as well as novelties, are often 
political. Each section  here is divided into two parts: a statement of the hypothesis 
and its lit er a ture and then a summary of what we, based on our reading of the chap-
ters in this book, saw in its case studies.
Regime Type  Matters: Authoritarianism Produces  
Distinctive Information Prob lems
The Hypothesis
One of the most basic issues in po liti cal science,  going back to Aristotle at least, is 
the development and operation of dif er ent po liti cal regimes. Regimes are the rules 
governing a polity. They are the combination of institutions, co ali tions, and po liti-
cal norms that govern how politics works. Regimes fall into broad and frequently 
debated families such as democracies, monarchies, and authoritarian states. Gov-
ernments exist within regimes: monarchs change while monarchical regimes per-
sist, and heads of government can change while leaving regimes intact. The ways 
in which regimes afect politics, policies, and  people’s life choices are the subject of 
much discussion in popu lar and scientific circles. For example,  there is a lively and 
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largely inconclusive debate about  whether and how democracies could produce 
better health and social policies (Greer & Méndez, 2015; Haggard & Kaufman, 
2008; Kavanagh & Singh, 2020; Kosack, 2012; Linos, 2013).
Defining regimes is tricky (Collier & Levitsky, 1997). Democracies are regimes 
that have both extensive participation in politics (also known as inclusion; the 
most impor tant form of inclusion is the vote) and contestation (public debate 
about rules, rules, and policies, such as the presence of a  free press and demo-
cratic opposition parties) (Dahl, 1971). Authoritarian regimes have  limited con-
testation or participation; many have, for example, extensive participation in 
elections that are nonetheless not contested (Levitsky & Way, 2002). Both partici-
pation and contestation are continuous variables, which means that regimes exist 
in a two- dimensional space and can change position. Databases such as V- DEM at 
the University of Gothenburg, Freedom House, and the Polity database all create 
and regularly update indices of authoritarianism. The two dimensions mean that 
a variety of logical possibilities exist and are regularly found in the world, such as 
high contestation and low participation (competitive oligarchies), authoritarian 
regimes with elections but no real opposition or debate (inclusive hegemonies), 
and regimes with neither contestation nor participation (Dahl, 1971).
Many hypotheses could be derived from the diferences between more and 
less authoritarian and demo cratic regimes (admittedly,  these are big and contested 
categories). We focus on two of par tic u lar relevance to public health but revealing 
about policy- making and its consequences in other cases.
The first is that authoritarian regimes have prob lems of information flow that 
shape their politics. Put simply,  there is a justified assumption in authoritarian 
regimes that  people lie to each other and that the regime lies to the public ( Little, 
2017; Wallace, 2016).This leads to the internal information prob lem (Egorov & 
Sonin, 2011; Svolik, 2009; Wintrobe, 2000). A major threat to authoritarian lead-
ers comes from within the regime. Therefore, incumbent leaders constantly watch 
for signs of disloyalty among se nior officials. However, this creates incentives for 
se nior officials to exaggerate their degree of loyalty and hide instances of policy 
failures, lest they are perceived by the leaders as signs of disloyalty. Another threat 
to regimes stems from large- scale uprising, so authoritarian regimes generally try 
to weaken the incentive to rise up by suppressing information about bad policy 
outcomes and information about the pervasiveness of popu lar dissatisfaction. 
Authoritarian leaders also often limit information sharing among state agencies 
to “coup- proof” their regime. They keep their bureaucracies fragmented to stop 
collusion and prevent any one agency from growing po liti cally power ful enough to 
carry out a coup (Greitens, 2016).
 These incentives work against the  free flow of information in the absence of 
transparency demands by opposition politicians or a  free press. If the regimes 
use coercion to enforce policies within their bureaucracies, they create incentives 
to lie about each and  every case of underper for mance (Tsai, 2008; Zhou, 2010). 
Misbehavior within such a system can lead to severe consequences. This leads 
to the internal information prob lem. Some scholars model authoritarian po liti cal 
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 institutions and strategies around precisely the internal information prob lem 
(Boix & Svolik, 2013; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Gao, 2016):  people at the top 
of the hierarchy are constantly trying to find out what lower- level officials and 
their own rivals at the top are  doing, but in an environment of pervasive perverse 
incentives, official opacity, and  limited public contestation.
Authoritarian regimes also have an external information prob lem, which is 
that in a variety of ways they  will often have earned public distrust (Kuran, 1991; 
 Little, 2017; Stockmann, 2013). Creating a climate of pervasive distrust can be a 
power ful po liti cal strategy from the point of view of an authoritarian leader (or 
would-be authoritarian). Pervasive disbelief and misinformation make collective 
action more difficult, reduce public confidence in the ability of government to 
deliver public goods, and enable a variety of po liti cal actions from theft to  human 
rights violations that are easier to deny if all facts are seen as politicized and pro-
visional (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011). Appeals to nationalism, an emergency, 
or per for mance legitimacy (e.g., a good economy, a disease- free country) can 
increase public trust in the information governments provide. The efect, how-
ever, might be temporary  because of widespread agreement that government 
reports and advice are not to be taken too seriously (Li, 2016). Singapore is argu-
ably the only authoritarian country in the world that has sustained public trust 
and reasonable transparency over time (Greer & Trump, 2019; Perry, 2017; Wai, 
chapter 9, this volume). Most would-be authoritarians may not actually want to 
subject themselves to the disciplines that the Singapore regime imposes upon 
itself. Similarly, the case of Hong Kong’s broad success in responding to COVID-19 
comes with a po liti cal context from which it is even harder to draw lessons (Burns, 
chapter 5, this volume).
In short, we should expect that authoritarian regimes, with few pos si ble excep-
tions,  will have prob lems of internal and external information flow. The regimes 
 will have difficulties gathering and difusing accurate information  because in the 
absence of contestation, information is primarily a pawn in internal regime poli-
tics. Some regimes  will also not benefit from a reserve of public trust  because the 
mechanisms of contestation that promote trust over time are disabled in authori-
tarian regimes. Thus, for example, they  will have difficulty gathering data about 
their cases and the efectiveness of their response and  will not benefit from public 
trust in their advice on NPIs nor implementation of TTIS systems.
The Findings
Our findings suggest that authoritarian information barriers and government 
inaction formed a lethal combination that plagued China in January 2020 and 
Rus sia and other authoritarian regimes for longer periods. This is a lethal com-
bination  because the authoritarian reflex of hiding disasters prevented health 
authorities and individual health professionals and citizens from spreading 
information about the pandemic, leading to accelerated spread of the disease, as 
occurred in Wuhan and the rest of Hubei Province. At the same time, the state 
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did not mobilize its (at times) considerable resources to combat the spread of the 
disease, so it was allowed to spread in the midst of general ignorance.
China clearly demonstrated the prob lems of information flow within authori-
tarian regimes. (Ironically,  there is a Sino- centric bias in research on comparative 
authoritarianism.) Early in the pandemic, city and provincial officials in Wuhan 
suppressed evidence of the outbreak, in keeping with a reluctance to be associ-
ated with prob lems (Shih, chapter 4, this volume; Ang, 2020). A January 14, 2020, 
attempt by Wuhan’s city government to win the Guinness World Rec ord for the 
world’s largest banquet was particularly ill advised but unsurprising, again  because 
of the lethal combination of general ignorance and inaction (Kynge et al., 2020). 
Once the scale of the prob lem came to the surface, though, the Chinese state 
seems to have responded efectively. (It is in ter est ing to imagine what would have 
happened had the first cases been identified in early January 2020 in a democ-
racy.) Other early hotspots, such as Iran, also saw denialism within the regime and 
in its external communications.
In a number of other authoritarian regimes, internal and external information 
flow did not seem to  matter as much. Vietnam’s relatively coherent authoritarian 
regime was able to enact and maintain strong NPIs very early; presumably the 
regime made it clear that failing to find or report a case would lead to very strong 
sanctions (Willoughby, chapter 7, this volume). Singapore’s regime had prob lems 
stemming from its lack of information about conditions among mi grant laborers, 
which in turn stemmed from the regime’s general lack of interest in their welfare. 
However, once it established the importance of their housing in its outbreak, it 
moved quickly to monitor them (Wai, chapter 9, this volume). Hong Kong also 
moved quickly and efectively (Burns, chapter 5, this volume). As ever with Hong 
Kong and Singapore, their nearly unique po liti cal systems make it a challenge to 
replicate their successes in any  simple way.
Before we give too much credit to authoritarian decisiveness and state capac-
ity, though, we can point to other, diverse, authoritarian, and hybrid states in the 
book that did not show such efective public health responses. Turkey’s autocratic 
presidentialism was impor tant to increase decisiveness and implement author-
itative policy tools such as curfews and keeping citizens at home, but at the cost 
of public trust; citizens  were concerned that public health mea sures  were an 
excuse to increase po liti cal control (Özçürümez, chapter 22, this volume). Egypt 
used coercion to enforce stay- at- home mea sures and even declared the inten-
tion to prosecute anyone spreading fake news about the pandemic. Although 
some Egyptians criticized the government’s response in mitigating the burden 
of the poor,  others argued that the authorities had not done enough to contain 
the virus (Ogujiuba and Binase, chapter  33, this volume). Rus sia’s rec ord was 
spottier: the federal government exerted control over the statistical reporting 
but left implementation to the regional authorities, exposing the geo graph i-
cal disparities rampant through the underfunded healthcare system (King and 
Dudina, chapter 24, this volume). Tanzania’s federal government minimized the 
threat of the pandemic, and local health officials  were left to respond amid an 
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inadequate healthcare system and low levels of authority (Yamanis et al., chap-
ter 31, this volume).
The opacity of authoritarian regimes also leaves us in something of a bind: 
if this hypothesis is correct, then it is hard to tell that from the outside. It is 
not likely that anybody  really knows the incidence and prevalence, let alone the 
course, of COVID-19  in many authoritarian regimes for most of 2020. This is 
partly  because authoritarian regimes still cluster on the lower- income range of 
countries, and many of them do not  really govern their  whole territory or provide 
many public goods. Any claim about COVID-19 anywhere in Central Asia, for 
example, is necessarily somewhat speculative given testing limitations and the 
lack of centralized, comprehensive healthcare data (Jones and King, chapter 11, 
this volume). Other  factors clouding the results are the incentives to represent 
the truth in keeping with internal regime politics rather than the satisfaction of 
outside observers.
Regime Type  Matters: Some Authoritarian Regimes  
Are Extremely Effective in Execution
The Hypothesis
Do authoritarian regimes do better than democracies in a crisis such as COVID-19 
(Stasavage, 2020)? The hypothesis that they might is in line with a certain kind of 
common sense, captured by the old saying that Italian dictator Mussolini made 
the trains run on time, or that China’s success in stamping out COVID-19 within 
its borders showed the value of authoritarianism as a key to an efective state. 
Authoritarian rulers need not argue nor compromise with opposition parties, leg-
islators, or subnational governments, and in theory they can override opposition 
within government or society.
 There are, nonetheless, two prob lems with this argument. The first prob lem 
lies in the conflation of authoritarian states and efective states. Authoritarian 
states might brook no public debate, be able to ignore slow  legal procedures and 
rules, and be able to punish re sis tance or sabotage, but that impunity also cre-
ates drawbacks that can systematically undermine their administrative efective-
ness.  There is no guarantee that authoritarian governance leads to the choice of 
efective and public- spirited policies.  Because authoritarian regimes are isolated 
from popu lar accountability, members of the regime may take advantage of the 
lack of transparency and accountability to pursue corrupt or particularist policies 
(Chang & Golden, 2010; Kunicova & Rose- Ackerman, 2005). In general, authori-
tarian regimes have narrower accountability (by definition), and that means they 
are  under less pressure to provide public goods. The conditions  under which 
authoritarian regimes do opt to provide public goods such as public health are 
variable, rather than anything we can assume. History is full of authoritarian 
regimes that did not provide public goods. That is why democ ratization is associ-
ated with increased provision of public goods (Deacon, 2009).
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Further, a decision to provide a public good— such as public health—is not 
necessarily easily implemented in an authoritarian regime. In the absence of par-
ticipation and contestation, fighting corruption is a serious prob lem. Obviously, 
corruption is also a serious prob lem in democracies, but it takes dif er ent forms. 
Corruption is both lower in democracies overall and more prevalent in authori-
tarian enclaves within democracies such as the Italian south, Brazilian north, or 
parts of South Africa, India, and the United States (Gibson, 2013).
Fi nally, authoritarian regimes are tremendously diverse and range from the 
poorest to some of the richest countries. Even if we rule out other undemo cratic 
regime types such as absolute monarchies, authoritarian regimes are as diverse as 
Rus sia, Venezuela, Rwanda, Hungary, and Vietnam.  There is scope to include or 
exclude a number of other countries in the category, from Bolivia to Turkey. We 
could draw a suggestive line from lack of participation and contestation to lack of 
trust and good information in the previous hypothesis, but  there is no reason to 
expect that lack of contestation and participation  will consistently produce admin-
istrative efectiveness.
The Findings
Overall we saw no evidence that authoritarian regimes as a group  were more efec-
tive at making and implementing policy than demo cratic regimes, or that they 
clustered in any par tic u lar way. Policy implementation was extremely efective and 
heavy handed in Vietnam (Willoughby, chapter 7, this volume), Singapore (Wai, 
chapter 9, this volume), the  People’s Republic of China (Shih, chapter 4, this vol-
ume), and Hong Kong (Burns, chapter 5, this volume), but demo cratic South  Korea 
(Park, chapter 6, this volume) as well as New Zealand, Norway, Taiwan, and even 
the Isle of Man (Yeh & Cheng, 2020) achieved equivalent results. A similar finding 
was reported in the comparative cases in Africa (Ogujiuba and Binase, chapter 33, 
this volume). The sustainability of NPIs likewise did not seem to vary with regime 
type  either. Some authoritarian regimes relaxed their NPI regimes as quickly as any 
democracy (as with Rus sia), and a few, including Tanzania (Yamanis et al., chap-
ter 31, this volume) as well as some post- Soviet personalist regimes remained in 
denial for too long (Jones and King, chapter 11, this volume).
In some cases, authoritarian regimes did efectively impose NPIs but could 
not sustain implementation or po liti cal support, producing a first wave mirage 
and a damaging second wave. Hungary rapidly and efectively imposed NPIs that 
quashed the first wave, but so did its more demo cratic neighbors Czechia and 
Austria, and in the second wave Hungarian policies  were noticeably weaker and 
worse implemented (Löblová et al., chapter 23, this volume).
In short, some authoritarian regimes  were efective in making and implement-
ing policy, but only some. For  every Vietnam  there was a Tanzania. Authoritari-
anism is clearly no panacea, and it is hard to see why we would expect that a 
lack of public accountability and open debate would reliably produce better policy 
implementation.
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Social Policy Is Crucial to the Effectiveness  
of Health Policy Responses
The Hypothesis
“Social policy” refers to policies that are, in Richard Titmuss’s definition, “benefi-
cent, redistributive, and concerned with economic as well as non- economic goals” 
(Alcock & Glennerster, 2001, p.  213). That efectively means the welfare state, 
including health, pension,  family, educational, and similar policies as well as 
income replacement policies such as unemployment insurance, short- time work 
(kurzarbeit) schemes that subsidize salaries for underemployed employees, and 
cash  payments. Our hypothesis is that social policy is crucial to the efectiveness 
of public health responses.
On the level of the individual, compliance with NPIs depends on resources. We 
can call this the “Cask of Amontillado prob lem,”  after an 1846 short story by Edgar 
Allen Poe. In the story, a murderer lures somebody to a basement (with the promise 
of Amontillado sherry) and walls them up to die. The prob lem that the gothic hor-
ror story lays bare is  simple: locking  people at home is fatal. Telling  people to stay 
home only works if they can eat and other wise maintain their life situations without 
leaving home to work. Telling businesses to stay closed without helping them meet 
payroll, rent, and other expenses is akin to closing them. Telling local governments 
dependent on tax revenue from business to enforce NPIs is asking for bad enforce-
ment. As a result, NPIs without accompanying social policy mea sures have a high 
risk of failure as time goes on.
This naturally puts lower- and middle- income countries in a bad situation, 
 because they did not all have the resources to pay businesses to close and work-
ers to stay at home (as we saw in, for example, India and South Africa). It is also 
a prob lem for countries such as the United States, which clearly had the capacity 
to use social policy mea sures to stay home but chose to use them for only a short 
time (Singer et al., chapter 26, this volume). To a variable and unpredictable extent, 
civil society (Greer et al., 2017),  family networks, and  others can fill in the gaps, as 
with the Sikhs in India (Raj, chapter 10, this volume), but in most places  there is no 
substitute for government in sustaining NPIs.
On another level, that of politics, the prob lem is that social policy interacts 
with the po liti cal preferences and actions of business  owners. Without imputing 
any motivations to business  owners, we can assume a business that must pay rent 
and other expenses  will want to open in the absence of subsidy such as kurzarbeit. 
Businesses, to be kept alive, need revenue. If they are not paid to stay closed, they 
 will campaign to open. If we impute further motivation to business  owners (e.g., 
a preference for opening over being paid to be closed), then we can easily imagine 
how and why businesses might mobilize to be open.
The tragic irony, which  will influence politics, is that individual decisions 
might end many of  these businesses, regardless of formal NPIs. Many of the ser-
vice sector businesses that seemed riskiest in the pandemic  were also businesses 
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run on thin service- sector margins, such as restaurants, bars, gyms, and hair or 
other salons. A business may need, for example, a 3  percent profit margin to be 
 viable, but a call for vulnerable  people to stay away might easily lead to a 20, 40, 
or 60  percent decline in its revenue without a single NPI enacted. NPIs taken by 
policy- makers may be a con ve nient target for business  owners’ ire, but if  those 
same policy- makers’ call for “vulnerable” populations to stay home is heard, that 
could easily lead to a drop in business sufficient to bankrupt many ser vice sector 
businesses. It was clear by the time of writing in late 2020 that in countries that 
did not undertake and sustain strong social policies,  there was an enormous busi-
ness mortality rate concentrated among smaller ser vice sector enterprises such as 
restaurants.
The Findings
Virtually  every chapter in this book confirmed the hypothesis that social policy is 
directly and indirectly crucial to sustainable pandemic response, but not all coun-
tries provided extensive social protection. Even in countries that saw infections 
and quickly dispatched them, such as South  Korea or Hong Kong, short- term 
social policy mea sures enabled NPIs, including over several waves, and softened 
the blow of the worldwide economic slowdown. In countries around the world 
that did not manage the pandemic with NPIs quite so successfully, social policy 
nonetheless enabled NPIs. In Brazil and the United States, over the summer, for 
example, federal health policies  were erratic at best, but state governors  were able 
to take relatively decisive NPIs if they chose  because the social policy was highly 
supportive (Massard et al., chapter 27; Singer et al., chapter 26, this volume).
Meanwhile, prob lems arose in middle- income countries where NPIs  were not 
supported by social policy. India and to some extent South Africa began with a 
national lockdown largely unaccompanied by social policy supports (Raj, chap-
ter 10; Harris, chapter 32, this volume). In par tic u lar, the weak point this revealed 
was the plight of mi grant laborers, who needed to work  every day to survive, who 
 were poorly connected with social policy programs (federal or state), and whose 
response to the sudden loss of income was often informal migration. That led to 
the state restarting transport, conveying six million mi grant workers by rail from 
virus- ridden cities to the  whole of rural India, and rapidly abandoning federal 
public health mea sures. In short: supportive social policy intended to replace lost 
income (and help businesses in many cases) was a necessary condition for the 
enactment, sustainability, and maybe efectiveness of NPIs.
The caveat is that some authoritarian regimes provided  limited social protec-
tion but  were efective enough to nonetheless impose NPIs. In China  there was 
virtually no additional support. Vietnam’s social policies meant military person-
nel and workers delivering food and supplies to all individuals on the street (see 
Willoughby, chapter 7, this volume) with no extensive cash transfer support, as in 
Brazil. In Singapore, “the government’s approach to supporting the unemployed 
is focused on helping them find jobs through skills training and such” (see Wai, 
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chapter 9, this volume). Singapore, however, did have a generous cash transfer 
program in place but excluded vulnerable populations such as mi grant workers. 
If  there is a limitation to the hypothesis, it is that it might be pos si ble to impose 
very efective NPIs through coercion alone if a regime has already built a repres-
sive apparatus as enormous, sophisticated, and entrenched as that of the  People’s 
Republic of China (Shih, chapter 4, this volume). Most countries have not and 
prob ably could not.
Majoritarianism Shapes Responses: Presidentialism,  
Pop u lism, and Agency
The Hypothesis
Broadly demo cratic regimes vary in endless ways, with po liti cal institutions alone 
ofering diferences in territorial organ ization, federalism, bicameralism, judicial 
review, electoral rules, composition of the executive, and referenda.  These institu-
tional features explain outcomes in interaction with each other and with features 
of the society such as social cleavages and economic structures.
We focus on one key division, which is between more majoritarian and con-
sensus democracies. Majoritarian democracies are ones that assign a  great deal 
of agency to the government,  whether through the  great powers of a government 
with a legislative majority (as with the “Westminster” systems modeled on the 
United Kingdom, including Canada, India, and Australia) or through the powers 
of a power ful president as found in presidentialist systems such as France, the 
United States, or Brazil (Lijphart, 1984, 1999). Majoritarianism is a continuum, and 
a long- debated concept, but we found it promising as a way to explain pandemic 
response decisions.
Majoritarianism as a concept is one end of a continuum that clusters mul-
tiple po liti cal institutions. One of  those institutions stands out in the context of 
the pandemic as possibly having additional explanatory power. Presidentialism, 
in par tic u lar, creates its own distinctive class of prob lems  because it separates 
the power and electoral incentives of the head of government from the legislature 
(Fix- Fierro & Salazar- Ugarte, 2012). In a presidentialist system, in Linz’s defini-
tion, “an executive with considerable constitutional powers— generally includ-
ing full control of the composition of the cabinet and administration—is directly 
elected by the  people for a fixed term and is in de pen dent of parliamentary votes of 
confidence. [The president] is not only the holder of executive power but also the 
symbolic head of state and can be removed between elections only by the dras-
tic step of impeachment. In practice . . .  presidential systems may be more or less 
dependent on the cooperation of the legislature; the balance between executive 
and legislative power in such systems can thus vary considerably.” Linz continued 
that “two  things about presidential government stand out. The first is the presi-
dent’s strong claim to demo cratic, even plebiscitarian, legitimacy; the second is 
[the president’s] fixed term in office” (1990, pp. 52–53).
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Linz was interested in the drawbacks of presidentialism for demo cratic stabil-
ity, and the considerable subsequent debate about the topic has largely followed 
him in that interest. As the lit er a ture evolved, it increasingly downplayed the 
power of presidentialism alone, emphasizing its complex interactions with party 
systems in par tic u lar. That elaboration and debate never  really undid Linz’s ini-
tial insight that a president is, as another presidency scholar (Skowronek, 1992) 
put it, a disruptive force (Elgie, 2005; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Shugart, 1999; 
Shugart & Carey, 1992). Our interest is in pandemic response, and more broadly 
the response of governments to shocks, which highlights presidentialism  because 
of its par tic u lar characteristic: the concentration of agency in a single person at 
a time of crisis. Some research has indeed found that parliamentary systems are 
more likely to efectively provide public goods (Shugart, 1999). If we are correct, 
then although some parliamentary regimes, notably  those with majoritarian elec-
toral systems, concentrate agency in the leader, almost all presidentialist systems 
 will give the president, in command of the executive, considerable agency to deter-
mine responses. Majoritarian and especially presidentialist systems’ decisions 
depend especially heavi ly on the leader, for better or for worse.
The Findings
The countries discussed in this book span a variety of more or less majoritarian 
demo cratic regimes. For once we can use excess mortality for a first approxima-
tion  because many of the strongest cases are in countries that report it in use-
ful form. It is perhaps coincidental that of our governments, some of the most 
erratic and apparently in efec tive (mea sured by excess mortality)  were at the 
majoritarian end of the scale: Brazil, the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, 
and India. In each of  these the electoral system granted considerable agency 
to single executives. The relationship is hardly perfect: majoritarian Australia 
and Canada all efectively managed, or even wiped out, COVID-19, whereas 
relatively consensual demo cratic procedures in Sweden did not prevent high 
excess mortality.
In consideration of the policy decisions and course of pandemic politics, the 
efect of majoritarianism was clear: to the extent that po liti cal agency was in the 
hands of one leader,  whether  because of dominance of a ruling party in a majoritar-
ian system (Johnson in the United Kingdom, Modi in India, Ramaphosa in South 
Africa) or institutions that empower a president (Bolsonaro, Trump),  there was 
scope for politics erratic enough to rival some authoritarian regimes. Other lead-
ers such as Macron of France (Rozenblum, chapter 15, this volume), Márquez of 
Colombia (Acosta et al., chapter 28, this volume), Piñera of Chile (Méndez, chap-
ter 29, this volume), or Trudeau of Canada (Fafard et al., chapter 25, this volume) 
enjoyed similar agency  because of their countries’ institutional arrangements but 
chose not to deploy it in the same way as populist radical right politicians such 
as Bolsonaro, Johnson, Modi, or Trump. For instance, although Piñera is not as 
flamboyant a leader as Trump and Bolsonaro, he opted to centralize pandemic 
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key decisions in his hands with  little discussion with Congress and subnational 
governments. Similarly, President Mutharika of Malawi (Dionne et al., chapter 30, 
this volume) enacted strict, even draconian, public health policies, which might 
be overturned as the new president Chakwera took office with higher levels of 
public trust than his pre de ces sor. On the other hand, Márquez of Colombia used 
his agency to delegate pandemic response to technocrats and found in the pan-
demic a space to regain popularity and to improve his communication with the 
population.
Looking at our cases also shows the interaction of institutions and populist 
politics. Majoritarianism, and in par tic u lar presidentialism, appear to have dis-
tinctive interactions with pop u lism and the radical right  because of the way it 
assigns so much agency to an individual. One of the  running media debates of 2020 
was precisely about the extent to which pop u lism  shaped pandemic responses. 
The debate specifically focused on the populist radical right affiliations of figures 
such as Bolsonaro in Brazil, Johnson in the United Kingdom, Modi in India, or 
Trump in the United States (Kavakli, 2020). The lit er a ture on the efects of pop u-
lism and the populist radical right in government is relatively clear that the efects 
of a populist radical right party or politician do  matter but are  shaped by institu-
tions and party systems (Falkenbach & Greer, 2020, 2021; Falkenbach et al., 2019; 
Rinaldi & Bekker, 2020). Thus the Austrian or Swiss po liti cal systems, in which 
populist radical right parties must be in co ali tion with larger parties, show less 
direct efect from  those parties than more majoritarian po liti cal systems in which 
a single leader can wield a  great deal of power. An anti- science or clientelistic 
leader in a majoritarian system can express  those impulses more and do more to 
block  others than one in a system in which other parties can temper them in co ali-
tion or parliament. Thus, anti- scientific or other problematic impulses found in a 
Bolsonaro, Johnson, or Trump administration are magnified in systems in which 
their office and command of the executive machinery are largely in de pen dent of 
their legislatures (as with Bolsonaro and Trump) or in which they enjoyed legisla-
tive majorities in majoritarian systems (as with Johnson and Modi). Majoritar-
ian po liti cal institutions gave populists, some of them COVID-19 denialists, the 
opportunity to make, or not make, pandemic response policy. It is a politics of 
agency, and concentrating agency in one leader with  limited accountability seems 
to have more obvious risks than benefits.
Federalism Shapes Pandemic Responses
Federalism is a kind of po liti cal institutional arrangement. It refers to a po liti cal 
system in which  there are at least two separate levels of elected general- purpose 
government, neither of which can unilaterally abolish the other. This means that 
it includes countries not always understood as federal, such as Italy and Spain, 
and that many analytical components of comparative federalism apply to the EU.
 There is a vast and confusing multidisciplinary lit er a ture on the impact of 
federalism on politics (Costa- i- Font & Greer, 2013; Greer, 2017b; Greer & Elliott, 
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2019). Some scholars agree with Hayek that its salient characteristic is the promo-
tion of intergovernmental competition, which supposedly promotes efficiency and 
 limited government (Qian & Weingast, 1997; von Hayek, 1992; Weingast, 2014). 
The basic idea operates by analogy with firms (Tiebout, 1956): just as companies 
compete to provide dif er ent ser vices to customers at dif er ent prices, govern-
ments compete to provide dif er ent levels of public goods to mobile taxpayers. In 
both cases a very  simple model suggests the result  will be Pareto- efficient: it might 
not be fair in any normative sense, but every body  will get what they want within 
what they can aford. This logic undergirds a wide range of models suggesting that 
competition between governments  will subject them to discipline, making them 
efficient and curing a putative habit of excessive expenditure. Scholars working in 
this area, who are often already normatively uninterested in fairness, often ignore 
resilience, prioritizing efficiency over the slack that is necessary to withstand any 
kind of a shock and bounce back.
A second school views federalism as a creator and multiplier of veto points, 
which slows and limits policy- making, entrenching opponents of change and 
then making coordination harder by demanding that the interests of more diverse 
elected governments be considered (Huber & Stephens, 2001; Swank, 2001). The 
empirical basis for this view as an explanation of policy is surprisingly thin, often 
reliant on indices of fragmentation that lump federalism together with other kinds 
of veto points.  These authors also tend to be insensitive to the extent to which fed-
eral states’ autonomy (self- rule) difers from their participation in other govern-
ments’ decisions (shared- rule) (Elazar, 1987; Hooghe et al., 2016). It is very impor-
tant to distinguish between self- rule and shared- rule. The most common patterns 
we found in a study of rich countries’ federalisms (Greer & Elliott, 2019) are that 
self- rule operates within bounds set by federal programs ( because even if the fed-
eral government is constitutionally constrained, it is usually financially stronger 
and more flexible) and that shared rule in which states can shape or veto federal 
decisions is rare and can be vitiated by the influence of po liti cal parties (Greer, 
2019; Greer, 2020b). That federalism creates obstacles to coordination, though, is 
well established and has been seen in the pandemic (e.g., Huberfeld et al., 2020; 
Migone, 2020; Rocco et al., 2020).
A third school sees federalism as a contributor to the resilience of a country, 
even if they do not always phrase it that way. This school focuses on the advan-
tages of policy divergence, allowing innovation, local adaptation, local account-
ability, learning and beneficial competition, as well as quarantining disappoint-
ments: if the federal government fails, state governments can compensate, and 
vice versa (Banting, 2006). This case is plausible, but the very  limited systematic 
comparative research on it is skeptical. First of all, size  matters (Stepan, 1999). A 
medium- sized American state such as North Carolina or Michigan has roughly 
the 10 million- person population of Sweden; the 41 million  people of São Paulo 
state in Brazil rival the 46 million  people of Spain, and the four biggest Indian 
states (Uttar Pradesh, Maharastra, Bihar, and West Bengal) have a combined 
population of 507 million, compared to the EU’s 447 million. North Carolina and 
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 Sweden are hardly deliberative democracies, and what kind of deliberative democ-
racy or clear accountability is to be expected among the 200 million inhabitants 
of Uttar Pradesh? Instead, it seems that decentralizing public policy decisions to 
states produces what the simplest theory would suggest: divergence among states 
(Greer, 2006; Kleider, 2015). Federations produce divergence within bounds set by 
law, finance, and programmatic design.
 There are two unpromising sets of hypotheses that the chapters in this book 
gave us no cause to revisit. An old school of “public choice” theory, ever on guard 
against public expenditure, saw it as breeding excessive government expenditure; 
this is clearly not the case. Another school of mostly historically oriented scholars 
discounts federalism, seeing it primarily as a form of adaptation to deep territo-
rial cleavages that would exist  under any regime, and perhaps as a cost of staying 
together at all (Erk & Koning, 2009). This latter approach has value but, for our 
purposes, creates imponderable counterfactuals: to draw conclusions about fed-
eralism from such an approach, we would have to imagine Canada or India as a 
unitary state facing COVID-19. That strains credulity.
Parsing out and weighing  these dif er ent perspectives are challenging theoret-
ical and empirical exercises (Greer & Elliott, 2019; Greer et al., 2015). Federalism’s 
efects clearly vary with the exact design of the federal system (e.g., the nature of 
its taxes and intergovernmental transfers shape the extent of interstate competi-
tion) as well as interaction with other institutions and features of the economy 
(e.g., party systems, social cleavages, and policy legacies). For our purposes, the 
basic hypothesis is that federalism does  matter in at least one of  these three ways: 
by keeping governments thin (at best, efficient but perhaps not resilient); by mul-
tiplying governments, creating diversity as well as potential backups in case of 
failure; and by slowing policy change or coordination. Broadly, though, we would 
expect that federalism’s impact  matters most in interaction with some other insti-
tutions and po liti cal forces, but would reflect some of  these dynamics.
The Findings
We found no par tic u lar evidence that federal states per se have intergovernmen-
tal competition that produces better government than more centralized systems. 
The obvious mediating  factor is intergovernmental finance: German federal 
states have more consistent funding than American ones, for example, and a 
number of countries such as Spain and Brazil operate highly redistributive fiscal 
systems that direct money from richer to poorer places. The competitiveness 
hypothesis would suggest that more competitive federations would have bet-
ter or more efficient responses, but it seems that they  were just underfunded in 
many cases. It is hard to see the metric by which the United States, the country 
with the least federal equalization between states and therefore the most com-
petitive state governments, turned in a superior per for mance relative to other 
federations. It is pos si ble that efficiency is achieved at the price of resilience: 
state governments in the United States have incentive to cut costs too much in 
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pursuit of efficiency (Greer, 2020a; Greer & Singer, 2016). That can lead to frus-
tration in normal times but lead to serious prob lems in the face of compounding 
shocks, such as 2020’s combination of pandemic, recession, and a variety of natu-
ral disasters and contentious politics. Insofar as the competitiveness hypothesis 
is correct— and it seems correct entirely within the margin created by systems of 
intergovernmental finance—it might produce efficiency, but it could equally well 
be producing systems that lack resilience in the face of predictable emergencies 
such as pandemics.
Did federalism generate veto points that slowed change? This breaks down 
into two questions. One is  whether legislative action to address the pandemic—in 
health or social policy— was impeded by federal po liti cal institutions. Although a 
number of surprisingly influential accounts assimilate federal failure or inaction 
to federalism, it is impor tant when studying legislation to divide between self- 
rule and shared rule. Strictly speaking, only if  there is shared rule, in which state 
governments have a formal say over federal decisions, or substantial reliance on 
state cooperation to enact and implement policy, can we say that federalism is 
an impediment to legislation. Federalism may tend to covary with other impedi-
ments to legislation, such as bicameralism or extensive judicial review, but that 
does not mean we can attribute prob lems created by bicameralism (such as the 
malapportioned US Senate) or judicial review to federalism.
In fact, almost  every federation saw substantial centralization, just as almost 
 every government saw substantial initial centralization (with heads of govern-
ment gathering power relative to their ministers and agencies in the spring and 
summer of 2020) (see Jarman, chapter 3, this volume; Greer et al., 2020a). Most of 
them saw emergency legislation covering health and social policy mea sures. Ones 
with substantial shared rule— a small category— saw, if anything, unusually good 
coordination, in part  because of po liti cal elites and party systems long adapted to 
managing coordination challenges in systems filled with interlocking veto points. 
As for notable failures to legislate, in most cases they happened at the federal level 
and in social and economic policy—in areas in which federal states’ fiscal advan-
tages are most prominent, and failure to use them most impor tant.
In terms of practical coordination, decentralization did lead to prob lems. 
Dubin writes about how, in Spain, long- standing “politics of who, not what,” focused 
more on which governments would act than on the substance of their actions, pro-
duced inexcusable failings in public administration such as failure to connect data 
sets across the country (Dubin, chapter 19, this volume; Dubin, 2019). Regional 
and state coordination failures magnified by partisan disagreement plagued Ital-
ian response (Falkenbach and Caiani, chapter 18, this volume). The United King-
dom was plagued with difficulties in what should have been the relatively  simple 
prob lem of coordinating policy between its four governments (Williams et  al., 
chapter 12, this volume). Almost  every federal government, even ones generally 
regarded as efective, such as Germany or Austria, saw coordination prob lems 
as well as a politics of blame- shifting and credit- claiming between its politicians 
(Czypionka and Reiss, chapter 17; Mätzke, chapter 16, this volume).
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Externalities also caused prob lems. The US state of Minnesota  adopted rela-
tively forceful and efective NPIs. They did  little good when neighboring South 
Dakota inexplicably hosted almost a half million motorcyclists for an August 2020 
party in the town of Sturgis. It was prob ably the world’s largest gathering at the 
time, unmasked and wholly unnecessary, and it led to cases around the country. 
Canada largely avoided the externalities of the US outbreak by closing borders, 
but that tool was unavailable to US states. In the EU, initial border closures proved 
too eco nom ically, socially, and institutionally disruptive. The member states who 
initially had “gone it alone” rapidly found themselves coordinating with each other 
on new, more federal policies to manage a level of interdependence comparable to 
that of many federations. By summer 2020 they  were ready to relax restrictions, 
and by September 2020 it was clear that summer holiday movements across the 
continent  were creating a second wave that showed the scale and public health 
importance of movement around the EU (see Brooks et al., chapter 13, this vol-
ume; Brooks et al., 2020). The EU and US responses and their efects  were very 
dif er ent, but both  were  shaped by the fact of open borders and externalities.
We did notice that alignment of responsibility for social policy and state roles 
in NPIs was a prob lem in some federations (Adolph et al., 2012; Rocco et al., 2020). 
In the United States and India, states could enact NPIs but mostly lacked the 
resources to make compensating social policy decisions on the necessary scale. 
As a result, when federal government resources  were unavailable (or when the 
federal government chose not to help), state governments faced as stark a tradeof 
between NPIs and tax revenue as any bar or restaurant. Governments and busi-
nesses alike needed the revenue from business activity, even if they knew it would 
be im mensely destructive to end NPIs.
Fi nally, did federalism increase resilience through fail- safes, learning, or adap-
tiveness? To a  limited extent, we saw federations in which the federal government 
failed but state governments took compensating action, notably Brazil, the United 
States, and India as well as, to a more  limited extent, the United Kingdom and Spain. 
In  those countries, state governments did act as fail- safes, enacting NPIs and some 
 limited social policies once the federal government had failed to act. As compara-
tive federalism would lead us to expect, though, the states operated within a deci-
sion space set by constitutional law, intergovernmental finance, and programmatic 
design as well as nationalized politics in some cases and nationalized economies 
in all cases, which  limited what they could efectively do.  There was learning, but 
 there was also a strong partisan efect in some cases, such as Spain and the United 
States (Singer et al., chapter 26; Dubin, chapter 19, this volume). Deliberate partisan 
polarization led to additional policy conflict about NPIs, social policies, healthcare 
priorities during surges, and masking. In sophisticated studies of the United States, 
it has become clear that it was partisanship rather than  actual policy prob lems that 
 shaped NPI decisions (Adolph et al., 2020).
Just what was learned from variation in COVID-19 responses within federa-
tions, and then usefully  adopted, is not clear, and in our reading the authors of this 
book did not find a consistent story of policy difusion. Where  there was  learning, 
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 there was also usually some well- established set of coordinating mechanisms, 
 whether the federal- provincial- territorial conferences of Canada or Germany’s 
numerous and normally ponderous coordinating forums (Czypionka and Reiss, 
chapter 17, this volume; Fafard et al., chapter 25, this volume; Migone, 2020; Wall-
ner, 2014).  These normally manage conflict and frustrate policy advocates with 
their slowness (Scharpf, 1988) but in an emergency turned out to be very useful 
for learning and coordinating. In cases where they  were absent or not used, as 
in Southern Eu rope, multilevel government did often turn out to slow coherent 
responses (Peralta- Santos et al., chapter 20, this volume).
Public Health Capacity Contributes to Effective Response
The Hypothesis
The October 2019 Global Health Security Index (GHSI) from a consortium led by 
Johns Hopkins University was, in retrospect, very well timed. It has become the 
subject of much discussion. The GHSI ranked almost  every country in the world 
by their pandemic preparedness and scored the United States highest. By late 
2020 no serious observer, including the GHSI authors, claimed that the United 
States had responded well to the pandemic (Nuzzo et al., 2020). In fact,  there was 
 little evident relationship between the GHSI rankings and countries’  actual deci-
sions or per for mance (Abbey et al., 2020; Haider et al., 2020; Kavanagh & Singh, 
2020).
The prob lem lay in good part not in the data of the index nor its peer rankings, 
which  were often accurate in their assessment of countries. The prob lem lay in its 
composition. The index efectively weighted countries’ adherence to a par tic u lar 
model of public health response and capacity that was intended to prepare them 
for a pandemic such as COVID-19. In other words, the GHSI scored countries 
against a par tic u lar concept of specialist public health bureaucracy.
Most countries have some form of specialist public health bureaucracy, but 
their size, ambition, breadth of ambition, and  legal position have varied a  great 
deal. The scope of “public health” is im mense in theory (almost every thing can be 
called public health if public health means or ga nized eforts to reduce avoidable 
morbidity and mortality). The scope of public health bureaucracies is much more 
variable from country to country and often includes dif er ent kinds of bureau-
cratic units and tasks such as restaurant inspection, workplace safety, border 
health,  water quality inspection, and basic health care (Greer & Jarman, 2020). It 
is never wise to make assumptions about what “public health” means in the poli-
tics, bureaucracy, or scholarship of another country.
Despite that high level of variation,  there is something of an international 
model that has been promoted by the WHO, the GHSI, the US CDC itself, 
regional organ izations, and even a specialist international organ ization (the Inter-
national Association of National Public Health Institutes, based in Atlanta and 
started with Gates Foundation support) ( Binder et al., 2008a, 2008b). The model 
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is broadly that of the US CDC, a high- level central agency with extensive scien-
tific capacities that can or ga nize surveillance, conduct research and laboratory 
analyses, formulate guidance, advise government, and communicate its recom-
mendations to the rest of government (for implementation) and the public (Greer, 
2017a). Echoes of the model are found around the world, even if implementation 
of or desire for a copy of the US CDC is highly variable. The philanthropic and 
intellectual push for the model echoes  earlier drives  toward public health profes-
sionalization supported by the Rocke fel ler Foundation (Fee, 1987).
The hypothesis is that investment in this kind of autonomous science- focused 
agency  will improve pandemic response as well as public health in general. Public 
health agencies with substantial executive capacity of their own are relatively rare, 
and that executive power is often a fairly small group of disease detectives who 
can bolster local field epidemiology or microbiological capacity. In most cases they 
rely on  others, such as local governments, the police, the military (in a crisis), or 
the healthcare sector to actually administer vaccines, implement NPIs, or inspect 
restaurants. They might look like a fire department but in a crisis actually are often 
part of a bucket brigade (Mätzke, 2012). The CDC agency’s contribution is in sci-
ence and scientifically grounded advice to government and the public. If the model 
works, its influence on policy- making and policy should be clear in the analy sis of 
decisions. The agency, if not organ izing the bucket brigade directly, should at least 
have the organizers’ attention.
The Findings
To our surprise, the relationship between dedicated public health capacity and 
government response was poor in most cases. In country  after country, we found 
that heads of government centralized power unto themselves in the first wave and 
put their public health agencies, and the public health profession to the extent that 
they had one, in a firmly subordinate position (Jarman, chapter  3, this volume; 
Greer et  al., 2020a). In some cases, such as the United States and  England, the 
sidelining was particularly dramatic and humiliating given the ambition and pres-
tige of the countries’ public health establishments at the start of the year (Singer 
et al., chapter 26; Williams et al., chapter 12, this volume). The Trump administra-
tion silenced the CDC and subjected it to po liti cal manipulation. In  England, the 
government abruptly de cided to eliminate its public health agency, folding it into 
a new agency designed to be much more clearly subordinate to po liti cal decisions 
and tasked only with implementation and scientific resources. But in other coun-
tries such as Denmark or France we also saw ambitious agencies sidelined from a 
leadership role (Rozenblum, chapter 15; Ornston, chapter 14, this volume). In Japan 
(Nagata et al., chapter 8, this volume) the number of PCR tests was low compared 
with other countries due to bureaucratic silo phenomenon in governmental organ-
ization and the agencies involved in managing the pandemic.
In a few countries such as Germany and Canada the system worked as 
intended, but in  those cases the agency had never been designed with a prominent 
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role in policy advice (Czypionka & Reiss, chapter 17; Fafard et al., chapter 25, this 
volume). In lower- income countries, such as Malawi (Dionne at al., chapter 30, 
this volume), the healthcare system was already over burdened before COVID-19, 
and the lack of PPE and critical care units made it even harder to deal with any 
surge in coronavirus cases.
Only in two cases did we find a communicable disease control agency in the 
lead: South  Korea and Sweden. The results in both countries  were dif er ent, with 
 Korea efectively eliminating the virus and Sweden adopting a controversial “herd 
immunity” strategy that led to far more deaths than its neighbors (Irwin, 2020; 
Pierre, 2020). Even in  those cases, it is likely that the prominence and power of the 
communicable disease control agency could be attributed to a po liti cal decision 
by the head of government to step back and let the agency make decisions (Park, 
chapter 6, this volume; Lee et al., 2020). A highly po liti cal decision to center an 
agency was what happened in Colombia (Acosta et al., chapter 28, this volume). 
It seems that governments can find expertise to their satisfaction (though policy 
in Czechia was first driven by a businessman with a model and then a prominent 
dentist, hardly the level of expertise we might like; Löblovà et al., chapter 23, this 
volume), and that when they cultivate specific public health expertise and capac-
ity, they explic itly want it to be on tap rather than on top.
This book’s broad conclusion about capacity of any sort is shared with other 
analyses of COVID-19 (Bosancianu et al., 2020; Capano, 2020; Capano et al., 2020; 
Kavanagh & Singh, 2020): using it is as impor tant as having it. Highly capable 
states misused or did not apply their strength. The strong agency model of public 
health capacity is in part a way to skew politics of pandemic response  toward pub-
lic health thinking by creating a putatively apo liti cal expert agency that can bring 
scientific answers to questions. It was an efort to shape decisions by shaping 
capacity. Not only was public health capacity only erratically applied, the capacity 
of public health agencies to advise governments was only erratically sought.
Conclusion
We can draw several conclusions from the findings in this book. Many countries 
that should have been best prepared to deal with a pandemic, based on existing 
global health preparedness mea sures,  were not able to implement efective strate-
gies to prevent infections and deaths. Countries that implemented swift responses 
such as robust testing and efficient contract tracing fared better in  these first 
months of the pandemic.
Social policy is equally impor tant to health policy during a pandemic; this is 
true in higher- income and lower- income countries. Without social policies to sup-
port lower- income and vulnerable populations, health policies to promote social 
distancing cannot be fully efective and are likely not sustainable long enough 
to end the epidemic in a country. However, we saw significant misalignment 
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between social and health policies in most countries, exacerbated in some cases 
by federations that misaligned public health and social policy powers. Apparently, 
the more authoritarian countries  were largely less inclined to provide broad social 
policies as they relied primarily on coercion and a historical pattern of compliance 
with government  orders.
Regime type was not a particularly conclusive variable in our findings.  There 
is  little evidence that authoritarian regimes  were more efective than demo cratic 
regimes in implementing health and social policies, or that the country cases in this 
book clustered in any meaningful way according to regime type. Information flow 
and trust  were also critical variables in a number of countries, across the spectrum 
of regime types, but  there was evidence that authoritarian regimes sufered distinc-
tive prob lems of internal and external information flow. Broadly, we found similari-
ties across regime type, and distinctive paths within regime type, more promising 
than regime types alone.
Institutional variables such as presidentialism and federalism greatly shape 
pandemic response. For example, a pandemic endows controversial leaders with 
power to push their agendas despite the magnitude of infectious disease threat 
and socioeconomic consequences of COVID-19 restrictions.  Those most afected 
by the pandemic can seemingly do  little to stop  these controversial government 
leaders in majoritarian systems.
It is clear that the COVID-19 pandemic is moving forward with us in 2021, in 
many places even harsher than in the first months that this book focuses on. We 
assembled this book in the midst of uncertainty, changing evidence- based pub-
lic health guidelines, testing of therapeutics and rapid development of promising 
vaccines, and ongoing and new po liti cal strug gles around the world. Some coun-
tries learned from their own miscalculations and other governments’ missteps, 
whereas other countries seemingly believed that they had surpassed the COVID-19 
threat or did not have the capacity or  will to continue providing adequate social 
and health policies needed to curb the epidemic.
What is clear from this “first wave” is that politics  matter and  there is a  great 
need to understand government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Pan-
demic preparedness must consider “po liti cal capacity” (Kavanagh & Singh, 2020), 
which is to say politics. Our book is an initial efort to systematically identify what 
 these variables are and explore how they operate in practice. We hope that the 
findings presented throughout this book  will draw the attention of and resonate 
with a diverse global health audience of prac ti tion ers, researchers, policy- makers, 
and scholars.
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 2 Playing Politics
 The World Health Organ ization’s Response to COVID-19
Matthew M. Kavanagh, Renu Singh,  
and Mara Pillinger
Understanding WHO as a Po liti cal Institution
The challenges of the World Health Organ ization (WHO) begin, perhaps, with its 
name— framed as one organ ization, spanning the globe, and tasked with secur-
ing, as defined by article 1 of its constitution, “the attainment by all  peoples of the 
highest pos si ble level of health” (WHO, 1946). Yet the gap between the expecta-
tions of WHO and how global po liti cal actors have  shaped its structure and its 
capacities is vast— never more so than during the COVID-19 pandemic.
It is necessary to look at WHO from at least two perspectives: (1) its role as 
a scientific, technical, and humanitarian organ ization and (2) as an international 
organ ization and venue for international po liti cal negotiation, diplomacy, and 
policy- making.  These two dif er ent, at times conflicting, missions leave WHO in a 
precarious position and have opened it to criticism over the years (Siddiqi, 1995). 
Some argue that WHO’s importance stems primarily from its po liti cal and agenda- 
setting functions, whereas  others argue the technical information- gathering, 
standard- setting, and cooperation- related activities are paramount and that the 
agency’s po liti cal nature detracts from  these activities (Clift, 2014; Jamison et al., 
1998; Retreat, 1996; Ruger & Yach, 2009).  There have even been calls over the years 
to split  these functions (Hofman & Røttingen, 2014).
In practice, though, WHO’s mandate to “act as the directing and coordinating 
authority on international health work” requires both, even where they sit uneas-
ily together (WHO, 1946). Indeed, some of the agency’s most impor tant work in 
recent years, such as fighting the recent Ebola outbreak in the Demo cratic Repub-
lic of the Congo in an active war zone, would not have been pos si ble without 
combining science, politics, and diplomacy. Yet this combination has also led to 
perhaps the biggest threat to the organ ization since its founding as the United 
States— WHO’s biggest financial contributor— declared its intention to withdraw 
in July 2020 over accusations that WHO is acting as a “po liti cal, not a science- 
based, organ ization” (Sabbagh & Stewart, 2020).
Founded in 1948, the WHO was established as a specialized agency of the 
United Nations (UN), governed by an executive board and parliamentary World 
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Health Assembly (WHA), both made up of member states. Its creation followed 
an extended negotiation over the direction of international health, culminating 
in the merging of functions that had previously been held across vari ous inter-
national entities (Lee, 2009). During its first de cades, WHO stood at the center 
of a global network of scientists and policy- makers, enjoying recognition as the 
international leader in issues of health and disease. The eradication of smallpox 
by a global program led by WHO demonstrated the power of international coor-
dination and technical expertise (Burci, 2018). Over the years, however, WHO 
has repeatedly been challenged by po liti cal rivalries, expanding and competing 
priorities, fiscal constraints, and competition with other private and public organ-
izations in global health (Davies, 2010; Youde, 2018). With regard to public health 
emergencies, the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2003 was 
a watershed when WHO,  under the leadership of Director- General Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, took the nearly unpre ce dented step of directly, publicly criticizing 
China, a power ful member state, for its lack of transparency. Brundtland also ral-
lied governments to respond with a set of scientifically based control mea sures. 
 These actions eventually led, in 2005, to a major revision of the legally binding 
International Health Regulations (IHR) treaty. The revised IHR placed new obli-
gations on states to share information about outbreaks within their borders and 
gave WHO new powers to gather and share data, declare “public health emergen-
cies of international concern” (PHEICs), and issue recommendations about how 
countries should respond (Heymann et al., 2013). Yet WHO quickly came  under 
scrutiny for how it exercised  these powers during the 2009 swine flu (H1N1) epi-
demic and the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, leading to multiple inquiries 
and reform eforts to make WHO more efective (Gostin et al., 2016; Moon et al., 
2017). During the former, the agency was criticized for acting too aggressively, and 
during the latter, for not acting aggressively enough (Kamradt- Scott, 2016).
In this chapter we seek to explain how po liti cal  factors and history help explain 
WHO’s actions— both where it has stumbled and where it is innovating to address 
prob lems in new ways. We begin with the challenges that existed at the outset 
of the pandemic, explain WHO’s actions in three specific areas, and then seek 
to explain  these actions. WHO’s capacities have been  shaped by member states 
in a set of evolving geopo liti cal contexts. In the current pandemic, many past 
strategies have proven untenable as its responsibilities, particularly vis- á- vis high- 
income countries, have rapidly expanded and forced WHO to innovate.
Three Sets of Challenges
Against this backdrop, the roots of WHO’s COVID-19 response can be found in 
three sets of po liti cal and structural challenges: the decentralized structure of the 
organ ization, the competing and conflicting pressures of member states, and the 
finances of the organ ization.
First, WHO is far less of a unitary “world” “organ ization” than its name 
suggests. In practice, it is characterized by familiar geopo liti cal divisions and 
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tensions between the organ ization’s headquarters and regional offices. Advanced 
industrialized countries began to lose their control over the WHA by the 1970s 
as decolonization led to a growing number of voting members from developing 
nations (Chorev, 2012; Cueto et al., 2019). This brought a loss of influence and 
prestige for wealthy nations and a deepening of WHO’s focus primarily in low- 
and middle- income countries (LMICs). Meanwhile, WHO’s Secretariat is based 
in Geneva, but much of its operations function through six semiautonomous 
regional offices. The Director- General has remarkably weak authority over  these 
offices, each of which is led by a regional director elected by its member states and 
with command over its own bud get. The increasing focus on LMICs has further 
decreased the po liti cal heft of Geneva. With three- quarters of staf and more than 
half of total expenditure  under the control of the regional offices, the decentral-
ized structure creates centers of power and jockeying between member states, as 
well as variable capacities between regions (Clift, 2014; Lee, 2009). Although this 
structure can have the advantage of fostering closer relations, better coordination, 
and cooperation between WHO and governments, it can also cause “pathological 
fragmentation,” creating inefficiencies, overlaps, and unaccountability resulting 
from a principal- agent prob lem between the Geneva and regional offices (Graham, 
2013; Hanrieder, 2015). During the West African Ebola outbreak, for example, dis-
juncture and miscommunication between the country, regional, and headquar-
ters levels contributed to the agency’s failure (Kamradt- Scott, 2016; Wenham, 
2017). The post- Ebola restructuring built a new Health Emergencies Program that 
has significantly improved the capacity of WHO headquarters to coordinate and 
respond, including by creating direct lines of reporting authority between Geneva 
and the regional offices (Ravi et al., 2019). Yet the continuing weakness of WHO 
Geneva (where much of the global po liti cal and media attention is focused) com-
pared to the regional offices (where much of WHO’s influence and capacity lies) 
is notable.
Second, WHO has also always been subject to the competing priorities of its 
194 member states and especially its donors. Cold War politics kept WHO torn 
between focus on biomedicine and social medicine, between a focus on Eastern 
Eu rope versus Asia, Latin Amer i ca, and Africa (Lee, 2009). More recently, the ten-
sions have been multipolar and multipriority. WHO has as many priorities as it 
has masters. Disease- specific eforts on  human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and 
polio, universal health coverage, pandemic preparedness, humanitarian emergency 
response, innovation, access to medicines, and a host of other priorities have been 
tasked to WHO at annual WHAs by overlapping co ali tions of member states and 
promoted by nonstate actors such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The 2017 
election of Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus as Director- General, Ethiopia’s for-
mer minister of health and of foreign afairs, marked the most open and competitive 
WHO election in which this complex prioritization challenge was clearly articu-
lated. Yet WHO still  faces a principal- agent prob lem, in which “when the signals 
from the principals are conflicting, it can paralyse the agent” (Youde, 2016). Chorev 
argues that the WHO Secretariat has not been a passive agent but has engaged in 
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strategic adaptation to external pressures— reframing demands and regimes to fit 
the orga nizational culture and building space for autonomy and action driven by the 
bureaucratic leaders of the organ ization (Chorev, 2012). That task has grown harder, 
though, as the principals’ demands have grown, and it is particularly difficult in 
issue areas such as pandemic responses, which are high visibility and high priority 
and therefore subject to high levels of oversight from principals.
Fi nally, WHO is operating on a bud get roughly the size of a large hospital in a 
wealthy nation. The bud get is predominantly endowed by a handful of actors, with 
the United States contributing up to 20  percent of WHO’s bud get in recent years 
(WHO, 2019). The current biennial bud get for 2020–2021 is set at $4.84 billion, 
without taking any potential additional, emergency expenditures into account. 
WHO’s funding comes in two forms: assessed contributions from member states 
and voluntary contributions from member states, private organ izations, and indi-
viduals. The latter are usually tied to specific uses and proj ects. Assessed contri-
butions from member states based on income and population originally provided 
the majority of WHO’s income (Lee, 2009). However,  because assessed contribu-
tions  were essentially frozen in the early 1990s, the scales have tipped (S. K. Reddy 
et  al., 2018). Voluntary contributions now account for up to 80   percent of the 
organ ization’s bud get (Kaiser  Family Foundation, 2020). Furthermore, member 
states often fail to pay their assessed contributions on time or at all (Daugirdas & 
Burci, 2019). This leaves WHO increasingly dependent on unstable voluntary con-
tributions, subject to the whims of donors and constrained in how it can spend 
even the money that it has (K. Reddy & Selvaraju, 1994). In addition, half of the 
top ten contributors to WHO are also nonstate actors (e.g., the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation) (WHO, 2020e). Private funders lack the same level of demo-
cratic accountability and institutional durability as states (Marion, 2020). Further, 
extrabud getary funds also provide disproportionate funding in certain areas and 
make it difficult for WHO to make long- term plans (Davies, 2010; Lee, 2014; Youde, 
2015). Member states have recognized  these financial prob lems and taken partial 
steps to shift bud getary control back to the WHA and the Secretariat, yet they 
have consistently rejected eforts to increase assessed contributions (Daugirdas & 
Burci, 2019).  These funding difficulties are vis i ble in WHO’s strug gle to raise 
emergency funds for its response to COVID-19.
WHO would benefit from greater power, autonomy, and funding to fulfill its 
mandate. Although  these benefits would apply to any number of health concerns 
that the agency addresses, COVID-19 provides a power ful example of both the 
high expectations and historically rooted institutional constraints the agency 
 faces in its work.
WHO Response to COVID-19
COVID-19 quickly evolved from an isolated set of “viral pneumonia” cases into 
a full- blown pandemic that overwhelmed health systems, brought countries to a 
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halt, and pulled the global economy into a deep recession. As the leading global 
health agency, WHO has played a central role in alerting the world to the threat 
of and coordinating eforts to fight the disease. However, it also has become a 
target of criticism. Although sometimes deserving of— and learning and evolving 
from— such criticism, the body is also an easy target  because of its status as an 
international organ ization that seems to have more capacity and freedom than it 
actually does. We can see  these dynamics play out in at least three roles WHO has 
played in the COVID-19 response: gathering and reporting epidemiological data; 
issuing scientific and technical guidelines; and promoting development of, and 
equitable access to, diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines.
Sharing Epidemiological Data
A key piece of WHO’s role is overcoming individual states’ incentives to sup-
press damaging news of outbreaks and ensuring outbreak information is rap-
idly shared. On December 31, 2019, a statement about “viral pneumonia” by the 
Wuhan Municipal Health Commission and media reports of the outbreak  were 
picked up by WHO office in China. This information was reported through vari-
ous channels in accordance with the IHR and eventually verified by Chinese 
authorities. Other governments, including Taiwan’s, inquired with WHO about 
similar reports they had received. By January  5, 2020, WHO had shared news 
about the outbreak on Twitter and through official channels, with the update that 
it was caused by a novel coronavirus coming shortly thereafter. On January 11, 
WHO tweeted that it had received the ge ne tic sequence, with the first protocol 
for a diagnostic test published by WHO on January 13 (WHO, 2020a). WHO’s 
actions  were rapid, although it would  later become clear that the disease had been 
circulating in China for some time. That country’s authoritarian power structures 
played a role in delaying public reports, including downplaying human- to- human 
transmission  until  after international spread had occurred (Kavanagh, 2020). 
WHO had to engage in a series of high- stakes negotiations with China for greater 
information sharing and access for expert investigative teams, including access 
to Wuhan in late January and an international mission to China in mid- February, 
which resulted in impor tant information about the mortality and transmission 
dynamics of the virus (WHO, 2020f).
 Here WHO’s  limited power was on display.  Because the IHR contain no enforce-
ment mechanism, WHO had no real recourse if the Chinese government de cided 
to stop sharing information or refused access to international experts. The option 
of publicly “shaming” the government as  under SARS was a risky strategy with a 
more power ful China of 2020 and could lead to significant delay. WHO instead 
sought to stay on good terms with Chinese authorities, focusing on praise and 
private diplomacy. But although WHO arguably had few other cards to play, it 
may have overplayed its hand. Dr. Tedros’ press conference upon his return from 
China strongly praised China’s response, which included harsh lockdowns many 
believed  were problematic (Kavanagh & Singh, 2020). This strong praise would 
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 later come to be used against the Director- General by  those seeking to cast doubt 
on WHO’s in de pen dence and who claimed he was too close to China.
Similarly, the question of human- to- human transmission would become a 
po liti cal flash point, with critics claiming a cover-up by China and pointing to an 
early WHO tweet on January 14, 2020, that “Preliminary investigations conducted 
by the Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human- to- human 
transmission” (WHO, 2020b). But that same day in a press conference, officials 
at WHO Geneva suggested it was pos si ble  there was human- to- human transmis-
sion, a real ity confirmed by WHO’s regional office on January 19, 2020, and an 
investigative trip to Wuhan by WHO officials on January 20 to 21, 2020 (WHO, 
2020b). On January 30, the Director- General declared a PHEIC, WHO’s highest 
level of alert. Although this followed the advice of an in de pen dent expert IHR 
Emergency Committee, some still claimed that it should have happened sooner 
(Pillinger, 2020a; WHO, 2020g). On March 11, 2020, the Director- General stated 
that COVID-19 was a pandemic; even though declaring an outbreak a “pandemic” 
is a colloquial term, with no formal or  legal meaning (unlike the PHEIC declared 
in January), the statement would  later provide fodder for  those critical of WHO 
(WHO, 2020g).
Taken as a  whole, though, WHO’s eforts to push countries to share data 
rather than hide it have been successful. An online dashboard displays daily case 
counts for nearly all WHO member states (WHO, 2020j). In the first six months 
of the pandemic, WHO conducted press briefings at least three times a week, 
sharing data and scientific updates. Its success is perhaps best illustrated in the 
breach, as only two countries, Turkmenistan and North  Korea, have at the time of 
this writing continued to claim they have no confirmed COVID-19 cases, despite 
evidence to the contrary. In mid- July 2020, a health advisory team from WHO 
was allowed to visit Turkmenistan and did not question the government’s asser-
tion publicly but urged health authorities to act “as if COVID-19 was circulating” 
(Auyezov & Gurt, 2020).
Issuing Scientific Guidelines
A second impor tant part of WHO’s COVID-19 response has been gathering and 
aggregating scientific information and issuing guidance to governments and the 
public about how to respond. One of the first and highest- profile pieces of guid-
ance advised countries not to enact travel restrictions or bans— first from China 
and then from other parts of the world (WHO, 2020i). This is rooted in the IHR’s 
goal of moving away from border restrictions and quarantines that  were highly 
disruptive to global trade. Restricting travel from countries experiencing disease 
outbreaks has not proved efective in stopping disease, with porous borders and 
significant opportunity costs (Pillinger, 2020b). They also undermine movement of 
goods and  people needed to fight disease. WHO also seeks to avoid travel restric-
tions  because they give countries incentive to hide outbreaks. In this case, however, 
many countries ignored WHO’s advice, racing to close borders to China. Early 
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reports suggest that countries that had not closed their borders had done as well or 
better in preventing the spread of COVID-19 than countries that had, such as the 
United States and Italy (Kiernan et al., 2020). This recommendation, however, has 
opened WHO to criticism— most pointedly by US President Donald Trump, who 
said WHO “actually criticized and disagreed with my travel ban at the time I did it. 
And they  were wrong” (Hjelmgaard, 2020).
WHO has issued a vast range of other scientific pronouncements, guidance, 
and advice, with more than one hundred dif er ent documents on the SARS- CoV-2 
virus, case identification, personal protective equipment, contact tracing, health 
worker protection, community response, and much more. It has published so 
much that it had to publish a guide to its guidance (WHO, 2020l). It is notable 
that most of this work was well received and quickly taken up around the world. 
However, a few critical issues have generated significant attention and contro-
versy, including WHO’s response on lockdowns, masks, and  whether COVID-19 
is “airborne.”
WHO for many months advised against widespread mask mandates, worrying 
that masks would “create a false sense of security, with neglect of other essential 
mea sures” and “take masks away from  those in health care who need them most” 
(WHO, 2020d). It was only on June 5, 2020, several months into the pandemic, 
that WHO recommended the widespread use of masks (WHO, 2020h). However, 
by that point, WHO was  behind the curve. More than one hundred countries had 
already  adopted some form of nationwide mask- wearing mandates before WHO 
updated its guidelines, and 95  percent of countries  were already recommending 
mask usage in public in at least some cases (Community Initiatives, 2020). And 
WHO’s initial endorsement of masks was lukewarm, noting that lack of “high- 
quality” scientific evidence to support their use and numerous disadvantages of 
wearing them, including “potential discomfort” and “difficulty with communicat-
ing clearly” (Mandavilli, 2020). Critics have said that mandating masks was long 
overdue as a  simple, inexpensive, and efective mea sure, and they fault WHO 
delay.
Relatedly, WHO had a long and complicated public messaging challenge 
around  whether COVID-19 was technically airborne (i.e., spread through small, 
aerosolized droplets that can float through the air, rather than just through larger 
droplets that quickly fall to the ground). The agency acknowledged the possibility 
of airborne spread  after a group of 237 international experts and scientists pub-
lished a commentary in Clinical Infectious Diseases urging them to do so (Lewis, 
2020; Morawska & Milton, 2020). As with masks, WHO has also remained adamant 
in emphasizing the uncertainty of scientific evidence and in recommending miti-
gation strategies through other means (Mandavilli, 2020).
During COVID-19, much of the criticism has centered on WHO moving 
too slowly in a rapidly evolving pandemic. But it is worth remembering that in 
the past, such as during the H1N1 pandemic, the criticism has gone in the other 
direction. Governments complained of costly and disruptive eforts necessary to 
implement WHO recommendations. Rapid recommendations can also create 
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backlash against the international agency if the mea sures are  later proven to be 
unnecessary, as during H1N1. Regardless, during COVID-19 controversies have 
occurred amid a fast- moving scientific context, unfolding in real time in the glare 
of media headlines. WHO’s position as global technical leader has taken a hit 
from controversies that may have gone unnoticed in other contexts.
Access to Diagnostics, Therapeutics, and Vaccines
A third major part of WHO’s response has been seeking to expand access to 
diagnostics, therapies, and  future vaccines worldwide— where WHO has inno-
vated, building new strategies in the face of new threats and an absence of other 
authoritative actors. WHO launched the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) 
Accelerator in April  2020— with words of strong commitment from heads of 
state, particularly from Eu rope, Africa, Latin Amer i ca, and the Ca rib bean. Nota-
bly missing from this nominally global efort  were the United States and Rus sia, 
who declined to participate in any form, and China, who participated only at a 
very low level. This initiative aims to facilitate coordination between govern-
ments, scientists, businesses, civil society, philanthropists, and global health 
organ izations to expedite the development and production of COVID-19 tests, 
treatments, and vaccines, and to provide equitable access.  There is a par tic u lar 
emphasis on developing an allocation strategy to ensure that LMICs receive an 
equitable and accelerated delivery of vaccine doses, treatments, and other com-
modities, with the logic that no one is safe in a pandemic  until every one is safe 
(WHO, 2020c).
The fundamental challenge, however, is that global solidarity has been hard 
to find, as ethical distribution would require power ful states to share access to 
 limited supplies even as their populations clamor for greater access. Although the 
ACT Accelerator was launched in April 2020, with fanfare by heads of state, it ini-
tially strug gled to secure funding: as of late September, it had raised only $4  billion 
of the needed $38 billion, and $15 billion of this shortfall was said to be urgent 
(WHO, 2020k). But despite WHO’s eforts to coordinate procurement, action has 
been fragmented and duplicative. For example, the African Union is seeking its 
own pooled procurement. Multiple dif er ent technology pools emerged, but with 
 little commitment from leading companies. Particularly on vaccines, WHO has 
strug gled to prevent the development of “vaccine nationalism” (i.e., competition 
among countries to secure  limited stocks of vaccine for their own populations, 
especially by high- income countries that can aford to place massive preorders for 
multiple vaccines, which de facto limits access for other countries). The Trump 
administration’s initiative to accelerate vaccine, treatment, and diagnostics devel-
opment for COVID-19, Operation Warp Speed, recently brought about the larg-
est contract to date with Sanofi and GlaxoSmithKline at $2.1 billion (Johnson, 
2020). In addition, the Eu ro pean Commission announced an EU vaccines strategy 
on June 17, 2020, that prioritizes securing the production of vaccines in the Eu ro-
pean Union and sufficient supplies for its own member states over that of  others 
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(Eu ro pean Commission, 2020), even though key EU governments have already 
committed to supporting the COVAX fa cil i ty of the ACT Accelerator. Large 
advance purchases by Eu ro pean governments raise the possibility that  these gov-
ernments  will wind up essentially negotiating against COVAX or restricting the 
vaccine doses that are actually available for it to purchase, undercutting WHO’s 
coordinated strategy (Paun, 2020; Ren, 2020).
Po liti cal Backlash during COVID-19
Within months of the COVID-19 outbreak, fin ger pointing began, and WHO was 
in for its share of criticism. As in past international challenges, this has involved 
a normal stream in in de pen dent evaluations— including a major review agreed 
upon at the WHA and headed by former heads of state Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and 
Helen Clark, former prime minister of New Zealand. But it has also included a 
highly charged irregular po liti cal stream as politicians in the United States, Brazil, 
Taiwan, and other nations have publicly attacked WHO and its Director- General, 
accusing it of failures and of too close of a relationship with China. Meanwhile 
African leaders rallied to the defense of the first African head of WHO (Shaban, 
2020). This once- in- a- century pandemic is testing the politics of WHO in ways it 
has never been tested before.
Po liti cal Explanations for WHO’s COVID-19 Response
Born out of a post- World War II era of internationalism and multilateralism, 
WHO was meant to embody the princi ples of solidarity and transparency in 
keeping with the UN’s founding ideals. Concerns over how to combat infectious 
disease epidemics from cholera, typhus, smallpox, and  others have been a driv-
ing force  behind international cooperation for centuries. And yet, the COVID-19 
pandemic appears to have accelerated a trend away from global cooperation, leav-
ing WHO in a precarious position.
WHO’s po liti cal history, its structure, and its leadership help explain why 
WHO has taken on so much, where it has succeeded, and why it has been unable 
to meet some of the high expectations of the organ ization. Chorev’s (2012) assertion 
that WHO’s Secretariat creates space and initiative through strategic adaptation 
remains true, but rather than broad ideological swings, we increasingly see spe-
cific and directly opposing demands that are harder to reconcile or elide.
When it comes to information sharing, WHO has succeeded where it has 
 because of its po liti cal nature rather than in spite of it, and it has failed where 
member states have restricted its capacity. For example, internal emails from Jan-
uary 2020 reveal that WHO officials  were deeply frustrated by China’s failure to 
share information in a timely manner. As discussed, their generally positive and 
praising tone  toward China was a deliberate, strategic attempt to coax the Chi-
nese government into sharing vital epidemiological data and allow international 
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expert investigators into the country (Associated Press, 2020). The debate  will 
rage on over  whether this was successful (China did share epidemic data and the 
genome sequence that enabled testing in weeks) or  whether the Director- General 
should have been more publicly critical. (Lockdowns mimicked elsewhere have 
been highly problematic, and many have criticized Chinese data as incomplete 
and misleading.) But, regardless of position, WHO’s strug gle is clear—it has no 
coercive power at its disposal. States have, in the IHR, required WHO to consult 
with a member state before sharing data it gathers for that country and provided 
no sanction for states who do not comply with their IHR obligations to report. 
In that context, WHO has only diplomacy— particularly when dealing with a 
state such as China, a permanent security council member and the second largest 
economy in the world. It is notable that all the data that modelers used early in the 
epidemic came through WHO’s access to China; indeed, even the US government 
relied on its participation in WHO mission to get direct access to Wuhan. WHO, 
given financial constraints, has only so much capacity and must rely on member 
states and  others located within a given country for much of the reporting and 
surveillance work.
Looking beyond China, though, we see many governments sharing informa-
tion that may surprise us: WHO was successful in receiving data from countries 
in Africa, Latin Amer i ca, and the  Middle East that have been reluctant to do so 
in other settings. This is at least in part  because states feel owner ship over the 
organ ization and particularly  because the regional offices are stafed by their own 
nationals, fostering greater trust and communication. A Geneva- based organ-
ization of technocrats alone would be unlikely to have received this level of coop-
eration. In this context many criticisms are unfair but also expected. On guidance, 
the decline, and then sudden rise, of WHO’s influence in high- income countries 
 under COVID-19 explains many of the challenges. It is of  little surprise that coun-
tries ignored WHO advice on border closures as their populations demanded it. 
Forty- seven countries did the same during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and many 
did at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic as well (Worsnop, 2017, 2019).
But other realities are less expected. As described in the beginning of the 
chapter, high- income countries pulled away from WHO as LMICs gained more 
power, with even more of its work focusing on LMICs. WHO has felt a strong 
burden to ensure its recommendations are relevant to its core LMIC audience, 
having experienced backlash from good ideas that are infeasible in low- resource 
settings.  There would also be political- optical, and arguably ethical, challenges 
involved if WHO issued dif er ent sets of guidance for dif er ent resource contexts. 
Meanwhile, high- income countries tend to worry less if WHO’s recommenda-
tions are geared  toward establishing a globally applicable baseline,  because they 
can supplement  those recommendations with guidance from other sources. For 
example, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) generally 
issues its own guidelines (often developed through close working consultation 
with WHO), which are looked to by other wealthy countries around the world. 
However,  under COVID-19 the United States has floundered, and the CDC has 
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been sidelined. This has had the efect of increasing the attention on WHO, includ-
ing from higher- income countries.
Much of what WHO has said and shared has been used widely in higher- income 
countries and LMICs alike— with many countries looking to the organ ization’s 
expertise to step up COVID-19 testing (WHO polymerase chain reaction [PCR] 
protocol is particularly valuable), set standards for health workers, and shut down 
transmission. But when it came to both masks and airborne transmission, WHO 
has been accused of lagging far  behind (Tufekci, 2020). Part of what delayed 
WHO, though, was exactly this focus on LMICs—as officials worried over  limited 
PPE supplies in many countries and the implications of stating the virus was air-
borne in contexts where investments in ventilation would come at the cost of 
other interventions.  There have been strug gles across the regionalized structure 
to reach consensus and strong pushback from some to moving too quickly. In 
other circumstances, this slower, more conservative approach is what states have 
demanded. However, as higher- income countries’ experts looked to WHO, with 
its staf a fraction of the size of the US CDC’s, speed and answers for high- resource 
settings instead  were demanded.
WHO’s rise reflects a  century of evolution in global health governance that 
sought to facilitate cooperation among states on health concerns that extend 
beyond national borders. However, the rise of aggressively nationalist rhe toric and 
priorities in some countries has tipped the scale back  toward Westphalian gover-
nance, a focus on state sovereignty, and a re sis tance to interference in domestic 
afairs. This shift has created significant hurdles for the pursuit of global public 
health, including during the COVID-19 pandemic, where it has resulted in several 
power ful governments refusing to cooperate with WHO or even challenging its 
recommendations and authority outright even as— and perhaps  because— those 
governments have performed poorly (Eckermann, 2017; Lasco, 2020; Wilson 
et al., 2020; Żuk & Żuk, 2020). In this context, massive criticism of WHO— for 
being too slow, for ofering recommendations po liti cal leaders dislike, for failing 
to curb the actions of China— are driven largely by domestic po liti cal consider-
ations. But that does not diminish the existential threat to the organ ization as the 
United States announced its withdrawal and Brazil, which has long been a power-
ful supporter of WHO, threatened the same.
Meanwhile, work  under the ACT Accelerator has been an innovative response 
to the crisis, even in a context in which WHO has insufficient po liti cal and con-
vening power. It has fundamentally been tasked by member states with solv-
ing a massive prob lem of collective action and global trade as it seeks to rapidly 
advance science and equitably distribute it. Power ful countries have  every incen-
tive to push their own scientists to achieve the breakthrough and backstop that 
with advanced  orders in the market economy for as much of a vaccine or other 
technology as they can aford. The gambit with the ACT Accelerator and its vari-
ous pillars has been that  there is enough uncertainty about which vaccines  will 
succeed that states can be brought to the  table to cooperate through fear of losing 
out completely if they do not, as well as by the argument vaccinating high- risk 
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 people around the world  will bring a swifter end to the pandemic. But WHO’s ral-
lying calls for solidarity, rational arguments about risk distribution, and appeals 
to science have so far been insufficient to fully overcome the power ful pull of vac-
cine nationalism. WHO also lacks a sufficient pool of funding from which to work 
as a base: its Contingency Fund for Emergencies has been chronically depleted 
(most recently by the Ebola outbreak in the Demo cratic Republic of the Congo) 
and most of the rest of its funding is tied to other functions. Member states did 
pledge $8 billion, although the majority has not yet been delivered (Sulcas, 2020). 
Meanwhile an online concert, “One World: Together at Home,” planned by Lady 
Gaga and the NGO Global Citizen raised one of the larger contributions at $128 
million, although not exclusively for WHO (Global Citizen, 2020).
It is too early to fully assess which WHO eforts  will work. But it is impor tant 
to remember again that WHO has no stick to match its carrot. The international 
organ izations that do have sticks— the UN Security Council, the World Trade 
Organ ization— have been notably avoided by member states as venues for negoti-
ation. The international order in which WHO was established and the under lying 
shared values that it embodies have been waning as the forces of nationalism and 
pop u lism have strengthened in recent years. In the postwar era,  there was a rise 
in globalization and global governance as the dominance of state- centric relations 
shifted  toward cooperation between states, international organ izations, and non-
state actors. In this context, WHO became a driver of global health governance, 
with an emphasis on sharing medical and epidemiological data and research 
across borders, monitoring of public health by global networks, and emphasizing 
collective public health interests. But in a context in which  these eforts are chal-
lenged, so too  will WHO’s eforts to ensure equitable access.
Fi nally, WHO’s response to COVID-19 cannot be explained without reference 
to the increasing size and diversity of other global health actors with which WHO 
must now compete— for funds, legitimacy, and the  limited po liti cal attention of 
states. For example, the COVAX fa cil i ty, the ACT arm focused on global procure-
ment of a vaccine, is anchored by two public- private partnerships— Gavi and the 
Co ali tion for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). Neither of  these organ-
izations has the reach nor legitimacy of WHO, but neither do they have the bag-
gage that comes from being governed by a parliament of more than 190 member 
states. As WHO frames its mission, it has at times taken on a far larger portfolio 
than its capacity allows in an efort to ensure its mandate and its existing funding 
is not further diminished in a competitive space.
Looking Forward
On July  6, 2020, the Trump administration officially notified UN Secretary- 
General António Guterres of its intention to withdraw from WHO member-
ship as the po liti cal maneuvering  behind the scenes of WHO broke into public. 
Although the move was criticized as neither  legal nor advisable (Gostin et  al., 
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2020; Kavanagh & Pillinger, 2020), it represented an existential threat to WHO. 
Outside the period covered in this book, Joe Biden was elected US president 
and pledged to halt the withdrawal. The WHO, however, still  faces an uncer-
tain po liti cal  future. As much as anything, the maelstrom around the WHO is 
a symptom of a geopo liti cal realignment  toward a multipolar world. WHO has 
been caught up in a high- politics confrontation between the United States and 
China, with the EU seeking a path between and the African Union seeking to 
defend the first- ever African Director- General. This comes as WHO seeks to 
grapple with a pandemic in which its structure, its po liti cal foundations, and its 
split personality as both technical- scientific agency and venue of international 
relations have left the organ ization open to criticism. Amid all of this, WHO’s 
successes can be underappreciated. As the UN Security Council all but closed 
up shop, WHO has forged ahead in bringing states together in negotiation. As 
the US CDC has been sidelined at home, WHO has managed to rapidly build a 
credible base of science from which policymakers can act (even if it cannot force 
them to do so).
The organ ization often leads with its identity as a scientific and humani-
tarian agency, yet it is also a creature of international politics, an international 
organ ization governed and financed by, and thus beholden to, member states. Its 
historical loss of influence in high- income countries and focus on LMICs have 
been upended by a global spotlight during COVID-19, as many of the countries 
believed most capable have stumbled badly in their response. Yet its structure 
provides WHO far less capacity than it would need to meet the expectations of 
its member states. Reversing this requires addressing the balkanized structure 
of regional offices, dramatically expanding assessed contributions to ensure suf-
ficient resources, and rewriting the IHRs to give WHO new powers to uncover 
information that member states refuse to share and sanction states that do not 
meet their international obligations. As the pandemic dissipates,  there  will be 
inevitable reviews and calls for reform.  Whether member states are willing to 
make the big- picture changes needed to give WHO what it needs is yet unclear.
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 Governance, Surveillance, Coercion, and Social Policy
Holly Jarman
Looking for an Exit
The coronavirus pandemic has systematically challenged how states govern, 
exposing the weaknesses in  every po liti cal system. In the first months of what 
became the COVID-19 pandemic,  there  were no efective vaccinations or treat-
ments for the virus. Medical professionals knew  little about how to treat the dis-
ease and  were forced to  settle for methods that supported patients while hoping 
that their bodies would recover.
Without medical means of addressing the pandemic, states had to rely on 
mea sures designed to prevent the spread of the disease. The first reaction of many 
countries was to close their borders in the hope that COVID-19 would not spread 
to their shores. But in many cases,  these restrictions  were too  little, too late. As 
they became aware of the extent to which the coronavirus was already circulating 
among their population, more and more countries de cided to enter some form 
of “lockdown,” essentially shutting down aspects of society deemed to be non-
essential. For many states, lockdown involved significant non- pharmaceutical 
interventions (NPIs) in public and private life: quarantine; physical distancing 
requirements; bans on large gatherings; stay- at- home  orders; closures of schools, 
businesses, and public transport; masking requirements; and other mea sures. When 
efectively implemented,  these public health mea sures controlled the spread of the 
virus and so reduced its death toll. But they also came with significant economic 
costs and po liti cal implications (Jarman, 2020c; Jarman et al., 2020a, 2020b, 2020d, 
2020e, 2020f).
In the first half of 2020, NPIs put a huge strain on states, challenging decision- 
making and legitimating structures, infrastructure and policy  programs, govern-
ment finances, workforce, communications, and more. Policy- makers found them-
selves having to quickly invent and implement new policies and figure out how to 
communicate  those decisions to the public. Governments  were faced with huge 
logistical prob lems, as they strug gled to mobilize  people and resources around 
testing, contact tracing, isolation, and treatment; procure specialized equipment 
and medicines; and support vaccine development. Almost all countries used their 
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authority to place tough restrictions on the be hav ior of individuals and businesses, 
and some states de cided to expand health and social policies to address the fallout 
from closing down society (Jarman, 2020b, Jarman et al., 2020c).
The success or failure of lockdown interventions in controlling the spread and 
impact of COVID-19 was not reliant upon resources alone, but contingent on 
politics. Rich countries with seemingly adequate resources to tackle the pandemic 
strug gled to act  because of high partisanship and a lack of public trust in govern-
ment (see chapters 12 and 26). Socie ties with an unequal distribution of power 
and wealth saw that unequal distribution replicated in the impact of COVID-19. 
And international organ izations designed to coordinate actions among states 
strug gled as countries began to turn inward and compete against each other for 
resources.
Despite  these po liti cal challenges, some countries  were initially successful in 
what became known as “flattening the curve,” controlling the spread of the virus 
to such an extent that predicted peaks of cases and deaths  were less severe and did 
not overwhelm their health systems. In  these countries, public health mea sures 
successfully reduced transmission to a relatively low level, such that commenta-
tors and politicians began talking about “exit strategies,” ways to transition out of 
lockdown and back to something like normal life (Jarman et al., 2020c). It slowly 
became clear, however, that an easy exit from strict pandemic mea sures was not 
an option. Jurisdictions that lifted lockdown mea sures too soon saw a resurgence 
in cases and deaths. Rather than being an acute crisis, COVID-19 was a crisis with 
no identified end point, likely requiring months and possibly years of sustained 
government action to address.
This chapter looks at the po liti cal consequences of governing during a sus-
tained global crisis, synthesizing published work from researchers who are con-
tributors to the HMP Governance Lab at the University of Michigan. We are cer-
tainly not experts in  every country nor region of the world. Furthermore, much 
of our research focuses on high- income countries, particularly in Eu rope and 
North Amer i ca. The following analy sis is therefore biased  toward  those countries 
and should be read with that in mind. Nevertheless, hopefully the discussion is 
useful in identifying global po liti cal trends and in understanding how countries’ 
responses to COVID-19 may vary and how they are the same.
The following section gives an overview of the functions and capacities of 
the state involved in tackling the crisis: governance, surveillance, coercion, and 
social policy. Using country examples, I explore the major po liti cal challenges 
faced by governments across  those four categories. The conclusions are clear. On 
one hand, many states have responded to the pandemic by creating and enforc-
ing what are often very strong public health mea sures, relatively quickly and in 
some cases with  limited resources.  These initial lockdowns  were often successful, 
although many states perhaps exited lockdown too soon and saw a resurgence in 
cases. The ways in which lockdowns  were achieved, however, and the prospects of 
entering lockdown again, raise questions for the  future of demo cratic governance.
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Four Capacities of the State: Governance, Surveillance,  
Coercion, and Social Policy
Managing COVID-19 as an ongoing crisis with significant consequences for 
 human life, the economy and society tests  every aspect of a country’s po liti cal 
system, but particularly its capacity to respond to a systemic, multivalent threat. 
Understanding state responses to COVID-19, therefore, can tell us something 
about the nature of demo cratic and nondemo cratic po liti cal systems, as well as 
shed light on how they may change in the wake of a disruptive, punctuating event 
such as the pandemic.
In par tic u lar, state responses to managing COVID-19 in the first half of 2020 
can be understood with reference to four types of state capacity: governance, 
surveillance, coercion, and social policy capacity. Across each of  these catego-
ries, politicians have used their authority and resources to manage the pandemic, 
sometimes with the goal of saving lives, sometimes with the goal of saving their 
own po liti cal  careers, and often both.
Governance
The first capacity of the state relevant to its COVID-19 response is governance. 
Governance is the pro cess of making and implementing decisions that afect a 
 whole society (Greer et al., 2015, 2019; Jarman, 2020a). It is impor tant  because of 
our expectations that the state should be the first line of defense in so many areas 
pertinent to the pandemic (Jarman & Greer, 2020). We expect that governments 
dealing with the pandemic should deal with (sometimes conflicting) objectives that 
include protecting lives, maintaining peace, borders and the rule of law, ensuring 
economic stability and stepping in to be the lender of last resort or the provider of 
welfare and health care.
Politicians in the executive branch, in par tic u lar, are expected to provide lead-
ership for the  whole state and  whole of society, and the signals they send, alli-
ances they form, and decisions they take have a huge impact on the course of the 
pandemic. Although some leaders attempted to unify their populations in support 
of lockdown mea sures,  others played down or denied the impact of COVID-19 
(Falkenbach, 2020; Falkenbach & Greer, 2020).  Because of the importance of indi-
vidual be hav ior on the spread of the disease, this likely had an impact on the sever-
ity of the outbreak in many states.
The pandemic challenges a state’s ability to coordinate action both horizon-
tally and vertically. Horizontally, lockdown mea sures are a test of a government’s 
ability to coordinate activities across dif er ent functions. Putting public health 
mea sures in place often requires cross- sectoral decision- making and mobilization 
of resources, such as coordination between public health, education, and trans-
portation functions in the case of closing and reopening schools. In some states, 
competing views from health and economic ministries  were apparent in COVID-19 
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responses, resulting in some cases in relaxing lockdown restrictions too quickly 
and a subsequent increase in the number of COVID-19 cases.
Vertically, the pandemic posed challenges to federalism and devolved govern-
ment structures. The coronavirus does not re spect human- made po liti cal borders, 
making coordination across jurisdictions an impor tant part of pandemic response. 
Even in countries where subnational governments normally have a lot of auton-
omy, subnational governments still rely on the central government for a number 
of vital functions essential to pandemic response, such as finance, or procuring 
needed equipment and medicines. In countries where subnational governments 
 were left without significant central direction or  were starved of needed resources, 
a patchwork of outcomes is vis i ble. Some countries chose to centralize previously 
decentralized government functions, particularly in terms of public health and 
health systems, where they used central government authority to do  things like 
close down large parts of the health system to make room for emergency capacity 
(Greer et al., 2020a; Greer et al., 2020c). It remains to be seen  whether an extended 
period of central control over  these functions  will have an ongoing impact on the 
vertical distribution of power within certain countries.
Central control comes with risks. Many concerns around governance during 
the pandemic stem from the suspension of routine procedures and rules during 
a crisis and the fear that governments  will not want to give up their “emergency” 
powers.  Because the pandemic is a long- term crisis likely to last a significant 
period of time, many commentators have raised concerns that governments  will 
permanently become less transparent or accountable. The veil of “crisis” allows 
the state to make decisions without adequately communicating to the public 
the reasons for the decisions or the evidence base (if any) that informed them. 
With fluid governing structures such as ad hoc advisory committees or “expert 
groups” (that may not be full of experts), it becomes difficult for the public to 
understand how a decision was made, and easier for governments to conceal deci-
sions that  were made for reasons of po liti cal expediency. In  these circumstances, 
stakeholder consultation may be ignored or downgraded. With poor scrutiny of 
decision- making, politicians may find opportunities to exercise their authority to 
their own benefit or in other harmful ways.
State governance capacity also extends to the management of elections. Elec-
tions in the time of COVID-19 pose a  couple of significant prob lems. They can 
spread the virus as  people gather to cast their votes. But they can also suppress vot-
ing:  people staying at home  because of fears about contracting the virus or a reduc-
tion in state capacity to pro cess votes in person, by mail, or, in some cases, through 
corrupt practices exacerbated by coronavirus politics. Many countries had elec-
tions during the first half of 2020 with very dif er ent outcomes. Some jurisdictions, 
such as South  Korea, appear to have had successful elections that  were orderly and 
resulted in very  little spread of the virus. Other countries (e.g., Israel, Malawi [see 
chapter 30]) experienced severe prob lems. In Belarus, adding a corrupt election on 
top of existing COVID-19 disruption resulted in widespread protests against the 
existing authoritarian regime. Widespread waves of arrests followed (“Hundreds 
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Arrested at Mass Protests in Minsk,” 2020). In Israel, the Knesset passed a law ban-
ning  people from protesting more than a kilo meter from their homes, a move that 
many believed was an attempt to silence criticism of Netanyahu (“Massive Dem-
onstrations Grip Thailand,” 2020). In Thailand, antigovernment, prodemocracy 
protesters have been calling for reforms to the Monarchy (“Israelis Protest Against 
Netanyahu despite Coronavirus Lockdown,” 2020).
In this sense, additional pressure on po liti cal systems arising from the pan-
demic has the potential to destabilize states. Only time  will tell  whether some 
of  these changes  will be ultimately positive, but we do know that the pro cess of 
destabilizing regimes is often painful.
Surveillance
The second capacity of the state relevant to its COVID-19 response is surveillance. 
Surveillance is the pro cess of collecting and analyzing data relevant to public 
health to inform decision- making. As a government function, public health sur-
veillance tends to be ignored, downgraded, and underfunded in times of relative 
calm, only to come to the fore during a public health crisis such as a disease out-
break. This happens  because day- to- day surveillance is often not po liti cally salient 
and can be overshadowed by debates about other aspects of health or health care 
(Greer et al., 2019). The tried and tested methods of public health surveillance are, 
however, robust and efective as controlling the spread of disease, even while rais-
ing impor tant po liti cal and ethical questions (Greer, 2017).
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, government surveillance actions 
centered around testing  people for the virus, then using the results to identify 
and isolate  people who had been exposed (often reflecting some form of the epi-
demiological maxim: “test, trace, isolate” or “test, trace, isolate, protect”). States’ 
success in  these activities has been largely dependent upon the readiness of its 
public health system as well as the integration of surveillance functions (gather-
ing, analyzing, and disseminating data) with the state at large (e.g., integration 
with health systems, ability to enforce quarantine restrictions) (Trump et  al., 
2020). Surveillance is a labor- intensive activity that requires specialized training 
and knowledge. Many states lacked enough day- to- day surveillance capacity at 
the start of the pandemic, having cut back on public health functions as part of 
decades- long welfare state retrenchment.
Yet even the most well- prepared states needed to ramp up their surveillance 
capacity in the face of a large- scale pandemic, and the ability to do so made the 
diference between success and failure in some states. It is notable that some pre-
dictions about which states would be well prepared for the pandemic, made on 
the basis of WHO’s SPAR (State Party Self- Assessment Annual Reporting) scores 
or numbers from the Global Health Security (GHS) Index, published jointly by the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security,  were 
very inaccurate. The United States ranks first in the GHS Index and the United 
Kingdom ranks second. Both states have severely underperformed on surveillance 
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functions during the pandemic when compared to lower- ranked countries (see 
chapters 12 and 26). One reason for this may be that surveillance functions are 
closely related to a country’s governance, particularly the ability to overcome 
po liti cal polarization and jurisdictional fragmentation (Greer, 2020a).
Testing  people for COVID-19 requires significant mobilization of resources, 
including workers, materials, and environments as well as the ability to rapidly 
collate and analyze the data from multiple testing sites. This is vital,  because 
without rapid testing that is accurate and reaches enough  people, much sur-
veillance is useless. Ideally, public health experts agree that test results should 
be available within twenty- four hours, with enough tests conducted to ensure 
that the spread of disease is fully understood (less than 3   percent of all tests 
returning positive results) (Harvard Global Health Institute, 2020). With good 
enough testing, however, outbreaks can be controlled through efective contact 
tracing. Once testing data have been collected, staf trace the contacts made 
with infected persons, informing them of their exposure and placing them in 
isolation. All of this has to be done as soon as pos si ble, ideally within forty- eight 
hours, if it is to be efective in controlling the outbreak (Harvard Global Health 
Institute, 2020).
It is not a coincidence that some of the states most successful at curbing 
COVID-19 have demonstrated a strong ability to conduct public health surveil-
lance during the pandemic. States with the capacity to track pro gress of the dis-
ease have been able to control it, whereas  those caught with holes in their public 
health safety nets have had to go farther to ramp up testing and contact trac-
ing activity. A further challenge for  those countries with poor permanent public 
health capacity is how to manage surveillance capacity at lower levels of disease 
prevalence. Testing and contact tracing capacity must be maintained when cases 
are low,  because the disease can often spread much more quickly than a govern-
ment can recruit and train contact tracers or obtain testing supplies. This has 
been a challenge in some states where funding is seen to be tight, resources have 
been mismanaged, and/or po liti cal pressure is strong to make the COVID-19 
prob lem go away.
In this way, surveillance is at once a logistical and a po liti cal issue. One of 
the biggest po liti cal debates around surveillance has been public concern about 
how governments  will store and use personal information. Contact tracing, for 
example, asks detailed behavioral questions about individuals and their fami-
lies. A lack of trust in government officials, therefore, or a fear of punishment for 
wrongdoing, can significantly hamper contact tracing eforts. Some of  these fears 
have been intensified with the introduction of technology such as phone applica-
tions (apps) that trace location and identify proximity via Bluetooth (Fahy, 2020; 
Hernández- Quevedo et al., 2020). The efectiveness of contact- tracing apps has 
been called into question  because far fewer  people than expected have down-
loaded apps to their phones. Some states are  going farther than this by intro-
ducing wristbands that track proximity, location, and health data, in some cases 
notifying the police when  those in quarantine leave their homes (“Coronavirus: 
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People- Tracking Wristbands Tested to Enforce Lockdown,” 2020). Civil society 
groups in some countries have voiced concerns that some governments  will use 
the pandemic as an excuse to further track their citizens, potentially with the goal 
of curbing their freedoms ( Human Rights Watch, 2020).
Coercion
The third capacity of the state relevant to its COVID-19 response is coercion. 
Specifically, this refers to the use of the state’s  legal authority to make and enforce 
rules that protect society from the worst efects of the pandemic by changing the 
be hav ior of individuals and organ izations. As mentioned previously, in a situation 
where  there is no vaccine, the state’s capacity to make and enforce public health 
protections can make a diference in the impact of the coronavirus on its popu-
lation, society, and po liti cal system. We know from prior experience as well as 
the current pandemic that restrictions on be hav ior can be efective at controlling 
the spread of the virus and reducing its harmful efects on health. But although 
state coercive power has the potential to benefit society in this way, it can also be 
extremely damaging.
In the first half of 2020, many countries chose to put tough protective pub-
lic health mea sures in place, including physical distancing requirements, stay- at- 
home  orders, bans on travel, public events and gatherings, masking requirements, 
and forced business closures. They also introduced quarantine and isolation mea-
sures for exposed residents and for many foreign visitors, regardless of exposure. 
In addition, some countries used their authority to make and change rules to pro-
tect vulnerable workers from being forced to work in dangerous environments by 
requiring businesses to ofer alternative work from home (Jarman et al., 2020c), to 
prevent evictions in cases of financial hardship, to protect businesses from bank-
ruptcy resulting from lockdown policies, or to protect consumers and purchasers 
in the health system from dangerous or misleading products, for example, inad-
equate tests or fake medicines (Jarman et al., 2020g; Rozenblum & Jarman, 2020). 
Some states chose to use their coercive capacity to govern production and dis-
tribution of  things such as personal protective equipment, ventilators, and treat-
ments (e.g., by requiring manufacturers to produce certain needed products). The 
same dynamic would apply to any vaccine that becomes available.
The most significant po liti cal concerns raised about the state’s use of coercive 
power in  these instances relate to enforcement of the new rules. In many places, 
noncompliance with policies such as physical distancing requirements, bans on 
gatherings, or masking requirements carried the possibility that individuals or 
businesses could be fined, cautioned or, in serious cases, prosecuted for violations 
or detained.
In many cases, states relied on the police to enforce COVID-19- related poli-
cies. In some countries, police officers are armed; in most, they have considerable 
discretion around how to enforce the law, creating many potential opportunities for 
injustice and state- sanctioned vio lence. Protests against the police, beginning in the 
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United States in response to police brutality against Black Americans and quickly 
spreading to other countries, have shone a spotlight on the long- term ways in which 
law enforcement systems in many countries discriminate against, and pose a physi-
cal threat to, minority groups.
As well as being significant stand- alone issues, bias and use of force in polic-
ing raise overlapping concerns in terms of states’ coronavirus responses.  These 
include the potential for COVID-19- related rules to be unfairly enforced against 
some groups in society and not  others, the possibility that enforcing COVID-19 
policies could provide cover for some governments, organ izations, and individu-
als to use force in ways that violate fundamental  human rights, and the potential 
for the enforcement of COVID-19 policies to pose a threat to physical and  mental 
health of individuals and communities such that it forms a public health prob lem 
in its own right.
Related questions have been raised as to the sustainability of coercive mea-
sures over time. Ultimately, coercive mea sures  were not designed to be imple-
mented long term; rather, they  were envisioned as a tough but necessary set of 
policies that would allow a government to put better long- term mea sures in place, 
such as adequate testing and contact tracing. As cases rise again, many states are 
putting lockdown mea sures back in place. But populations asked to lock down 
once may be far more compliant than  those asked to lock down a second or third 
time. Masking requirements and renewed lockdown mea sures in some Eu ro pean 
countries have been followed by mass protests (Jones, 2020; Kirka, 2020; Specia, 
2020). This raises a concern that the long- term efectiveness of lockdown poli-
cies may be poor, as well as a fear that in some cases governments could sanction 
increasingly unjust and violent responses to noncompliant populations over time.
Social Policy
The final capacity of the state relevant to its COVID-19 response relates to social 
policy. Social policies are policies designed to improve the overall welfare of a 
society by meeting social goals such as educating  children, supporting older 
 people, providing incomes to  those experiencing financial hardship, or caring for 
the sick.
Social policy plays into the success of state responses to the pandemic in two 
distinct ways. First, a state’s historic track rec ord (i.e., the extent to which its welfare 
state, health system, or macroeconomic policies pre- COVID-19 address overall 
need and address inequalities in society) has a direct impact on morbidity and mor-
tality relating to the pandemic. The prepandemic state of social policies is impor-
tant  because COVID-19 is not an equal- opportunity condition. Certain groups 
are more vulnerable to contracting and/or experiencing the worst outcomes from 
COVID-19  because of combinations of  factors that can include age, existing health 
conditions, occupation, and living conditions. Some of  these  factors are, in turn, 
determined by structural divisions within society, such as discrimination among 
racial, ethnic, class, or age groups that afect access to  things such as work, educa-
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tion, health care, housing, clean  water, and adequate food and contribute to higher 
rates of institutionalization and incarceration. Paying attention to existing state 
policies that impact  these  factors and mea sur ing how unequal a society is  after 
redistributive policies are applied is therefore very impor tant.
Second, a state’s immediate COVID-19- related social policy response also has 
an efect on health outcomes. It is likely that  people whose COVID-19- related 
health costs are covered  will more readily seek medical advice, testing, and treat-
ment. Likewise,  people whose immediate economic needs are met are more likely 
to be able to comply with stay- at- home  orders. Businesses whose immediate eco-
nomic needs are met are more likely to be able to retain workers and infrastruc-
ture. Workers who are entitled to paid sick leave are less likely to come to work 
sick, and so on.
By necessity, many of the NPIs that prevented  people from getting the virus 
also diminished economic activity (in addition to  people who could aford to stay 
at home  doing so out of fears that they would catch the virus). In many coun-
tries, this left businesses in financial trou ble and caused unemployment to soar. 
Some countries addressed this prob lem through existing unemployment insurance 
schemes, in some cases expanding their criteria for eligibility or the generosity of 
benefits. Other states modified or instituted income replacement programs and/or 
announced additional support for small businesses in financial trou ble. But many 
of  these COVID-19- specific social policy mea sures  were not long term, even in the 
richest countries.
A significant proportion of the  people who contracted the virus needed health 
care, with the most serious cases requiring extensive hospitalization. For this rea-
son, an early goal for many states was to “flatten the curve,” meaning they aimed 
to control the spread of COVID-19 to prevent their hospitals and health systems 
from being overwhelmed with cases. Many countries ultimately succeeded in 
avoiding this fate, although in some parts of the world, early or ongoing uncon-
trolled spread exceeding hospital capacity likely contributed to the death toll. 
Although some states made additional financing available to their healthcare sys-
tems and/or sought to reduce out- of- pocket healthcare costs for their citizens, 
many did not take  these actions.
In addition to providing care, a state’s ability to lessen the impact of COVID-19 
on its population likely relates to its ability to coordinate health, social care ser-
vices, and other forms of support. For  those who survive a serious case of corona-
virus requiring hospitalization and/or intubation, the impact on quality of life can 
be severe. They may sufer temporary or permanent  mental or physical degrada-
tion, meaning that even if they still have employment  after being hospitalized, 
they may not be able to work. In many cases, their ability to get back to “normal” 
 will rely in part on the social ser vices they can access, such as physical rehabili-
tation, counseling, and ongoing medical treatment, which can all be afected by 
eligibility and the administrative burdens of obtaining support even when eligible. 
Other  factors include out- of- pocket costs and income, ongoing lockdown, and 
physical distancing requirements.
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The virus had a devastating impact on older populations in many countries, shin-
ing a spotlight on systems of social care and structures of intergenerational support 
within each society. Care homes, in par tic u lar, often provided an optimal environ-
ment for the virus to spread, with residents in close proximity to one another and 
staf and receiving visitors who may be carry ing the virus. Several Eu ro pean gov-
ernments with aging populations, including Sweden, France, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom,  were criticized for their inability to anticipate and control the spread of the 
virus in care homes, as well as for failing to include statistics about care home cases 
and deaths in national rec ords.
All tiers of education have been disrupted by the virus. Countries with nor-
mally robust school systems have had to cope with unanticipated school closures 
during lockdown and the resulting disruption in students’ learning. In many 
countries, school closures during lockdown also caused prob lems with childcare 
for  those who remained at work, whereas in the poorest countries,  children dis-
placed from schools  were forced to enter the workforce (Pérez- Peña, 2020). In 
many countries, higher education institutions  were deemed a risk for spreading 
the virus and in- person activities  were canceled, although the start of the new 
academic year in September 2020 brought new students and a wave of new infec-
tions in many cases.
Policies and politics afecting housing also had a huge efect on the course 
of the virus in many countries. With proximity to  others as a key component of 
contagion,  people  housed in more cramped conditions  were automatically put at 
greater risk of catching the virus. In terms of pandemic- specific policies, some 
countries chose to place moratoriums on evictions, although some of  those mea-
sures have since expired. The long- term consequences of the economic crisis on 
homelessness remain to be seen.
In addition to  these sector- specific issues, overarching concerns have been 
raised that reflect long- term deficiencies in the structure of social support pro-
grams in vari ous countries as well as the additional needs imposed by the pan-
demic. Many states routinely rely on civil society groups and/or donor organ-
izations to meet the basic needs of their populations, and  those groups have been 
eco nom ically damaged by the pandemic (Greer et al., 2020a, 2020d). Where social 
policies do exist, they do not always provide an adequate level of support for  those 
in need. Often, programs do not provide universal benefits that apply across the 
population. Rather, many countries tie access to health care, social care, unem-
ployment benefits, pensions, education, or other social ser vices to a person’s citi-
zenship status. In addition, social programs are often or ga nized in ways that are 
biased against certain groups in society, posing administrative burdens that can 
have discriminatory efects.
The pandemic replicates  these patterns, meaning that many  people who are 
routinely excluded from social benefits and ser vices continue to be excluded at a 
time of greater need. Many mi grant workers, for example, are likely to be more at 
risk from the virus and its economic consequences than the general population. 
They are more likely to be engaged in work that is precarious, with few  legal and 
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economic protections, and/or that requires them to be indoors in close contact 
with  others, with many mi grant workers employed in the hospitality, domestic 
ser vices, healthcare, agriculture, and food pro cessing sectors. They may also be 
more likely to have to rely on mass transportation, which poses a higher risk of 
infection, and to be  housed in relatively crowded conditions that make it harder 
to physically distance themselves from  others. Yet they are also less likely to have 
access to health and social ser vices and to benefit from income replacement or 
unemployment benefits (International  Labour Organ ization, 2020).  These pat-
terns of in equality  will likely be replicated in terms of access to any  future vaccine 
against COVID-19.
Consequences
 There are impor tant po liti cal consequences that stem from the ways states are gov-
erning during the pandemic, their surveillance activities, the coercive mea sures 
enacted to protect public health, and governments’ social policy responses. Many 
countries have demonstrated the capacity to put recommended public health 
policies in place, and enforce them, at short notice and in some cases with  limited 
available resources. A perhaps unpre ce dented amount of data on the spread and 
consequences of the disease has been made publicly available, although many 
deficiencies and discrepancies in the data remain, and we still know  little about 
some aspects of the disease. Some countries have been successful at controlling 
the virus and/or have seen it inflict  limited damage on their populations  because 
of strong surveillance or lockdown mea sures, high hospital capacity, low popula-
tion density, or other population health  factors.
In many cases, the pandemic is throwing existing trends and patterns into 
sharp relief: some leaders are governing in less- than- transparent or undemo cratic 
ways, disregarding science and abusing their authority, while  people and po liti cal 
parties in many countries are divided. Many are voicing their criticism of po liti cal 
leaders on the streets. In many places, the pandemic is highlighting clearly exist-
ing deficiencies in the welfare state, the economy, social policy, the justice system, 
or the electoral system.
It remains to be seen  whether changes in governance and politics precipitated 
by the pandemic may prove to be long- term trends, with potentially severe con-
sequences for democracy everywhere. In liberal democracies, we know that much 
of the functioning of the po liti cal system relies on the belief that governments 
are legitimate. What the COVID-19 pandemic emphasizes is just how much the 
compact between  people and governments has been eroded in many liberal demo-
cratic systems.  There is a distinct lack of trust in governments that impacts many 
aspects of COVID-19 response, including surveillance, compliance with protection 
mea sures, and vaccination. In patterns that po liti cal scientists are familiar with, 
state- sanctioned vio lence against protesters (including prodemocracy and antipo-
lice protesters) justifies and strengthens this lack of trust (Diamond, 2020). The 
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efect, if  these trends continue, may well be that democracy as a model of govern-
ment is further discredited in the eyes of many  people around the world.
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Part ii asia

 4 china’s leninist resPonse to covid-19
 From Information Repression to Total Mobilization
Victor C. Shih
As of September 2020, China has had one of the most successful 
responses to COVID-19  in the world, despite being the origin of the epidemic 
and having the largest population and multiple dense urban centers. Yet China’s 
response did not begin serendipitously. Despite receiving a wealth of information 
about COVID-19 by the end of the first week of January, the top authorities in 
China de cided to keep vital information on the epidemic from the public for two 
weeks, thus allowing the disease to spread through much of Hubei province and 
in other major cities. This led to the unfolding of a large- scale tragedy in Wuhan, 
a city of ten million  people, and in other cities in Hubei. The precise scale of the 
death toll caused by COVID-19 and by draconian government lockdown policies 
remains unknown.
On January 20, 2020, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shifted gears 
and initiated mobilization for containment. The resulting draconian quarantine 
and self- quarantine, as well as the rapid construction and production of quarantine 
sites, personal protective equipment (PPE), and medical supplies, allowed China to 
quickly control the spread of COVID-19 so that by early March, untraceable com-
munity transmission had come to an end in the vast majority of regions in China. 
This mobilization not only  stopped the epidemic in Wuhan but also prevented the 
large- scale spread of COVID-19 in another major urban center in China.  Because 
the mobilization mainly focused on containing COVID-19, medical care for other 
diseases and many social welfare issues  were largely ignored by the government.
In both the information repression phase and in the mobilization phase, the 
CCP’s hierarchical and authoritarian structure, the party’s ability to transcend 
state institutions, and the state’s owner ship over vital economic resources greatly 
facilitated the party achieving key objectives in  these two dif er ent phases. In the 
first phase, through its control of the media and arbitrary detention, the party 
largely succeeded in preventing the spread of not only information but also panic 
about COVID-19, thus largely preventing urban unrests. In the second phase, the 
mobilization of state and societal resources  toward containment allowed the gov-
ernment to control the trajectories of the epidemic relatively quickly, compared 
to other countries. Beyond the party’s Leninist structure, the containment efort 
was greatly helped by community parastatal organ izations, the neighborhood 
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committees, which the party relied on to implement core tasks related to the 
quarantine. Without their frantic efort, the outcomes in China would have been 
much worse. The digital surveillance program, which facilitated contact tracing, 
likely did not play a decisive role in controlling COVID-19 in China.
Yet the mobilization of the party- state could not make up for the shortfalls in 
China’s medical insurance and social security system. Although other wise healthy 
urban residents working for state- owned entities or major private corporations 
continued to receive the benefits owed to them throughout the lockdown, the state 
chose not to devote significant resources to address challenges faced by both the 
urban and rural vulnerable population and mi grant workers. Many of China’s 
290 million mi grant workers, especially, found themselves unemployed and largely 
outside of China’s patchy social welfare system, desperately fending for themselves 
on paltry government “minimal assistance insurance.” Although the Chinese gov-
ernment easily could have devoted greater resources to the sick and unemployed, 
in the absence of a  free media or demo cratic pressure, it chose not to do so.
Public Health and Repressive Responses
The public health responses in China can roughly be broken down into two 
phases: the information repression phase and the mobilization for containment 
phase. Clear evidence from China suggests that the information repression phase 
from December 2019 to January 20, 2020, allowed COVID-19 to spread widely 
around China, especially in Wuhan and in the rest of Hubei province. The cam-
paign to repress information on COVID-19 likely had to do with the regime’s 
imperative to ensure social stability in the po liti cal and economic centers along 
the eastern coast of China. The mobilization phase began on January 20, 2020, 
which was soon followed by the closing of Wuhan to the outside world and by the 
self- quarantine of all rural and urban  house holds in China in the weeks follow-
ing. This was associated with the rapid decline in the new caseload across China, 
beginning in the second half of February 2020.
According to epidemiologists interviewing the first wave of patients,  human 
COVID-19 cases likely began to proliferate in Wuhan starting in early Decem-
ber  2019 (Huang et  al., 2020). Among patients with contacts to the Huanan 
Seafood Market, the site of the first major cluster of infection, the first patients 
manifested symptoms starting on December  1, 2019 (Huang et  al., 2020). By 
December  31, 2019, the Wuhan Health Commission (WHC) admitted publicly 
that  there was an outbreak of “pneumonia of unknown origin” based around the 
Huanan Seafood Market, which was promptly shut down for disinfection on Janu-
ary 1, 2020 (Huang et al., 2020).
On January 1, 2020, the Wuhan police also announced that eight “rumor pur-
veyors”  were “dealt with according to the law,” but they  were all doctors who had 
communicated their worries about a spike of patients with pneumonia symptoms in 
private social media discussions with families and friends (“Xianchangpian: Wuhan 
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Weicheng” [“Live: The Closing of Wuhan”], 2020). Still,  because of total surveillance 
in China, they  were detained and had to sign confessions of wrongdoing. Although 
their posts  were widely circulated online, they  were ultimately scrubbed on order 
from the Chinese government. For workers in the medical community, this deten-
tion by the police directly prevented many of them from spreading the news of the 
“pneumonia of unknown origin” to friends and families and to the wider commu-
nity, which helped COVID-19 spread further in Wuhan and beyond (“Xianchang-
pian: Wuhan Weicheng” [“Live: The Closing of Wuhan”], 2020).
On January 5, 2020, the WHC announced to the public additional cases of the 
“pneumonia of unknown origin,” but still insisted that  there was no evidence of 
human- to- human transmission and that no medical worker had contracted the 
disease (Huang, 2020). This was clearly untrue  because the detained doctors and 
many  others working in frontline hospitals had already noticed many cases of sus-
picious pneumonia among their colleagues (“Xianchangpian: Wuhan Weicheng” 
[“Live: The Closing of Wuhan”], 2020). Yet the pressure for information control 
persisted as the local committees of the CCP at frontline hospitals ordered all 
workers to “not create or convey rumors so as to avoid social panic” (“Xianchang-
pian: Wuhan Weicheng” [“Live: The Closing of Wuhan”], 2020). On January 10, 
2020, the WHC announced, again contrary to evidence, that “no new case has 
been recorded  after January 3rd” and that wearing masks was “required only when 
necessary” (“Xianchangpian: Wuhan Weicheng” [“Live: The Closing of Wuhan”], 
2020). On January 15, 2020, during a question- and- answer session at a press con-
ference, the WHC fi nally admitted that the possibility of human- to- human trans-
mission “cannot be ruled out” (Zhang et al., 2020).
Despite growing worries, Wuhan still held its annual “ten thousand families 
banquet” on January  18, 2020, in which groups of several hundred gathered in 
multiple neighborhoods to share local delicacies that they had cooked for each 
other (Zhang et al., 2020). In fact, lower- level party officials also  were not privy to 
the growing alarm at the highest level  because the Hubei Provincial  People’s Con-
gress meeting, attended by hundreds of mid- level party functionaries, was still 
held in Wuhan from January 11 to 17, 2020 (“Xianchangpian: Wuhan Weicheng” 
[“Live: The Closing of Wuhan”], 2020). Undoubtedly, many low- and mid- level 
government officials, as well as a much larger number of ordinary citizens, unnec-
essarily contracted COVID-19  because higher- level party authorities did not can-
cel  these two major events.  After the Hubei Provincial  People’s Congress sessions 
ended on January 18, 2020, the WHC fi nally announced an additional twenty- one 
cases to the public, but frontline doctors  were already reporting hundreds of sus-
pected cases to the health authorities (“Xianchangpian: Wuhan Weicheng” [“Live: 
The Closing of Wuhan”], 2020).
The tone of the information repression campaign fi nally changed on Janu-
ary  18 and 19, 2020, when the WHC suddenly announced an additional 136 
confirmed cases of COVID-19 (“Xianchangpian: Wuhan Weicheng” [“Live: The 
Closing of Wuhan”], 2020). On the night of January 20, 2020, China Central Tele-
vi sion, watched by the majority of Chinese  house holds, broadcasted an interview 
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with leading infectious disease specialist, Dr. Zhong Nanshan, who stated unam-
biguously that “ there is definitely human- to- human transmission” and that “the 
diseases is still at its starting stage and is in a growth period” (China Central Tele-
vi sion, 2020b). This TV interview was followed by a series of drastic government 
actions to combat COVID-19 and thus spelled the end of the information repres-
sion phase of the response.
Although public information about potential human- to- human transmis-
sion of COVID-19 was systematically suppressed by the authorities, government 
experts and frontline doctors channeled the latest information in a relatively 
unimpeded way to the central government in Beijing. According to the authors 
of the first major clinical study of COVID-19, published online in Lancet on Jan-
uary  24, 2020, a central government team, composed of the leading infectious 
disease specialists from around China as well as national level health officials, 
first arrived in Wuhan in early January and immediately reviewed clinical data on 
forty- one patients who had been admitted to Wuhan hospitals with pneumonia- 
like symptoms before January 2, 2020 (Huang et al., 2020). The fact that the gov-
ernment team did not review clinical data  after January 2 indicates that they had 
begun drafting a version of the eventual Lancet paper during the first week of 
January, which strongly suggests that a version of the findings was available to 
the leadership soon  after the first week of January. Based on a review of this clini-
cal data in early January, the central government health team concluded, “Taken 
together, evidence so far indicates  human transmission for 2019- nCoV” (Huang 
et al., 2020).
By January 3, 2020, the team had agreed on a set of protocols and criteria to 
identify a much larger sample of potential cases so that much more clinical data 
could be reviewed (Li et al., 2020b). By January 5, Shanghai health authorities had 
isolated and sequenced the genes of COVID-19 based on a late- December sample 
from Wuhan and had submitted reports to both the Shanghai Health Commis-
sion and the National Health Commission in Beijing (“Xianchangpian: Wuhan 
Weicheng” [“Live: The Closing of Wuhan”], 2020). RNA testing of samples also 
began in the first week of January 2020 in both a Wuhan- based level-2 labora-
tory and in a lab run by the National Institute for Viral Disease Control (Li et al., 
2020b). In essence, by the end of the first week in January, the central government 
team had determined a high likelihood for  human transmission of COVID-19 and 
had confirmed the presence of a large number of infections, but the Chinese gov-
ernment did not disclose  these facts to the public  until Dr. Zhong Nashan’s tele vi-
sion interview on January 20.
Meanwhile, it seems that the shocking findings of the central government 
team had elicited a response from the top leadership. According to remarks by Xi 
Jinping in early February 2020, by the January 7 Politburo Standing Committee 
meeting, he “raised demands on the prevention and control of the novel corona-
virus” (Xi, 2020). It was also revealed in a government press release that by the 
January 25, 2020, Politburo Standing Committee meeting, Xi Jinping had “con-
vened meetings and listened to reports by experts on multiple occasions” on the 
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novel coronavirus (Xin hua, 2020). It is very likely that an  earlier version of the 
Lancet findings, published just two and one- half weeks  later, had made it on to 
the desk of Xi Jinping himself  after the first week of January; yet, publicly, the Chi-
nese government still maintained a calm demeanor. It remains unclear what the 
thinking of the Chinese government was between January 7 and 19, when a more 
concerted reaction to COVID-19 began to manifest publicly. Perhaps the lead-
ership had hoped that COVID-19 would be a relatively controllable disease and 
would not require a drastic lockdown. This seems unlikely  because the authors of 
the Lancet paper, all leading Chinese government experts,  were clear about the 
“pandemic potential of 2019- nCoV” (Huang et al., 2020).  After the lesson of SARS, 
it was unlikely that the Chinese leadership would have ignored such a consensus 
among its top experts. Perhaps the leadership had realized the magnitude of the 
prob lem early on but had de cided to keep it a secret from the public for one and a 
half weeks while it prepared for total mobilization.
One pos si ble explanation is that the period between January 7, 2020, and Janu-
ary 23, 2020, or so fell on the busiest traveling time for China: 290 million mi grant 
workers working in eastern and southern China traveled to their mostly rural 
hometowns in central and western China for the Lunar New Year cele bration, 
which fell on January 25, 2020 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020). If the regime 
had instituted a lockdown in early January, most of the mi grant workers would 
have been trapped in major cities along the coast, where they lived in cramped 
quarters. This obviously was far from ideal from an epidemiology perspective. 
Also, their presence in major cities would have taxed the medical resources in 
 these urban centers and would have represented a much greater social stability 
risk for the regime. Given the regime’s perennial worries about instability in the 
major cities (Wallace, 2014), it was logistically and po liti cally much more facile to 
first disperse them to the countryside before instituting a lockdown. The tradition 
of returning home for the Lunar New Year holiday provided the regime with a 
perfect opportunity to do so. What ever the reason for the delay in the regime’s 
reaction, it very likely caused tens of thousands of additional infections in Wuhan 
and in the rest of Hubei. By January  20, when seven hospitals in Wuhan  were 
designated for COVID-19 treatment, hundreds of patients with high tempera-
ture  were lining up outside each of them, and scores would die in their hallways 
(“Xianchangpian: Wuhan Weicheng” [“Live: The Closing of Wuhan”], 2020).
In any event, on January 19, the regime began to manifest a systematic response 
to COVID-19. On that day, the National Health Commission announced the for-
mation of a leading group within the agency to coordinate responses to COVID-19. 
Among the many tasks of this leading group, it began to coordinate the announce-
ment of more realistic infection figures, starting with the announcement of 136 
new cases on the January 20  after over a week of no new cases (“Xianchangpian: 
Wuhan Weicheng” [“Live: The Closing of Wuhan”], 2020). This was followed in the 
eve ning of January 20 by Dr. Zhong Nanshan’s confirmation of human- to- human 
transmission. Also on January 20, Xi Jinping instructed the entire party to “focus 
a high level of attention on the infection; use all resources to prevent and control 
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the disease” (Xi, 2020). On January 25, a Politburo Standing Committee meeting 
chaired by Xi announced the formation of the Central Leading Group on Con-
fronting the Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia (CLGCNCP), a plenipotentiary body 
headed by Premier Li Keqiang and the regime’s top propaganda official, Wang 
Huning (Xin hua, 2020). At the same Politburo Standing Committee meeting, Xi 
Jinping also issued a flurry of instructions, including the summary command of 
“Preserving life is the highest priority; let responses be guided by the trajectory 
of the epidemic; all  will be held responsible for preventing and controlling the 
epidemic” (Xin hua, 2020). It was also at this meeting that the princi ples of “all 
infected  will be concentrated in designated containment facilities; all  those who 
had contacts (with the infected)  will be placed in home quarantine”  were issued 
(Xin hua, 2020).
With  these  orders from the highest authority in the party, the entire regime 
mobilized to contain COVID-19 while maintaining the CCP’s iron grip on society. 
As discussed in greater details  later,  because key state and even commercial insti-
tutions  were supervised by communist party cells, the party cells issued  orders 
to their institutions that superseded existing laws and regulations, thus allowing 
resources to be mobilized quickly. As of August 2020, the Chinese government 
more or less had achieved its two major objectives: containment of COVID-19 and 
maintaining social stability.
The major challenges faced by the government by late January  were threefold. 
First, as the number of symptomatic patients exploded, it quickly overwhelmed 
both testing and treatment capacity in Wuhan. The government needed to quickly 
mobilize resources to overcome  these gaps. Second, although the vast majority of 
cases  were in Wuhan,  there was a possibility that the end of the Lunar New Year 
holiday would lead to a large- scale transmission of the disease to other major 
urban centers. Fi nally, if the regime is seen as dealing with the disease ineptly or 
if the containment caused too much collateral damage, social instability in the 
form of protests or riots may emerge in major urban centers, jeopardizing overall 
regime stability. As a vast amount of lit er a ture points out, the Chinese govern-
ment devoted enormous online and physical resources to “stability maintenance” 
(King et al., 2013; Mattingly, 2019; Wallace, 2014).
As treatment and testing capacity  were surpassed by the explosion of COVID-19 
symptomatic patients in late January, the Wuhan municipal government (WMG) 
first designated seven hospitals for COVID-19 treatment, which made available 
over two thousand beds. Wuhan also began construction of two temporary treat-
ment facilities, each with one- thousand- bed capacity, on January 23 (“Yisi Bingren 
Nanti” [“The Dilemma of Symptomatic Patients”], 2020).  Because the construc-
tion was undertaken by state- owned enterprises each controlled by their own 
CCP party committees, they immediately heeded Xi Jinping’s order to “use all 
available resources” and began construction of  these hospitals. The third bureau 
of China Construction Corporation, tasked with building the Huoshenshan Hos-
pital, began construction on January 23, even before any contract was signed with 
WMG or with the central government (He et  al., 2020). Within days, over ten 
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thousand workers working twenty- four hours a day and a thousand trucks and 
construction machineries  were deployed, allowing the completion of the hospi-
tal in ten days (He et  al., 2020). Again, in the pro cess of this break- neck pace 
of construction, numerous safety and  labor regulations  were likely ignored. Yet, 
 because both the regulators and the firms took  orders from the CCP, construction 
proceeded apace. State Grid, the state- owned mono poly for electricity distribu-
tion, deployed thousands of workers to makeshift hospitals across China to lay 
down the electricity grids for them (He et  al., 2020). Monetary concerns  were 
set aside for the moment with the expectation that further central government 
policies would address  these needs in the near  future. Meanwhile, thousands of 
doctors and nurses from around the country, including a large number of medical 
personnel from the military,  were mobilized to help with the containment efort 
in Wuhan (Qin, 2020b).
Eventually, the Wuhan model was replicated in multiple cities across China 
as authorities in several major cities around China scrambled to ensure sufficient 
treatment facilities for the infected.  Because the caseload turned out to be smaller 
than expected, some of  these facilities  were repurposed for quarantine. This was 
the case with Xiaotangshan Hospital in Beijing, which was first built in 2003 dur-
ing the SARS outbreak but was repurposed into a quarantine fa cil i ty for interna-
tional travelers when caseload in Beijing turned out to be relatively modest (Xia, 
2020). The surplus in quarantine facilities eventually allowed the Chinese govern-
ment to pursue the policies of “taking in all who should be taken in” (yingshou 
jinshou), which entailed placing confirmed patients, suspected patients, and  those 
who had been in contact with confirmed patients in designated quarantine facili-
ties (Wen et al., 2020).
As the first country faced with a COVID-19 outbreak, China initially faced a 
severe shortage in testing kits, even  after medical firms began to develop them on 
January 10, 2020 (“Yisi Bingren Nanti” [“The Dilemma of Symptomatic Patients”], 
2020). By January 19, however, the National Health Commission had approved 
testing kit production by three biotech firms, all Shanghai- based, thus enabling 
mass production of the nucleic acid tests. By January 26, some thirty firms around 
China had received approval to produce some 600,000 nucleic acid testing kits 
per day, more or less overcoming the initial bottleneck in testing availability (“Yisi 
Bingren Nanti” [“The Dilemma of Symptomatic Patients”], 2020).
While the regime mobilized resources for testing and treating COVID-19, it 
also si mul ta neously instituted the strictest quarantine the world has ever seen. 
This began with the January 23, 2020, lockdown of Wuhan along with fourteen 
other cities in Hubei, cutting of  these cities and their tens of millions of residents 
from all forms of traffic, including air, rail, and vehicular traffic, allowing only offi-
cial vehicles to go into and out of the quarantine zone (“Xianchangpian: Wuhan 
Weicheng” [“Live: The closing of Wuhan”], 2020). This lockdown did not end  until 
a color- coded system designating the risk profiles of residents of all cities and 
counties in China allowed  people from some parts of Hubei province to travel 
outside of the province starting in late March (“Shijianchou: Wuhan ‘Fengcheng’ 
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de 76tian” [“Timeline: 76 Days of the Wuhan Lockdown”], 2020). Since the air-
ports, the railroads, and the police all had party committees, once the highest 
authorities in the party ordered the lockdown, it was executed immediately by 
party cells and committees across China with  little time lag between jurisdic-
tions. Also, nationally, the Lunar New Year holiday was extended in defi nitely so 
that most workers and university students remained in their hometowns instead 
of traveling back to their workplaces and schools in major urban centers (China 
Central Tele vi sion, 2020a).
The key to China’s success in containing COVID-19 was its draconian stay- 
at- home policy, which saw nearly all of its 1.3 billion population remain in their 
homes over the course of four to eight weeks starting in late January. This was 
enforced at the lowest level by neighborhood committees in the cities and by vil-
lage committees in the countryside.  These committees are parastatal bodies at the 
neighborhood or village level mostly led by party members and stafed by local 
activists such as demobilized soldiers and former state- owned enterprise (SOE) 
workers on a part- time basis (Read, 2012, p. 52). During normal times, they mainly 
channeled information about potential sources of unrests to the authorities and 
helped the local governments distribute information and propaganda about the 
latest policies (Read, 2012, p. 32). In times of emergency, however, they provided 
additional personnel for the Chinese state authorities to implement policies at the 
grassroots level.
In the case of COVID-19, the party soon mobilized neighborhood and vil-
lage committees to implement the quarantine. As a decree issued by the Beijing 
municipal government (BMG) made clear, neighborhood and village committees 
 were to “carry out the task of investigating and recording all the coming and  going 
of residents within their jurisdictions” (BMG, 2020). The neighborhood com-
mittees carried out in- person surveillance and contact tracing, which provided 
much of the under lying data for China’s impressive digital COVID-19 surveillance 
program (Lin, 2020). Neighborhood committees also regulated or even outright 
blocked residents from leaving their homes and required residents to check their 
temperatures on a periodic basis and reported results to local health authorities 
and to digital surveillance platforms (BMG, 2020). As more and more  house holds 
 were placed in strict home quarantine  because of contacts with confirmed 
patients, residential committees also delivered food and other supplies to  these 
 house holds and checked their temperature on a regular basis (Zhang et al., 2020).
Throughout the pandemic, the government also ordered several waves of 
comprehensive testing, whereby all suspected patients or even the entire popula-
tion underwent nucleic acid testing. Again, the neighborhood committees  either 
carried out the testing or assisted health authorities to compile lists of  house holds 
and to notify the neighborhoods about impending testing drives (Wen et  al., 
2020). As  these tasks multiplied, the party also mobilized staf in local schools and 
government- controlled civic organ izations, as well as state- owned enterprises to 
augment the neighborhood committees so that twenty- four- hour surveillance 
and lockdown could be enforced (Wen et al., 2020). For all the crucial tasks per-
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formed by  these community workers during the pandemic, the government only 
compensated them with a modest bonus,  free insurance policies, and  free meals 
while on the job (Central Leading Group on Confronting the Novel Coronavirus 
Pneumonia, 2020b).
Fi nally, although the government began to release to the public more accurate 
information about the trajectory of the pandemic and government responses, it 
continued to deploy a concerted information manipulation campaign, including 
heavy censorship. First, although the WHC and the National Health Commis-
sion began to report a much higher caseload and death rate related to COVID-19 
 after January 20, 2020, the true infection figures remained undercounted as thou-
sands of suspected cases  were excluded from the official figures (Qin, 2020a). 
Even according to the official media, the COVID-19 death toll for Wuhan was 
vastly undercounted  until the  middle of April 2020, when the government sud-
denly increased the official COVID-19 death toll in Wuhan by 50  percent (Qin, 
2020a). As China strug gled with economic recovery in March and April  2020, 
analysts of China’s economy also doubted the accuracy of China’s economic 
numbers, including  those for electricity use (Qin, 2020b). For several weeks in 
late January and early February 2020, the government allowed journalists, both 
Chinese and foreign, relatively unimpeded access to Wuhan, and they provided 
excellent reporting on the real situation in Wuhan (Wang, 2020). The authorities 
likely tolerated such reporting  because they had mistrusted the flow of informa-
tion from the WMG and wanted on- the- ground verification. As the number of 
central officials in Wuhan expanded, however, the party once again reasserted a 
mono poly on publicly available information on the epidemic. By the  middle of 
February, the authorities had rounded up 350  people around China for “spread-
ing rumors,” including famous bloggers Fang Bin and Chen Qiushi (Wang, 2020). 
They remained in detention as of September 2020.
Social Policies
Although the mobilization for containment meant that the Chinese government 
quickly agreed to undertake the full medical costs of COVID-19 treatment and 
testing, it could not make up for the uneven nature of China’s health insurance 
and social security regimes. Like in the United States,  those covered by the most 
resourceful health insurance and pension schemes and  were healthy could go for 
months without working, whereas  those who  were not covered or  were covered 
by bare- bone insurance schemes had to fend for themselves during illnesses and 
periods of unemployment. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this was especially 
a major prob lem for China’s 290 million mi grant workers, who  were trapped in 
the countryside away from their workplaces and had much less access to adequate 
social insurance coverage. Like more advanced countries, China had a power ful 
central bank, which began to subsidize government spending via a form of quanti-
tative easing. Yet, in the absence of demo cratic pressure, the Chinese government 
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devoted central bank funds to the government and to firms, rather than  toward 
financing social spending.
Soon  after the Chinese government began to acknowledge the potential of a 
pandemic, the issue of treatment and testing costs emerged. Even  after the reform 
of the medical insurance system in 2009, some 17  percent of the 290 million or so 
mi grant laborers did not have any form of public health insurance (Chen et al., 
2017). Among  those with health insurance, out- of- pocket costs for urban residents 
 were still over 50   percent for inpatient care (Huang, 2013). For patients in rural 
areas, out- of- pocket costs  were even higher. For multi- day inpatient care, the costs, 
even  after insurance reimbursement, can surpass the annual salaries of mi grant 
workers. Thus, in late January 2020, some hospitals in Wuhan actually turned 
away patients  because they had insufficient cash or insurance coverage to pay for 
the potentially high costs of inpatient care.  After receiving reports on this phe-
nomenon, the central government on January 25 made a decision to cover the full 
medical costs of all patients, both confirmed and symptomatic patients, as well as 
for testing (“Yisi Bingren Nanti” [“The Dilemma of Symptomatic Patients”], 2020). 
This eliminated a major treatment bottleneck in the system.
Although the government devoted enormous resources to COVID-19 patients, 
the lockdown exacerbated existing in equality in the medical system, both geo-
graph i cally and across residency status. Geo graph i cally, Hubei province had 
some of the lowest capacity to treat infectious diseases before the COVID-19 out-
break. It only had 1  percent of the hospital beds for treating infectious disease in 
China, despite having 4   percent of China’s population (Liu, 2020). Thus, when 
the COVID-19 surge began, nearly all the other hospitals in Hubei, especially in 
Wuhan,  were converted to COVID-19 care. This left patients with other critical 
illnesses without any care. The lockdown instituted on January 23, 2020, meant 
that patients critically ill with other diseases could not seek help from hospitals 
outside of Hubei province, even though neighboring provinces all had excess 
capacity to care for patients (Liu, 2020). Anecdotal evidence suggests that a sig-
nificant number of patients in Wuhan with critical illnesses such as cancer and 
HIV died  because of the absence of care for one month or more during the lock-
down (Qin, 2020c).
Although workers in the government or in state- owned enterprises benefited 
from a well- funded pension and social security systems, China’s traditional social 
security regime provided  little to no coverage to urban workers outside of the state 
system and especially left out mi grant workers, whose  house hold registrations 
 were in the countryside (Frazier, 2010). Since 2010, nationwide minimal assis-
tance insurance (dibao) has become available to most urban and rural residents 
who are unemployed or unable to work (Frazier, 2014). As the quarantine shut-
tered the majority of economic activities in China, the central government mainly 
relied on dibao to provide basic necessities to unemployed healthy working- age 
workers and disabled workers, instead of providing additional fiscal assistance. As 
the CLGCNCP decree on this issue states, “As for  those urban residents whose 
livelihood  faces difficulties  because Covid-19 prevents them from working in 
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other cities, operate businesses, or other wise engage in gainful employment, they 
can be included in the coverage of minimal assistance insurance if they fulfill its 
enrollment criteria” (CLGCNCP, 2020b).
Yet this was in a sense the least the government could have done. According 
to a schedule published by the Ministry of Finance, the minimal assistance insur-
ance standard for rural residents in Hubei province, for example, amounted to $67 
a month, which was a paltry sum considering the 2019 average per capita rural 
income of $165 a month for the province and food inflation of over 13  percent in 
the first half of 2020 (Li et  al., 2020a; Ministry of Finance, 2020). For an aver-
age Hubei  house hold made up entirely of unemployed rural residents, monthly 
dibao payments only provided 40   percent of the income it had earned in 2019, 
which allowed it to buy 34  percent of the food it could have purchased with 2019 
income. For urban residents in Hubei, the decline was even steeper if they only had 
received dibao payments. The Ministry of Finance– mandated payments to urban-
ites in Hubei amounted to $90 a month, whereas their per capita disposal monthly 
income in 2019 was $452, representing an 80   percent drop in income (Ministry 
of Finance, 2020). To be sure, the majority of urban residents likely had access to 
other forms of social insurance through their workplaces and thus on average  were 
better of than their counter parts trapped in the countryside, including mi grant 
workers normally employed in cities (Frazier, 2014).
As the quarantine continued and as more  people  were placed  under quaran-
tine in designated facilities, the central government also did not deploy too many 
additional resources to look  after vulnerable populations typically cared for by 
the quarantined patients. Instead, the neighborhood committees, already inun-
dated with the demands of the quarantine,  were also asked to perform this task 
(CLGCNCP, 2020b). The central decree on this issue states vaguely that “upon 
notification, the neighborhood (village) personnel should visit and evaluate, and 
contact relevant persons or organ izations to provide care and monitoring of the 
target population” (CLGCNCP, 2020b). The decree never made clear who the 
“relevant persons or organ izations” would be, leaving the neighborhood com-
mittees with the unenviable task of scrambling for resources, or to do nothing. 
This clearly was one task too far for some of the neighborhood committees as 
cases of  children or el derly starving while their loved ones underwent treatment 
soon emerged (Li, 2020). In a widely publicized case, a sixteen- year- old with ce re-
bral palsy died of starvation  because his caretaker underwent a prolonged period 
of COVID-19 treatment (Li, 2020). The true extent of this public health crisis 
remains untold  because of government censorship.
At a time of widespread firm shutdown and heightened public health expenses, 
the Chinese government mobilized the state- controlled financial sector to finance 
vari ous needs.  Because the Chinese government owns the vast majority of banks 
and  because state- owned banks  were all governed by party committees (Shih, 
2008), the January 20 edict by Xi Jinping and subsequent commands from him 
and Premier Li Keqiang also  were transmitted to the financial sector. By Janu-
ary 31, 2020, the central bank had rolled out an earmarked lending program to 
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provide 300 billion yuan to designated firms, mainly state- owned ones, which 
engaged in priority activities including the construction of makeshift hospitals, 
the production of vital medicines and PPE, and the procurement of essential food 
and necessities ( People’s Bank of China, 2020). As the containment and recovery 
efort continued, the central bank unveiled additional programs to finance major 
policy priorities directly or to subsidize the interest payments of firms afected by 
the lockdown. In total, the central bank ultimately provided 1 trillion yuan to firms 
via lending or re- discounting programs (“Yiwan Yi Zaidaikuan Zaitiexian Shiyong 
Mingque” [“The Usage of the 1 Trillion Yuan in Re- lending Became Clear”], 2020).
Yet  little of this was devoted to financing additional government social secu-
rity spending. Official spending on social security and unemployment for both 
the central and local governments  rose by only 2  percent in the first half of 2020 
(Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC, 2020). Given the enormous size of Chi-
na’s supply- side response, the Chinese government certainly could have ordered 
the central bank to directly or indirectly purchase government bonds to dramati-
cally boost unemployment aid. Yet this was not done.
Explaining Outcomes: Leninist Party Structure with  
Grassroots Mobilization Capacity
The trajectory of outcomes in China, the rapid ascent in caseload, followed by a 
rapid and per sis tent decline in COVID-19 cases, can be explained by two major 
 factors: the Leninist structure of the party- state and the enormous grassroots 
mobilization capacity of the regime stemming from the socialist legacy of party 
control over basic social and economic units in society.  These features enabled 
the top leadership to repress information related to COVID-19 in the first phase. 
When the leadership saw fit to begin national quarantine,  these institutional fea-
tures also allowed for the total mobilization of state and community resources 
and personnel. Meanwhile, the complete lack of demo cratic accountability in 
China compelled the government to provide the minimum level of social aid 
to eco nom ically stressed  house holds to prevent mass starvation. Despite having 
a clear capacity to provide more help, the Chinese government refrained from 
 doing so.
Three key features of the Leninist party- state played an impor tant role in 
shaping China’s COVID-19 responses. First, within the CCP, lower- level officials 
must obey decisions made by higher- level party authorities, or  else face punish-
ment (CCP, 2017). Although the party constitution allows for debates among party 
members on policies, once higher- level authorities make a decision, all lower- level 
party members are obligated to carry out  these  orders. Thus, the dictates of the 
highest party authority, that of Xi Jinping himself, become laws for all lower- level 
party officials to follow, superseding most existing laws and regulations. During 
emergency periods, failure to obey the dictates of higher- level party authorities 
brought about especially harsh punishment. During the information repression 
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phase, for example, some grassroots level officials had called for the cancellation 
of the “ten thousand families banquet,” but district party authorities ignored such 
pleas, and the banquets went ahead (Zhang et al., 2020). Likewise, the party com-
mittees in frontline hospitals in Wuhan  were ordered to not disclose caseload 
numbers to the public and only do so to higher- level public health authorities 
(“Xianchangpian: Wuhan Weicheng” [“Live: The closing of Wuhan”], 2020). As 
long as the party center did not reveal a strong preference for fighting the epi-
demic, local officials did not do much on their own initiative, and the epidemic 
proliferated without much hindrance.
Once mobilization for containment was ordered, local officials immediately 
 were placed  under enormous pressure from higher level authorities to put the 
quarantine in place both at the provincial level and at the neighborhood level. As 
Xi Jinping stated at a February 3, 2020, Politburo Standing Committee meeting, 
“for  those who are unwilling to take responsibility, who do not take this seriously, 
who shirk their duties, not only  will they be punished. If the consequences are 
dire, their party and government supervisors also  will be held responsible. Der-
eliction of duty  will be punished according to the law” (Xi, 2020). This high- level 
po liti cal pressure was passed down through  every level of government down to the 
grassroots level. As the follow-up order from the BMG reveals, the BMG would 
“thoroughly implement regional responsibility, departmental responsibility, work 
unit responsibility and individual responsibility” (BMG, 2020). That is,  every party 
committee and individual party member was held responsible for the proliferation 
of the disease. At the same time,  because the party center hardly focused on other 
health challenges and economic hardship faced by ordinary  people, few govern-
ment resources  were deployed to address  these issues.
Second, the Communist Party is a hierarchical command structure embed-
ded in all levels of the government, major firms, major social organ izations, and 
nearly all financial institutions in China (Koss, 2018; Shih, 2008). Thus, when the 
highest authority in the party issued a clear order, the formal jurisdictional cleav-
ages between  these vari ous institutions did not hinder the implementation. Again, 
when the party center did not reveal a high level of alarm about COVID-19, the 
rank- and- file party members across vari ous state institutions, including hospitals 
and China’s public health authorities, did very  little to disclose to the public the 
true extent of the epidemic and at times even suppressed information.  Behind the 
scenes, the top leadership likely was very worried starting in early January 2020, 
but  there was only a  limited mobilization efort to investigate the severity of the 
epidemic. Once the highest authorities publicly mobilized the party, however, 
decrees from the party center quickly cut through the fragmented institutions in 
China’s party- state. Thus, during periods of emergency at least, China’s perennial 
prob lem of “fragmented authoritarianism” suspended as all party cadres set aside 
bureaucratic interests for fear of harsh punishment to fulfill commands from the 
highest authorities (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988).
The formation of the CLGCNCP was the modern manifestation of an old 
institutional trick from the revolutionary years, which centralized power in the 
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hands of essentially one se nior official, who also took full responsibility for the 
outcome. Even in the late 1920s, the party formed “frontline committees,” which 
entrusted enormous powers in the hands of a se nior party official on the front 
line, who exercised plenipotentiary power over all communist forces on the front 
line (Gao, 2000). In a similar vein, the party not only formed the CLGCNCP at the 
central level to coordinate nationwide containment efort; it also formed a Central 
Guidance Small Group (Zhongyang Zhidaozu) headed by Politburo member and 
Vice Premier Sun Chunlan and top Hubei officials, which directed containment 
eforts on the ground in Wuhan. Again, the purpose of this Guidance Group was 
to leverage the high po liti cal stature of Sun to cut through jurisdictional cleavages, 
including the military. The work of the Guidance Group was very granular, includ-
ing sending leading epidemiologists to neighborhoods in Wuhan to instruct local 
community cadres on garbage disposal and carry ing out nucleic acid testing (Cao, 
2020). Despite the efectiveness of  these elite bodies in addressing issues directly 
related to COVID-19, they did not focus on or devote too many resources on 
severe welfare challenges caused by the lockdown, such as the cessation of income 
for mi grant workers and care for patients with other critical illnesses.  Because 
 these leading groups saw  these issues as less urgent priorities, the entire Chinese 
government also neglected  these issues.
Third, the mobilization of resources was sped up by the party’s existing con-
trol over major assets and institutions in China. Despite de cades of reform and 
waves of restructuring and privatization, the Chinese government, and by exten-
sion the CCP, still owned and controlled all of the major oil companies, the largest 
construction companies, almost all of the banks, the railroad, major electricity 
producers and the grid operator, as well as the largest industrial and electronics 
firms in the country (Naughton, 2015). During the information repression phase, 
the party’s control over all major media allowed it to suppress information fairly 
successfully, although rumors of the pandemic spread through private chatrooms 
online.  After January 20, 2020, the massive economic resources directly  under the 
control of the party  were mobilized immediately.
Moreover,  because the party also controlled the police and the courts, other 
economic actors had no way of refusing government decrees to mobilize resources 
 under their control. By early February 2020, China’s economy was  under direct 
state control whereby the CLGCNCP imposed production targets on designated 
producers for testing kits, PPE, and other essential medical supplies (China Cen-
tral Tele vi sion, 2020a). The leading group also ordered priority material to be 
channeled to Wuhan at state- mandated prices (China Central Tele vi sion, 2020a). 
Even if producers had wanted to sell PPE to the highest bidder, for example, in 
Shanghai, they did not have that option, nor could they have challenged the gov-
ernment’s decision in court. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, this feature 
in China’s po liti cal system facilitated the production and distribution of PPE and 
testing kits to areas with the greatest needs. The government’s total control over 
the media and the courts also prevented citizens with concerns about their wel-
fare from suing the government or complaining to the media.
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As the preceding discussion demonstrates, China’s massive quarantine efort 
likely would not have succeeded to the same extent had it not been for the millions 
of neighborhood and village level committees. The neighborhood committee 
system was reintroduced by the communist authorities in 1949 on the basis of a 
much older system of local governance, the baojia system (Read, 2012). Although 
it languished through much of the Cultural Revolution and deteriorated some 
more in the wake of mass SOE closure through the early 1990s, by the late 1990s, 
the increasingly resourceful central government began to experiment with ways 
of reviving neighborhood committees (Read, 2012, p.  52). By 2010, the central 
and municipal governments had provided enough funding such that the heads of 
residential committees in major cities could expect monthly stipends of $100 to 
$200, which would have been a nice bonus on top of pension payments that many 
in  these positions already received (Read, 2012, p. 53).
Still, in the face of the epidemic, even the neighborhood committees did not 
provide sufficient personnel. In a large neighborhood in Wuhan, for example, 
twenty- one members of the Baibuting neighborhood committee oversaw more 
than ten thousand residents living in dozens of residential buildings (Zhang et al., 
2020). If the entrance of each apartment building needed to be stafed by six com-
munity workers, two per eight- hour shift, seventy- two  people would be needed to 
watch over twelve buildings. Clearly, the Baibuting residential committee itself did 
not provide sufficient personnel. It had to be augmented by SOE workers, teach-
ers, and staf from social organ izations (Zhang et al., 2020).  Because all of  these 
organ izations  were loosely or tightly controlled by the party, the party deployed 
personnel from  these organ izations to needed areas. Most likely, millions of party 
members across China  were mobilized to augment the neighborhood committees 
to enforce the quarantine.
Still in the face of enormous health risks and the multiplication of missions 
piled on to them by the central government, neighborhood committees in heavi ly 
afected regions acquitted themselves surprising well, basically ensuring that the 
stay- at- home order was carried out and facilitating waves of testing, as well as 
delivering vari ous essential social ser vices to some extent. They likely did not do 
as well on addressing other social issues confronting the millions of  house holds in 
lockdown, but that was due to the government’s unwillingness to devote greater 
resources at the community level.  Future works  will unravel the puzzle of their 
efectiveness in instituting the quarantine during the COVID-19 pandemic in 
China.
Discussion
In a way, the relative success with which China dealt with COVID-19 was the 
product of luck.  Because so much power is invested in the hands of Xi Jinping 
alone, had he chosen to delay mobilization even longer for idiosyncratic personal 
reason, thousands more would have been infected, and more would have died. 
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The machineries  under the party’s control are enormously power ful and resource-
ful, but they only go into motion when the party center issues a clear signal for 
mobilization. The initial hesitation by the party center led to a horrendous spike 
in infection and death in Hubei province and in other parts of China, which was 
reversed only  after the January 25, 2020, Politburo Standing Committee meeting 
ordered a containment mobilization. The top leadership’s singular focus on the 
pandemic itself, however, led to a systematic neglect of other challenging social 
and welfare issues confronting vulnerable populations in China, especially the 
mi grant workers.
Certain features of COVID-19 made a strong response by Xi and other se nior 
officials more likely. First, COVID-19 mainly afected urban residents in dense 
major cities, where the majority of mid- level officials and SOE man ag ers— the 
main constituency of the party— lived (Wallace, 2014). Potential harm to  these 
core supporters of the party motivated the top leadership and the rank and file 
party members to devote their energy to fighting this pandemic. Second, COVID-19 
spread so rapidly and easily that the authorities  were compelled to act, or  else 
risk losing control of it entirely. China’s reaction to an epidemic with dif er ent 
features likely would have been less successful. For example,  because the acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) epidemic mainly afected a more marginal-
ized population and was much slower moving than COVID-19, the Chinese gov-
ernment did not even begin to keep accurate statistics on AIDS patients or to 
have any coherent policy  until ten years  after cases had begun to appear in China 
(Huang, 2013). The dearth of public health response or even basic information 
campaigns on AIDS led to the rise of AIDS villages in Henan province, which saw 
the reusing of  needles from blood sales causing thousands of infections (Huang, 
2013).  Future research should further specify features of diseases that would elicit 
an efective or delayed response from a Leninist party- state such as China.
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 5 PUblic Policy and learning froM sars
 Explaining COVID-19 in Hong Kong
John P. Burns
Health outcomes in Hong Kong, a city of 7.3 million, are among 
the best in the world (Goodman, 2009; Kong et al., 2015). Life expectancy for men 
(82.2) and  women (87.6) makes them the longest lived in the world (Food and 
Health Bureau, 2019). Infant mortality rates (1.5 per 1000 registered live births) are 
fourth lowest globally (Food and Health Bureau, 2019). All of this is achieved by 
spending just 6.2  percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on health care (Food 
and Health Bureau, 2019), compared to an average of 8.8  percent in Organ ization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, and 17.1  percent 
in the United States (OECD, 2020). This makes Hong Kong’s healthcare sys-
tem one of the most efficient (Miller & Lu, 2018). Yet, despite its experience of 
SARS in 2003 and community solidarity to implement mea sures to fight the 
virus, Hong Kong experienced uncontrolled community outbreak of COVID-19. 
Beginning January 23, 2020, for five months Hong Kong recorded only six deaths 
from COVID-19. However, by August 26, 2020, Hong Kong had recorded 4,736 
confirmed/probable cases and 78 deaths in three waves of COVID-19 infection, 
each more severe than the previous one (The Government of Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, 2020l). Hong Kong’s third wave of contagion, beginning 
July 5, 2020, was so serious that for the first time since 1997, when China resumed 
sovereignty over Hong Kong, local authorities sought emergency help from the 
central government. What happened? Why was Hong Kong unable to cope?
Successive governments in Hong Kong established a dual- track public and 
private healthcare system. The public system, centered around the Hospital 
Authority (HA), provides about 90  percent of inpatient ser vices, open to all resi-
dents of Hong Kong needing medical care at an “afordable” (nominal) price. The 
HA delivers  these ser vices through a network of forty- three hospitals, employing 
about 40  percent of local doctors (Hospital Authority, 2020). The private sector 
provides about 70   percent of all fee- for- service outpatient ser vices (Our Hong 
Kong Foundation, 2018; Schoeb, 2016). The HA picks up the rest through its pub-
lic outpatient clinics, again at a nominal charge. The HA system  faces a chronic 
shortage of public health professionals, and patients face long delays for nonemer-
gency ser vices (Cheung & Tsang, 2019; Schoeb, 2016). The public system provides 
most ser vices for Hong Kong’s rapidly aging population. The government esti-
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mates that from 2020 to 2066, the percentage of Hong Kong’s population sixty- 
five years or older  will grow from 18  percent to 33  percent (Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region Census and Statistics Department, 2017b).
The Hong Kong colonial government long ago established a business- friendly 
low tax system (15  percent salaries tax; 17  percent business tax; and neither value- 
added tax (VAT), inheritance, nor capital gains taxes). Authorities chose to keep 
the tax base narrow, relying instead on land and property sales (stamp duty), 
and property taxes to help balance the bud get (Poon, 2010). Only 40  percent of 
employed  people pay any salaries tax, and only 10  percent of businesses pay busi-
ness tax (“Hong Kong’s Narrow Tax Base Is Storing Up Trou ble for the  Future,” 
2016). Neither employers nor employees in Hong Kong contribute to a mandatory 
health insurance scheme. Business- funded think tanks argue that the public health 
system, funded from annual government appropriations, is financially unsustain-
able at current levels of ser vice, afordability, and revenue (Bauhinia Foundation 
Research Center Health Care Study Group, 2007; Hsiao & Yip, 1999; Our Hong 
Kong Foundation, 2018).
In 2003 the public health system was severely tested by the less infectious but 
more deadly SARS-1. Then Hong Kong recorded 1,775 cases of SARS-1, of which 
299  people died (Legislative Council, 2004; SARS Expert Committee, 2003). Public 
inquiries into Hong Kong’s  handling of SARS-1 resulted in reform of Hong Kong’s 
institutions for  handling epidemics. Government set up the Center for Health Pro-
tection; introduced preparedness and control plans; established a command and 
control structure for epidemics; and facilitated cross- border public health experts’ 
networks (see The Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
2014). The most se nior government official responsible for Hong Kong’s response 
to SARS-1 resigned to take responsibility for the government’s per for mance (Lee & 
Benitez, 2004). SARS-1, however, impressed on the  people of Hong Kong the 
importance of following medical advice (wearing masks; hand washing; social dis-
tancing), and the community overwhelmingly complied when COVID-19 struck.
Hong Kong’s  battle with COVID-19 came during a  bitter po liti cal strug gle over 
the  future relationship of Hong Kong to the mainland. Beginning in June 2019 
almost daily mass street protests, sometimes involving hundreds of thousands 
of  people, increasingly violent, para lyzed Hong Kong, sank the economy, espe-
cially tourism on which Hong Kong depends, and by November, closed the entire 
school system. Civil servants and white- collar workers spent days working from 
home (Purbrick, 2019; “The Revolt of Hong Kong,” 2019). In 2019 the economy 
contracted by 2.8   percent and 2.9   percent in the third and fourth quarters “as 
the local social incidents involving vio lence [anti- government protests] dealt a 
heavy blow to economic sentiment and consumption- and tourism- related activi-
ties,” deepening Hong Kong’s recession (The Government of Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, 2020a). Authorities in Beijing and Hong Kong fought 
back, relying on the police to suppress protest. By December 2019 protests waned.
During the pandemic, authorities imposed a new centrally drafted and draco-
nian national security regime, removed opposition politicians from office, arrested 
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and jailed  those who advocated in de pen dence for Hong Kong, and most recently 
postponed local elections to Hong Kong’s legislature (“Hong Kong Postpones Leg-
islative Election for a Year Citing COVID-19,” 2020). Public trust in government 
fell from 30.6   percent in December  2018 before the protests to 17.8   percent by 
March  2020  after nearly a year of protest and two months of pandemic (Hong 
Kong Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, 2020).
In summary, the government has waged Hong Kong’s  battle with COVID-19 
in an environment of low trust in government (Hartley & Jarvis, 2020). Yet, in the 
pandemic, the community pulled together (Wan et al., 2020). Public health has 
mostly not become a po liti cal issue.
Public Health Policy
Authorities recorded Hong Kong’s first COVID-19 case on January 23, 2020. By 
that time the government, with more than three weeks’ advance warning, was rea-
sonably well prepared, within the limitations of its fragile public healthcare sys-
tem and its experience of SARS-1.  These limitations encouraged officials to take 
a high- risk, low- cost approach that by early July 2020 led to uncontrolled com-
munity spread. The government’s strategy was to manage COVID-19 at a level 
that would not overwhelm Hong Kong’s public healthcare system— not to sup-
press the virus to zero as was attempted on the mainland (Dharmangadan, 2020). 
By not sufficiently expanding testing, tracing, and isolation capacity, which saved 
resources in the short term, the government failed to prepare for the community 
spread that characterized the third wave. Hong Kong authorities relaxed suppres-
sion when they perceived that hospitals could cope, well above zero new cases.
At the time of this writing, Hong Kong had experienced three waves of infec-
tion. During the first two waves (January 23 to March 14, 2020, and March 15 to 
July 4, 2020) authorities succeeded in managing the virus, in cycles of “suppres-
sion and lift.” As they lifted restrictions at the end of the second wave, however, the 
government implemented policies especially relaxing border control that allowed 
the infection to enter and spread in the community unchecked (third wave, July 5, 
2020, to end of August 2020). Hong Kong found that, like  water, the virus seeps 
through  every crack. Local authorities, overwhelmed, requested central govern-
ment help to ramp up Hong Kong’s testing and isolation capacity to bring the 
virus  under control.
Hong Kong acted swiftly to manage COVID-19 in early January, not waiting for 
official notification from the mainland government of the virus’s infectiousness, 
which authorities  there delayed (Associated Press, 2020; Da, 2020; Yang, 2020). 
On December 31, 2019, Hong Kong’s infectious disease experts informed the Hong 
Kong government of what colleagues on the mainland told them had emerged in 
Wuhan (G. M. Leung, personal communication, June 12, 2020; K. Y. Yuen, per-
sonal communication, June 12, 2020). By January 15, 2020, Hong Kong authorities 
already knew that the virus could spread efficiently from person to person (Chan 
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et al., 2020; K. Y. Yuen, personal communication, June 12, 2020). Hong Kong public 
health authorities’ action in early and mid- January was based on locally sourced 
expert information and preparations planned in the wake of the 2003 SARS-1 
epidemic.
The health minister called the first of scores of meetings on the issue on 
December 31, 2019. On January 4, 2020, the Hong Kong government raised its 
official alert level to “serious” on a three- tier scale and promulgated the Prepared-
ness and Response Plan for Novel Infectious Disease of Public Health Significance 
prepared in advance (Food and Health Bureau, Department of Health, Hospital 
Authority, 2020; The Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
2020k). The plan identified in detail the actions required at each response level, 
assigned responsibilities for each action, and laid down a command and coordi-
nation infrastructure, its leadership, membership, and responsibilities (Food and 
Health Bureau, Department of Health, Center for Health Protection, 2020). By 
January 14, 2020, nine days before the first recorded case in Hong Kong,  because 
of its stepped-up surveillance of inbound travelers, the Hong Kong government 
had isolated sixty- eight  people in the hospital for observation and put  under sur-
veillance 763 close contacts of  those hospitalized (“HK Experts to Make Public 
Wuhan Trip,” 2020, January 14). On January 25, 2020, the government raised the 
alert level to “emergency,” and the Chief Executive took over chairing the steering 
committee and established a four- person advisory experts’ group (Lam, 2020a).
Suppression of COVID-19 in Hong Kong included travel- based, community- 
based, and case- based mea sures (Cowling et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020). Travel- 
based mea sures targeted travel restrictions, port control, and inbound traveler 
screening. Community- based mea sures included physical distancing (e.g., work-
ing from home; closure of schools, bars, nightclubs, fitness centers, and theaters; 
restrictions on dining-in at restaurants) and behavioral changes (e.g., masks, hand 
hygiene, social distancing) among the general population. Case identification and 
isolation, and quarantine of close contacts of confirmed cases made up case- based 
mea sures (classification of mea sures is based on Wu et al., 2020). The government 
used vari ous combinations of  these mea sures to suppress each of the three waves. 
 After bringing the virus to manageable levels, authorities gradually lifted restric-
tions, attempting to return to some kind of normalcy.
Travel controls. The epidemic hit Hong Kong during the peak Chinese Lunar New 
Year holiday (January  25 to 28, 2020) travel period. From early February  2020 
authorities suspended eleven of thirteen land border control points. At the air-
port, the government stepped up controls, eventually banning most non- Hong 
Kong residents, with some exemptions, from entering the territory on March 25, 
2020.  These mea sures cut the total number of inbound travelers from 162,000 on 
January 24, 2020, to about 20,000 by mid- February 2020 and to 1,200 by mid- 
April 2020, most of whom  were Hong Kong residents (Hong Kong Immigration 
Department, 2020). From February 8, 2020, the government required all inbound 
travelers to be tested and then  either isolated in hospital (all  those with positive 
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test results) or quarantined for fourteen days. Wu et al. (2020, p. 4) estimate that 
the efective reproductive number from imported cases was mostly below one 
from mid- February1 and that the fourteen- day mandatory quarantine for travelers 
was 95  percent efective up to early May.
With no new local infections reported from April 20, 2020, to May 12, 2020, 
authorities may have perceived that they had managed the second wave. Indeed, by 
June 25, 2020, the government reported that “ people’s lives have generally returned 
to normal” (Lam, 2020d). As part of its mea sures to lift suppression, in May the gov-
ernment widened the scope of exemptions granted from the mandatory fourteen- 
day quarantine imposed on all inbound travelers.  These included thirty- three 
categories of inbound travelers, such as essential business travelers, cross- border 
students, and cross- border truck  drivers on whom Hong Kong depended for food 
and other supplies. By July 5, 2020, the number of confirmed cases began to creep 
up and then increased rapidly, with a reproductive rate of four. The virus spread 
quickly through Hong Kong’s high- density housing estates and el derly care homes, 
where visitors previously banned  were once again allowed in (Lum et al., 2020). This 
time the virus infected taxi  drivers, restaurant workers and customers, port work-
ers, domestic helpers, hospital and clinic staf and patients, private medical prac ti-
tion ers, civil servants, and students and many other groups, their numerous close 
contacts mostly untraceable (Lam, 2020e).
It  later emerged that authorities had exempted air and sea crews, and that 
Hong Kong had become a hub for crew changes for airlines, mostly cargo flights, 
and ships. According to one report, Hong Kong was the only place in southeast 
Asia that permitted unrestricted crew changes for shipping (Choy et al., 2020). 
Experts repeatedly pressed the government to close exempted traveler loopholes 
(J. Wong, 2020). Government resisted, arguing that Hong Kong depended on 
imports and should facilitate air and sea crew rotation for “humanitarian” reasons 
(The Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2020f; “Up to 250 
Crew Members a Day Arrive Without Quarantine,” 2020). Authorities eventually 
tightened the loopholes efective on July 29, 2020 (Siu et al., 2020), but only  after 
it became known that from February to July 2020, the government had exempted 
from quarantine 290,000 inbound travelers (The Government of Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region, 2020e; “Zhèngfǔ Jìn Yuè Fā Yú 29  Wàn Fèn Yīxué 
Jiānchá Tōngzhī Shū Huòmiǎn Qiángzhì Jiǎnyì” [“The Government Issued More 
Than 290,000 Medical Surveillance Notices In Recent Months Exempted From 
Compulsory Quarantine”], 2020). Tests proved that many carried the virus (“Chén 
Zhàoshǐ: Dì Sān Bō Yìqíng Yuántóu Láizì Huòmiǎn Jiǎnyì Rénshì Yǒu Shízhèng 
Zhīchí Huì Yánsù Gēn Jìn,” [“Sophia Chan Siu- chee: The Source of the Third Wave 
of the Epidemic Comes From  People Who Are Exempt from Quarantine”], 2020; 
Ho, 2020a). Asymptomatic, they moved around Hong Kong freely, spreading the 
disease. The need to obtain central government approval and the government’s 
reluctance to admit that it was wrong may account for the local authorities’ delay 
in tightening the loopholes.
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Community mea sures. It is likely that before mandatory testing of all inbound trav-
elers, asymptomatic carriers infected  others in the community. As a result, local 
clusters of infection emerged in the community (in restaurants and bars and a 
place of prayer before the government- imposed controls). To suppress COVID-19, 
the government required civil servants to work from home in February 2020 to 
March 2, 2020; from March 21, 2020 to May 3, 2020; and from July 20, 2020 to 
August 24, 2020. About 40  percent of Hong Kong’s more than 170,000 civil ser-
vants,  because of the nature of their jobs, could manage this (“Forty  Percent of 
Civil Servants to Work from Home Starting Tomorrow,” 2020). Many businesses 
and non- government organ izations followed. Authorities closed schools and uni-
versities from early February 2020  until late May, closing them again in July and 
August.  These mea sures cut the mobility of the population dramatically (Figure 5.1; 
Apple Maps, 2020). Wu et al. (2020, pp. 4–5) estimate that working from home and 
reinstituting working from home reduced the transmissibility to one,2 and that the 
efectiveness of civil servants working from home was 67  percent.
Surveys confirm behavioral changes among Hong Kong residents. Respon-
dents reported greater personal hygiene and, by mid- February 2020, the use of 
face masks in public exceeded 98  percent (Wu et al., 2020, p. 5).  After first ban-
ning masks in October  2019 to help police identify antigovernment protesters 
who mostly wore masks (K. Cheng, 2019; The Government of Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, 2019) and then receiving conflicting advice from experts 
about the efficacy of masks in the fight against COVID-19 (K. Y. Yuen, personal 
communication, June  12, 2020), the Hong Kong government reversed its posi-
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Figure 5.1. Apple mobility trends in Hong Kong, from January 13, 2020 to August 10, 
2020.
Source: Apple Maps (2020).
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wave of infection, authorities made wearing masks compulsory indoors in public 
places, and  later, on public transport and in public areas (The Government of 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2020m).
At the end of each suppression cycle, authorities lifted restrictions, reopen-
ing closed businesses such as bars, karaoke lounges, entertainment venues, and 
theaters. In June 2020 they permitted groups of fifty to meet, up from four and 
then eight during suppression, for example, in restaurants. With the emergence 
of a third wave, authorities pointed to “pandemic fatigue”: less cautious residents 
ventured out in large groups, letting their social distancing guard down (Lam, 
2020e). Still, the government used the pandemic restrictions to ban all antigov-
ernment protests: when protesters continued to demonstrate in numbers allowed 
by the regulations, riot police still arrested protesters for violating the regulations 
(Lau et al., 2020).
Case mea sures. The Hong Kong government’s PCR (polymerase chain reaction) 
antigen test detects the sequence of the virus RNA (ribonucleic acid) and is gener-
ally considered the most accurate (Xia, 2020). Samples may be collected by nasal 
swab, deep throat saliva, or throat swab (Cheng, 2020). Authorities increased 
the number of tests from about six hundred per day in early February 2020 (first 
wave) to from two thousand to four thousand per day from late March  2020 
 until May (second wave) (Wu et al., 2020, p. 5). The government isolated all who 
tested positive in the hospital. The government reduced the time from symptom 
onset to isolation in hospital from ten days in late January 2020 to five days by 
late March 2020. Still 59  percent of the local cases in March 2020 took five days 
or longer to isolate (Wu et al., 2020, p. 5). The government published the street 
addresses of local residents who tested positive to encourage pos si ble additional 
close contacts to come forward for testing and isolation or quarantine. Case- 
based quarantine arrangements varied from closed and guarded quarantine 
camps to less tightly managed quarantine housing estates and  hotels, to self- 
supervised home quarantine for inbound travelers who tested negative, provid-
ing them with e- wrist bands that initially failed to allow efective monitoring. 
Government policy depended on the active cooperation of  those quarantined. 
Authorities fined and jailed the relatively small number caught violating quaran-
tine, five by mid- August (The Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, 2020b, 2020i, 2020j).
By early May 2020 local authorities had tested 170,000 specimens, mostly from 
pneumonia inpatients and inbound travelers (Wu et al., 2020, p. 5). By July 2020, 
well into the third wave, demand for tests far exceeded local capacity of about 
10,000 tests per day. Moreover, the close contacts of most local infected persons 
 were untraceable, so widespread had the virus become. At the time of this writ-
ing, the central government had established temporary testing labs in Hong Kong 
with a reported target capacity of 500,000 tests per day, based on testing five 
samples at a time (V. Wong, 2020). The central government also planned to build 
two temporary emergency COVID-19 hospitals in Hong Kong, similar to  those 
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built in Wuhan, to supplement local public hospitals and locally established tem-
porary isolation units (e.g., at Asia World Expo, Lei Yue Mun, and other repur-
posed facilities) (The Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
2020h). Government also acted in anticipation of further outbreaks of COVID-19 
during the peak winter flu season in the autumn and winter.
Economic and Social Policy
Hong Kong is characterized by high rates of in equality, densely packed and 
unafordable housing, and a miserly social welfare net. In 2016 the Gini coef-
ficient3 was 0.539, adjusted to 0.473 if benefits are included (Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region Census and Statistics Department, 2017a). Thousands of 
poor families in Hong Kong who have yet to qualify for relatively scarce public 
housing live in subdivided flats, sharing bathrooms and kitchens, or, for el derly 
singles, in caged bunk spaces. Hong Kong’s neoliberal economy provides nei-
ther a universal pension nor social security for the el derly (Poon & Wong, 2018). 
Social distancing mea sures have impacted the poor and el derly disproportion-
ally. When government shut schools and demanded online learning, poor par-
ents, many single, could hardly cope (Marques, 2020).  These issues languished 
while the government fought COVID-19, trying to mitigate its impact on the 
economy.
In 2019 and 2020 Hong Kong’s economy was hit by a  triple whammy: the US- 
China trade war, six months of almost daily and increasingly violent antigovern-
ment protests, and from late January 2020, COVID-19. As a result, Hong Kong’s 
economy slipped into recession and months of economic contraction. From the 
second quarter of 2019 Hong Kong’s economy contracted rapidly, so that by the 
first and second quarter 2020 real GDP fell by 9.1  percent and 9.0  percent, year- 
on- year, respectively (“2nd Tranche of Wage Subsidy Set,” 2020; The Government 
of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2020d). The government forecast 
a contraction of 6 to 8  percent for the year. Unemployment grew at seldom- seen 
rates of from about 2 to 3  percent in 2019 to 6.2  percent, the highest in more than 
fifteen years. Job losses  rose by 10.7   percent in April to June  2020  in tourism- 
related retail, accommodation, and food and beverage, the biggest fall since 
SARS-1 in 2003. Among them restaurants recorded a 14.7  percent unemployment 
rate as government restrictions to fight COVID-19 kicked in (The Government 
of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Census and Statistics Department, 
2020).
A year  earlier, months of antigovernment protest hammered  these same sec-
tors. In November 2019 alone, tourist arrivals fell by 56  percent, a steeper decline 
than even during SARS-1 when the WHO posted a travel advisory for Hong Kong 
and travelers stayed away (L. Cheng, 2019). Hong Kong provides no unemploy-
ment compensation, instead supporting the unemployed via a means- tested wel-
fare benefit, set at near destitution levels (comprehensive social security assistance, 
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CSSA [Hong Kong Social Welfare Department, 2020]). In April and May 2020 
the government reported a “sharp” increase in unemployment- related CSSA pay-
ments of 3,950 payments and 2,160 payments, respectively (“2nd Tranche of Wage 
Subsidy Set,” 2020). Yet the government’s own unemployment statistics indicate 
that at least 250,000  people lost their jobs during the pandemic (“Hong Kong 
Facts: Employment,” 2019). The government did distribute a one- time payment of 
HK$10,000 (US$1,282) to each resident.
At the time of this writing, the Hong Kong government had introduced 
three relatively large- subsidy, tax concession, and stimulus packages to cushion 
the economy (The Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
2020d), totaling HK$280 billion (US$36 billion), or 10  percent of the city’s GDP. 
The centerpiece was the Employment Support Scheme (ESS) designed to provide 
businesses with “time- limited subsidies” to reduce the need for employers to lay 
of their employees. The government’s stated goal was to protect employees and 
“guarantee employment.” On August 18, authorities announced that they had deliv-
ered HK$44 billion (US$5.7 billion) in the form of subsidies to 148,000 employ-
ers, mostly small and medium- sized enterprises employing fifty or fewer  people 
(“2nd Tranche of Wage Subsidy Set,” 2020).
The government intended that 1.9 million workers would benefit from this 
scheme.  Labor groups pointed out, however, that some employers accepted the 
subsidies and then forced their employees to take pay cuts, unpaid leave, or layofs. 
Union representatives complained that ‘the scheme  doesn’t require employers to 
disclose if they have received the subsidy, and called on employees to file a report 
if their employer has applied for the subsidy but  either failed to pay it out or forced 
employees to take a reduced wage or unpaid leave” (“Give Anti- Epidemic Funds 
Directly to Workers: Unions,” 2020).  Labor groups demanded that the subsidies be 
paid directly to workers.
Some sectors have prospered during COVID-19, including supermarkets. 
 Under the scheme authorities provided HK$560 million (US$72 million) to the 
 owners of Hong Kong’s duopoly supermarket chains, run by two conglomerates, 
CK Hutchison Holdings (Li Kashing  family, Hong Kong’s wealthiest) and Dairy 
Farm (Jardines) (“Hong Kong Subsidies Must End Up in Hands of  Those Who 
Need Them Most,” 2020). Each engaged hundreds of thousands of employees. 
Anticipating criticism, on August  18, 2020, the government promised the con-
glomerates further subsidies only if they passed on benefits to their customers. 
How this would be monitored was unclear.
In addition to the ESS, the Hong Kong government subsidized job creation, 
job advancement, and specific sectors required to fully or partially close  because 
of COVID-19. Authorities also announced a variety of other mea sures, such as 
government rent concessions, fee waivers, and deferral of loans. The Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority, the region’s central bank, increased its support for banks (cut 
reserve requirements, deferred new regulations, and increased bank liquidity), 
approved payment extensions from corporate customers, and granted other relief 
in total valued at about HK$1.1 trillion (US$142 billion) (Hong Kong  Monetary 
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Authority, 2020). With help from the Hong Kong government, the local Airport 
Authority provided a HK$2 trillion (US$258 billion) relief package to the aviation 
sector. The Hong Kong government also invested HK$30 billion (US$3.9 billion) 
in Cathay Pacific Airlines, mostly grounded during the pandemic, taking a six 
 percent stake, and $5.4 billion (US$700,000) in a local theme park, Ocean Park 
(The Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2020g; Schofield, 
2020; T. K. Wong, 2020).
Explanation
By late August 2020 Hong Kong had managed three waves of COVID-19 relatively 
successfully. This interim outcome was the result of learning from Hong Kong’s 
experience of SARS-1, support from the central government, a relatively merito-
cratic bureaucracy, sufficient healthcare investment to support a fragile public 
health care system, and cross- border networks of infectious disease experts that 
enabled early detection.
First, Hong Kong is a local government of China, an authoritarian country 
ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Hong Kong’s authoritarianism 
is characterized by centralized po liti cal leadership (the CCP), local government 
that focuses on policy implementation, and a po liti cally dependent and corpo-
ratized civil society, which privileges big business (Glasius, 2018; Ma, 2015; Pur-
cell, 1973). This system is implemented via colonial- era po liti cal, bureaucratic, 
economic, and educational institutions, which transitioned mostly unchanged 
from British to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. The CCP provides po liti cal lead-
ership in Hong Kong, guiding, supervising, and directing Hong Kong’s civil 
service- led government. The party rules Hong Kong with the active and enthu-
siastic support of the united front, of which the Hong Kong government is a 
core member. Since 2006 but accelerated in 2019, the CCP has shifted Hong 
Kong’s hybrid system of accountability (mixed external po liti cal and internal 
bureaucratic accountability) to one that is predominantly bureaucratic (inter-
nal), similar to the rest of China (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). As of this writing, 
the party still permits a somewhat greater degree of autonomy for the internet, 
media, education, and legal/judicial institutions in Hong Kong than exists on 
the mainland (Basic Law, 1990).
The early post-1997 hybrid system allowed local authorities in Hong Kong 
to carry out relatively thorough, critical, and transparent investigations into the 
local government’s mismanagement of SARS-1 when it hit Hong Kong in 2003 
(Abraham, 2004; Davis & Siu, 2007; Lee & Yun, 2006; Legislative Council, 2004; 
Thomson & Yow, 2004). Authorities learned from this experience, better prepar-
ing Hong Kong for the outbreak of COVID-19 (see the forty- six recommendations 
in SARS Expert Committee, 2003). Crucially, authorities set up the Center for 
Health Protection in 2004 with specific responsibility, authority, and accountabil-
ity for the prevention and control of communicable diseases (Recommendation 
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No. 2). Authorities improved coordination between the Hospital Authority, which 
has taken key responsibility for suppression in COVID-19, and the Department of 
Health (Recommendation No. 3). The government set up a new command structure, 
the “Steering Committee cum Command Centre,” chaired by the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region chief executive when the response level is “emergency,” 
as officials set it on January 25, 2020. Authorities prepared a pandemic manage-
ment plan for Hong Kong, which they rolled out swiftly on January 4, 2020. They 
established regular official channels of information sharing with cross- border 
organ izations in the Pearl River Delta and with the National Health Commission in 
Beijing. The government planned for epidemic surges and all that entails with the 
HA as the core (Recommendation No. 16). Authorities improved communications 
with the public, resulting in daily briefings delivered by Center for Health Pro-
tection experts, and the informative COVID-19 thematic website and dashboard 
(Recommendation No.  23) (Hong Kong Center for Health Protection, 2020b). 
Government increased support for research on newly emerging infectious diseases 
and university medical schools redirected research to this topic (Recommenda-
tion Nos. 35–40) (K. Y. Yuen, personal communications, June 12 and 14, 2020, and 
August 4 and 11, 2020; also see Wong et al., 2017). Officials have had less success, 
however, at improving coordination between the public and private healthcare sys-
tems. Public doctors continue to be attracted to lucrative private practice, which 
the medical profession is unwilling to touch.
Hong Kong’s experience of SARS prepared the  people of Hong Kong for 
months of nearly universal mask wearing, stepped up personal hygiene, and social 
distancing that, although not completely locking down the territory, produced the 
economic dislocation discussed previously (Wan et al., 2020). Hong Kongers are 
pragmatic and seek to protect themselves and their families. They are also gener-
ally law abiding, and COVID-19 management rules  were made law. Re spect for 
experts and peer pressure also contributed to this result, largely unafected by deep 
po liti cal divisions, months of antigovernment protest, and distrust of government.
Second, China is a unitary, not federal, system. Once the central govern-
ment de cided to suppress COVID-19, it did so very efectively, imposing tight 
border controls and complete lockdowns (see chapter 4). Hong Kong benefited 
from China’s unitary system. The central government provided border control, 
access to masks and personal protective equipment, improved testing and isola-
tion capacity, and a postponed legislative election. From late June 2020 new tools 
 were provided to suppress antigovernment protests (the national security law and 
its infrastructure). Further, Hong Kong could close its border with the mainland 
 because the central government agreed to this move.
Third, the technical competence, professionalism, and reputation of the Hong 
Kong public healthcare system are relatively high (Goodman, 2009; Kong et al., 
2015). In 1991 the government centralized management of all public hospitals in 
a hybrid organ ization, the HA, headed by a medical doctor. A board of directors 
governs the system, now employing 67,000  people. Authorities or ga nized  public 
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hospitals into seven regional clusters, each with a CEO to improve efficiency 
and ser vice delivery. The system has allowed specialization across the territory. 
 These moves better coordinated public health care and improved per for mance 
monitoring. The Secretary for Food and Health, traditionally a medical special-
ist, provides policy guidance to the HA (Gauld & Gould, 2002). Fourth, the gov-
ernment subsidizes the HA, amounting to about 14  percent of annual recurrent 
expenditure, third only to education (19  percent) and social welfare (14  percent) 
(Legislative Council, 2020). Substantial infrastructural and financial investments 
 were made in pandemic preparations in the wake of SARS-1. Still, as we have 
seen, Hong Kong’s public hospital- based healthcare system is fragile and finan-
cially unsustainable.
Fi nally, Hong Kong’s infectious disease specialists have developed dense net-
works of professional collaboration with colleagues on the mainland and overseas. 
Hong Kong is a global hub for the study of coronaviruses and avian influenza, 
based on its location. Western specialists visit Hong Kong to study  these diseases. 
Hong Kong epidemiologists and public health experts serve in se nior positions in 
mainland hospitals (e.g., the University of Hong Kong- Shenzhen Hospital), giv-
ing them access to patients. The central government and the WHO invite Hong 
Kong’s medical experts to join fact- finding missions to investigate novel coronavi-
ruses. K. Y. Yuen, University of Hong Kong, joined the third National Health Com-
mission mission to Wuhan in January 2020, which reported the infectiousness of 
COVID-19 at a Beijing press conference on 20 January. G. M. Leung, University 
of Hong Kong, joined the WHO mission to Wuhan in February 2020. Both Yuen 
and Leung, and undoubtedly  others, received information on December 31, 2019, 
about the situation in Wuhan that the Hong Kong authorities acted on in early 
January 2020. As a result of  these networks, Hong Kong could act early, and it did.
Conclusion
Hong Kong learned from its experience of SARS-1. Po liti cal leadership capable of 
learning is an asset. Still Hong Kong’s preparations  were incomplete. Prepared as 
they  were by experts and bureaucrats, the plans assumed the continued existence 
of an unreformed colonial- era public finance system and a fragile, barely able to 
cope public health system. That was to be expected. Po liti cal leaders should con-
sider the larger picture. Yet Hong Kong’s po liti cal system has proven unable to 
produce po liti cal leaders up to the challenge.
Hong Kong’s authoritarian po liti cal system, even though contested, has thus 
far prevented deep po liti cal divisions and distrust of government from fracturing 
the community’s response to COVID-19. In Hong Kong, the community appears 
to have compartmentalized politics and its pandemic response. The lack of elec-
toral politics during a pandemic and the relatively low stakes of elections in Hong 
Kong (voters do not elect the government) may account for this outcome.
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Notes
 1. This is the estimated number of  people an infected person would infect. Authorities 
sought to reduce it to less than one.
 2. This is the estimated number of  people an infected person would infect. Authorities 
sought to reduce it to less than one.
 3. The Gini coefficient is a mea sure of the distribution of income across a population 
used as a gauge of economic in equality. The coefficient ranges from 0 (or 0%) to 1 (or 
100%), with 0 representing perfect equality and 1 representing perfect in equality.
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 Public Health, Social Policies, and the Control Tower  
in South  Korea
June Park
South  Korea’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic
What role do institutions play in overcoming a public health crisis? The case of 
COVID-19  in South  Korea suggests that, amid the country’s whirlwind of pop-
u lism and geopo liti cal strug gles, the country’s resilience in the pandemic relies 
heavi ly on technocratic mea sures that derive from the po liti cal necessity of the 
leadership and the demand by the public to end the pandemic, while si mul ta-
neously relying on the participation of the  people and resisting public protests as 
a democracy.
Institutions have been critical to South  Korea’s response to COVID-19. South 
 Korea’s  handling of COVID-19 has been based on its experience of the  Middle 
East respiratory syndrome (MERS) in 2015— another coronavirus that rocked 
the country, albeit in a relatively short period compared to COVID-19. In 2015 
South  Korea recorded 38 deaths and 186 confirmed cases, higher than anywhere 
in the world outside the  Middle East—an appalling figure for a country that is well 
equipped with a universal healthcare system and high- quality public health infra-
structure. The realization from MERS that full utilization of the country’s extant 
facilities must be coupled with institutional change resonated through the pub-
lic health bureaucracy. Many of the institutional mea sures that  were transformed 
post- MERS  were critical to the response to COVID-19, and additional institutional 
changes  were made during the COVID-19 pandemic. Overall, institutional trans-
formation of public health and social policies in South  Korea is built on experience 
and responses from the public.
Specifically, what has become more salient during the COVID-19 pandemic is 
that public health authorities formulate policies from the technocratic perspective 
but at the same time are constantly met with demands to satisfy the public from 
their own perspectives. South  Korea has evolved in the past three de cades since 
the country’s democ ratization in the 1980s, and the country can no longer toler-
ate a system whereby policies are dictated to its  people. The policy think- through, 
therefore, must resonate with the public to bring about strong participation among 
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them. A plethora of its citizens would participate rigorously in a government- 
driven initiative to combat the virus by choice—be it large- scale real- time poly-
merase chain reaction (RT- PCR) testing and QR code- check- ins for personal data 
sharing  under the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act (IDCPA) and 
the Medical Ser vice Act, or social distancing mea sures and quarantine  under the 
Quarantine Act—in the hopes of getting back to normal life as law- abiding citizens.
This chapter broadly examines the role of institutions in South  Korea in its 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic through public health and social poli-
cies, embodied by the three Ts: testing, tracing, and treatment, spearheaded by 
the  Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA). On health policy 
and public health mea sures, the chapter centers on the implementation of the 
revised IDCPA and the Medical Ser vice Act.  These provided  legal grounds for 
emergency- use authorization (EUA) of  RT- PCR test kits by KCDC in public 
and private hospitals as well as drive- through test sites; the electronic contact- 
tracing “Smart Management System” (SMS)  under the by the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT) based on personal data; and  free testing 
and treatment  under South  Korea’s universal healthcare system. The implemen-
tation of the revised Quarantine Act allowed for quarantining individuals with 
confirmed cases of COVID-19, while social distancing mea sures based on the 
COVID-19 reproduction rate (R- value: the number of  people that one infected 
person  will pass on a virus to, on average)  were enacted by the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare (MOHW) in lieu of full- fledged lockdowns. The chapter also exam-
ines disinfection and public mask provision through controlled domestic produc-
tion by the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (MFDS) and mask- wearing guide-
lines by the MOHW and KDCA. The public responded to  these mea sures with 
proactive participation, which proved to be crucial for controlling the virus amid 
several unexpected peaks in confirmed case numbers throughout the pandemic. 
The limitations of South  Korea’s COVID-19 pandemic governance are revealed in 
domestic vaccine development for COVID-19, despite showing some pro gress on 
development of treatment drugs.
On social policy, the chapter examines the South Korean government’s finan-
cial support for the public, the vulnerable, small business  owners, and medical 
facilities as regions throughout the country  were hard hit continuously by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The distribution of financial relief packages by the South 
Korean government to revitalize the economy sparked a heated public debate on 
basic income, while si mul ta neously raising criticisms on populist policies, in a 
country where capitalism has prevailed. Emergency care was provided to  children 
and the el derly in need of care.
Among  these policies, what stirred the most heated debate  were the pay-
checks to the overall population given out by the government. Although the gov-
ernment is responsible for the well- being of the citizens  under the Framework Act 
on Social Security, the concept of basic income is underwritten in this law, and 
the concept was rather new to the South Korean citizens. Therefore, the provi-
sion of economic stimulus packages provided by the Ministry of Economy and 
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Finance (MOEF) was met with divided responses from the public. At the local 
government level, the Local Public Enterprises Act served as the  legal grounds 
for regional development bond issuance  toward the livelihood of citizens. The 
Framework Act on the Management of Disasters and Safety as well as the Disaster 
Relief Act gave way to financial support of the public in dif er ent forms, such as 
prepaid cards, cash, or regional currency cards. The amounts per  house hold or 
business by regional governments varied as well.
Overall, this chapter argues that functioning institutions  matter in pandemic 
governance and determines the level of their efectiveness by scrutinizing the 
case of South  Korea  under COVID-19, focusing on public health bureaucracy and 
policy coordination supported by public participation, which are vital to efective 
policy response. It serves as a rec ord of South  Korea’s institutional experience of 
COVID-19 and provides an overview of the health policies and social policies in 
South  Korea  under the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the crux of the chapter lies 
with the institutional mea sures and the public response, it highlights the technoc-
racy at the core in public health and the significant role it has come to play as the 
“control tower.”
Nonetheless, although South  Korea may have been relatively successful in con-
trolling the virus compared to other nations, especially  those in Eu rope and the 
United States, as of this writing, the country remains in the pro cess of  handling 
the crisis and  faces further challenges for economic recovery ahead.
Health Policies and Public Health in South  Korea  
under COVID-19
Upon the discovery of Patient Zero from Wuhan, China, in the city of Incheon, 
South  Korea, on January 20, 2020 (the same date as the discovery of Patient Zero 
in Seattle in the state of Washington in the United States), South  Korea’s immedi-
ate public health response to COVID-19 (Government of  Korea, 2020; Ministry of 
Health and Welfare, 2020a, 2020b) has been best described as the three Ts: test, 
trace, and treatment. Alongside public health policies of social distancing, disin-
fection, and public mask provision, the prescriptions of the South Korean public 
health officials embodying the three Ts became the fundamental pillars in carry-
ing out public health policy  under COVID-19 (Cha & Kim, 2020). South  Korea 
was not new to coronaviruses— before encountering SARS- CoV-2 (COVID-19), 
the country had experienced SARS- CoV  under the severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) outbreak in 2002 and the rather distinct SARS- CoV-1  under the 
MERS outbreak in 2015 (Koh, 2020; Our World in Data, 2020).
The amendments to the IDCPA in addition to the Medical Ser vice Act and 
the Quarantine Act on February 26, 2020— only one month into the outbreak 
of COVID-19  in South  Korea ( Table  6.1)— were instrumental to shaping South 
 Korea’s policy choices  under COVID-19, as the first two laws served as the cor-
nerstone of the three Ts in public health policies and the final law the crux of 
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quarantine mea sures (Library of Congress, 2020). Without the  legal foundations 
firmly in place, implementing new mea sures with public persuasion in an efec-
tive manner would not have been pos si ble, regardless of the competency of public 
health officials (Park & Chung, 2021).
Testing: Large- Scale Testing at Drive- Through and  
Designated Test Sites by KDCA and MFDS
Most impor tant, the IDCPA made pos si ble large- scale testing nationwide through 
the EUA of RT- PCR test kits by KDCA and MFDS in public and private hospi-
tals as well as drive- through test sites (Park & Chung, 2021). As of September 12, 
2020, the  Korea Center for Disease Control (KCDC)  under the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare (MOHW) was elevated to the  Korea Disease Control and Prevention 
Agency (KDCA), allowing for more in de pen dence in policy making. Nonetheless, 
it must still work in coordination with MOHW, as a new deputy minister position 
has been created to liaise with the KDCA. To ensure high levels of accuracy, only 
RT- PCR test kits (with accuracy levels of 95  percent)  were given  under EUA. A 
public- private partnership (PPP) mechanism between the KDCA and the MFDS 
ensured quality control and competition- based applications by leapfroggers of 
the South Korean In Vitro Diagnostics (IVD) industry. Notably, big data analy sis 
conducted by supercomputers enabled by artificial intelligence relying only on 
the RNA information provided by the World Health Organ ization on COVID-19 
at the time of outbreak in Wuhan gave impetus to RT- PCR kit development by 
a South Korean molecular diagnosis com pany, Seegene (Watson et  al., 2020). 
Drive- through RT- PCR test sites (Kwon et al., 2020; D. Lee & Lee, 2020) and des-
ignated test sites at public and private hospitals nationwide enabled large- scale 
testing with results in an expedited six hours, which did not exist during MERS 
even with an EUA mechanism. Only the then- KCDC (now KDCA) pro cessed 
tests at that time, prolonging wait times for test results.  Under the IDCPA, the 
tests  were provided  free  unless someone volunteered to be tested without being 
contacted and advised by KDCA’s COVID-19 tracking team to be tested and 
tested negative.
Tracing: COVID-19 Smart Management System by  
MOLIT in Cooperation with KCDC
Electronic tracing was one of the crucial ele ments that prevented South  Korea 
from lockdowns. The electronic contact tracing platform, SMS,  under MOLIT, 
was launched based on the conditional use of personal data  under public health 
emergency, based on Article 76–2(1) of the IDCPA, which was an existing clause 
written into law post- MERS.
Elaborate amendments to subsidiary clauses of the IDCPA have been made 
in accordance with the unfolding COVID-19 situation (Ministry of Health 
and Welfare, 2020h). The conditions that bolstered the use of such mea sures 
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in South  Korea  were its reliance on extant technology on smart cities: (1) its 
heavi ly wired environment with 5G stations rolled out where 95   percent of 
South Koreans possess a cell phone (Koh, 2019) and (2) its credit card distribu-
tion rate at 64   percent (World Bank Indicators, 2017), where nine out of ten 
South Koreans possess a credit card, with an average of 1.88 cards per person 
(J. Choi, 2020a), albeit the caveats of financial technology usage and provision 
rate  under expansion but still at relatively lower levels (Yoon, 2019). Although 
GPS location data (based stations of the mobile networks) and credit card pay-
ment rec ords are the main sources of information used for the SMS, CCTV- 
surveillance footage (e- National Figures, 2019), the most disputed component 
of data collection (originally implemented in South  Korea for criminal investi-
gation purposes), is not uploaded onto the SMS but used on a separate track. It 
was publicly noted by a MOLIT official at the joint MOLIT and KCDC online 
briefing on April 9, 2020, that GPS data and credit card payment data are only 
uploaded to SMS for additional verification eforts that are deemed necessary, 
at the request of health officials for epidemiological survey. Further, CCTV 
footage is used for supplementary eforts to connect the logistics of an infec-
tion case and to verify the testimonies of an infected person, given the crucial 
need of identifying the exact date of infection (day 1) of COVID-19 in the con-
tact tracing pro cess to accurately conduct epidemiological investigations (KTV 
YouTube Channel, 2020a).
In March  2020 the COVID-19 SMS (KTV YouTube Channel, 2020b; Smart 
City  Korea, 2020) using GPS cell phone data and credit card transaction data, was 
developed by MOLIT (Lee, 2020c). Other wise dubbed the “COVID-19 Epidemic 
Investigation Support System” by the KDCA, the SMS enabled the expedition of 
epidemiological surveys and exhaustive search for new cases of infection, which 
had been conducted entirely manually  until that point (KTV YouTube Channel, 
2020a). According to the KDCA, the manual method would take at least a day 
for results to be obtained, whereas the SMS enabled the tracking in ten minutes. 
Testimony by a MOLIT official revealed that the ministry had already been work-
ing on a Smart City application (app) system, which covered all regions of South 
 Korea, and that the SMS was launched based on a suggestion by an official that 
had been working on the Smart City data hub technology at MOLIT. In addition 
to the SMS, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety launched the Self- Quarantine 
app and the Self- Diagnosis app, available for Android mobile phones on Google 
Play (March 7, 2020) and iPhones through the Apple App Store (March 16, 2020) 
for public download and use. The apps  were used to implement strict two- week 
quarantine mea sures for South Korean nationals and foreign entrants through the 
South Korean border (Van der Veere & Ha, 2020).
Other digital technologies involving artificial intelligence (Lin & Hou, 2020; 
Ting et al., 2020) or internet of  things (IoT)  were also deployed in South  Korea. 
Hi- COVIDNet (M. Kim et al., 2020), by the  Korea Advanced Institute of Tech-
nology (KAIST), used big data and deep learning methods to predict the two- 
week number of infectees from abroad (KAIST Public Relations, 2020; H. Lee, 
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2020b).  Korea Telecom (KT) developed the COVID-19 risk mea sure ment model 
and AI  hotel and food server robots (J. Park, 2020b) for servicing customers to 
further enhance the efects of social distancing (M. Choi, 2020; M. Park, 2020).
Treatment:  Free Treatment  under the Healthcare System  
and Community Treatment Centers
Article 6 of the IDCPA as amended on March 3, 2020, stipulates that all citizens 
have a “right to receive the diagnosis and medical treatment of any infectious dis-
ease” and that “State and local governments  shall bear expenses incurred within.” 
 Free testing and treatment  were provided to the South Korean public through its 
high- quality universal healthcare system (Maizland & Felter, 2020). According to the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) based on 2017 
figures, South  Korea’s number of hospital beds per 1,000 population remains the 
highest among OECD countries: South  Korea (12.27), Germany (8), France (5.98), 
Italy (3.18), Spain (2.97), United States (2.77), and United Kingdom (2.54) (Ministry 
of Health and Welfare, 2020c; OECD, 2020). Maintenance of capacity of hospitals 
was emphasized to prevent the breakdown of the medical system in South  Korea. 
Patients  were categorized by severity of symptoms to prioritize the acute patients 
in the intensive care units with pressurized beds in hospitals. Up to 303 hospitals 
applied to be designated COVID-19 protection hospitals operating outpatient clin-
ics for respiratory patients and confirmed patients with minor symptoms  were 
 housed at community treatment centers (W. S. Choi et al., 2020; Kang et al., 2020; 
Y.- H. Lee et al., 2020; P. G. Park et al., 2020), which proved to be a cost- efective 
and resource- saving strategy in managing massive cases of COVID-19 (Ministry of 
Health and Welfare, 2020b). The amended Medical Ser vice Act required hospitals 
and medical facilities to streamline their management of charts and patient docu-
ments even  after repose or closure of facilities, defined the term “medical related 
infections” arising from hospitals and related care facilities, and required medical 
institutions to voluntarily report any signs of infections in preemptive mea sures to 
track cluster infections in nursing homes and hospitals (Medical Ser vice Act, 2020).
With the continued influx of confirmed cases of COVID-19 in foreigners enter-
ing the South Korean border that remained open, the  free treatment and care for 
foreign entrants to South  Korea came  under scrutiny and received criticism by 
the South Korean public for wasting tax money. The  free treatment scheme for 
foreigners was then shifted to conditional  free treatment based on reciprocity by 
nationality to ensure reciprocal treatment of overseas South Koreans by foreign 
countries (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2020i).
Social Distancing Mea sures without Total Lockdowns  
and Medical System Maintenance
Social distancing mea sures and quarantine guidelines  were based on reproduc-
tion rate by the MOHW in lieu of full- fledged lockdowns.  Under the amended 
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Quarantine Act, the quarantine at the South Korean border was streamlined 
for efficiency and quality control, and the MOHW was granted the authority to 
quarantine individuals arriving or transiting through the South Korean border 
if afected by COVID-19,  under a period of fourteen days if confirmed COVID-19 
positive or epidemiologically presumed positive.  Those who broke quarantine 
 under Article 6 of the IDCPA  were subject to a fine of KRW 1,000,000 or 1 year in 
prison. Social distancing campaigns throughout the country contributed to pre-
venting the spread of COVID-19 (S. W. Lee et al., 2020; S. W. Park et al., 2020), of 
which the levels for implementation would range from 1 to 3 (level 1: small cluster 
infections, level 2: community- level infections, level 3: massive scale infections) 
 after weekly assessments by public health authorities. Each time a big cluster 
infection was witnessed—in the Shincheonji religious sect infections in Daegu in 
February 2020, the Itaewon clubs in early June 2020, or the August 15 Gwangh-
wamun protests, as seen in Figure 6.1— the levels  were elevated to keep the virus 
reproduction rate  under control and to maintain hospital capacity.
The MOHW evaluated the efects of social distancing and public participation, 
evidenced by tracking cell phone mobility during the targeted time periods (and 
cell phone mobility data during observed time periods and public transportation 
ridership fluctuations) (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2020e). However, grad-
ual increase of ridership  after high- level social distancing periods (J. Park, 2020a) 
indicated a societal inertia returning to normal patterns, whereas the economic 
downturn (i.e., losses in business revenue from infections that lead to disinfection 
and temporary closures, or abiding by social distancing mea sures) from COVID-19 
continued to be exacerbated (Park & Maher, 2020). Public criticisms  were based 
on the grounds of the need to resume economic activities, as  there  were dire eco-
nomic ramifications from reinforced mea sures of social distancing. The details of 
the criticisms  were  toward public health officials of MOHW formulating policy 
centering on reproduction rates (S. Choi & Ki, 2020; Ministry of Health and Wel-
fare, 2020e), medical system capacity, and its maintenance, rather than economic 
consequences from the mea sures.
Disinfection of Public Venues for Prevention  
of Virus Spread
As much as the South Korean response to COVID-19 did not entail com-
plete lockdowns, it was vital for the public health authorities to maintain and 
restore public health by sanitation and disinfection eforts, particularly public 
spaces, on a regular basis throughout the country  under Articles 50 to 60 of 
the IDCPA. For this social endeavor the KDCA laid out guidelines for disinfec-
tion via official documents, indicating the training, equipment, and methods of 
disinfection, as well as a case- by- case approach on the use of specific nonmedi-
cal chemicals for virus disinfection eforts (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 
2020f ). The guidelines  were updated in August 2020 (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, 2020g).
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Public Mask Provision System  under IDCPA and Mandatory  
Mask- Wearing Guidelines
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the use of face masks was common among 
South Korean citizens  because of the micro- fine dust and yellow dust from 
China and domestic air pollution impacting the country seasonally. Cultural or 
religious taboos on mask wearing  were therefore difficult to find, and as soon 
as the COVID-19 outbreak in China made headlines, the South Korean public 
sought to secure face masks. In a country where online retail and grocery delivery 
based on supply- and- demand algorithms worked smoothly, peculiar panic buy-













































































Figure 6.1. Daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases.
Source: “Our World in Data” based on data published by COVID-19 Data Repository by 
the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University. 
https:// ourworldindata . org / coronavirus - data - explorer ? zoomTo Selection = true&time 
= 2020 - 01 - 03 . . latest&country = ~KOR&region = World& casesMetric = true&interval 
= smoothed&hideControls = true&smoothing = 7&pickerMetric = total _ cases&pickerSort 
= desc.
Note: The three main slopes point to the first, second, and third major waves of 
COVID-19 in South  Korea. The first wave was caused by major cluster infections 
in Daegu surrounding the religious group Shincheonji, the second by the August 15 
demonstrations in Gwanghwamun, and the third wave in which small and big cluster 
infections at the community and grassroots level are the main  causes of newly confirmed 
cases.
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masks,  under the amended IDCPA Article 6, public health officials  were granted 
the  legal authority to take “necessary means to make masks available to  children 
and the el derly in a public health crisis involving any respiratory virus.” The MFDS 
pursued a public mask provision program from March 2020 based on associating 
the final digit of birth year with day of the week, procuring masks sold at marts 
and pharmacies, whereby citizens would acquire masks with their ID cards.  After 
controlled domestic production, the MFDS abolished the public mask provision 
system in July 2020 and lifted the export restriction on masks produced domesti-
cally in September 2020.
Mask- wearing guidelines by the MOHW and KDCA  were not met with too 
much backlash as in the West, and the public responded with proactive participa-
tion to end the pandemic as soon as pos si ble.  Because  there was a high level of 
policy reception on wearing masks by the public, mandatory mask- wearing guide-
lines  were not in place  until masks on public transport became compulsory on 
May 25, 2020, and in indoor and public spaces in thirteen out of seventeen met-
ropolitan cities or provinces in South  Korea, including Seoul Metropolitan City 
on August 24, 2020, by an administrative order, following the August 15 Gwangh-
wamun protests, which caused large cluster infections. From November 13, 2020, 
fines of up to KRW 100,000 on violations of mandatory mask- wearing guidelines 
in public  were enforced in South  Korea (Seoul Metropolitan City, 2020). Nonethe-
less, as in other Western countries, mandating mask- wearing guidelines resulted in 
public responses of noncompliance and refusal to cooperate in public health safety 
eforts. Such cases often resulted in escalated conflict and vio lence on public trans-
port and other public venues in South  Korea, to which the public health authori-
ties responded by a fine and criminal prosecution by the Korean Police Agency 
(Ministry of the Interior and Safety, 2020). Overall, high public participation rate 
in wearing masks proved to be crucial for controlling the virus in the absence of 
vaccines, amid several unexpected peaks in confirmed case numbers throughout 
the pandemic.
Limitations in Treatment Drugs and Vaccine  
Development
Although South  Korea made strides in the three Ts during the course of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, it still fell short of competency and speed in vaccine devel-
opment, with a relatively shorter history of the industry compared to countries 
where Big Pharma— large phar ma ceu ti cal companies— has played a significant 
role in the development of vaccines. Although SK Bioscience demonstrated 
the potential for vaccine development with support from the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation since 2016 (The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2016) 
coupled with an additional financial backing for research and development 
in May  2020 (Jung, 2020), it has gone nowhere near the global competition 
on COVID-19 vaccines. SK Bioscience is highly likely to produce vaccines 
on behalf of Big Pharma’s vaccines when they are introduced, rather than 
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announce its own (H. Lee, 2020a). Such lackluster per for mance reaffirms the 
difficulty, time, and efort required to excel in the vaccines industry. Similarly, 
reagents of South Korean RT- PCR test kits have relied on imported sources; for 
them to excel further, domestic development and production of the reagents 
 will be required to ensure stable supply and competitiveness (J. Choi, 2020b; 
Han, 2020).
On treatment drug development, South Korean phar ma ceu ti cal com pany Cell-
trion yielded positive results in the development of CT- P59, an anti- COVID-19 
monoclonal antibody treatment candidate as a preventative mea sure,  under the 
approval of the Investigational New Drug (IND) application  under MFDS on Octo-
ber 8, 2020. The treatment entered phase III clinical  trials in twelve dif er ent coun-
tries, with the planned timeline of completion by end of 2020 (S. Cha, 2020; Ministry 
of Food and Drug Safety, 2020).
Social and Economic Policies in South  Korea  under COVID-19
Fiscal Response by the South Korean Government  
and Supplementary Bud gets Approved
The early successful eforts to reduce the incidence of COVID-19 cases received 
positive responses domestically and from abroad, but as time passed, public com-
plaints from vari ous sectors of the economy pressured the government to provide 
economic stimulus packages. The initial support package prepared by the execu-
tive branch and the MOEF in late February 2020 did not suffice in responding 
to the economic damages to the South Korean government. Leading up to the 
April 15, 2020, legislative election, the government faced more pressures on finan-
cial support provision.
COVID-19 Relief Funds by the South Korean Government  
and the Debate on Basic Income
 These events led to a major supplementary bud get allocation and approval prior 
to the election and subsequent series of supplementary bud gets in the aftermath 
of the election  under the Framework Act on the Management of Disasters and 
Safety and the Disaster Relief Act. Notably, the government’s emergency relief 
payment (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2020c) from the first supplementary 
bud get sparked a long- awaited, heated debate on basic income in South  Korea 
(Kim, 2018).  Under the Framework Act on Social Security, South  Korea focused 
more on public assistance and social insurance in welfare policy, but had not 
dwelt upon the concepts of social ser vice and income provision leading up to 
COVID-19, and the  legal grounds for a basic income concept are not made explicit 
in the law.
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In disseminating the emergency funds, using digital tools, South  Korea 
introduced cash transfers for quarantined individuals, coupons for low- income 
 house holds, and wage and rent support for small businesses, which  were admin-
istered by the MOEF and the Ministry of Interior and Safety. The government’s 
initial rollout via the MOEF of comprehensive stimulus packages catering to all 
citizens received mixed responses from the public (Kim & Lee, 2020; Ministry of 
Health and Welfare, 2020d). Although some expressed gratitude for the lump- 
sum cash in their bank accounts,  there was also backlash by critics for populist 
economic strategy and demands on targeted support. The Ministry of Employ-
ment and  Labor then provided stabilization funds for individuals engaged in spe-
cific industries and freelancers the second time around (Ministry of Employment 
and  Labor, 2020). As of this writing, the third wave of COVID-19 continues in 
South  Korea, and  there are discussions of a plausible third round of emergency 
relief payment.
 Table  6.1 is a breakdown of the fiscal responses and disaster relief packages 
that  were proposed by the South Korean government with the MOEF (executive 
branch) and  later passed by the South Korean National Assembly.  These stimulus 
packages would not be able to account for the array of economic damages result-
ing from COVID-19, which  were accumulated through a series of social distancing 
periods.  Going forward, the biggest challenge for South  Korea  will be recovery of 
its economic potential at the  house hold level.
Institutions and the Control Tower in South  Korea’s COVID-19 
Pandemic Governance
State capacity in pandemic governance in South  Korea has been a combina-
tion of public health and socioeconomic policies on top of existing public health 
infrastructure, coupled with transparency and information delivered in a timely 
manner by the public health authorities that served as the control tower and pub-
lic participation. For South  Korea, large- scale RT- PCR testing made it pos si ble to 
slow down the rate of virus transmission, thereby lowering mortality rate from 
COVID-19 at an early stage of the outbreak.
The policy choices made by South  Korea indicate the significance of prior 
coronavirus experiences that have impacted solutions written into law, as in the 
IDCPA. South  Korea’s legislative election on April 15, 2020, during the pandemic, 
also influenced the government’s need to demonstrate positive results in pan-
demic governance per for mance. The incumbent Moon Jae-in government won 
the general election by a landslide victory, having flattened the curve with the 
MOHW and KDCA at the forefront, acting as the control tower. The concept of 
the control tower in the South Korean policy- making system has been coined as 
the “Government Administrative Control Tower (GACT) in a Crisis Management 
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refers to a central hub at the top of a tall building used in aviation, from which 
controllers with a high level of authority direct takeof and landing. In supply 
chain management, a control tower refers to a pro cess of decision making and 
execution by visualizing distribution flow with real- time data (Bentz, 2014).
The control tower concept, which is commonly found in engineering technol-
ogy or supply chain management, is applied in domestic policy- making to refer to 
the chain of command, or in more narrowly defined terms, “a systematic method 
whereby a central organ ization controls a situation by directing certain individu-
als to act as planned, agilely adjusting its approach in the face of uncertainty and 
the ever- present possibility of expanding disaster” (Lee, 2015). The control tower 
is a system by which decisions are made through interor gan i za tional eforts in the 
shape of a pyramid, in which  every organ ization has its own role and task, akin to a 
chain of command. In spite of the existence of the KCDC in 2015, the absence of a 
clear and transparent control tower during MERS was considered one of the main 
ele ments of policy failure and gave a wake-up call to South  Korea’s lawmakers, 
which prompted them to make a series of institutional changes and  legal amend-
ments to make the MOHW the main and highest control tower for disaster pre-
vention and control mechanisms.
Despite the economic downturn and low popularity  because of the admin-
istration’s constant maneuvers with North  Korea, without delivering substantial 
results in foreign policy results, the early response to the pandemic led to victory 
for the incumbent party in the general election on April  15, 2020. The election 
results reveal that despite dissatisfaction with the incumbents, citizens hoped for 
ending the pandemic with a significant level of trust in the public health authori-
ties, with further expectations of their role as control tower. Given public percep-
tion that South  Korea has a relatively superb public health infrastructure among 
OECD countries but failed in pandemic governance in MERS, another pandemic 
governance failure in COVID-19, like that witnessed in MERS, would have been 
considered unforgivable by South Korean citizens.
South  Korea’s centralized power structure evolves around the presidency, and 
it extends to regional governments in a centrifugal manner. To secure nationwide 
support, the legislative eforts  were crucial in pandemic governance, and fast- track 
pro cesses  were conducted to pass the amendments to the IDCPA. South  Korea went 
through democ ratization in the 1980s; the impeachment pro cess of former President 
Park Geun- hye in 2017 served as a litmus test to South Korean democracy while the 
remnants of authoritarianism remain embedded in the centralized power structure 
and the presidency. Responding to public opinion and pressures on the government 
for delivering on crisis management became central to leadership maintenance.
Conclusion: Crisis Recovery and the Road Ahead  
for South  Korea
In the aftermath of the general election, having secured a majority in the National 
Assembly, bipartisanship is regrettably absent on multiple domestic and foreign 
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policy fronts. The left- leaning incumbent government has been turning a blind eye 
not just on public opinion but policy suggestions from other po liti cal parties. Since 
democ ratization, South Korean presidencies are five- year terms without reelec-
tions. With the next election coming up in 2022, the Moon Jae-in government 
needs to continuously deliver on pandemic governance for the progressives to stay 
in power. Nonetheless, pandemic governance, however successful it may be,  will 
not suffice in clearing the Moon Jae-in administration of the missteps taken in the 
failed détente with North  Korea and lackluster results on the economy. The prob-
ability of a more deeply divided po liti cal arena into progressive and conservative 
parties remains high in South  Korea.
Into the  future, pandemics or other infectious diseases  will come in shorter 
cycles, with new viruses emerging constantly. Maintaining the quality of the uni-
versal healthcare system is paramount to South  Korea,  because the country’s popu-
lation is aging rapidly. The pressure on the government to perform well in pub-
lic health crises  will keep the government in check and public health technocrats 
occupied and strengthen  legal foundations and institutions as the country experi-
ences any subsequent pandemics. In the prolonged pandemic, the policy solutions 
on economic recovery from COVID-19 remains the elephant in the room in South 
 Korea just as elsewhere in the world, and despite South  Korea’s Personal Informa-
tion Protection Act, the questions regarding data privacy  will arise more frequently 
as the shift to the contactless economy  under COVID-19 demands more use of 
personal data in cyberspace. Data governance in this regard  will be crucial  under 
the tech- oriented features of South  Korea’s economy, as the contactless economy is 
further bolstered by the deployment of artificial intelligence and seamless network 
infrastructure, in which the control and use of data would be key.
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 7 Unified, Preventive, low- cost governMent 
resPonse to covid-19 in việt naM
Emma Willoughby
Việt Nam has become a poster child of the COVID-19 pan-
demic. It serves as a counterpoint to the other communist power house coun-
try in Asia— China, which has, by many media accounts, been blamed for the 
emergence of COVID-19 and sequestering impor tant data about the virus. In 
contrast, the Viet nam ese government has been praised for its swift and early 
action to quell the spread of COVID-19 in the country by closing of the nearly 
800- mile- long Chinese border, which is along the country’s most mountain-
ous territory. With approximately 96 million  people, Việt Nam ranks first as the 
most populated country with the fewest number of coronavirus cases. It is also 
one of the few countries among  those most populated with a government that is 
strongly committed to stopping the virus. Yet Việt Nam remains a relatively poor 
country, with an average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of US$2,566. 
Like many countries, Việt Nam  faces per sis tent challenges in improving popu-
lation health and education opportunities for all. As major cities Hà Nội and 
Hồ Chí Minh City continue to see massive economic growth, urban poverty 
persists as more  people relocate from the countryside.  There are also signifi-
cant regional inequalities between more urban and rural provinces, particularly 
among ethnic minority communities located in the country’s mountain regions, 
which have seen poverty reduction at slower rates than the rest of the country 
(World Bank, 2014).
Nevertheless, the Viet nam ese government took early, targeted action against 
COVID-19 to spare its population from a disastrous outbreak. In January 2020, 
when reports from Wuhan about the virus emerged, the Ministry of Health mobi-
lized the Public Health Emergency Operation Center to meet and discuss pan-
demic preparation.1 Similarly, as in China, citizens throughout Việt Nam  were at 
this time celebrating the Lunar New Year holiday, Tết, a week- long public holiday 
during which time families travel to gather together. Schools remained closed for 
several weeks  after the holiday (La et al., 2020). Early response focused on China 
as a source of viral transmission, but by March 2020, as case numbers continued 
to rise, the Viet nam ese government turned attention to all foreigners entering 
the country as cases  were increasingly linked to Eu rope and the United States. 
On March 12, 2020, the government mandated a fourteen- day quarantine for all 
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incoming travelers, which they hosted at converted military bases. By March 22, 
all foreigners  were barred entry into the country (La et al., 2020). Nonessential 
businesses  were shut down for only two weeks’ time in April 2020. Once cases 
of COVID-19  were identified, individuals  were directed to quarantine and  those 
in pos si ble contact with the virus  were identified, traced, and also sent to a state- 
run quarantine fa cil i ty. As a result of the country’s stringent, but also short- lived, 
eforts, Việt Nam had reported no deaths related to the COVID-19 virus for one 
hundred days,  until July 24.
With only 417 total cases of COVID-19 at the end of July 2020, Việt Nam was 
reporting no more community transmission of the virus. However, on July 24, a 
new case was reported in the city of Đà Nẵng. By August 10, 2020, the country 
reported fourteen deaths from COVID-19 and linked 347 cases to the outbreak in 
Đà Nẵng and Quảng Nam province (Viet, 2020). As of late August, the country 
reported a total of thirty- five COVID- related deaths.
With fears of further community spread into the month of September 2020, the 
country faced the new challenge of quickly isolating cases from this new outbreak. 
Yet, at the time of revising this chapter, Việt Nam has demonstrated yet again, no 
community transmission for the past nineteen days. Viral resurgence  will test the 
country’s health care system and the government’s efectiveness. At the time of the 
Đà Nẵng outbreak, citywide lockdowns  were reintroduced, as bars and karaoke 
clubs in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City  were closed and in Đà Nẵng, only phar-
macies, hospitals, ATMs, and supermarkets remained open. Nonessential workers 
teleworked for two weeks. Approximately 80,000 tourists  were evacuated from Đà 
Nẵng, and estimates report that approximately 180,000  people  were quarantined 
at home or in facilities (including  hotels) around the country (Viet, 2020).
In large part, the country’s success is indebted to the surveillance capacity of 
the Viet nam ese government, a one- party state led by the Viet nam ese Communist 
Party (VCP). The country has maintained a hierarchical structure of communism 
with extensive party networks since its in de pen dence in 1945, providing it with 
valuable tools in rolling out a preventative, low- cost strategy to combat COVID-19 
(London, 2014). The international  community has heralded the government’s 
response, which has relied on thorough contact tracing, enforced quarantine, 
mass temperature screenings, and widespread consistent public health messaging, 
often conducted by party- affiliated social groups and  unions. The government was 
able to efectively deploy strict preventative mea sures during an event in which 
their general distrust of China aligned with preserving economic development 
and tourism (T. Vu, personal communication, July 8, 2020). The legitimacy of the 
VCP relies on its ability to deliver on economic development, especially for elites 
and the  middle class (Vu, 2014). Government success in quelling COVID-19 would 
have major impact on the country’s trade and tourism industries.
In sum, the Viet nam ese government has used its available tools to deliver an 
impressively coordinated, seemingly ordered, preventative pandemic response 
efort. The unity and strength of the VCP  were impor tant  factors in demonstrat-
ing such a response. It is not yet entirely clear the influence of  factors that con-
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tributed to mass citizen compliance with such eforts. Yet it might be that most 
stringent pandemic response eforts in Việt Nam remained targeted and  limited 
to select regions, rather than countrywide. Considering that most of the efort was 
done to prevent spread early in 2020, the government’s response was impressive 
but perhaps not as herculean as presented in most media sources.
Health Policy
Importantly, the Viet nam ese government quickly implemented extensive preven-
tative mea sures to stop spread of COVID-19 within the country. Hospitals  were 
put on high alert about the possibility of the virus on January 3, 2020, and guide-
lines on transmission prevention  were distributed when China reported only 
twenty- seven confirmed cases (Nortajuddin, 2020). The first case of COVID-19 in 
Việt Nam was linked to a group of Viet nam ese workers who had been to Wuhan 
on a business trip, returning January 17, 2020 (Le Van et al., 2020). This first case 
served as an impor tant early warning signal for the government about the real 
possibility of outbreak. The United States and Việt Nam both reported their first 
case of COVID-19 in the same week in 2020, but by February 1, Việt Nam declared 
the threat of a pandemic. News that a novel virus possibly emerged from China 
fit within the very long history of general mistrust  toward China in Việt Nam. 
Viet nam ese and Chinese relations have always been fraught. More recently, con-
tinued dam proj ects in China on the Mê Kông River and proposed building of 
Việt Nam special economic zones, which would receive a significant amount of 
Chinese investment, have received a lot of backlash from Viet nam ese citizens in 
recent years (ASEAN Post Team, 2018; Eyler, 2019).
Besides early information cues, Việt Nam had other advantages to prevent-
ing spread of COVID-19. First, the government quickly took a strong preventa-
tive approach. By locking down their borders early, the Viet nam ese government 
deterred a mass outbreak from ever happening. It did not have to use the same 
institutional muscle that was required of China to undertake the large outbreak 
that emanated from Wuhan. Việt Nam simply does not have an extensive health 
care system that could have endured treating thousands of patients with COVID-19. 
Additionally, the role of masking has prob ably been underplayed in many reports 
coming from Việt Nam.  Because the most common form of transportation in the 
country is the motorcycle, it is common on a daily basis for individuals to cover 
most of their  faces and bodies to accommodate for the harsh air pollution. Mask-
ing for most Viet nam ese is not a novel practice. Last, Việt Nam has only dealt 
with smaller outbreaks in its cities, not the countryside, meaning that disease 
hotspots have the advantage of access to proper sanitation and clean  water (in 
addition to healthcare facilities). The cities most afected (Hà Nội and Đà Nẵng) 
lack vast urban slums, unlike other low- and middle- income countries in Asia that 
have been adversely afected by COVID-19 (including the Philippines, Indonesia, 
and India). Some have even suggested that the use of fresh ventilation in Việt 
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Nam, compared to air conditioning mainly used in urban China, may have also 
afected disease transmission (“Why Has the Pandemic Spared the Buddhist Parts 
of South- East Asia?,” 2020).
The puzzle remains— mainland Southeast Asian countries seemed to avoid 
major COVID-19 crises. It might have something to do with masking, the role of 
the Buddhist greeting, called the wai (which is more distanced than a handshake), 
or perhaps we  will  later learn that a combination of environmental and popula-
tion health  factors played a large role in shielding Việt Nam, Thailand, Cambo-
dia, Laos PDR, and Myanmar. Although  there has been skepticism around Việt 
Nam’s reporting of COVID-19 cases, a number of international research groups 
and non- governmental organ izations in the country validate the government’s 
published data (“As Investors Move from China, Vietnam Adds EU Trade Pact to 
Arsenal,” 2020; Pollack et al., 2020). Additionally,  there was not the same report-
ing on widespread outbreaks and health system surge as in Indonesia and the 
Philippines.
Việt Nam has made real strides  toward achieving universal health coverage 
through its social health insurance program, which covers 87  percent of the country 
(Teo et al., 2019; Van Tien et al., 2011). Total health expenditure in is approximately 
6   percent of GDP, which mainly consists of out- of- pocket payments and social 
health insurance subsidies for low- income populations (Teo et al., 2019). Although 
 there is a growing and profitable private health sector, it caters to wealthier Viet-
nam ese, citizens from neighboring countries, and tourists. In contrast to strong 
health financing, Việt Nam has weaker healthcare infrastructure, with estimated 
0.8 physicians per 1,000 individuals and  limited critical care capacity (Vu et al., 
2017; World Bank, 2020).
Việt Nam has one of the highest life expectancies in the region, at 76 years, 
and is increasingly characterized by an aging population coping with chronic dis-
ease, notably heart disease and cancers (high smoking rates). With such a rapidly 
aging population,  there is concern about  future pressure on the health care system 
and financial solvency (Teo et al., 2019). At the same time, the country continues 
to experience infectious disease outbreaks. In 2019 Việt Nam dealt with a more 
widespread outbreak of dengue, but smaller outbreaks occur yearly. Rural areas 
in the Mê Kông River delta still combat malaria. Many have noted that Việt Nam’s 
approach to COVID-19 was a consequence of pandemic preparedness imple-
mented  after previous experience with SARS-1  in 2003 (Le Thu, 2020). Impor-
tantly, the spread of SARS-1 began in China; perhaps this also cued the Viet nam ese 
government to take early action when learning about the possibility of another 
novel virus.
Yet  there are diferences between the situation of SARS-1 and SARS- CoV-2. 
First, the SARS-1 outbreak occurred nearly twenty years ago. Việt Nam has grown 
much more in terms of economic, technological, and social development since 
then; this past disease experience alone is not the only  factor informing the current 
government’s approach to combatting the COVID-19 pandemic.  There  were only 
sixty- three cases of SARS-1 in Việt Nam, and that virus certainly did not  disturb 
global supply chains as much as COVID-19 has (World Health Organ ization 
[WHO], 2003). Việt Nam has a lot more at stake this time. However, SARS-1 did 
contribute to increased infectious disease surveillance in the country. Indeed, 
since 2003, Việt Nam has dealt with avian flu outbreaks and, through  these experi-
ences, has developed rigorous animal health monitoring and vaccination programs 
(World Bank, 2015). When H5N1 avian flu emerged, the Viet nam ese government 
took swift action to quell the spread by culling 44 million poultry, willing to sacri-
fice short- run economic gains in the interest of long- term public health and likely, 
reputation of the government on the world stage (Vu, 2009). Since then, Việt Nam 
has had repeated outbreaks of avian flu, resulting in mass vaccination eforts and 
culling poultry when necessary as the government increasingly monitors food sup-
ply chains and prioritizes food safety.
Việt Nam’s fast response to COVID-19 centered on closing borders, contact 
tracing, and isolation of confirmed cases. Unlike other Asian countries respond-
ing early to COVID-19, such as South  Korea and Taiwan, Việt Nam did not at first 
conduct an extensive number of tests (only 200,000) (Nortajuddin, 2020). Instead, 
the government relied heavi ly on contact tracing and isolation of suspected cases. 
On February 13, 2020, a town of ten thousand called Sơn Lôi, located 16 km out-
side Hà Nội, was placed  under a military- enforced lockdown with checkpoints, 
along with health, police, and military officials  after four cases of COVID-19  were 
confirmed  there (Trevisan et al., 2020). When it was discovered that a  woman in 
Hà Nội had returned from a trip to Eu rope,  those living along her entire street 
 were placed  under strict quarantine, not allowed to leave their  houses at all. At 
the beginning of the Đà Nẵng outbreak, approximately 12,000  people remained 
in mandatory quarantine in facilities or their homes throughout the country (Vu 
& Nguyen, 2020a).
At the beginning of March 2020, the Ministries of Information and Commu-
nications released NCOVI, or Bluezone, a contact tracing app on which residents 
should not only report their own COVID-19 status but also could track to see 
where in the cities other confirmed cases of the virus  were located (Dang, 2020). 
As of this writing, nearly 8.5 million users are on the app, but the Ministry of 
Health insists that  there  will need more than 50 million users for the tracing to be 
most efective (“Vietnam PM Says Risk of COVID-19 Community Spread ‘Very 
High,’ ” 2020).  Because of the party structure of the VCP, citizens are encour-
aged to report about  others’ whereabouts and any suspected cases of COVID-19 
(Fages, 2020). In general, citizens of Việt Nam are expected to participate in 
party- affiliated organ izations, and many are paid small stipends to work for the 
party in vari ous capacities down to the local level, including organ izing, commu-
nity ser vice, and informing party officials of suspected dissenters (Vu, 2014). Since 
the founding of the communist- led government in the 1950s, the VCP has relied 
on community organ izations as the government’s primary link to civil society. 
 These organ izations, including peasants,  labor, and  women’s  unions, as well as 
cultural and religious associations, both delivered party doctrine and transmitted 
information back to higher- level officials (Vasavakul, 2019). Many of  these same 
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groups still operate  today and have facilitated much of the sanitation, quarantine, 
and short- term aid eforts related to COVID-19.  These existing VCP networks 
have provided an im mense amount of  human capacity needed for adequate sur-
veillance and monitoring for COVID-19 prevention.
The government’s public health messaging about the virus has also received 
significant attention (Wamsley, 2020). A song made the rounds on social media, 
called “Ghen Cô Vy,” or “Jealous Coronavirus.” Adapted from a 2017 pop song and 
re- released by the original singers, the song advocates that individuals should avoid 
crowded areas, keep their homes sanitized, and wash their hands. Dancer Quang 
Đăng even started a TikTok dance challenge, which helped gain additional interna-
tional attention for Việt Nam’s eforts. In the video, the cartoons are wearing masks 
and standing beside public health officers. Towns and cities  were adorned with 
PSA billboards of similar imagery. But  these are usual, common sights in Việt Nam, 
as the VCP often promotes vari ous messages to the public in many formats. Towns 
in Việt Nam are dotted with loudspeakers from which local party officials make 
regular announcements. The Viet nam ese government and the VCP did not hesi-
tate to use all its resources, networks, and communication channels as necessary to 
spread a clear, unified message regarding its response to COVID-19. The Ministry 
of Information has actively censored social media to dispel misinformation about 
the virus and has enforced penalty of fines (Đức, 2020; Nguyen & Pearson, 2020).
Social Policy
In addition to swift response to confirmed cases of COVID-19, Việt Nam took steps 
to enforce compliance with quarantine in  those locations  under lockdown (Vu & 
Tranh, 2020). Military personnel and workers (likely from VCP- affiliated  unions) 
delivered food and supplies to all individuals on the street. Checkpoints  were 
enforced in which individuals leaving and entering had to undergo to temperature 
checks. Around this time, all incoming foreign visitors  were subjected to fourteen 
days of quarantine held at converted military bases. Additionally, as contact trac-
ing continued, individuals who  were known to have come in contact with a posi-
tive COVID-19 case  were also required to stay in  these quarantine facilities. During 
quarantine, individuals  were supervised by military personnel and delivered sup-
plies. Government intervened to stabilize prices for the public and seized supplies 
that  were hoarded, as ways to curb panic stockpiling (Đức, 2020; Ngoc, 2020).
When Bạch Mai hospital in Hà Nội, the country’s top medical fa cil i ty, harbored 
a COVID-19 outbreak, the entire fa cil i ty was placed  under lockdown for fourteen 
days, reopening April 12 (Boudreau & Nguyen, 2020; Sở Y Tế Thành Phố Hồ Chí 
Minh, 2020). Forty- five cases  were linked to the hospital, half of which  were from 
food delivery and logistics workers (Vo, 2020). Staf  were required to quarantine 
in the hospital and not return to their homes  after workdays. Approximately forty 
thousand individuals with connections to the Bạch Mai outbreak  were contacted 
and asked to self- isolate at home for fourteen days (La et al., 2020). The outbreak 
in Hồ Chí Minh City began at Buddha Bar, a popu lar hangout for expatriates and 
foreign travelers. By March 22, 2020, the country suspended all foreign entry and 
imposed a short two- week lockdown in major cities beginning April 1 (Vu & Tran, 
2020).
At the end of April 2020, social distancing campaigns had been eased  because 
of low case counts. Party organ izations and businessmen in major cities across the 
country had constructed philanthropic “rice ATMs” to bolster food security dur-
ing economic uncertainty, as well as providing  free masks (X. Q. Nguyen, 2020; 
Quỳnh, 2020; Vietnam News Agency, 2020). By mid- July, bia hơi, the famed 
crossroads in Hà Nội where  people flock to drink fresh cheap beer out on the 
streets, had returned. The country had resumed most business as usual, and per-
haps it was  under pressure to do so  because of economic stagnation.
To accommodate for the loss of revenue from international tourism (as of this 
writing, the country remains barred from visitors with the exception of diplo-
matic officials2), the government issued campaigns to encourage local tourism 
and reopened domestic airlines by the end of June 2020 (Pearson, 2020). How-
ever, on July 25, 2020, the country reported a new case of COVID-19 from a fifty- 
seven- year- old man in Đà Nẵng, a popu lar resort city for many Viet nam ese. A few 
days  later, new cases  were linked back to the hospital in Đà Nẵng where he was 
treated, as well as in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City, and the more remote Cen-
tral Highlands region (Dinh, 2020a). With the August 2020 outbreak, the govern-
ment closed all nonessential businesses and implemented mass serological testing 
eforts (Dinh, 2020b). The Viet nam ese health minister reported that this outbreak 
might be linked a strain of the virus new to the country, and more contagious, as 
cases in Đà Nẵng had been noticeably more severe (Nhóm, 2020; Vu, 2020). As of 
this writing, the country planned to test the entire city of Đà Nẵng, over 1 million 
 people, along with tens of thousands of  those who had been visiting Đà Nẵng and 
now returned to Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City; its previous strategy had only 
included 200,000 tests (Nguyen & Vu, 2020).
Certainly, the Viet nam ese government has demonstrated concerted efort to 
provide stopgaps for essential needs to increase compliance for efective quaran-
tine. However, the government has not yet demonstrated efective plans for long- 
term social policy that  will sustain its citizens. Since Việt Nam’s easing of their 
lockdown, the economy has not bounced back mainly  because it largely relies on 
exports to the United States and other countries that are still struggling to man-
age their own outbreaks. Việt Nam has seen a massive decline in demand for their 
manufacturing, textiles, and tourism industries. According to government author-
ities, as of late June 2020, approximately 900,000 Viet nam ese  were unemployed, 
and another 18 million now work dramatically reduced hours (“COVID-19 Damp-
ens Vietnam Employment Figures,” 2020). The government passed a US$2.7 billion 
relief fund for which 20 million individuals would be eligible, but the overwhelm-
ing request for unemployment benefits has led to long delays for recipients (“For 
Vietnam’s Poor, Access to Relief Aid Key To Joining Re- Opening Economy,” 2020; 
D. Nguyen, 2020). However, the country just signed a significant trade deal with 
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the Eu ro pean Union that may help secure its position as an alternative to China 
as a key trading partner for the West (“As Investors Move from China, Vietnam 
Adds EU Trade Pact to Arsenal,” 2020). Still, Việt Nam is missing a strong social 
welfare system. The government has primarily relied on the private sector for eco-
nomic security, heightening the precarity of citizen welfare as trade slows during 
the pandemic.
Explanation
One- Party Authoritarian State Capacity
Although Việt Nam is classified as a single- party authoritarian regime,  these 
regimes are not uniform in character (Kerkvliet, 2019; London, 2014). Việt Nam 
originally modeled its government structure on the Chinese- Leninist system, but 
 there are some key diferences within their central- provincial relations that have 
implications for COVID-19 response and pathways to economic development in 
the country. Việt Nam has had a central, unified government solely  under the 
leadership of the VCP but includes a lot of internal bargaining. The VCP is unique 
in that it has maintained a cohesive party elite for some time with  limited purges 
of leadership: for example, nothing as devastating as China’s  Great Leap Forward 
(Vasavakul, 2019; Vu, 2010). In Việt Nam this unity is actually a result of negotia-
tions between regional and provincial officials and the central state, rather than 
strictly top- down implementation of  orders.  These negotiations may actually buf-
fer the party from fragmentation and protect unity, which as we have seen, has 
been a key component to Việt Nam’s successful COVID-19 response. As the coun-
try transitioned from planned economy to market economy in the 1980s, state 
authority and regulation over business transactions became more fragmented and 
the VCP had to adapt. As Thomas Jandl writes, the Đổi Mới economic reforms 
 were “the accumulation of lessons of continuous local experimentation” (2014, 
p. 69). Jandl and  others argue that the economic development generated within a 
province “buys” its leaders po liti cal clout within the VCP. Edmund Malesky (2008) 
has demonstrated that provincial leaders who successfully garner and administer 
foreign direct investment have more autonomous governance in their regions. This 
has a few implications for Việt Nam’s COVID-19 response. Regional leaders are  under 
pressure to protect manufacturing, tourism, and investment opportunities, which 
means that preserving the health of workers (citizens) might be a high priority as 
well, particularly in major cities. Preventing spread of disease meant that Viet-
nam ese firms  were able to manufacture and export masks, equipment, and ven-
tilators to the United States and  others (USAID, 2020). Additionally, provincial 
leaders have more autonomy on the  whole and may be less likely to cover up any 
threat of pandemic to central leadership, unlike China’s case. At the same time, 
Việt Nam also has not experienced as a large an outbreak as China, so the degree 
of pressure on po liti cal leaders may have been less. So far, government response 
to the pandemic has been extraordinarily well managed and perhaps is a result 
of balanced relations between provincial and central leadership, and business 
leaders.
Việt Nam’s government, although authoritarian, has been committed to stop-
ping the spread of COVID-19 and has used the VCP’s networks, including party- 
affiliated social groups and state surveillance (strengths of the regime) to mobilize 
a concerted public health campaign to protect the health of its citizens. In con-
trast, long- time authoritarian leader of neighboring Cambodia, Hun Sen, denied 
impact of the virus, continued to accept visitors from China, refused wearing a 
mask in public, and administered a low- efort campaign against COVID-19— except 
to incriminate  those posting in social media about the virus ( Human Rights 
Watch, 2020). As of this writing, Cambodia still reports very few cases of COVID-19 
and also no deaths (Roser et al., 2020a).
Information Flow
Authoritarian regimes usually face challenges with information flowing primarily 
from the central government, which often shrouds transparency. In Việt Nam, 
the government along with state- run media3 have consistently delivered a uni-
fied message about the virus and clear steps how to combat its spread. Actually, 
they have used transparency to manage contact tracing, by reporting all known 
cases of COVID-19 through an online tracker. Reporting known cases worked 
not only to demonstrate legitimacy of the VCP in  handling the pandemic but also 
helped illustrate the severity of the prob lem of COVID-19 in Việt Nam. This has 
likely increased public trust in the VCP. At the same time, the Bluezone contact 
tracing app has received some backlash regarding privacy concerns (An Duong, 
2020). Viet nam ese citizens tacitly complying with government  orders should not 
be taken as a given.
Ben Kerkvliet (2019, p. 6) has written about the public outspokenness of Viet-
nam ese citizens and the government’s increasing tolerance to dissent, calling the 
Viet nam ese system “a responsive- repressive party- state.” In the case of COVID-19, 
exactly how compliance to government  orders played out in Việt Nam remains 
a puzzle. Accounts of citizen skepticism have been absent from Western media, 
but  there was a lot of discussion about the legitimacy of early reports of the virus. 
Citizens are constantly bombarded with government messaging and  orders— they 
work to parse out which  orders are definitive, legitimate, or false. At the same 
time, mass compliance might not have been necessary in Việt Nam. The most 
stringent COVID-19 containment  orders  were for the most part isolated to a few 
cities within the country, and with the exception of Đà Nẵng,  limited to only 
certain neighborhoods.  There have only been approximately one thousand total 
cases of COVID-19 in Việt Nam. In efect, although  there was impressive logisti-
cal coordination between the central government and provinces, and very clear 
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messaging, perhaps the Viet nam ese containment and compliance eforts  were not 
as herculean as Western reports have described, especially since  there was not a 
large disease outbreak to cope with.
Prime Minister Nguyễn Xuân Phúc and Minister of Health Nguyễn Thanh 
Long  were the main spokespeople for the country’s coronavirus strategy and 
updates. Fortunately for the  people of Việt Nam, the government’s stance on the 
virus aligns with protecting public health. The strong state surveillance capacity 
also made it easier to provide mass communication and contact trace. The Viet-
nam ese government was able to send SMS messages to all mobile phones, rely 
on party groups to help enforce quarantine and masking be hav iors, and promote 
public health education through state media. During the pandemic, government 
has censored social media to dispel misinformation about the virus, emphasizing 
the importance of a national unified public health efort.
 Labor witnessed renewed bargaining power in Việt Nam in the beginning 
of the viral spread. Reports indicated that workers’  unions  were campaigning 
as early as February 2020 for necessary workplace sanitation protections, back- 
due overtime payments, and benefits contributions, contributing to the success 
of virus prevention eforts (Buckley, 2020a). At a garment factory, workers even 
went on strike when an employee, a Chinese national, returned from China and 
was suspected of having COVID-19. He was tested and quarantined (Minh, 2020). 
Although, with renewed viral spread and increased economic pressure, as of this 
writing,  there have been higher demands on  labor, and it seems like COVID-19 
may have spread in factories (Buckley, 2020b).
Nationalism was another component to the government’s COVID-19 strat-
egy. State media continued to report that most of its cases of COVID-19  were 
imported into the country (Bộ Y Tế, 2020). As of this writing, news suggests, 
although does not confirm, that illegal- status Chinese mi grants in Đà Nẵng might 
be linked to the new outbreak, invoking more anti- Chinese sentiment (Dac, 2020; 
Do, 2020).
Critically,  there has been no indication that Viet nam ese leaders lied about the 
spread of coronavirus. They  were transparent in communicating to citizens how 
to prevent spread.  There are a few pos si ble reasons why they have done this. First 
is Việt Nam’s positioning in contrast to China. Unlike China, provincial leaders 
 were not reportedly misleading higher-up officials about case counts and deaths. 
If Việt Nam could successfully defeat coronavirus without lying, the world would 
notice the success of the communist state, and the leaders of Việt Nam would 
benefit eco nom ically and diplomatically. Additionally, in recent years, the Viet-
nam ese government has invested efort in demonstrating improved transparency, 
illustrated by the Provincial Competitive Index (PCI) and Provincial Governance 
and Public Administration Per for mance Index (PAPI), proj ects developed in tan-
dem with USAID and UNDP, respectively, to highlight improved regional gover-
nance for the purpose of attracting business to Việt Nam. As discussed, po liti cal 
leaders also can advance within the party if they encourage foreign investment 
in their provinces.  These studies also show evidence of increased citizen trust in 
government, which may have aided compliance with social distancing and quar-
antine policies. Last, perhaps po liti cal transactional norms are changing in Việt 
Nam. Leaders must respond willingly to anti- corruption campaigns and transpar-
ency eforts if they wish to maintain friendly relations with foreign investment 
and, therefore, po liti cal power. Technocrats have demonstrated transparency 
in addressing COVID-19, but  whether this difuses to other spheres of politics 
remains to be seen. If the VCP can show that it governs efectively by generating 
income and saving lives, the party’s current leadership might secure a very long 
 future.
Congressional elections are scheduled for January 2021; the previous elections 
 were held in 2016. As the VCP is the sole po liti cal party in Việt Nam,  these elec-
tions  will primarily be impor tant for the VCP in reappointing or identifying new 
internal leadership. Party members  will elect officials to the Central Committee, 
the two hundred- member body primarily directing national policy. At this time 
they  will also elect members to the Politburo, the highest- ranking group of the 
VCP. Per for mance of Prime Minister Nguyễn Xuân Phúc during the COVID-19 
outbreak may improve his chances of advancing to the position of party general 
secretary, the leader of the VCP.
Social Policy
The Viet nam ese government has demonstrated that it can deploy a strong, con-
sistent, efective response to preventing the spread of COVID-19. It successfully 
maintained quarantine by providing shelter and necessary supplies needed to 
isolate  those suspected and confirmed to be infected. However,  these have been 
short- term eforts. In the larger context, Việt Nam’s economy remains primar-
ily dependent on tourism, real estate, and manufacturing for the United States 
and Eu rope as it positions itself as a competitor with China for Western markets 
(Delteil et al., 2020). Millions of Viet nam ese applied for unemployment benefits 
since the economic downturn from the pandemic, but overwhelmed administra-
tion has left many empty- handed.
Việt Nam remains a relatively poor country with low resources to provide 
long- term social policy for all  people. Nevertheless, the country has witnessed 
unpre ce dented economic growth since 1986 with the implementation of major 
policy reforms colloquially known as Đổi Mới, literally “new change,” or more 
properly “renovation,” when the government moved the country from a closed 
economy to a market- oriented socialist economy.  Earlier, the central govern-
ment tightly managed all trade, even between provinces and districts. All mar-
kets  were strictly local (Jandl, 2014). At the time of Reunification in 1975, and 
the end of the Vietnam- American War, Việt Nam’s economy was devastated and 
was largely financed by the Soviet Union and foreign aid (Vu, 2010). But between 
2001 and 2007, the country managed to double its average annual GDP largely 
 because of foreign direct investment (Jandl, 2014; Vasavakul, 2019). Importantly, 
the VCP relies on economic development as a primary indicator demonstrating 
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 government efectiveness. In the context of COVID-19, the VCP  will be con-
cerned about sustaining economic growth for its primary constituents if it wants 
to maintain support and continued authority.
Since 1992 when social health insurance was introduced, Việt Nam now has 
a population that is 87  percent covered by insurance, and rates are even closer to 
100  percent in the cities (WHO, 2020). Nevertheless, the quality and accessibility 
of health care for all Viet nam ese is far from ideal. As Việt Nam’s health is increas-
ingly characterized by aging and chronic disease, the country’s healthcare system 
 will face more challenges in financing and capacity. Although reported corruption 
is declining, the Viet nam ese health care system still  faces the “envelope prob lem,” 
as many doctors still rely on receiving a bribe, and out- of- pocket payments remain 
high (Nguyen, 2019). The best medical care is available only in cities, so many cir-
cumvent local communal clinics and seek treatment at urban hospitals instead, 
driving up medical costs and inefficiencies. Although authorities converted a 
sports arena in Đà Nẵng into a one thousand- bed field hospital, advanced medical 
care needed to treat severe cases of coronavirus might be difficult to secure (Vu & 
Nguyen, 2020b). As of this writing, if coronavirus continues to re- emerge, it  will 
put a higher demand on the health care system than in previous months, when the 
government was able to implement primarily preventive strategies.
The re- emergence of COVID-19  in Đà Nẵng, and global per sis tence truly 
tested state capacity to protect citizens both eco nom ically and in terms of health 
in the long run. The puzzle remains, to what extent did the Viet nam ese govern-
ment have an interest in improving public health and social welfare for its citizens 
amid the coronavirus pandemic, and for what reasons?
Conclusion
At the beginning of this book proj ect, Việt Nam had reported no community spread 
of COVID-19 since April 2020, no deaths, and was the most populous country in the 
world to achieve such a feat. As the country lifted restrictions and began encourag-
ing domestic travel as a bufer from further economic downturn, the country expe-
rienced a second outbreak in August 2020 originating in Đà Nẵng, which is  today 
a popu lar resort city. A country that had been devastated by war in the twentieth 
 century now claims massive economic growth, improved life expectancy, and strong 
government support for health, despite the VCP’s continued authoritarian rule. As 
of this writing, Việt Nam reports 1,068 cases of COVID-19 and 35 deaths from the Đà 
Nẵng  outb reak (Roser et al., 2020b). The country’s pandemic response and health-
care system  will be tested as outbreaks continue. Additionally, Tropical Storm Noul 
recently made landfall in central Việt Nam, afecting Đà Nẵng and several surround-
ing provinces with structural damage, flooding, and leading to at least twenty- nine 
injuries and one death (Q. Nguyen, 2020). In August 2020, Hồ Chí Minh City sus-
tained mass flooding with many residents living with standing  water in their homes 
for weeks (Huu, 2020).
Việt Nam, like many other countries,  will be facing compound threats along-
side the COVID-19 outbreak. However, from early on in 2020,  there was strong 
public support and government buy-in to manage and prevent the spread of 
COVID-19. The world has noticed  these successes in Việt Nam. With the resur-
gence of COVID-19  in August 2020, Việt Nam demonstrated that government 
responses  will have to constantly adapt to the virus before a vaccine is widely 
available. Importantly, the government may have to face a reckoning with deliv-
ering  viable long- term social policy, which it currently lacks. The government 
may have been motivated to prevent the spread of COVID-19  in order to pro-
tect the country’s economic growth and demonstrate its legitimacy, though the 
VCP maintains a strong grip on the country. By and large, as COVID-19 cases 
continued to climb,  there was strong citizen compliance to public health  orders. 
This may have something to do with strengthened government- citizen relations 
as transparency has improved in the past de cade and has been key to the efective 
COVID-19 response (Nguyen & Malesky, 2020).
In the  future, Viet nam ese citizens may begin to demand more transparency 
in other sectors of government besides public health (Truong, 2020).  Because of 
their early success with the virus, the government is  under renewed pressure to 
demonstrate its efectiveness not only to protect public health but also to deliver 
economic prosperity for the country, which is now proving to be exceedingly diffi-
cult as international markets remain stagnant. Thus far, the single- party Viet nam-
ese government has relied on coordinated and transparent surveillance to deliver 
targeted eforts preventing a large- scale COVID-19 outbreak.
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Notes
 1. Việt Nam’s Public Health Emergency Operation Centers  were initially developed in 
2015 in coordination with the US Centers for Disease Control and Department of Health 
and  Human Ser vices and have been further expanded throughout the country in recent 
years (CDC, 2016; US Embassy and Consulate, 2017; Vietnam News Agency, 2019).
 2. Although Việt Nam was soon to permit entry for visitors from China,  Korea, and 
Taiwan, and had permitted flights from Japan in July, with the Đà Nẵng outbreak,  these 
plans had been reversed (Dezan Shira & Associates, 2020).
 3. All media in Việt Nam are subject to state censorship.
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 8 fighting covid-19 in JaPan
 A Success Story?
Takashi Nagata, Akihito Hagihara, Alan Kawarai Lefor, 
Ryozo Matsuda, and Monika Steffen
The outbreak of COVID-19, sometimes referred to as “Wuhan 
fever” in Japan, developed into a national epidemic by July 2020.  After the first 
patient, who came directly from Wuhan and was formally identified on January 16, 
2020, Japan experienced several waves of domestic outbreaks. Public authorities 
tried to control the situation by using existing institutional tools and adding new 
mea sures.
Before discussing the health and social policies  adopted to fight the epidemic, 
we  will highlight two background ele ments by which Japan difers from other 
countries with mature health systems.
Japan has a universal health care system in which equal access is guaranteed 
(Hatanaka et  al., 2015). In recent years, health expenditures as a proportion of 
gross domestic product (GDP) increased considerably. In 2010 Japan ranked 
fifteenth in healthcare expenditure among the Organ ization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) countries, just above its average. In 2018 it 
ranked fifth, spending 11.0  percent of its GDP on health care, just  behind France 
(11.2   percent), Germany (11.7   percent), and Switzerland (12.1   percent) (OECD, 
2020b). Although patient copayments are high compared with other universal 
healthcare systems (30   percent of billed charges), Japan enjoys the highest life 
expectancy worldwide at 84.2 years in 2017, more than half a year ahead of the 
runner-up, Switzerland (OECD, 2020c). This suggests that copayment does not 
necessarily indicate insufficient access to medical care, as commonly assumed, 
but may reflect a greater attention given to prevention and public health than in 
other nations with advanced healthcare systems.
Japan does not rely only on health policy in its classical sense for the manage-
ment of a contagious epidemic. Japan also has considerable scientific and insti-
tutional resources, with highly professionalized intervention forces for “disaster 
preparedness” and for crisis management in response to events such as earth-
quakes, typhoons, tsunamis, and nuclear power plant incidents (Ishii & Nagata, 
2013). The occurrence of serious natu ral disasters is increasing  every year, and the 
Japa nese  people as well as municipalities, prefectures, and the central government 
understand the importance of disaster preparedness. Regular disaster drills are 
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common. This preparedness capacity, together with public awareness and ac cep-
tance, also worked well in the response to COVID-19. The Japa nese COVID-19 
case demonstrates that such capabilities imported from other sectors can contrib-
ute to efectively fighting infectious disease outbreaks.
Policy Response to the Epidemic
Policy responses to the COVID-19 epidemic in Japan in 2020  were implemented in 
three phases, each responding to a specific stage of the epidemic and a set of related 
policy mea sures: (1) January and February (fighting the first wave of infections), 
(2) March to May (declaring a state of emergency), and (3) June and July (fighting 
the second wave of infections). The timeline of each stage is shown in  Tables 8.1 
through 8.3 (International Science Council 2020; “The Oxford COVID-19 Govern-
ment Response Tracker,” 2020).
 After Japa nese medical surveillance confirmed the first positive case of infec-
tion on January 16, 2020, in a Chinese resident of Kanagawa Prefecture who had 
returned to Japan from Wuhan, the initial government response to the COVID-19 
outbreak was a policy of containment, focused on repatriation of Japa nese citi-
zens from Wuhan and the introduction of new regulations for border control. 
On January 24, 2020, the Japa nese government announced that it would arrange 
repatriation ser vices for all Japa nese citizens in Hubei Province. On January 27, 
2020, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe designated the novel coronavirus as an “infec-
tious disease”  under the Infectious Diseases Control Law and designated the dis-
ease as a “quarantinable infectious disease”  under the Quarantine Act.  Because of 
its geo graph i cal proximity to China, Japan realized the significance of the public 
 TABLE 8.1. January and February (The first wave of the pandemic)
January 16 Kanagawa Prefecture confirmed its first positive case of COVID-19,  
a Chinese man in his thirties who had traveled to Wuhan.
January 27 Japan’s Prime Minister Abe designated the novel coronavirus a “designated 
infectious disease”  under the Infectious Diseases Control Law. In addition, 
he designated the disease as a “quarantinable infectious disease”  under the 
Quarantine Act.
February 3 The Japa nese government announced entry restrictions for all foreign citizens 
with a travel history to and from Hubei Province or anyone who held a 
Chinese passport issued from Hubei.
February 16 Prime Minister Abe convened the government’s first Novel Coronavirus  
Expert Meeting at the Prime Minister’s Office to draft national guidelines  
for COVID-19 testing and treatment.
February 25 The Ministry of Health,  Labor, and Welfare established the Cluster Response 
Team in accordance with the Basic Policies for Novel Coronavirus  
Disease Control.
February 27 Prime Minister Abe requested closure of all elementary, ju nior high, and high 
schools from March 2 to the end of spring vacation (which concluded  
in early April).
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 TABLE 8.2. March through May (Declaring a state of emergency)
March 9 Medical experts reviewed the data from the Cluster Response Team and refined 
its definition of a high- risk environment as a place with overlapping “three Cs” 
(closed spaces, crowded places, close contact).
March 13 The amended Special Mea sures Act to  Counter New Types of Influenza of 2012, 
which extended the law’s emergency mea sures for influenza outbreaks to include 
COVID-19, was approved by the Diet (Japan’s legislative branch).
April 7 Prime Minister Abe proclaimed a State of Emergency from April 8 to May 6 for 
Tokyo and Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, Osaka, Hyogo, and Fukuoka Prefectures. 
In addition, Prime Minister Abe stated that the pandemic created the nation’s 
greatest economic crisis since the end of World War II.
April 16 The Japa nese government expanded the state of emergency to include all forty- 
seven prefectures in Japan.
May 1 Distribution of the 100,000- yen stimulus payment to residents began 
(approximately US$960).
May 25 Prime Minister Abe announced lifting of the government’s emergency declaration 
for five remaining prefectures (Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, and 
Hokkaido).
 TABLE 8.3. June and July (The second wave of the pandemic)
June 19 Voluntary restraint of movement in five remaining prefectures (Saitama, Chiba, 
Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Hokkaido) lifted.
July 15 The “Go-to campaign,” a tourism revitalization proj ect actively pursued by the  
Abe government to promote domestic tourism demand, was launched in Tokyo.
July 18 The total number of COVID-19 fatalities in Japan exceeded 1,000. It  rose  
to 1,519 by the time of writing (September 24, 2020).
health emergency and quickly took mea sures to counteract the emerging pan-
demic. Almost si mul ta neously, Japan faced an outbreak of COVID-19 on board a 
cruise ship, the Diamond Princess, registered in Britain and operated by Princess 
Cruises. Follow-up surveys, conducted  later, showed that more than 712 out of 
3,711  people on board became infected (567 of 2,666 passengers and 145 of 1,045 
crew), and 14  people (passengers) died (Ahmad et al., 2020; Yamahata & Shibata, 
2020).
On February 3, 2020, the cruise ship arrived at the Port of Yokohama and was 
not allowed to dock but remained anchored of the coast. In an unusual initia-
tive, the Japa nese government de cided to re- quarantine the ship  because  there 
was concern that COVID-19– infected  people may have remained on board. The 
quarantine officer of the Ministry of Health,  Labor and Welfare (MHLW) boarded 
the ship to establish the quarantine. All passengers and crew members  were then 
quarantined by the MHLW for fourteen days in the  waters of Yokohama. The 
response was led by the MHLW and the government of Kanagawa Prefecture 
(where Yokohama is located).
At the same time, other government agencies, such as the Ministry of Defense 
and the Cabinet Office, closely collaborated. Healthcare professionals from the 
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Japan Self- Defense Forces (the Japa nese military), Disaster Medical Assistant 
Teams, Japan Medical Association Teams, national institutions, and the Japa nese 
Society for Infection Prevention and Control,  were on the front lines of the pub-
lic health and medical responses. During this response to the Diamond Princess 
infections, deployed medical professionals faced multiple challenges (Sawano 
et al., 2020). Command and control  were not properly established, and many med-
ical teams  were deployed with  little or no coordination. Standardized command 
structures, such as an incident management system,  were not used on the ship 
(World Health Organ ization, 2018). Isolation of areas on the ship, such as strictly 
separating clean and infected areas, was not correctly implemented. Many medical 
teams lacked adequate training for the management of  people with contagious and 
infectious diseases.  There  were inadequate supplies of appropriate personal pro-
tective equipment. Press conferences about daily activities  were not conducted on 
a regular basis. Public information intended for foreign countries was insufficient.
The difficult experience with the Diamond Princess, however, taught many 
impor tant lessons and yielded impor tant scientific findings, particularly with 
re spect to the specific clinical characteristics of COVID-19 infections. It was 
quickly confirmed that COVID-19 is transmitted by aerosolized droplets and 
appears to be more contagious than other viruses (Morawska et al., 2020). Drop-
lets containing COVID-19 virus remained on surfaces aboard the ship much lon-
ger than expected. Respiratory failure in several patients who initially needed 
oxygen support suddenly developed into a critical illness (Tabata et  al., 2020). 
Respiratory management and extracorporeal membrane oxygenation  were intro-
duced. Infection control on ships is difficult for structural reasons. The lesson 
learned from the case of the Diamond Princess was that greater availability of 
personal protective equipment would likely have reduced disease transmission 
and death.
In March 2020 the number of confirmed infection cases in Japan increased 
dramatically, and hospital beds  were occupied by patients with COVID-19 infec-
tions. However, at that time, the capability of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 
testing was not yet well established (Matsuda, 2020). This uncertainty caused 
social confusion and distrust, especially as the media severely criticized this situ-
ation. In March 2020 Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Japan was can-
celed, and the 2020 Summer Olympics and Paralympics in Tokyo  were postponed 
for one year (Gallego et al., 2020; Nakamura et al., 2018).
 After the influenza pandemic in 2009, the Japa nese government realized the 
importance of preparedness for a pandemic and then enacted the Special Mea sures 
Act to  Counter New Types of Influenza of 2012. The Office for Pandemic Influenza 
and New Infectious Diseases Preparedness and Response (part of the Cabinet Sec-
retariat) was established as the headquarters for governmental responses in collab-
oration with the MHLW. In April 2020 a state of emergency was declared according 
to an amendment to this law. The requirements to declare a state of emergency 
are (1) potential for serious health and life damage and (2) rapid transmission of 
infection, with a significant impact on daily life and on the economy. To prevent or 
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mitigate the transmission of COVID-19, contact with  people should be reduced. 
Yet,  under this law, the Japa nese government lacks authority to enforce citywide 
lockdowns. Apart from individual quarantine mea sures, officials cannot restrict the 
movement of  people for the purpose of containing the virus. Consequently, compli-
ance with government requests to restrict movements in Japan is voluntary.
In April 2020 healthcare workers sounded the alarm about the possibility of 
medical system collapse resulting from COVID-19 overcrowding.  People in Japan 
realized and accepted the real ity of the crisis and practiced self- restraint in order 
to prevent a collapse of the medical care system. On April 7, 2020, Prime Minister 
Abe proclaimed a one- month state of emergency, from April 8 to May 6, for Tokyo 
and the prefectures of Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, Osaka, Hyogo, and Fukuoka 
(Looi, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). On April  16, 2020, the government expanded the 
state of emergency to include all forty- seven prefectures. The number of con-
firmed cases started decreasing in late April 2020, permitting hospitals to resolve 
the acute crisis. On May 25, 2020, Prime Minister Abe announced the lifting of 
the government’s emergency declaration for all prefectures.
Staying at home and requesting store closures initiated by a seven- week state 
of emergency had an expectedly serious economic impact, with economic losses 
estimated at approximately US$50 billion (Ahmad et al., 2020; König & Winkler, 
2020; Lenzen et al., 2020).  After the state of emergency was lifted, society resumed 
activities, and  people returned to towns to restart their businesses. As a result, the 
confirmed number of cases of COVID-19 began to gradually increase by June 2020. 
The highest number of confirmed cases during this second wave of infections sur-
passed the number in the first wave. The specific characteristics of patients with 
COVID-19 infections during the second wave changed compared to the first wave: 
most  people infected  were young, symptoms  were milder, and consequently hospi-
tals  were not overwhelmed. The Survey of Critically Ill COVID-19 Patients, man-
aged by the Japan ECMOnet for COVID-19 (“Nationwide System to Centralize 
Decisions Around ECMO Use for Severe COVID-19 Pneumonia in Japan,” 2020; 
Shime, 2020; Takeda, 2020; Worku et al., 2020), covering more than 80  percent of 
the ICU beds in Japan, showed that the peak number of critically ill patients requir-
ing extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) during the second wave was 
half of that during the first wave (Figure 8.1). This second wave subsided gradually 
in July 2020, and the government and the  people tried to balance restarting eco-
nomic activity with controlling the infection.
Several clusters of COVID-19 outbreaks occurred at nursing homes. At a nurs-
ing home in Toyama Prefecture, forty- one of sixty- one residents  were infected 
and fifteen died; eigh teen staf members  were also infected with COVID-19 (“Out-
break among Care- Workers and El derly Deaths: How to Prepare for the Second 
Wave in the Nursing Home,” 2020). The infection spread so rapidly that, when 
medical teams arrived, only five staf  were available to provide basic care ser vices 
for forty- one  people, such as dietary and incontinence management. It took about 
six weeks to control the infection at this nursing home.
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Similar situations occurred in several areas, and the MHLW and prefectures 
deployed medical teams to provide medical support and distribute medical 
equipment. Nursing homes tried to take action to promote infection control, such 
as staf training, preventing the 3Cs (closed spaces, crowded places, close con-
tact), and restricting visits. Although only sporadic COVID-19 clusters at nursing 
homes  were reported;  these  were controlled with efort (Iritani et  al., 2020). If 
nursing home residents became severely ill, they  were transferred to an intensive 
care unit. Age is a significant  factor associated with COVID-19 mortality. The 
MHLW showed that the case fatality rate is 18.1   percent among  people in their 




The MHLW or ga nized the Cluster Response Team, or “cluster busters,” on Feb-
ruary 25, 2020, to identify and contain small- scale clusters of COVID-19 infec-
tions before they become community- wide mega- clusters (Furuse et  al., 2020; 
Oshitani, 2020). The team included epidemiologists, infection control specialists 
from universities and the National Institute of Infectious Diseases, and a mana-
gerial staf. If a local government confirmed the existence of a new cluster, the 
MHLW deployed a surveillance team to the area to conduct an epidemiological 
survey and contact tracing in coordination with the staf of the local public health 
center.1  After determining the source of an infection, the MHLW and local gov-
ernment officials put countermea sures in place to locate, test, and place  people 




















































Figure 8.1. Number of patients in Japan treated with ECMO to treat COVID-19 infections.
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person. The Cluster Response Team also requested suspensions of afected busi-
nesses and restricted planned events. Based on the findings of contact tracing, the 
MHLW estimated that 80  percent of infected  people did not transmit COVID-19 
to another person. In contrast,  those who did infect another person tended to 
spread it to multiple  people and thus tended to form infection clusters in cer-
tain environments. On March 9, 2020, medical experts reviewed data from the 
Cluster Response Team and refined the definition of a high- risk environment as 
a place where the “3Cs” overlap, namely (1) closed spaces with poor ventilation; 
(2) crowded places with many  people nearby; and (3) close- contact settings, such 
as close- range conversations. Consequently, gyms,  music clubs, exhibition con-
ferences, social gatherings, and other gathering places  were considered high- risk 
locations for COVID-19 transmission.
On April  10, 2020, Dr.  Mike Ryan, Executive Director of the WHO Health 
Emergencies Program, mentioned that Japan, with its teams of “cluster busters,” 
had collected a lot of very useful information. The Cluster Response Team was 
divided into several new subcommittees for COVID-19 responses on June  24, 
2020.
Medical Issues
Over the last several years, the Japa nese government has been making eforts to 
prepare for emerging public health issues such as pandemics. In 2014 the MHLW 
approved the use of favipiravir, which is an anti- influenza medi cation developed 
by Fujifilm (Sissoko et al., 2016). Although its safety was demonstrated in more 
than two thousand patients and accelerated clearance of influenza viruses in 
phase III  trials was demonstrated, favipiravir was initially not approved  because 
of potential side efects in the young. In animal experiments, teratogenic and 
embryotoxic efects  were shown in four animal species (Shiraki & Daikoku, 2020). 
With a strong request from the Japan Medical Association, favipiravir was fi nally 
approved as the second choice for treating influenza strains unresponsive to cur-
rently available antiviral agents (Nagata et al., 2015). At the time, favipiravir was 
considered as a candidate for the treatment of the Ebola virus. It is a promis-
ing candidate for the treatment of viral illnesses that may emerge in the  future. 
Currently, favipiravir is considered as a candidate antiviral medi cation to treat 
patients with COVID-19 infections (Kaptein et al., 2020; Koba et al., 2020).
Japan and the United States have continued and strengthened their existing 
relationship regarding pandemic preparation. At the time of the Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa, both countries considered a collaboration plan. In 2018 the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (USA) in Atlanta conducted a closed three- day 
command post exercise for pandemic simulation. Delegates from allied countries 
including Japan  were invited. The Japa nese government carefully investigated the 
pro cess of invoking a state of  emergency during pandemics,  because no regula-
tion currently exists regarding states of emergency in the Japa nese Constitution. 
A state of emergency has never been declared  after World War II in Japan. Based 
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on its investigation, the government of Japan conducted tabletop exercises in 2018 
and 2019 to prepare for a pandemic and to simulate situations that necessitate a 
state of emergency (Mitsubishi Research Institute, 2020).
However, Japan was spared from most recent pandemics before the COVID-19 
outbreak. Consequently, it has lacked on- scene, clinical, and practical public 
health responses to the severe acute respiratory syndrome that originated in 
Guangdong, China, in 2003, to the H1N1 pandemic influenza in 2009, the Ebola 
virus disease from West African countries in 2014, and the  Middle East Respira-
tory Syndrome from  Middle Eastern countries and South  Korea in 2015.  Because 
 these diseases did not occur in Japan, the urgent need for comprehensive public 
health preparedness for infectious pandemics, with practical training, equipment 
storages (personal protective equipment and PCR testing), surveillance systems, 
and scientific priority programs for the discovery of new vaccination and drugs, 
was underestimated. COVID-19 provided Japan with the necessary and fruitful 
experience for learning and training.
Social Policy and Economic Mea sures
As economic activity imploded during the pandemic, the Japa nese government 
provided, in addition to existing mea sures, large- scale financial support plans 
from the national trea sury to support companies and individuals.  These plans  were 
developed to prioritize promptness rather than consistency. Prefectural govern-
ments also developed additional financial support plans.
First, a variety of benefits  were set up for  people with economic difficulties. 
They  were partly useful for  those facing an abrupt decrease in income. Unemploy-
ment insurance, social assistance, leave compensation paid by statutory health 
insurance, long- term care leave system, and more  were included in a package of 
social support for  those afected by COVID-19. New applicants for social assis-
tance in April 2020 amounted to 21,486 cases, which is an increase of 24.8  percent 
compared to the same period of the previous year (based on data from a press 
release of the Ministry of Health,  Labour and Welfare on July 1, 2020).
Second,  because it took time and complex procedures to use traditional ben-
efits, such as social assistance, the government implemented additional mea-
sures, including (1) personal benefits in the form of immediate cash handouts 
of JPY100,000 (approximately US$960), and postponements and exemptions 
for social security contributions and fiscal payments and (2) individual financial 
support for  those who needed social assistance. The government also introduced 
financial supports for small businesses and the self- employed. For example, com-
panies whose revenues dropped to half what it was in 2019 could receive financial 
support to maintain their businesses. Additionally, low- interest loans, postpone-
ment and exemptions of taxes, and rent subsidies  were made available.  These 
socioeconomic mea sures aimed to stabilize employment for  those who sufered 
severe income setbacks  because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Ele ments of Explanation
A media controversy existed in Japan, questioning  whether its policy responses 
to the COVID-19 epidemic  were timely and adequate. Contradictory arguments 
compared Japan  either to other East Asian countries (e.g., South  Korea, Taiwan, 
or China) and judged Japan’s mea sures as late and inefficient, or alternatively to 
Western countries (e.g., the Eu ro pean Union, United Kingdom, or United States of 
Amer i ca) against whom Japan’s per for mance is cast in a positive light (Allen et al., 
2020; Tabari et al., 2020; Watanabe, 2020). This highlights the relative nature of 
comparing policy outcomes and a pos si ble dual perspective on what happened 
in Japan. The contrasting evaluations may be less contradictory than they seem.
The following pages pre sent background ele ments that may contribute to 
understanding, and perhaps explaining, the ways the COVID-19 epidemic was 
managed in Japan, and the outcome. They may also indicate specific lessons that 
could be learned from the Japa nese case.
Experienced observers refer to Japan as the most westernized country in Asia 
(Pilling, 2014), although it developed its own civilization over two thousand years. 
Japan was influenced by China, Eu rope, and the United States, but it also isolated 
itself for more than two hundred years to escape the risk of Western colonization, 
as experienced by China and much of the world. In sharp contrast to the preced-
ing isolation, the second half of the nineteenth  century saw Japan engaged in an 
extremely rapid pro cess of modernization and industrialization. Japan was the first 
Asian country to be fully industrialized and to renew its po liti cal system from the 
feudal- like shogunate system to a modern state with a parliament and po liti cal 
parties. Democ ratization was fi nally achieved  after World War II, when a liberal 
and antimilitary constitution was enacted  under the influence of the Allied Powers.
Although largely westernized, Japan kept many homegrown social traditions, 
such as re spect for the emperor, who symbolizes the nation; authority figures and 
the el der ly;  family responsibility; consensus- seeking; disciplined be hav ior; and 
strict attention to cleanliness and hygiene. For example, the widespread volun-
tary use of facial masks as protection against pollution, allergies, or infection and 
the re spect of a certain physical distance between  people, bowing in front of each 
other rather than handshaking, are common social norms in Japan.  These behav-
ioral patterns limit the spread of infection.
Geo graph i cal and demographic ele ments are of immediate importance in a 
contagious epidemic. Japan is an island country, which should facilitate control 
of an epidemic. However, shipping, harbors, and modern air travel provide open 
doors for pathogens. The Japa nese islands are next to China, a short travel distance 
from the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic. Japan is connected worldwide, as 
a global economic player and a member of the G7. It has the United States as its 
largest business partner. Japan also keeps close po liti cal and economic connections 
with its neighbors, including China and South  Korea. Similar to many countries 
throughout the world, Japan’s supply chains are largely dependent on China. In con-
trast to a commonly held misconception, Japan is not a small, isolated country. It is 
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the world’s third largest economy with a population of 127 million in 2019, equal to 
that of the United Kingdom and Italy combined. Japan’s GDP per capita amounts to 
US$43,279 (2019), which situates Japan between South  Korea (US$42,925) and New 
Zealand (US$43,774) and the EU-28 average (US$46,776) (OECD, 2020a).
Further ele ments impacting epidemics in Japan are the extremely dense con-
centration of the population in megacities such as Tokyo, with 15,000 persons per 
square kilo meter, and a large depopulated countryside where access to medical 
care can be a prob lem, especially for a rapidly aging population. Japan has the 
world’s highest el derly de pen dency rate (47), a ratio of  people aged sixty- five and 
older to  those aged fifteen to sixty- four years. This places Japan far ahead of the 
second and third oldest countries, which are Italy (36.1) and Finland (35.8) (World 
Data Atlas, 2020). Geo graph i cal, territorial, and demographic  factors should 
place Japan among the most COVID-19– afected countries, but it figures among 
the least afected.
The Japa nese government is a constitutional monarchy, with demo cratic 
institutions and the separation of power into legislative, judicial, and executive 
branches. The emperor is the symbol of the nation and the state, in de pen dent 
from po liti cal afairs and without po liti cal power. The emperor’s mission is sym-
bolic and consists of standing for peace and the comfort of the  people. Japan’s 
po liti cal system is comparable to a parliamentary cabinet system, like that in 
the United Kingdom and Canada. Inside the country,  there are three po liti cal lay-
ers, the national or central government, the prefectural governments, and the 
municipal governments. Japan is not a federal state, like Germany, the United 
States, or Brazil, although it is divided into forty- seven prefectures, each of which 
has a regional government with impor tant autonomy and competency. Prefec-
tures implement regulations for medical facilities, coordinate healthcare deliv-
ery, and lead crisis management in their jurisdictions, while the national gov-
ernment decides social security cash benefits and the regulatory framework. 
The national and local governments have complex top- down and bottom-up 
relationships that follow administrative law or common practice between poli-
ticians for consensus building (Council of Local Authorities for International 
Relations, 2019).
Like most industrialized countries, Japan has promoted decentralization of 
po liti cal power from the central government to the local level. Thus, policy deci-
sions and operations such as infection control for COVID-19 or disaster responses 
are mainly conducted by local governments. Public health centers and public 
health institutes, which are at the core of infection control eforts, exist in all pre-
fectures and municipalities. The capacity for public health responses is vital for the 
response to COVID-19. However, occasionally, for this unpre ce dented challenge, 
gaps or disagreements may occur between the national government and prefec-
tural governments. For example, Hokkaido, the northernmost prefecture, declared 
its state of emergency on February 28, 2020, and the Tokyo metropolitan govern-
ment did so on March 23, 2020, both without a precise  legal basis, whereas the 
national government did not declare the state of emergency  until April 7, 2020, 
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according to the Special Mea sures Act to  Counter New Types of Influenza of 2012. 
This discordance caused confusion in public understanding and public opinion.
In a similar way, the social security system seems rather unique compared to other 
countries, especially the organ ization of the statutory health insurance, which 
combines employer- linked private health insurance funds and local public health 
insurance funds. The social security system is described as “productivist welfare 
capitalism” (Holliday, 2000), placing priority on the economic stability of compa-
nies to provide employment, rather than subsidies and assistance to individuals as 
in Eu ro pean welfare states, although Japan’s social security system also assists the 
unemployed to some extent.
Japan is a demo cratic country, where restriction of freedom without a  legal 
basis is clearly a violation of the constitution. Therefore, the Japa nese government 
amended the Act on Special Mea sures for Pandemic Influenza and New Infec-
tious Diseases  because  there was controversy as to  whether COVID-19 was to be 
regarded as a target disease of the act.  Because this act has only  limited power to 
restrict the freedom of individuals and companies, even  after the declaration of a 
state of emergency, the action taken by the government to modify be hav ior was to 
ask  people and companies alike to change their be hav ior voluntarily and conduct 
self- restraint, just by request and persuasion from the Japa nese government.
So cio log i cal lit er a ture suggests two general classifications of culture world-
wide: individualist culture and groupist culture (Gudykunst et al., 1997; Kagawa- 
Singer, 1996). The characteristics of the individualist culture are re spect for an 
individual’s choices, emphasis of individual requests, and the importance of per-
sonal autonomy. The United States, Canada, and most Eu ro pean countries are 
categorized as individualist cultures. Characteristics of the groupist culture are 
the predominance of the group over the individuals that compose the group, and 
the emphasis on harmony and agreement as a fact of the group. Japan, Thailand, 
and most South American countries are categorized as groupist cultures. The 
Japa nese government requested and persuaded  people and businesses to restrain 
themselves and refrain from moving, such as business or personal trips by using 
public transportation or private vehicles, without a  legal basis, and this approach 
was successful in controlling COVID-19 to a remarkable extent.
Groupist culture may be part of the explanation for this voluntary self- restraint. 
Most Japa nese  people seem to comply with apparently reasonable requests of the 
government: compliance is not 100  percent but is generally high. The predomi-
nant culture leads  people to act on the recommendations of the government by 
wearing masks, respecting social distance, and limiting the 3Cs. Employers and 
their organ izations made recommendations about what employees  shall and  shall 
not do in their spare time (such as not visiting Tokyo and not  going to restau-
rants), and most employees appear to comply with  these recommendations. This 
may not be the case in an individualist culture, where  people may not comply with 
such voluntary recommendations, and it would be necessary to legislate limita-
tions to enforce compliance.
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The ability of the Japa nese government to influence the actions of  people has 
been studied extensively. The interrelationships between the state and society 
remain complex in Japan (Garon, 1997). Bouissou (2020) considered the re spect 
of social norms in Japan as the essential active link in this relationship and termed 
it “making society” (faire société). The ability of the government to afect the 
everyday lives of  people so strongly may at least in part explain the voluntary 
cooperation of Japa nese  people with the recommendations made to control the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
However, the request and careful persuasion from the government have no 
 legal force upon  people who do not follow the request. Furthermore, voluntarily 
refraining from business activities might cause restriction of freedom for the sales 
activities of  others, which is also against rights granted  under the Constitution 
of Japan, Article 22.  There was an ongoing discussion concerning the question of 
compensation for  people who are the second- line victims of the voluntary restric-
tion: should compensation be given to them, and would such compensation be 
in accordance with the constitution, or not? At the time of this writing,  there 
are public demands that the government should be given  legal power to enforce 
restrictions on freedom if an emergency makes it necessary and to assert such 
limitations with appropriate compensation.
Initially the MHLW planned that all patients with confirmed COVID-19 
infections would be admitted to “designated hospitals.” Consequently, hospital 
beds  were quickly occupied by COVID-19 patients. The lack of alternatives and 
additional accommodation capacities became evident. The MHLW then called 
on the prefectures to revise the Plan for COVID-19 Public Health and Medical 
Responses, and rather strict and efective infection control interventions  were 
initiated. For example, patients with confirmed infections but only mild symp-
toms  were accommodated in  hotels, available hospital beds  were categorized, and 
their usage was triaged. Furthermore, the use of other  limited resources, such as 
intensive care unit beds, advanced medical equipment (e.g., respiratory, extra-
corporeal membrane oxygenation, hemodialysis), personal protective equipment, 
medi cations, and so on, was prioritized. Distribution was controlled to ensure the 
optimal medical efficiency. If el derly  people with COVID-19 infections became 
sick and a medical indication was validated, the el derly also  were admitted to an 
intensive care unit. In March 2020, the MHLW almost failed to control the logis-
tics; consequently a declaration of a state of emergency was considered and fi nally 
 adopted in April.
A further major issue in Japan’s public health response to the COVID-19 pan-
demic was PCR testing (Sawano et al., 2020). In the first wave, the MHLW was 
internationally and domestically criticized that the number of PCR tests was low 
compared with other countries. For example, South  Korea rapidly established an 
efective PCR testing system, the so- called “drive- through PCR.” Implementa-
tion and expansion of PCR testing capacity in Japan  were controversial and slow 
between April and July 2020.  There was international interest why the number 
of PCR tests in Japan was lower than that in other countries. A bureaucratic silo 
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phenomenon in governmental organ ization and the agencies involved in manag-
ing the pandemic might have delayed the establishment of a similarly efective 
PCR testing system in Japan. However, the PCR capacity was gradually increased 
at local levels, with the collaboration of hospitals, public health centers, public 
health institutions, and laboratory companies.
Conclusion
By September 24, 2020, the cumulative number of patients with COVID-19 infec-
tions confirmed by PCR testing, death, and critically ill treated with ECMO  were 
79,621, 1,519, and 250, respectively.  These numbers suggest that Japan was suc-
cessful in responding to the COVID-19 epidemic, by applying existing public 
health preparedness mea sures, efective countermea sures such as the “cluster 
buster approach” for preventing the 3Cs, and requesting the nation to practice 
self- restraint. Social support policy was initiated,  under existing policy mea sures, 
legislative temporal mea sures, and adopting a supplementary bud get, comple-
mented according to special needs resulting from the COVID-19 crisis. At the 
same time, however,  there  were some confusing and inappropriate public health 
and social policy interventions. At the time of this writing, a third COVID-19 
wave has come in the fall/winter season 2020–2021, for which adequate prepared-
ness must be ascertained well in advance.
It seems too early to draw final conclusions from the COVID-19 crisis, but 
the Japa nese case already suggests three lessons. First, it illustrates how an Asian 
country, with a high level of group discipline, can operate in a demo cratic way 
and context and control an epidemic without  legal constraints from a central-
ized authority. The basic condition for such successful combination of both indi-
vidual freedom and public health seems to be a culture shared by all citizens of 
hygiene and of disciplined be hav ior by re spect for the common good (Andrew, 
2020). Second, the par tic u lar features of the Japa nese welfare and healthcare sys-
tems together with a set of behavioral pattern are likely to facilitate the other-
wise very difficult po liti cal compromise during a pandemic between the protec-
tion of health or the economy. Third, the subtle interplay of central, prefectural, 
and local governments in decision- making and policy implementation is based 
on multi- professional and multi- institutional expertise with large- scale disaster 
preparedness, rather than on narrow bureaucratic rules and exclusive medical 
advice.
Note
 1. Prefectures and large cities or ga nize public health centers, where physician and 
other specialists work in multi- professional teams responsible for protecting and main-
taining the population health. According to the Japa nese Association of Public Health 
Center Directors, 472 centers  were in operation countrywide in 2019.
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 9 singaPore’s resPonse to covid-19
 An Explosion of Cases despite Being a “Gold Standard”
Rebecca Wai
When COVID-19 first hit, Singapore was held up as the “gold stan-
dard of near- perfect detection” of cases (Niehus et al., 2020). Singapore is used to 
this kind of praise; it is internationally known as a prosperous, well- functioning 
country that has low corruption and impressively high scores on many social pol-
icy indexes, such as the United Nations  Human Development Index and World 
Economic Forum’s Social Mobility Index. According to the Global Health Security 
Index (GHSI), which mea sures countries’ preparedness for  handling public health 
crises, Singapore ranks third in southeast Asia and twenty- fourth overall (Global 
Health Security Index, 2019). It was unsurprising that Singapore would  handle the 
COVID-19 pandemic well, especially  after learning hard lessons from the SARS 
epidemic in 2003. However, a second wave of cases hit Singapore in March 2020. 
At first, the cause was easily identifiable and manageable. Thousands of Singa-
porean students and expatriates living in the west  were coming back home to be 
somewhere more well managed and predictable. Even with this  great influx of 
travelers, the government easily monitored them through mandatory fourteen- 
day quarantine  orders in four- or five- star  hotel rooms, which the government 
paid for.
However,  there was a second source of cases that was largely ignored by the 
Singaporean government and society— mi grant worker communities. Singapore 
relies on almost a million low- paid mi grant workers to keep itself  running (Minis-
try of Manpower, n.d.).  These mi grant workers, who usually come from China and 
south Asian countries, provide cheap  labor for manual  labor jobs that the highly 
educated Singaporean workforce would prefer to forgo (Phua & Chew, 2020). 
About 300,000 mi grant workers live in government- commissioned dormitories 
that are commercially built and operated. They live in circumstances that are not 
conducive to COVID-19 prevention mea sures. They live twelve to twenty work-
ers in one room, often cramped and poorly ventilated. Hygiene facilities are also 
often inadequate. In his surveys of mi grant workers in Singapore, Mohan Dutta, a 
professor at Massey University in New Zealand, found that workers often lacked 
access to soap and cleaning supplies (Ratclife, 2020). In some cases, a hundred 
workers shared just five toilets and five showers.
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When COVID-19 first appeared in Singapore, the government knew that 
mi grant worker dormitories could be a potential hotspot, and they told the com-
mercial operators to take precautions such as increasing cleaning and disinfect-
ing eforts (Cheong, 2020a). Although it seems like the government anticipated 
that COVID-19 would spread quickly through  these dormitories, they still dedi-
cated the bulk of state resources to stemming the spread in Singaporean citizen 
and permanent resident (PR) communities, which makes up about 70  percent of 
Singapore’s total population (“Singapore’s Population Grows,” 2019). They largely 
left eforts to monitor and contain the spread in mi grant worker communi-
ties to nongovernment organ izations and commercial operators. At the end of 
March 2020, Singapore had less than one thousand total cases of COVID-19. By 
mid- April 2020, Singapore was seeing close to one thousand new cases per day, 
the bulk of which came from mi grant worker dormitories (Yong, 2020).
Inequalities in countries all around the world are being revealed during the 
pandemic, but Singapore gives us one of the starkest cases of how a country’s 
response to a public health crisis is only as good as its response to its least privi-
leged populations. In this chapter, we explore how Singapore’s expansive state 
capacity and public ser vices  were able to contain the spread of COVID-19 within 
the general population at first but allowed the virus to spread as a result of the 
government’s blind spot of the mi grant worker community. This blind spot exists 
 because of the tight control of civil society by the government and treatment of 
mi grant workers as “second- class citizens” who do not have equal access to pub-
lic ser vices (Stilz, 2010).  These shortcomings led to case counts rising from less 
than a few dozens a day to more than a one thousand a day, making Singapore the 
 bearer of the highest number of cases per capita in southeast Asia.
Health Policies
Singapore was quick to institute travel restrictions and precautions  because of the 
outbreak. Early in January 2020, Singapore was made aware of the novel corona-
virus cases in Wuhan, China, and said they would start screening all incoming 
travelers from Wuhan. In late January 2020, when  there was an increase in travel-
ers from China  because of the Chinese New Year holidays, Singapore expanded 
temperature screening to all travelers from China and announced a quarantine of 
fourteen days for anyone who had pneumonia and travel history to China (Min-
istry of Health, 2020).
The first case of COVID-19 in Singapore was confirmed on January 23, 2020, as 
a Chinese citizen traveling from Wuhan. Very quickly, Singapore moved to restrict 
travel from China, only allowing Singaporean citizens, PRs, and visa holders to land 
in Singapore from China. All travelers from China  were placed on a fourteen- day 
quarantine.  Those who breached their quarantine  orders  were prosecuted  under 
Singapore’s Infectious Disease Act, with fines of up to SGD$10,000 (US$7,500) and 
jail time of up to six months, or both (Lam, 2020). Non- citizens would be at risk 
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of losing their visas or PR status.  These punishments  were meted out quickly and 
forcefully. In late February 2020, two Chinese citizens who broke their quarantine 
 orders lost their PR status in Singapore and  were barred from coming into the coun-
try in the  future (Lam, 2020).
In March 2020, Singapore quickly increased travel restrictions and the criteria 
of who would be placed  under quarantine. This culminated in all travelers except 
citizens, PRs and certain visa holders being barred from coming into the coun-
try. All travelers from any country  were required to serve a fourteen- day quaran-
tine order in dedicated facilities, which  were mostly four and five- star  hotels. The 
luxurious accommodations paid for by the government that returning travelers 
faced during their quarantine caught public attention; they  were  housed in five- 
star  hotel rooms that would usually cost hundreds of dollars per night for their 
quarantine. More than 7,500  hotel rooms  were booked by the government for 
returning travelers to serve out their quarantine  orders (Mokhtar & Mookerjee, 
2020). Around the same time, public facilities  were quickly being shut down, and 
very soon Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong announced the strict lockdown mea-
sures, termed “cir cuit breaker.” This lockdown period was at first slated to run 
from April 7 to May 4, 2020, but it was  later extended to June 1. During the “cir-
cuit breaker” period, only essential ser vices, such as supermarkets, pharmacies, 
and restaurants (for takeout only) could be opened, and all schooling and other 
workplaces transitioned online.
On April 14, 2020, Singapore made it mandatory to wear masks and imple-
mented a fine of SGD$300 (US$225) if  those who flout the rules  were caught in 
public for the first time without a mask, and SGD$1,000 (US$750) fine if they are 
caught subsequent times (Yong, 2020). To make it easier for residents of Singa-
pore to adhere to mandatory mask rules, the government started distributing in 
February two  free reusable masks that could be collected from vending machines 
at con ve nient locations such as bus interchanges, among other mask distribution 
eforts. In total, almost 10 million masks  were distributed to residents in Singa-
pore (Goh, 2020). However, mask distribution eforts notably did not include dis-
tribution to mi grant workers in dormitories (Geddie & Aravindan, 2020).
To facilitate the enforcement of mandatory masks in public, about three thou-
sand enforcement officers and safe distancing ambassadors  were deployed to 
ensure that  people  were wearing masks in public and keep a safe distance from 
 others (Ang & Phua, 2020). Another initiative that caught much public attention 
was a two- week pi lot trial of a robot dog, named SPOT, that barked at  people who 
 were not adhering to social distancing mea sures. SPOT was fitted with cameras 
and sensors to estimate the number of  people in the park and the distance between 
 people (Tan, 2020). As of June 25, 2020, more than eleven hundred fines had been 
issued for  those who flouted mask- wearing rules, and more than fifty- five hundred 
fines had been issued for breaches of safe distancing mea sures (Goh, 2020). Fur-
thermore, one hundred forty  people had their work visas revoked for breaching 
lockdown mea sures and quarantine  orders (Goh, 2020). The government also set 
up a far- reaching digital contact tracing system, called SafeEntry. It required all 
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residents to check in at any public venue visited through their phone or by giving 
their national identity card information (“COVID-19: SafeEntry,” 2020). Singapore 
also developed a phone application called TraceTogether, which detected when 
 people  were near someone who had tested positive for COVID-19. The govern-
ment also planned to distribute wearable tokens that  were part of the TraceTo-
gether system to increase the adoption of it. The government emphasized that it 
had no location- tracking capabilities and only detected proximity to positive test 
cases through Bluetooth (Ang, 2020).
Although the world was looking enviably at Singaporean citizens returning 
from overseas being put up in five- star  hotels, Singapore’s 300,000 mi grant work-
ers who lived in purpose- built dormitories  were packed twelve to twenty  people 
a room, while COVID-19 spread through their living spaces like wildfire starting 
in March 2020. Almost 95  percent of Singapore’s COVID-19 cases  were mi grant 
workers living in purpose- built dormitories (Ministry of Health, 2020).
The disparity between the treatment of Singaporean citizens and mi grant 
workers could already been seen in early February 2020, when a thirty- nine- year- 
old Bangladeshi national who lived in a mi grant worker dormitory developed 
symptoms of COVID-19 and visited a clinic and  hospital only to be sent back to 
the dormitory. It took a few days for him to be admitted to the hospital, and he 
eventually tested positive for COVID-19. This is in contrast to the experiences 
of Singaporean citizens who  were brought to the hospital as soon as they  were 
showing symptoms of COVID-19, even if the symptoms  were not severe, and 
whose close contacts  were quickly traced and quarantined. Despite the attempts 
of mi grant worker advocacy groups, such as Transient Workers Count Too, to call 
attention to their cramped living conditions that would allow the virus to spread 
very quickly, the government’s response was lukewarm (Chandran, 2020b). They 
only tested and quarantined  those who  were in contact with the worker and asked 
the dormitory operators to increase cleaning of premises and take residents’ tem-
peratures regularly.
However, this was not enough to prevent the spread of the virus; by early 
April  2020, cases in mi grant worker dormitories  were making up half of daily 
cases. Singapore did not report on the number of tests done in dormitories  after 
the first reported case, but on April 14, it was reported that only fifteen hundred 
mi grant workers  were tested so far and  there  were plans to test only five thousand 
more (Mokhtar, 2020). In contrast, it was reported on April 6 that “2,800 to 2,900 
tests [ were] done each day in the last three to four weeks” (Wong, 2020). Accord-
ing to the Ministry of Health, as of August 10, 0.04  percent of the general popula-
tion tested positive for COVID-19, whereas 16.2  percent of mi grant workers living 
dormitories tested positive. As the cases in the mi grant worker dormitories  rose, 
the government started to divide the reporting of cases into  those in the com-
munity and  those in dormitories, further entrenching the division of the general 
and mi grant communities in the minds of the Singaporean public. Furthermore, 
while Singaporeans  were quarantined in  hotels, mi grant workers  were  either quar-
antined in their cramped dormitories or in unused carparks and construction sites 
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that  were hastily set up  after the sudden increase in positive cases among mi grant 
workers in early April 2020 (P. Ang, 2020).
Social Policies
Singapore has announced four bud gets for COVID-19 support mea sures from Feb-
ruary to May 2020, totaling SGD$93 billion (US$68 billion). SGD$52 billion (US$38 
billion) comes from past reserves, which are estimated to be above SGD$500 bil-
lion (US$370 billion) (Ng & Jaipragas, 2019). Support mea sures mostly focused on 
preventing job loss. SGD$72 billion (US$53 billion) of the announced bud gets was 
used for supporting businesses and ensuring job retention. Introduced in Febru-
ary 2020, the Jobs Support Scheme provided wage subsidies between 25  percent 
to 75  percent of the first SGD$4,600 (US$3,356) of gross month wages for each 
local employee (Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, 2020). During the cir cuit 
breaker period, 75  percent of all wages  were co- funded by the government. Busi-
nesses who  were not allowed to resume operations even  after restrictions eased 
continued to receive 75  percent wage support  until August 2020. This was fairly 
successful in keeping businesses afloat as the number of businesses that closed 
down during the month of April  were comparable to the number recorded in the 
same month from the past five years (Tang, 2020).
Although  there  were support schemes targeted  toward individuals, compared 
to countries like the United States,  there was less focus on support for individuals 
 because of Singapore’s circumstances. For example,  there  were no specific assis-
tance schemes for residential renters as Singapore’s home owner ship rate is more 
than 90  percent of the citizen population, which in turn makes up about 60  percent 
of Singapore’s total population (Tan, 2020). This is in large part due to its emphasis 
on building afordable public housing, of which 80  percent of Singaporeans live in 
(Housing Development Board, n.d.). The rate is one of the highest in the world and 
is much higher than the home owner ship rates in many other developed countries 
(Majendie, 2020).
Singapore also does not have a universal unemployment benefit system. The 
government’s approach to supporting the unemployed is focused on helping them 
find jobs through skills training and such.  There is financial support for  those 
who are unemployed, but usually only the old, ill, or disabled can apply. How-
ever,  those who  were retrenched  because of the COVID-19 outbreak could apply 
for up to SGD$800 (US$584) for three months, but they must have a monthly 
 house hold income of less than SGD$10,000 (US$7,295) or per capita  house hold 
income of less than SGD$3,100 (US$2,261) a month before becoming unemployed 
(Government of Singapore, 2020). Although this might seem less robust than in 
many other developed countries, such as the United States, where unemployed 
workers could get USD$600 a week, Singapore’s unemployment rate increased 
by just 0.1  percent in the first quarter of the year from 2.3  percent in the previ-
ous quarter to 2.4   percent (Phua, 2020). Although this was Singapore’s highest 
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unemployment rate in a de cade, compared to many countries, such as the United 
States, which saw an unemployment rate of 14.7  percent in April 2020, Singapore 
managed to weather the efects of the economic downturn relatively well (Rosen-
berg & Long, 2020). Therefore, its focus on employer and job support rather than 
individual support was arguably an efective and suitable decision for Singapore’s 
circumstances.
Individual support included SGD$600 (US$438) in cash as a “solidarity pay-
ment” for all Singaporean citizens, with some PRs and visa holders who hold 
white- collar jobs receiving SGD$300 (US$219) in April 2020. A second cash pay-
ment of SGD$600 (US$438) for Singaporeans earning less than SGD$28,000 
(US$20,426) and SGD$300 (US$219) for  those earning from SGD$28,000 to 
SGD$100,000 (US$20,426 to US$72,950), was disbursed in June 2020 (Ministry 
of Finance, 2020). All parents also received an additional SGD$300 (USD$219). 
In addition,  those in need can apply for a one- of cash assistance of SGD$500 
(USD$365) and low income  house holds whose members contracted COVID get 
up to SGD$1000 (USD$730).
Explanation
Public Health Investment
A  factor that played into Singapore’s quick and efective initial response to the 
outbreak was from the protocols in place  after its experience with the severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 and the H1N1 outbreak in 
2009. The government developed the National Influenza Pandemic Readiness 
and Response Plan (PRRP) in the aftermath of the SARS epidemic in 2003. Part 
of the PRRP was the establishment of a Homefront Crisis Management System 
(HCMS), which sought to address the inadequacy of Singapore’s public health 
crisis management system during SARS (Woo, 2020). Another integral part to 
the PRRP plan was the Disease Outbreak Response System (DORS), which is a 
color- coded framework that served to guide the intensity of response mea sures. 
Its dif er ent levels corresponded with WHO’s alert phases 1 through 6, and the 
levels  were based on the transmissibility of the virus. However, it should be noted 
that SARS mainly spread through the citizen and PR population, which meant 
the PRRP focused on planning for the spread in  those communities, not in the 
mi grant worker community. This meant that despite creating a plan that included 
lessons learned from the SARS epidemic, Singapore was still blindsided by the 
rapid spread of COVID-19 in the mi grant worker dormitories.
Singapore’s ability to contain the spread of COVID-19  in the early days of 
the pandemic is also attributed to its high capacity for contact tracing, which 
undoubtedly stemmed from Singapore’s experience with SARS. As Singapore’s 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong noted, “We [the Singapore government] have 
been preparing for this [COVID-19] since SARS, which was 17 years ago” (Lee, 
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2020). They  were quickly able to form contact- tracing teams and easily mobilized 
other parts of the civil ser vice, such as the military, which contributed greatly to 
their capacity to contact trace. Furthermore, Singapore ensured its citizens, PRs, 
and white- collar visa holders that COVID-19 testing would be  free for every one 
and their medical bills would be taken care of by the government if they  were to be 
infected with COVID-19. This further contributed to Singapore’s high COVID-19 
detection rate  because it ensured that  people would not be hesitant to get tested 
or treated for COVID-19  because of prohibitive costs;  those that tested positive 
 were immediately sent to isolation in hospitals.
Serendipitously, Singapore completed the National Centre for Infectious Dis-
eases (NCID) in May 2019, to take over Tan Tock Seng Hospital’s Communicable 
Disease Centre (CDC), which was the fa cil i ty used to contain and  handle the 
2003 SARS outbreak. The NCID is a 330- bed purpose- built medical fa cil i ty that is 
“designed to manage an outbreak on the scale of SARS” (Kurohi, 2019). It is meant 
to be a form of excess medical capacity to be used in major outbreaks of infec-
tious diseases. Outside of major outbreaks, it was used to detect and treat major 
food poisoning cases and conduct research on infectious diseases. However, 
 because it was built in anticipation of a SARS- like virus, which was less infectious 
than COVID-19, the NCID’s capacity was not enough to  handle the spread of the 
highly contagious COVID-19 virus, and it had to be quickly ramped up to more 
than five hundred beds.
Authoritarian with High State Capacity and Tight Control  
of Civil Society
Singapore is a one- party state and has been ruled by the  People’s Action Party 
(PAP), the party of Singapore’s famous founding  father, Lee Kuan Yew, since Sin-
gapore’s founding in 1965. PAP maintains a supermajority in Singapore’s parlia-
ment to this day. Singapore has been termed an “electoral authoritarian regime,” 
which refers to “regimes in which electoral institutions exist but yield no mean-
ingful contestation for power” (Levitsky & Way, 2002). In 2019 Singapore scored 
a 3.45 out of 10 on Va ri e ties of Democracy’s (V- Dem) Liberal Democracy Index, 
which mea sures how strongly individual rights are protected against state inter-
ference (Coppedge et al., 2020). V- Dem is a research institute that mea sures how 
demo cratic countries are based on five dimensions. This low score indicates that 
individual rights in Singapore are not well protected and the state has a high level 
of control over the population. This can be seen in how much harsher Singapore’s 
punishments for flouting COVID-19 rules  were than other countries. As men-
tioned previously, more than 6,600 fines had been issued for breaking COVID-19 
rules, and 140 work visa holders had their visa revoked. The Oxford COVID-19 
Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) shows that during the “cir cuit breaker” 
period, Singapore scored a high of 85 out of a 100 on their COVID-19 Govern-
ment Response Stringency Index, which mea sures the strictness of policies that 
limit  people’s freedom of movement (e.g., restrictions on public gatherings, closure 
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of restaurants and retail). For comparison, China’s high is 82 out of a 100 and 
United States had a high of 73 out of a 100. Stringent rules are of no use if they are 
not complied with, but Singapore was able to ensure compliance with the rules 
 because of high state capacity. Singapore was able to mobilize dif er ent parts of 
the civil ser vice quickly to mete out fines for rule- breakers. They also made it 
easier on citizens to comply with mask- wearing rules by distributing millions of 
masks in a short amount of time. This was also  because they  were able to mobilize 
the civil ser vice to pack and distribute masks, and the government had easy access 
to public venues to set up distribution stations.
However, despite their authoritarian setting, Singaporeans have a high level 
of trust in the government and willingness to give up their personal information, 
unlike citizens in many authoritarian countries. According to the Edelman Trust 
Barometer, 70  percent of Singapore trusts the government (Rekhi, 2020). This can 
be seen in how easily Singapore’s far- reaching and robust digital contact- tracing 
system was rolled out. Singaporeans  were even willing to use a phone app called 
TraceTogether that always rec ords Bluetooth proximity information used for con-
tact tracing in the background (Ang, 2020). Undoubtedly,  there is a high level of 
compliance among the population  because Singapore has a high state capacity to 
enforce its rules and  there is a lack of privacy laws, which gives the government easy 
access to individual’s data (Privacy International, 2015). However, trust in the gov-
ernment also plays a  great part in increasing the information flow from the popula-
tion to the government. According to an April 2020 poll, over 80  percent of Sin-
gaporeans comply with the rules, and about 70  percent said they  were coping well 
with the rules (Kurohi, 2020). Singapore’s authoritarian setting, high state capacity, 
and high level of citizen trust in the government contributed to the efectiveness of 
Singapore’s response to COVID-19 and its containment of the virus. Singapore was 
able to set strict rules as the population was already used to having their individual 
rights curtailed by the government. They  were able to enforce it  because of the state 
capacity they have built up over the years, and Singaporeans  were willing to comply 
with the rules and seek the government’s help when they  were infected.
Another consequence of Singapore’s rule as a one- party state is that its civil 
society has been kept anemic. In 2019 Singapore scored a 3.29 out of 10 on V- Dem’s 
Core Civil Society Index, which mea sures the robustness of a country’s civil soci-
ety, signaling that Singapore has a weak civil society (Coppedge et al., 2020). The 
government’s approach to civil society has always been to enforce strict restric-
tions on civil society organ izations to limit their influence and power. This is 
 because PAP’s government thinks of itself as a neutral party, which is only inter-
ested in pursuing the interests for the common. Therefore, the government does 
not see a need for “interest groups that pursue particularistic goals” as the PAP 
perceives that it is able to “absorb virtually all demands from society” (Ortmann, 
2015). The government has been largely successful in creating a depoliticized civic 
space. As a result, activists— even if they are non- partisan— who challenge the 
system are framed as just trying to create trou ble for Singaporean society.
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Singapore’s Socie ties Act requires civil society organ izations to register with 
the government, if not they  will be deemed illegal. Furthermore, organ izations 
 will not be registered if the government deems the purpose of the organ ization 
“contrary to national interest” or “prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good 
order in Singapore” (“Socie ties Act,” n.d.).  Unless an organ ization is registered 
as a po liti cal party, is it illegal for them to engage in po liti cal activities. Organ-
izations that operate without approval from the government  will be subjected to 
fines and imprisonment. This allows the government to control who is allowed in 
Singapore’s civic space and greatly limits the scope of activities organ izations are 
allowed to participate in, which limits their influence.
This is relevant  because mi grant workers have to work with advocacy groups 
and nongovernmental organ izations to fight for their rights,  because the work-
ers have very few resources to make their plight known  because of lack of access 
to stakeholders, language barriers, and other issues. Advocacy for mi grant  labor 
rights has been especially curtailed  because of its controversial history. First, the 
general  labor rights movement in Singapore has been suppressed and co- opted by 
the government  after most in de pen dent  unions  were closed down or weakened 
in the 1960s.  These  unions  were replaced by a state- sponsored National Trades 
Union Congress (NTUC), which acted as an “umbrella group for affiliated organ-
izations that are largely supportive of the government’s economic and  labor poli-
cies” (Rodan, 1996, p.  100). Second, many NGOs are unwilling to advocate for 
mi grant  labor rights  because  there is an association of the issue with the “Marx-
ist conspiracy,” “a term used to describe the arrest and detention  under Singa-
pore’s Internal Security Act of 22  people in May 1987 for threatening the state and 
national interests” (Lyons, 2005, p. 216). Social workers from the Geylang Catholic 
Centre for Foreign Workers, which advocated for better working conditions for 
mi grant workers,  were arrested. When the arrests happened, the government said 
that Catholic organ izations  were “a cover for po liti cal agitation” to “radicalize stu-
dent and Christian activists” (Haas, 1989, p. 59).
Therefore, the mi grant  labor rights movement was not allowed to grow and 
has only recently, in the early 2000s, been revived. Furthermore,  because of the 
rules curtailing the activities of civil society organ izations, the work often focuses 
more on public education and volunteer work rather than advocacy in the po liti-
cal and  legal sphere for improved mi grant  labor rights.  These groups for many 
years have tried to bring the public and government’s attention to the subpar liv-
ing conditions of mi grant workers and their resultant high susceptibility to infec-
tious disease outbreaks (Chandran, 2020a). However,  because the government 
has created a civic space where organ izations who advocate for issues outside 
the scope of what they explic itly recognize are unwelcome,  little attention has 
been paid to the living conditions of mi grant workers. Although the government 
has worked hard to ensure that  there are facilities to  handle a public health cri-
sis in the general population, they have largely forgone building up public health 
capacity with mi grant workers in mind. This can be seen from the aforementioned 
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reluctance to carry out the same level of testing for COVID-19  in the mi grant 
worker community as in the general population.
Mi grant Workers as Second- Class Citizens
Public health experts in Singapore have done research that shows mi grant worker 
communities are at a higher risk of spreading and contracting infectious diseases 
 because of their living conditions (Sadarangani et  al., 2017). However, it did not 
seem to be a pressing issue for the government  because  there was  little risk of them 
burdening the healthcare system  because mi grant workers lack access to it for many 
reasons. A survey of doctors found that the two main barriers to healthcare access 
 were language/cultural prob lems and financial costs (Ang et al., 2019).  There are few 
medical translation ser vices for mi grant workers, who often do not speak En glish 
or one of Singapore’s other official languages. Employers of mi grant workers are 
required to bear their healthcare costs if they fall ill or are injured, and mi grant 
workers do not have access to subsidized healthcare as most other residents of Sin-
gapore do. However, many employers are unwilling to pay  these costs, even when 
they are required by law to provide healthcare for their mi grant worker employees 
(Ang et al., 2019). Employers are rarely held accountable for lapses in healthcare 
provision  because of mi grant workers’ lack of knowledge about their right to health-
care and minimal oversight by the government; therefore, mi grant workers often 
have inadequate medical care. About 40   percent of doctors saw mi grant worker 
patients discharging themselves against medical advice or not receiving the treat-
ment needed  because of financial reasons (Ang et al., 2019). Many doctors said that 
mi grant worker employers often sought to downplay the extent of their employees’ 
illnesses and injuries and would even sometimes send them back to their home 
country to avoid paying for their treatment (Ang et al., 2019).
Furthermore, even though the government carried out almost  every aspect 
of Singapore’s COVID-19 response in the general population, they largely ceded 
responsibility of the  handling of the outbreak to private contractors who oper-
ate the workers’ dormitories. It had been known for years that the living condi-
tions of  these privately run dormitories  were often cramped and unsanitary. The 
government’s hands- of approach to mi grant workers meant that nearly half of 
dormitories failed to meet requirements of appropriate living conditions that the 
government had initially laid out (Cheong, 2020b).
This disparity in oversight further illustrates mi grant workers as second- class 
citizens and how the government did not think mi grant workers’ living conditions 
was a public health issue that would afect Singaporean citizens. The  handling of 
the outbreak in the general population was efficient and efective  because of the 
government’s heavy involvement. However,  because the government did not see 
mi grant workers as a population integrated with the general Singaporean society 
and one they had the responsibility to protect, the ability to detect and contain the 
spread of the virus in the mi grant worker community was lackluster.
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Conclusion
Singapore excels at many indicators needed to address a public health crisis: 
extensive social policies, well- managed information flow, high citizen trust in the 
government, and  great capacity for coercion. However, the stellar per for mance on 
many indicators does not apply to mi grant workers. They do not have access to 
Singapore’s public resources, are largely ignored by the government, and are often 
subject to exploitative employers.  These employers,  until very recently,  were not 
subject to the strict regulations that Singapore is known for  because of the lack of 
attention on the subpar working and living conditions of mi grant workers. Many 
are surprised that Singapore went from the gold standard of pandemic response 
to one of the hardest hit countries in East Asia. But if we look closely at Singa-
pore’s po liti cal system and societal structure, early warning signs and generaliz-
able lessons  will be revealed.
An impor tant lesson  here is that a strong civil society is necessary to reveal 
the blind spots of the government. Often vulnerable populations such as minori-
ties and mi grant workers are not seen by the government  because of their lack of 
po liti cal access and influence. Civil society organ izations that work closely with 
vulnerable populations would be able to contribute to the robustness of a public 
health crisis response by providing means to monitor and provide care for  these 
populations. A stronger civil society  will also contribute to a strong response to 
public health crises by providing resources and educating  people on the ground to 
reinforce outbreak mitigation mea sures. Although Singaporeans in general have 
a high trust in the government, their forceful punitive mea sures may dissuade 
certain populations who the government has not fostered as strong a relationship 
with, from adopting government- led mea sures such contact- tracing phone apps. 
Civil society organ izations can fill that gap in monitoring  because they are more 
likely to have built trust within  these populations.
Furthermore, it is impor tant to expand access to basic public ser vices to all 
populations. Certainly, provision of basic healthcare and welfare ser vices allowed 
Singaporeans to seek help if they  were sick and adhere to lockdown mea sures 
 because their basic needs  were met. However,  because  these basic ser vices  were 
not expanded to the mi grant worker community, they  were less willing to come 
forward when they  were sick, leading to a lower detection rate and a faster and 
wider spread of the virus. Civil society organ izations in Singapore have for a long 
time warned that if we do not take care of the basic needs of mi grant workers to 
the same extent as the government takes care of the general population, it  will be 
detrimental for public health and the economy. Unfortunately, Singapore turned 
a blind eye to  these warnings and even took active steps to silo mi grant workers 
from the general population and restrict their access to basic public ser vices to 
avoid having to pay for the provision of healthcare and other basic ser vices to 
them. In the end, the decision to ignore mi grant workers  because it was eco nom-
ically and logistically easier led to even more economic and social prob lems.
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As a result of Singapore’s unwillingness to address mi grant  labor issues, the 
virus spread to the point where Singapore had to enforce its strictest lockdown 
mea sures to prevent the spread of the virus from the mi grant worker community 
to the general population. Therefore, if Singapore wants to ensure that the next 
public health crisis is not mishandled in the same way, it needs to include more 
civil society organ izations or loosen restrictions on existing ones in its policy and 
decision- making pro cess and ensure that the basic needs of all populations— not 
just “legitimate” citizens— are met. Viruses are apo liti cal; even if the government 
wants to ignore certain populations, virus outbreaks  will not.
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 10 india’s resPonse to covid-19
Minakshi Raj
India’s first confirmed case of coronavirus was observed on Janu-
ary  30, 2020, in a patient in the southern, coastal state of Kerala (Reid, 2020). 
 Because the patient was a student at Wuhan University in China, upon receiving 
permission, a plane was prepared immediately to send to China to bring Indian 
nationals back to India (Reid, 2020). Over the next several months, India would 
experience a strikingly low number of cases and deaths followed by a rapid spike 
in close tandem with a national lockdown and then a phased “unlock.” In the 
country of 1.35 billion individuals, by July 31, 2020,  there  were 1.64 million con-
firmed cases with 35,747 deaths.
Understanding India’s response to the virus requires first recognizing that 
India’s modern identity has emerged from layer upon layer of external and inter-
nal monarchy regimes over time. With each successive empire that ruled the 
country— the most recent being imperial Britain  until 1947— India’s culture and 
character has evolved. Although each of  these invading regimes enforced arbi-
trary divisions within the country for economic and po liti cal expediency, over 
time language, religion, and other aspects of culture have brought about diversity 
and, oddly amid that, a sense of unity.
Sunil Khilnani refers to modern India as an “experiment,” wherein members 
of the Indian democracy must “entrust their destiny to a modern state” while 
maintaining their distinctive culture and the cultures within (Khilnani, 2017, 
p.  5). India’s history is impor tant for understanding its response to the virus. 
 Under British rule remote management for purposes of extracting resources 
made salient a collective sense of loss of culture and subsequently catalyzed 
an ongoing efort to maintain the country’s identity even  after seventy years 
of in de pen dence. State bound aries drawn by the British  were arbitrary and 
informed by trading posts established by the East India Com pany in the 1600s, 
with parallel colonization of much smaller regions by the French and Portu-
guese, and progressive military coercion (Dalrymple, 2019). The bound aries 
have since shifted across the country, established primarily on the basis of 
language and population density (Aula, 2014; Sur, 2015). Accordingly, cultural 
diversity is still observed in India (Riley, 2007). However, cultural memory and 
collective trauma underlie the broader unity that has persisted in India (Alexan-
der, 2017; Yusin, 2009).
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Vari ous groups  were underrepresented from formal legislative bodies during 
colonization and  were neglected entirely even in local government bodies. The 
desire for repre sen ta tion in modern India is steadfast and has resulted in a mul-
titude of po liti cal parties seeking to represent communities based on language, 
religion, caste, and other markers of identity. This, in addition to other forms of 
regional variation that other countries experience— such as population density, 
public health infrastructure, geo graph i cal characteristics, and border instability— 
shape the complexity and variation of policy decisions and implementation across 
India. Accordingly, COVID-19 represents striking unity in decision- making, and 
challenges in policy implementation reflect the diversity of po liti cal repre sen ta tion 
across the country.
In this chapter, we explore the public health response in India during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the social policies initiated to enable the public to quar-
antine, and the po liti cal  factors shaping India’s policy decisions, implementation, 
and general response.
Public Health and Health Policy Response
In this section, we describe India’s chronological public health response to the 
pandemic. We describe the response in three parts: the first constitutes the ini-
tial  response from the state of Kerala, where the virus was first reported; the 
 second focuses on the public health policy response led by the central govern-
ment; and the third demonstrates decisions that  were once again left to the 
states.
Although India’s constitution deems health as a  human right, the govern-
ment’s expenditure on health, roughly 1.28  percent of gross domestic product, 
remains lower than healthcare spending of other countries (Chetterjee, 2020). 
Despite per sis tent underinvestment in public health infrastructure for its popu-
lation needs, many  factors had the potential to prepare India to control spread 
and deliver care. The first is perhaps the fact that the first case of coronavi-
rus was reported in a patient in Kerala, the southern coastal state that success-
fully handled a Nipah outbreak only two years ago, and intensive flooding a 
year before that (Arunkumar et al., 2019; Chetterjee, 2020). Further, Kerala has 
emerged as an outlier for successful health outcomes when compared to most 
states in India, which may be in part attributed to its historical leadership in 
health policy planning and its emphasis on preventive care in addition to its 
high literacy rate. For instance, the maternal mortality rate in Kerala is 66 per 
100,000 live births as compared to 178 per 100,000 live births in the rest of the 
country (PHPCI, 2018). As another example, vaccines  were made mandatory for 
public workers and students as early as 1879 (Kutty, 2000). The Kerala govern-
ment has also invested in health information technology to support popula-
tion health management with a focus on surveillance of communicable diseases 
(Mannathukkaren, 2013; PHCPI, 2018).
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The first three cases in Kerala  were managed swiftly and, by the third case 
on February 3, 2020, a health emergency had been declared in the state. Subse-
quent mea sures included surveillance and screening of incoming passengers from 
China and immediate collaboration between the Kerala State Disaster Manage-
ment Authority and the health department. Kerala observed no cases for about 
one month; and about a month  later three travelers returned to the state from Italy 
and from  there on, cases began to rise (WHO, 2020b). In early March new cases 
 were reported in New Delhi and Telangana. As travel continued, cases began to 
rise across the country as  those returning to India from Italy, Germany, and the 
 Middle East had begun spreading the virus to their contacts both through typical 
social gatherings as well as through vari ous religious gatherings of entire com-
munities (“Coronavirus: Search for Hundreds of  People  after Delhi Prayer Meet-
ing,” 2020).  After a religious gathering on March 9, 2020, in Kerala despite rising 
numbers of cases, the state banned all mass gatherings and suspended classes for 
students up to seventh grade. Just a few days  later, other states in India started 
reporting deaths from COVID-19. On March 14, 2020, the central government 
declared the virus a “notified disaster” as cases surpassed one hundred. Mean-
while, Kerala’s government launched a “Break the Chain” campaign to ensure 
hand hygiene and on March 23, announced a lockdown  until March 31, 2020, to 
contain the virus (WHO, 2020b).
By March 23,  there  were purportedly 468 reported cases and 9 deaths resulting 
from COVID-19 across India. Indeed, tracking cases is challenging in a country 
of more than 1.3 billion individuals, where migration between states and move-
ment within cities is common. This denotes the transition to India’s centralized 
response to COVID-19; however, it is impor tant to note that India is considered a 
federalist country, meaning that power is divided between national and state gov-
ernments (Greer et al., 2020). Health care, for instance, is considered a responsi-
bility of states by the Indian constitution, although the central government shares 
in the funding of infrastructure and resources in states.
The largest lockdown in India’s history evolved from the “Janata ( People’s) 
Curfew” of fourteen hours a day on March 22, 2020. Travelers  were screened from 
select countries. On March  24 a complete national lockdown was announced, 
requiring all nonessential workers to stay at home with the exception of obtain-
ing essential ser vices, including groceries and banking.  There was an interna-
tional travel ban as well as a domestic travel ban, including suspension of travel 
by railway for the first time in 167 years (Press Trust of India, 2020). The decision 
was marked not only for the rarity of a centralized, authoritarian decision in the 
nation but also  because of its fairly unified implementation across the states. 
Enforcement certainly varied— for example, one police ofer in Rishikesh, a tour-
ist spot in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh, demanded that foreign tourists 
violating the lockdown write five hundred times, “I did not follow the lockdown, 
I am very sorry”; yet lockdown was still an anticipated success (Frayer, 2020).
One of the clear complexities of India’s response lies in its confidence in the 
health care system to manage compound threats. According to recent estimates, 
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India  faces a shortage of roughly 600,000 doctors and 2 million nurses primar-
ily in primary care (“India Facing Shortage of 600,000 Doctors and Two Mil-
lion Nurses,” 2019). The national lockdown likely initially prevented shocks to the 
healthcare system, which has been recognized globally for its developed capacity 
in emergency and intensive care (Haseltine, 2019). Indian hospitals face 300,000 
emergencies per day, with a majority of emergency visits for infectious diseases, 
cardiac issues, and trauma (e.g., road traffic accidents) (Clark et al., 2016). Further, 
India’s climate makes it susceptible to natu ral disasters ranging from torrential 
rains and landslides to tsunamis, making hospitals uniquely prepared for unpre-
dictable care delivery needs. Patients may travel extensively in inappropriate 
medical transportation and/or through traffic congestion, resulting in hospitals’ 
preparedness to manage urgent and severe needs associated with delays in care 
(Bajpai, 2014). India’s intensive care structure is less well defined and, as such, pro-
viders across hospital units are versatile and equipped to triage and provide inten-
sive care even in facilities lacking designated wards.  There are ongoing eforts to 
address the general qualified workforce shortage in the country. However, per-
sis tent high patient volume, including  those patients with the highly contagious 
coronavirus infection, presented a threat to capacity (Anand & Fan, 2016).
In response to anticipated challenges with healthcare infrastructure, at the 
end of March  2020, Prime Minister Modi called for the conversion of India’s 
trains into mobile healthcare facilities. He responded positively to a proposal 
to convert 12,617 trains with twenty- three to thirty coaches into “mobile hospi-
tals” with consultation rooms, medical stores, intensive care units, and pantries 
(Dhingra, 2020). But India— like many other countries— faced a shortage of test-
ing kits. As a result, health and government workers set out to trace and quaran-
tine individuals across the country, using a symptom- based surveillance approach 
to close the large testing gap, which can be attributed to a shortage of testing 
kits, lack of facilities for testing samples, and missing information linked to tests 
(e.g., missing information about date of onset and  whether the patient was symp-
tomatic) (Kadidal, 2020). By April 9, 2020, India had conducted 144,910 formal 
tests and a week  later, it had conducted more than 274,000 tests; however, some 
states had not reported any testing at all at that point (Vaidyanathan, 2020). On 
April 8, the Supreme Court of India ordered private labs to ofer  free COVID-19 
tests. However,  after it was deemed an unsustainable option, a week  later the 
Court clarified that  those who could aford the test should pay and reserve  free 
testing by the government for the poor. Meanwhile, private companies and gov-
ernment as well as research institutions had begun developing and producing 
their own testing kits (Raghunathan, 2020). India has faced a double burden of 
disease (i.e., communicable diseases such as typhoid and malaria in addition to 
noncommunicable diseases such as diabetes and cancer) and has a proclivity to 
manufacturing low- cost healthcare products, including medical devices, which 
likely prepared the country for rapid production of COVID-19 tests. Before the 
pandemic, India was producing no personal protective equipment (PPE) kits; by 
May 2020, it was reportedly producing an average of 150,000 PPE kits per day 
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and became the second largest producer of PPE in the world (Bhowmick, 2020; 
Mandal, 2020; PTI, 2020). By August 2020 asymptomatic contacts of confirmed 
cases constituted the largest group to be tested and symptomatic contacts of 
confirmed COVID-19 cases accounted for more than 10  percent of positive tests 
(Kadidal, 2020).
Unlock 1.0 commenced in June 2020 with large gatherings still banned, but 
with the opening of other activities primarily for economic purposes, includ-
ing hospitality ser vices, places of religious worship, and interstate travel mainly 
for mi grant workers (“Govt Releases Lockdown 5.0 Guidelines:  Here’s What’s 
Allowed and What’s Not,” 2020). The initial Unlock phases did not apply to “con-
tainment zones,” or “hotspots” of dense areas with positive cases.  These zones 
would be determined at the district level and continue only essential activities, 
contact tracing, and surveillance, with states lifting restrictions as deemed appro-
priate (“Govt Releases Lockdown 5.0 Guidelines:  Here’s What’s Allowed and 
What’s Not,” 2020). Trains and domestic flights resumed as well, and mask wear-
ing and social distancing  were mandated practices.
Early in June 2020, concurrent with Unlock, India began to see a spike in its 
death toll. It was unclear at the time, however,  whether the increase in deaths was 
a reflection of deaths that had not been classified as being related to COVID-19 
or had not necessarily been recognized and documented at all. The central gov-
ernment assured states in early June  2020 that spread was  under control and 
that “timely tracing, treatment and reporting”  were contributing to an increas-
ing number of patients recovering from the virus (Perrigo, 2020). But June also 
brought about shifts that  were anticipated yet unpredictable in their nature and 
intensity.
In April 2020, Indian scientists had begun expressing concerns about models 
predicting a surge of cases in July or August during the monsoon season. One 
of their major concerns included that monsoon months coincide with flu sea-
son in many places in India, which may require additional COVID-19 testing 
(“India May See Second Wave of Coronavirus Outbreak in Monsoon, Say Sci-
entists,” 2020; Kumar, 2020). Yet cyclones complicated the situation even  earlier 
than monsoon season, presenting a glimpse of the efect of compound climate 
risks (Phillips et al., 2020). In mid- May 2020 Cyclone Amphan brought torrential 
rains and winds to the eastern coast of India, near the major city of Kolkata in 
West Bengal (Agarwal, 2020). Tragedy associated with the cyclone was perhaps 
mitigated as millions  were evacuated ahead of time and more than twenty relief 
teams  were deployed by both the Indian and Bangladesh governments. An esti-
mated eighty  people  were killed in a region where more than 130 million reside. 
Thousands  were left homeless with residents grappling with the decision to 
stay at home and risk lacking supplies or seek help from a crowded shelter and 
risk infection from cyclone shelters, some of which  were partially converted 
into COVID-19 quarantine centers (“Amphan: India and Bangladesh Evacuate 
Millions Ahead of Super Cyclone,” 2020). Subsequently, the West Bengal gov-
ernment converted schools, colleges, and village administration buildings into 
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cyclone shelters (Dasgupta, 2020). The number of confirmed infections in  these 
shelters is unclear as officials in  these areas anticipated difficulties with main-
taining social distancing as they prioritized the sheltering of evacuee victims 
(HT Correspondents, 2020).
It is impor tant to note  here that Unlock eforts  were only initiating during 
Cyclone Amphan. But in early June 2020, Unlock was well underway as Cyclone 
Nisarga made its appearance in the western coast city of Mumbai, which is home 
to 20 million  people and considered a hotspot (Masih, 2020). At least one coro-
navirus care center had been evacuated but was subsequently flooded, and other 
healthcare facilities  were damaged or destroyed.
Although the central government had issued guidelines for opening ser vices 
outside of containment zones at the end of July 2020  in response to economic 
pressures, at the end of June several states (Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Megha-
laya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Assam, Jharkhand, Telangana, West Bengal, Delhi, and 
Karnataka) had extended their lockdowns  until the  middle or end of July. As of 
July 2020, states continued to extend or reimpose their lockdowns through the 
end of August.  These states include Tamil Nadu (245,859 total cases as of July 31), 
Maharashtra (422,118 as of July  31), Nagaland, Jharkhand, Himachal Pradesh, 
Mizoram, and Bihar. Although most of the lockdown authority was up to states, 
at the end of June the central government re- suspended Indian Railways  until 
mid- August (Athrady, 2020). By July 31, 2020, India had 1,638,870 cases, including 
recoveries, and 35,747 reported deaths from COVID-19. Popu lar media attributed 
this striking rise in cases during July to both the ease of restrictions and increased 
testing across the country.
Social Policies
The efficacy of the government’s response in terms of health policies relied upon 
its social policies. In this section, we discuss social policies that  were formally 
implemented by the government and also, community- driven social eforts to 
enable  people to quarantine and sustain lockdown eforts through the pandemic, 
as well as the implications of  these eforts.
As Prime Minister Modi announced the national lockdown in March 2020, 
Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced a Rs 20 lakh crore (US$307 bil-
lion) stimulus package. Of this, Rs 170,000 crore (US$24 billion)  were allocated 
 toward providing food security and cooking gas through direct cash transfers to 
avoid delays or corruption in money reaching individuals (“India’s Rs 20 lakh crore 
Covid Relief Package One Among the Largest in the World,” 2020). India’s popu-
lation is estimated at over 1.3 billion with  people residing in dif er ent formal and 
informal housing environments, across rural and urban regions, and spanning a 
variety of topographies, including the mountainous Himalayas in the north, the 
Thar Desert in Rajasthan, and coastal states such as Kerala and Gujarat. Ensuring 
that  every individual obtained access to the stimulus package was expected to be 
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complicated (“India’s Rs 20 lakh crore Covid Relief Package One Among the Larg-
est in the World,” 2020).
At the beginning of the pandemic, unemployment was at 23.5   percent in 
India, but by mid- June was down to 8.5   percent. In addition to cash transfers 
of  500 billion rupees (US$6.7 million) to  women and farmers, and subsidized 
food grains, which supplied 800 million  people, the Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGA) was critical in mitigat-
ing unemployment issues. MGNREGA was passed in 2005  under Prime Minister 
Dr. Manmohan Singh and provides at least one hundred days of guaranteed wage 
employment in a year to  house hold adults who agree to do unskilled manual  labor 
(such as building roads) in rural areas. Forty million  people sought work in June 2020 
as compared to 23 million between years 2013 and 2019 (Kugler & Sinha, 2020).
Still, more than an estimated 100 million internal mi grant workers  were 
stranded in their state of work during the initial lockdown  because of the suspen-
sion of Indian Railways (Athrady, 2020; Maji et al., 2020). Although the stimulus 
package was intended to support mi grant workers by enabling them to access 
food through their One Nation One Ration Card  either in their district of resi-
dence or of work, many did not use the card  because of misinformation about 
eligibility in their place of work. Further, the system used to identify individuals 
requires biometric mea sure ments that increase risk of infection (Jebaraj, 2020). 
 Because the railways  were closed, many mi grant workers opted to walk or cycle 
hundreds of kilo meters back to their home states, although some  were able to 
take special Indian Railways trains established specifically for mi grant workers 
(“DSGMC Launches ‘Langar on Wheels’ for Mi grants,” 2020).
On April 29, 2020, in response to the plight of stranded mi grant workers, the 
Ministry of Home Afairs issued  orders to state governments to facilitate inter-
state movement of stranded individuals including mi grant workers. The central 
government resumed ser vice for one train on May  1 to bring twelve hundred 
mi grant workers from the southern state of Telangana back to the eastern state 
of Jharkhand with the plan of screening and institutionally quarantining them 
upon their arrival (Mitra, 2020). In early June 2020, the Supreme Court ordered 
the government to register mi grant workers, ensure transportation, and provide 
them with shelter, food, and  water during their journey home  after reports of 
vio lence against  these workers (WHO, 2020a). Yet on June  1, railway stations 
received huge crowds as individuals both with and without tickets arrived at train 
stations expecting to travel. Although social distancing and masks  were observed 
when entering trains, public health mea sures  were not followed at ticket  counters 
(“India Coronavirus: Huge Crowds as Some Train Ser vices Resume,” 2020).
India is considered a highly collectivistic society, and community- level iso-
lation and quarantine  were anticipated challenges throughout the pandemic. 
Isolation and separation are challenging in this context, where  family members 
are depended upon for proximal support (Chetterjee, 2020). India’s aging popula-
tion and multigenerational  house holds typical to  family and community dynam-
ics  shaped the expectation that many families would likely be quarantining within 
India’s Response to COVID-19  185
the same  house hold. Nearly half of  house holds comprise multiple generations, 
including even three or four generations. Indeed, it was presumed that the infec-
tion was initially fairly well contained. However,  later, as Unlock eforts com-
menced, the risks increased with one Delhi  family even describing their home as 
turning into a hospital overnight as eleven of seventeen  family members living in 
the  house hold tested positive (Pathi, 2020).
However, this same collectivism supports the notion that individuals— 
and families— saw their isolation eforts as being necessary— and perhaps even 
obligatory—to the well- being of their  family members, community, and country. 
India showed this notion of collectivism in the initial Janata Curfew and national 
lockdown phases— both by staying at home and by ringing bells and clapping as 
encouraged by Prime Minister Modi as a demonstration of gratitude to essential 
workers (“What Is Janata Curfew: A Curfew of the  People, by the  People, for the 
 People to Fight Coronavirus,” 2020). Furthermore, communities developed ways 
to support other members. For example, the langar is a term used to describe a 
community kitchen in Sikhism, wherein a  free meal is served to any visitor regard-
less of their religious background. Although the langar was initially serving forty 
thousand meals a day in Gurdwaras (Sikh religious sites) during the pandemic 
across India as is typical practice, by June 2020 the Sikh community in Delhi had 
served roughly fifteen thousand  people living in informal housing using a “langar 
on wheels” (Agrawal, 2020; “Coronavirus Warriors: Amid Lockdown, Gurudwara 
Bangla Sahib Is Serving 40,000 Meals a Day,” 2020). In fact, upon recognizing 
that mi grant workers  were not able to benefit from the national stimulus pack-
age  because of restrictions in identification pro cesses, the “langar on wheels” also 
started providing food to mi grant workers.
Despite  these eforts, quality of health care remained a significant issue  because 
 there is no mandatory system for monitoring and evaluating health indicators or 
health status.  Because of a lack of oversight of  whether public or private hospi-
tals follow infection control guidelines as developed by health agencies such as 
the Indian Council of Medical Research and the Indian Public Health Standards, 
many hospitals do not have minimum standards for infection control, resulting 
in high rates of hospital- acquired infections (Pulla, 2020). Further, literacy pre-
sents a barrier in healthcare settings  because patients and their families may not 
understand information related to their health and/or to safety protocols within 
hospitals (e.g., reading signs with information on infection control procedures) 
(D’Cruz & Aradhya, 2013). Professionals may also have  limited language compe-
tency, especially, for instance, if they are working in another region of India where 
another language is predominant (Barker et  al., 2017). Controlling community 
infection spread is also challenging in an environment with  limited or insufficient 
health literacy  because of reduced adoption of preventive or protective be hav iors 
(Castro- Sanchez et al., 2016).
Further,  because citizens can receive  free care in public health facilities and 
government funding is  limited, much health care in India is still delivered at pri-
vate, expensive facilities;  these out- of- pocket payments accounted for 65  percent 
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of health expenditures in 2015 and 2016 (Tikkanen et al., 2020). During COVID-19, 
 these issues came to light as public hospitals  were disproportionately burdened 
with pandemic- related ser vices and private hospitals avoided the limelight, con-
cerned about having to deal with unpaid bills. Subsequently, state governments 
such as that of Maharashtra capped the fees hospitals can charge, took over 
80  percent of private hospital beds, and asked private doctors to volunteer at pub-
lic hospitals, even inviting personnel from Kerala to help ease staf shortages in 
Mumbai (Chandrashekhar, 2020).
The central government’s sense of innovation— with two salient instances 
demonstrated through the conversion of railway coaches into healthcare facilities 
and its continued eforts to expand health insurance coverage over the past eighty 
years— reflects a broader sense of innovation that has been recognized in India 
(Krishnan, 2020). Frugal scientific and technological innovations particularly 
in the domains of healthcare delivery and community health, have been critical 
social eforts to enable individuals to quarantine and also survive (Krishnan, 2020; 
McNicoll, 2014). For example, mobile health vehicles, telemedicine, and training 
of community health workers have demonstrated success in facilitating healthcare 
access for rural communities and have been used during the pandemic (DeSouza 
et al., 2014; Lahariya, 2017; Mishra et al., 2012).  After an earthquake in Gujarat in 
2001 that left 400,000 residents without their homes, entrepreneur Mansukhbhai 
Prajapati designed a low- cost clay fridge that would function without electricity to 
be used in rural communities and in instances of natu ral disasters and other cata-
strophies (McNicoll, 2014).  These innovations—in addition to formal social poli-
cies such as the stimulus package— may have instilled a par tic u lar sense of trust 
early on in the pandemic (Stevens & Reinhart, 2020). However, as has been the 
case in India for centuries, states faced dif er ent situations and compound threats 
 whether natu ral disasters, stranded mi grant workers, or border instabilities, that 
led to competing priorities and a search for decisions that could represent the 
welfare of all groups across the country.
Policy Choices
India has twenty- eight states and eight  union territories and is a demo cratic 
republic that has a parliamentary system operating  under the 1950 constitution 
(Heitzman & Worden, 1996; “India: Constitution and Politics,” 2018). It has a pres-
ident, who is the head of state, and a prime minister, who is the chief executive of 
the executive branch. Parliament, modeled  after the United Kingdom, is divided 
into two  houses, including the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) and the House of 
the  People (Lok Sabha). The president appoints twelve members for field expertise 
in science, art, and lit er a ture for the Rajya Sabha, and legislative bodies at the state 
and territory levels of government elect the remaining members. The Lok Sabha 
has a limit of 552 members with about one- quarter reserved for representatives 
of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who comprise historically disadvan-
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taged populations; the remainder of seats in the Lok Sabha are determined by the 
general election as well as by population size of individual states and territories 
(“India: Constitution and Politics,” 2018).
The legislative branch of India is responsible for the development of laws and 
policies, and the executive branch is responsible for implementing  these policies. 
The Parliament also has control over the executive branch in many ways, but in 
par tic u lar relevance to COVID-19, it has authority in preparing bud gets and is the 
main source of information to the Houses. According to the Election Commission 
of India, the country has 8 national parties, 52 state parties, and 2,538 unrecog-
nized parties. Indeed, as described in the introduction to this chapter, the desire 
and need for repre sen ta tion and inclusiveness across highly diverse states likely 
drives the multitude of po liti cal parties in the country (Sangita, 2017).
India supported the idea of health for all since its in de pen dence in 1947. The 
Bhore Committee Report of 1946 recommended a publicly financed health ser vice 
plan, envisioning a country “where no individual would fail to secure adequate care 
 because of the inability to pay” (Zodpey & Farooqui, 2018). Over time the Indian 
government developed vari ous health insurance schemes that may be or ga nized 
diferentially by state, to improve coverage for specific populations. For example, 
the National Health Insurance Program (Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana; RSBY) 
launched in 2008 to provide coverage for lower- income populations. As of 2016, 
41 million families  were enrolled in RSBY (Tikkanen et al., 2020). However, observ-
ing  little reduction in out- of- pocket spending and other barriers to access to care, 
including long wait times and infrastructure issues, in 2018 the central government 
implemented the Ayushman Bharat Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PM- JAY), 
considered the largest health insurance scheme in the world (Tikkanen et al., 2020). 
The tax- financed PM- JAY ofers  free hospital coverage for 40  percent of the coun-
try’s impoverished residents, and further, transforms primary health facilities into 
comprehensive Health and Wellness Centers. Through PM- JAY, the central and 
state governments continue to share responsibility for governance, financing, and 
operations of the health system. Local government institutions are responsible for 
administration in rural villages, including establishment of health and wellness cen-
ters and education, agriculture, and transportation (Tikkanen et al., 2020; “WHO 
DG Praises PM Modi, Health Minister Nadda for Ayushman Bharat Scheme,” 2019). 
During COVID-19, the federalist approach of dividing power between national and 
state governments was a hallmark of the public health and social policy eforts that 
 were ultimately pushed by individual states (Greer et al., 2020).
State Capacity
India is considered a federal system wherein states have their own legislatures 
and  union territories are directly controlled by the central government. State 
legislatures make laws regarding criminal justice, education, health taxation, 
public order, lands, and forests. However, once a state of emergency has been 
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declared, the federal government has the authority to temporarily assume exec-
utive and financial control of a state, and the president may even impose Presi-
dent’s rule (“India: Constitution and Politics,” 2018). Although states seemingly 
have quite a bit of control and autonomy in India,  because financial control is 
exerted by the federal government, states may not ultimately garner as much 
power in implementing laws. During COVID-19, however, states exercised their 
authority  under the law that granted them authority to manage epidemics and 
disasters.
Although India intended to “Unlock” in mid- April 2020, some state govern-
ments (Odisha, Punjab, Maharashtra, Karnataka, West Bengal, and Telangana) 
individually extended their lockdowns  until the end of the month (“Coronavirus 
India Live Updates: Telangana Follows Maha and West Bengal, Extends Lockdown 
till April 30,” 2020; “Covid-19: Karnataka Extends Lockdown by 2 Weeks, Throws 
in Some Relaxations,” 2020). Concurrently Prime Minister Modi also extended 
the national lockdown  until early May with a “carrot and stick” approach of prom-
ising relaxed mea sures regionally in the last week of April, depending on spread 
and presence of hotspots. At the end of April, farming and agriculture— a large 
economic sector— resumed, and the Ministry of Home Afairs released guidelines 
for interstate movement of stranded persons through airlines. As states began to 
implement “Unlock” procedures diferently, individuals began to mobilize prema-
turely as a product of misinformation about their respective state’s procedures. 
In Maharashtra by early July 2020, when the lockdown was still in efect, police 
had collected over 10 crore rupees (over US$1 million) from lockdown violators 
(Yadav, 2020).
In fact, states such as Kerala, Karnataka, and Odisha implemented their own 
stay- at- home  orders before the national government announced a national lock-
down. Throughout the pandemic, states  were also completing COVID-19 testing 
to varying degrees. Some states such as Odisha used infrastructure previously 
reserved for cyclones for attending to patients with coronavirus. Uttar Pradesh 
designated certain hospitals in the state as being specifically for COVID-19 treat-
ment and provided its own financial support to workers. Tamil Nadu and Raj-
asthan implemented contact tracing eforts of their own while developing tests. 
For instance, in the southern Tamil Nadu city of Chennai, health workers  were 
conducting door- to- door monitoring and testing of any individuals showing 
influenza- like symptoms; in Kerala, phone rec ords  were obtained to conduct con-
tact tracing.
As demonstrated, states varied in their responses and also varied from the cen-
tral government response. For example, Maharashtra monitored physical distanc-
ing during lockdown by using drones. Of course, law enforcement used a variety 
of punitive methods ranging from asking lockdown violators to write an apology 
five hundred times on papers, to monetary fines (“India  under COVID-19 Lock-
down,” 2020; Pahwa, 2020). Still, studies showed that even before the pandemic 
trust and confidence in governments  were high, particularly among individuals of 
lower socioeconomic status and  those living in less developed states (Kumar et al., 
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2020). This trust has likely been critical to population support of state- level public 
health mea sures.
Conclusion
During the pandemic, India observed the bluest skies in “living memory” (Biswas, 
2020). India  faces a high burden of chronic respiratory diseases such as asthma 
and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in par tic u lar  because of pollution and 
tobacco use (Salvi et al., 2018). The presence of  these under lying respiratory condi-
tions may exacerbate complications associated with COVID-19 and research con-
ducted during the pandemic encouraged policymakers to consider pollution in 
their “Unlocking” plans to extend the positive efects of clean air (Mani & Yamada, 
2020). But, unfortunately, as of this writing, pollution is the least of India’s con-
cerns as active cases continue to rise across India, hinting at state- driven lock-
downs that may extend well beyond August 2020.
That India  faces multiple challenges— natu ral disasters, border instability, pol-
lution, and the double burden of disease to name a few—is impor tant to recog-
nize to understand India’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. India’s national 
lockdown was the first of its kind in de cades and was a decision that likely con-
tributed to trust in the government. Although the sweeping lockdown early in 
the pandemic was critical to early mitigation of COVID-19 spread, that millions 
of mi grant workers  were left stranded undoubtedly has lasting consequences 
 because of the government’s overlooking of a key population. As has been a com-
mitment throughout its history, in seeking to ensure responsiveness to the needs 
of underserved communities, a national lockdown was no longer feasible. As is 
protocol, further decisions  were left to individual states, which could implement 
policies based on the individual needs and circumstances of their populations 
and geographies (Greer et al., 2020). Centralized “Unlocking” led to the spread of 
misinformation, which certainly may have contributed to the subsequent rise in 
cases across the country.
In India, time and again calamity carves the way for collectivism and creativ-
ity. Public trust in the government in general  rose 6  percent during the pandemic 
and is higher than several other countries; so is trust in doctors and nurses (Edel-
man, 2020; Stevens & Reinhart, 2020). This trust has been, and is likely, key to 
the population’s resilience and subsequently, its willingness to forego short- term 
freedoms for collective well- being (Hall et al., 2001; Mayer et al., 1995). As with 
any government, transparency is fundamental to trust; in India’s case, despite 
the central government’s lifting of the lockdown, state governments have con-
tinued to pick up the responsibility by extending lockdowns as needed, signaling 
to constituents that the pandemic is not yet over. As a collective, the country— 
both through government and community eforts— has come together to develop 
creative means of providing health care, COVID-19 testing, PPE, transportation, 
and food for its underserved. In a country that depends heavi ly on the well- being 
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of the economy for its continued development, the impact of the pandemic  will 
resonate long  after its exit. However, we hope that India continues on her path of 
prioritizing the well- being of her  people as she seeks to grow eco nom ically.
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 11 covid-19 resPonse in central asia
 A Cautionary Tale
Pauline Jones and Elizabeth J. King
The Central Asian region, comprising five countries that emerged 
 after the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, continues to strug gle eco nom ically and 
face developmental challenges. Three of  these countries— Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan, and Uzbekistan— thus surprised many by taking some critical steps early on 
to combat the spread of SARS- CoV-2 to their respective populations. In terms 
of both their timing and comprehensiveness,  these three countries developed a 
response that seemed much more promising than that of their counter parts in 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan moved swiftly and decisively to close 
borders and impose strict social distancing mea sures before having any officially 
recorded cases. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan  adopted similarly aggressive mea sures 
but albeit  were slower to implement them. In contrast, Tajikistan was initially very 
reluctant to even acknowledge the risk associated with COVID-19 and was late 
in advising its citizens not to travel to certain destinations and then closing its 
airports. Turkmenistan fi nally took some similar steps, such as canceling flights 
and closing borders, but continued to deny the risk of COVID-19. Yet, despite their 
relatively swift and decisive responses in March and April 2020, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, and Uzbekistan experienced a dramatic resurgence of COVID-19 cases in 
June and July 2020.1 This chapter aims to ofer insight into why the social distanc-
ing mea sures put in place at the start of the pandemic in  these three countries  were 
ultimately in efec tive. In short, it argues that the crucial (but perhaps understand-
able)  mistake was lifting  these restrictions too soon.
Central Asia’s strug gle with COVID-19 suggests two valuable lessons for 
understanding both government response to the pandemic and its efective-
ness. First, although many point to regime type and state capacity as the major 
determinants of government responses to crises,  these do not seem to be the cru-
cial  factors explaining how swiftly or decisively governments acted to mitigate 
COVID-19  in Central Asia. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are both authoritarian 
countries with a high and medium degree of state capacity, respectively. Kyrgyz-
stan is a demo cratic country with a low degree of state capacity. Second, the expe-
rience of  these three countries strongly suggests the need for continued vigilance. 
 After less than two months, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan all relaxed 
the stringent mea sures they had put in place. The number of confirmed cases and 
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deaths quickly began to increase, leading many to express concern that Central 
Asia was experiencing a “second wave” of COVID-19. This dramatic spike in new 
cases over burdened the chronically weak healthcare infrastructure that is com-
mon across the region.
In short, Central Asia is a cautionary tale in three key re spects. First, it dem-
onstrates what happens when restrictions are lifted too soon. The dramatic rise 
in COVID-19 cases and deaths in June and July 2020 was arguably not a so- called 
“second wave,” but rather, the continuation of its first wave that had been inter-
rupted or at least slowed down by the vigilance early on but was accelerated by 
the relaxation in  these policies. Second, the experiences of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan, and Uzbekistan seem to suggest that neither the stringency of policies nor 
compliance with  these policies is primarily about regime type and state capacity. 
Despite dif er ent regime types and varying levels of state capacity, at the start of 
the pandemic, all three countries  were willing to acknowledge its potential severity 
and take necessary but unpop u lar actions. Yet all three countries reversed course. 
Third, the efectiveness of  these policies is nonetheless tied to health infrastructure. 
In other words, even though all three countries reinstated strict social distancing 
mea sures  after it was clear that COVID-19 was continuing to spread, their ability to 
contain the virus was  limited by their pre- existing weak healthcare systems.
Health Policy Mea sures
Despite their many similarities, the five states that make up Central Asia have 
exhibited varied responses to the threat of COVID-19 since the first cases  were 
confirmed in early March 2020.  These can best be distinguished along two key 
dimensions: timing and comprehensiveness. Three countries in particular— 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan— introduced fairly swift and decisive 
health policy mea sures. In comparison to their counter parts in Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan, by mid- March, the leaders of  these three countries had closed bor-
ders and imposed strict social distancing mea sures, including canceling all public 
events and gatherings to celebrate the Nowruz holiday on March 21. However, by 
early June all three countries also began to relax  these mea sures largely  because of 
the economic implications of maintaining them. This led to a resurgence in con-
firmed cases in mid- June and July 2020. Subsequently, each government seemed 
to recognize the need to return to the initial stringency despite the economic, and 
possibly po liti cal, consequences.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan was quickest to both acknowledge the threat and develop a health 
policy response to COVID-19.  After several of its citizens returned from China 
with what seemed like symptoms of the virus in late January 2020, the govern-
ment or ga nized an emergency meeting, at which it took additional mea sures to 
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reduce exposure (for details, see Strategy 2050, 2020). Although the Chinese gov-
ernment had already proactively closed its land borders with Central Asia, the 
Kazakhstani government de cided to close its side of the Khorgos border crossing2 
as well as to suspend a seventy- two- hour visa waiver for transit passengers from 
China. It was not  until March 15, 2020,  after the first case was confirmed, that 
President Kassym- Jomart Tokayev declared a state of emergency. Days before, the 
government had already de cided to close all schools (Ministry of Education and 
Science, 2020) and cancel all major public events, which included the cele bration 
of the popu lar holiday Nowruz. When the number of confirmed cases began to 
rise in the weeks that followed, concentrated in the country’s two largest cities, 
Almaty and, the capital, Nur- Sultan, the government responded by imposing a 
quarantine on the cities’ inhabitants and suspending the activities of all businesses 
that are not considered essential from March 30, 2020,  until April 5, 2020 (Official 
Information Resource of the Prime Minister, 2020a). When COVID-19 appeared 
to have spread beyond  these three cities, the government renewed the quarantine 
it had imposed on  those two cities and extended it to six other cities, including 
Shymkent and Atyrau, and to one region (Akmola). It also renewed the nation-
wide state of emergency through the end of April (Vlast, 2020).
By early May  2020, however, Kazakhstan’s government began lifting  these 
restrictions. Flights between Almaty and Nur Sultan  were allowed to resume on 
May 1, 2020, and some small businesses  were allowed to reopen on May 4. Then on 
May 11, the Deputy Prime Minister announced the end of the state of emergency 
and that “[r]estrictive mea sures would be lifted in stages, depending on the epide-
miological situation of each region” (Official Information Resource of the Prime 
Minister, 2020c). Focusing on the economy, the first to be lifted  were restrictions 
on domestic flights between most cities and small businesses, including  hotels 
and restaurants with outdoor seating. Churches and mosques  were also allowed 
to reopen but not with full capacity (Official Information Resource of the Prime 
Minister, 2020c). The quarantine, however, remained in efect and citizens  were 
instructed to continue wearing masks and gloves and to observe social distanc-
ing regulations (“Tokaev: Karantinnyi Rezhim Sokhranyaetsya” [“Tokayev Says 
That The Quarantine Mea sures  Will Continue”], 2020). And, in some places, the 
quarantine regulations  were tightened in response to COVID- related deaths. Yet, 
even as the government threatened renewing quarantine mea sures and adopt-
ing tighter restrictions, compliance among businesses and the general population 
seemed to be loosening.
Meanwhile, by early June, the spread of the pandemic showed no signs of 
abatement. The number of confirmed COVID-19 cases continued to rise as did 
the mortality rate, which continued to be underreported, partly  because Kazakh-
stan was not including deaths from “strange pneumonia” in its calculation.3 In 
mid- June, several cities and regions reported increases, including the capital 
city, Nur- Sultan, where hospitalizations  were reportedly increasing by five hun-
dred per day (“V bol’nitsy Nur- Sultana Postupaet Po 500 Chelovek v Den” [“500 
 People Are Admitted to the Hospital in Nur- Sultan Each Day”], 2020). Medical 
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professionals  were among  those hardest hit with COVID-19 infections, which the 
Health Ministry blamed on their own negligence, yet the higher rate of infections 
among  these frontline workers was already apparent in April (KazInform, 2020). 
Government officials, including the country’s former president Nursultan Naz-
arbayev,  were also among  those diagnosed with and hospitalized for COVID-19.
The government once again responded swiftly, immediately moving to tighten 
restrictions. Although initially  these  were  limited to weekend lockdowns in major 
cities and mandates to wear masks in public throughout the country, by the begin-
ning of July 2020 a new lockdown was put in place and then extended through the 
end of the Month (“Tokaev Poruchil Prodlit’ Karantin v Kazakhstane” [Tokayev 
Instructed the Quarantine to Be Extended in Kazakhstan”], 2020). The extended 
lockdown meant that the country’s Muslim majority would have to celebrate the 
upcoming holiday, Kurban Ait (or Eid al- Adha), without gathering with  family and 
friends and with sacrificing an animal only remotely. Perhaps more importantly, 
the government agreed to change the way it calculated deaths from COVID-19, 
beginning August 1, 2020, to provide a more accurate mea sure of the virus’ impact 
on the country (Kumenov, 2020).
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan’s response was not quite as swift as Kazakhstan’s, but it was decisive. 
President Sooronbay Jeenbekov officially declared “an emergency situation” on 
March  22, 2020— a week  after Kazakhstan did—by which time it had already 
reported over a dozen cases of confirmed COVID-19 (Orlova, 2020).4 Schools 
 were closed and residents of the country’s three major cities  were placed  under 
a strict curfew with the exception of essential personnel (Government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, 2020b). Checkpoints  were established around Bishkek to limit 
travel into and out of the capital city, where it was made illegal to gather in groups 
larger than three  people. The government also canceled public events, including 
the cele bration of Nowruz. On April 16, 2020, Mufti Maksat Azhy Toktomushev 
pleaded with the country’s predominantly Muslim population to abide by the 
quarantine restrictions and to refrain from public worship and iftar meals during 
Ramadan (Masalieva, 2020).
Yet, like neighboring Kazakhstan, the government of Kyrgyzstan moved to 
lift restrictions in early May despite an increase in the number of confirmed 
COVID-19 cases and hospitalizations. It also focused on the economy and allowed 
the reopening of small businesses first beginning on May 1, 2020 (Government of 
the Kyrgyz Republic, April  28, 2020), followed by the lifting of curfews in the 
country’s major cities on May 11 (Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2020d), 
and the reopening of public transportation on May 25, albeit with masks required. 
Unlike its neighbor, Kyrgyzstan kept the nationwide state of emergency in place. 
Nonetheless, more restrictions continued to be lifted through the beginning of 
June, including the resumption of domestic and international flights (June  5, 
2020) and the re- opening of mosques and churches (June 8).
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Kyrgyzstan was also much slower than Kazakhstan to react to the continued 
increase in COVID-19 cases in May and June. Yet, by mid- June, it seems that the 
government was forced to recognize that the pandemic was not  under control. The 
capital city of Bishkek was hit particularly hard, as  were medical care workers.5 
Nor  were government officials spared.6 The government of Kyrgyzstan responded 
by acknowledging that both the  infection and morbidity rates  were on the rise and 
warning that new restrictions could follow. Along with Kazakhstan, in an attempt 
to increase transparency, it de cided to include deaths from pneumonia when cal-
culating the number of deaths attributed to COVID-19. As a result, the number 
of COVID- related deaths essentially doubled ( Human Rights Watch, 2020a). But 
it did not act decisively beyond requiring masks in public. Meanwhile, officials in 
Bishkek reinstated a weekend curfew, promised to ramp up punishments for  those 
businesses that did not properly implement regulations (Irgebaeyeva, 2020a), and 
began removing anyone not wearing a mask from public transit. Despite  these 
mea sures, the number of new cases continued to rise in July 2020, and the major-
ity of them continued to be in Bishkek (Irgebaeyeva, 2020a).
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan’s response was  later than Kazakhstan’s but quicker than Kyrgyzstan’s 
and was equally decisive as both of its neighbors. The government declared a state 
of emergency on March 16, 2020, just  after its first case of COVID-19 was con-
firmed, closed its borders and all schools, and canceled all major public events, 
including  those in cele bration of Nowruz (“Uzbekistan Confirms COVID-19 
Case, Closes Borders,” 2020). In the weeks that followed, the government severely 
 limited transportation to mitigate the spread of the virus: efective March 20, it 
suspended all car, bus, train, and air travel into and out of the country; efective 
March 22, it suspended all public transit within the capital city (Tashkent); efec-
tive March 27, it suspended all car, bus, train, and air travel within the country, 
except for trucks carry ing freight; and efective March 30, it suspended car travel 
within cities. The government also  adopted and began enforcing several other 
impor tant health policy mea sures, such as requiring Tashkent residents to wear 
masks in public or pay a large fine, prohibiting gatherings of more than ten to 
fifteen  people (including weddings and funerals), and calling upon the chief mufti 
to issue a fatwa recommending that Muslims stay home to perform their daily 
prayers (“Upravlenie Musul’man Uzbekistana i Sovet Ulemov Prizvali Musul’man 
Prinyat’ vs Emery Dlya Predotvrashcheniya Rasrostraneniya Koronavirusa” [“The 
Board of Muslims of Uzbekistan and the Council of Ulemas Called on Muslims to 
Take All Precautions to Prevent the Spread of Coronavirus”], 2020).7
Similar to its counter parts in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the government of 
Uzbekistan also began to lift restrictions before the virus was completely  under 
control, although it proceeded more cautiously. At the end of April 2020, Presi-
dent Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced that the situation had stabilized and that 
the quarantine requirements could be gradually relaxed. He also emphasized 
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the strain on the economy and the need to allow some forms of transportation 
between and within cities to resume to “prevent the loss of ripe agricultural prod-
ucts” and enable  people to return to work (“Prishlo Vrenya Prinyat’ Sleduiushchie 
Shagi k Poetapnomu Snyatiiu Karantina” [“It Is Time to Take the Next Steps to 
Phase Out Quarantine”], 2020).8 By mid- May 2020, domestic travel by rail and 
air was allowed to resume with some restrictions (“Kompaniya Uzbekistan Air-
ways Vozobnovila Prodazhi Biletov na Vnutrennie Reisy” [“Uzbekistan Airways 
Has Resumed Ticket Sales for Domestic Flights”], 2020). By the end of May, the 
government was encouraging domestic travel to revive the tourism industry 
(“Uzbekistan Gotovitsya Prinimat’ Turistov” [“Uzbekistan Is Preparing to Wel-
come Tourists”], 2020). In mid- May, the government published a long list of “sani-
tary rules and norms” developed by the Ministry of Health that businesses would 
be required to follow in order to reopen (Agency for Sanitary and Epidemiologi-
cal Welfare, 2020). Then in early June 2020, it announced that small businesses, 
including retail stores, restaurants, and kindergartens (but not nightclubs or pub-
lic transportation) would be allowed to reopen on June 15 (Mamatkulov, 2020). 
Requirements for wearing masks in public and observing social distancing, how-
ever,  were extended  until August 1, 2020, and the zoning system also remained in 
place in defi nitely (“Karantin v Uzbekistane Prodlili do Avgusta” [“Quarantine in 
Uzbekistan Was Extended  until August”], 2020).
Uzbekistan was perhaps slowest to respond to the unrelenting spread of the 
virus. New reported cases of COVID-19 began to increase already by the end of 
May 2020 and continued to spike in June. They also began to appear in regions 
that had not previously been considered to be at high risk (“Novye Bol’nye s Koro-
navirusom Obnaruzheny v Vos’mi Regionakh. Vysokie Pokazateli v Khorezme, 
Surkhandar’e i Tashkente” [“New Patients with Coronavirus Have Been Found 
in Eight Regions. High Rates in Khorezm, Surkhandarya and Tashkent”], 2020). 
Nonetheless, the government did not respond  until the number of cases per day 
hit a new rec ord (318 on July  3, 2020) and then surpassed that rec ord (342 on 
July 6, 2020) in less than one week (“Uzbekistan Obnovil Rec ord Po Chislu Zabo-
levshikh COVID-19 Za Sutki” [“Uzbekistan Set a New Rec ord for the Number of 
COVID-19 Cases Per Day”], 2020). On July 7, 2020, the government announced 
that the quarantine would be tightened and extended beginning July 10 (“S 10 Iiu-
lya v Uzbekistane Zakroiut Rynki i Zapretyat Svad’by” [“Starting July 10, Markets 
 Will Be Closed and Weddings  Will Be Forbidden in Uzbekistan”], 2020).  These 
new mea sures included stricter limitations on the travel between regions and 
the banning of most large gatherings (specifically, weddings). Over a week  later, 
President Mirziyoyev officially acknowledged that the country was experiencing 
a so- called “second wave” and pleaded with its citizens not to panic (Yakubov, 
2020). In late July 2020, the government extended the lockdown once again, this 
time through mid- August, citing the success of its decision  earlier that month to 
tighten quarantine mea sures in combating the further spread of the virus (Radio 
Azzatyk, 2020b).9
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Social Policy Mea sures
Social policy mea sures, which  were necessary to address the social and eco-
nomic costs of the stringent health policy mea sures, followed a similar pattern 
to the health policy mea sures described  earlier. Kazakhstan acted the most 
swiftly and comprehensively. It was the first and only country in Central Asia to 
introduce a significant domestic anticrisis package. The primary reason for this 
is that Kazakhstan had greater financial capacity than its neighbors before the 
COVID-19 pandemic, fueled by its large oil and gas sector.10 With more  limited 
fiscal means before the pandemic and both the loss of remittances from mi grant 
laborers in Rus sia and the expense of trying to bring them home once the crisis 
began to unfold, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan faced greater constraints. As a result, 
both depended on receiving emergency aid from the international community. 
All three countries banned the export of basic foodstuf by the end of March to 
ensure a sufficient domestic supply. Despite the best intentions, none  were able to 
fully address the economic consequences of the lockdown mea sures.
Kazakhstan
The day  after President Tokayev declared an official state of emergency, he issued 
two additional decrees11 outlining mea sures for steps that the government would 
take to provide social and economic support to its citizens and industry. The 
mea sures amounted to a significant “anti- crisis package”12 that included cash pay-
ments to the unemployed and self- employed,13 an increase in pension and welfare 
benefits, and support for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The package for 
SMEs in par tic u lar includes tax breaks (payroll and value added tax, or VAT), 
subsidized lending and suspension of debt payments, as well as employment sup-
port. As the crisis continued in May and June and the impact on the economy 
became greater,14 the government renewed its commitment to providing social 
and economic benefits, focusing on restoring growth.  These social policy mea-
sures included subsidizing mortgages, tax breaks for the hardest hit sectors (e.g., 
agriculture), and continued subsidies to SMEs (World Bank, 2020b, pp. 6–9). By 
July, the country’s economy had shrunk by almost 2  percent since the beginning 
of the year. Yet, confident in its ability to rely on its reserves, the government 
continued  these mea sures (“Den’gi est’- Ministr Finansov o Bor’be s Korornaviru-
som” [“The Minister of Finance Says That  There Is Money to Fight Coronavirus”], 
2020). It also continued to promise cash payments to  those who lost substantial 
income as a result of the quarantine, although it has been criticized for reducing 
the amount of  these payments in August  2020 ( Human Rights Watch, 2020b) 
and for its inability to pro cess the increased volume of requests (“Kazakhstantsy 
‘Polozhili’ Sait Dlya Podachi Zayavok na Karantinnye Posobiya” [“Kazakhstanis 
‘Shut Down’ the Website for Submitting Applications for Quarantine Benefits”], 
2020). Fi nally, the government announced that it would grant a special one- time 
payment to compensate medical workers (“Skol’ko Zarazivshikhsya Koronavi-
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rusom Medikov Poluchili po 2 Milliona Tenge” [“How Many Medical Workers 
Infected with Coronavirus Each Received 2 Million Tenge”], 2020).
Kyrgyzstan
The government of Kyrgyzstan also quickly acknowledged the economic impact 
concerning both the pandemic in general and the health policy mea sures it 
had enacted but could not provide much relief on its own. President Jeenbekov 
almost immediately reached out to vari ous international institutions— including 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Eu ro pean Union, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)— for financial assistance to cover the anticipated gaps in the 
country’s bud get.15 Meanwhile, the government could do  little more than assert 
that it was working on mea sures to provide assistance to  those most afected. In 
par tic u lar, the government announced that it was considering a package of loan 
payment deferrals and tax breaks for small Businesses (“Pravitel’stvo o Vesenne- 
Polevykh Rabotakh: S Segodnyashnego Dnya na «Kudaibergene» Budut Rabotat’ 
Ryady s Zapchastyami” [“The Government on Spring Field Work: From  Today 
on, Rows of Spare Parts  Will Work at Kudaibergen”], 2020). Like its neighbors, 
Kyrgyzstan was concerned about food security and so had already banned the 
export of most basic foodstufs by the end of March. It also allowed farmers to 
harvest their spring crops and bring them to market (Government of the Kyr-
gyz Republic, 2020a). However, this did not prevent the closing of the Dordoi 
Bazaar, located on the northeastern outskirts of Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek, on 
March 23 “ until further notice.”16 Dordoi is not only Central Asia’s largest market 
and one of the main entry points for Chinese goods but also the main source of 
income for approximately 150,000  people.17 This contributed to the already high 
level of unemployment in the country; by mid- April, it was estimated to be about 
50  percent for the formal  labor force and even higher for the informal one (OECD, 
2020a).
Uzbekistan
Like its counter parts in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the government of Uzbeki-
stan was well aware of the potential social and economic impact of the pandemic 
and the health policies that  were put in place to mitigate its spread. Although it 
moved faster than Kyrgyzstan, its package was not as extensive as Kazakhstan’s. 
On March  19, 2020, the government announced that it would create an “Anti- 
Crisis Fund in the amount of 10 trillion soms,” which would be directed primar-
ily at the medial system to ensure adequate supplies of needed equipment and 
compensate medial workers but was also intended to ofset the impact on SMEs.18 
High rates of unemployment  were of par tic u lar concern, particularly given the 
large number of  people employed outside the formal sector.19  Those in the infor-
mal  labor sector, however, account for the largest portion of the population that 
was employed before COVID-19 and  were the most vulnerable to the consequent 
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economic shutdown (OECD, 2020a, p. 45). Also unlike Kazakhstan, the govern-
ment of Uzbekistan was ill equipped to fulfill  these promises without foreign 
assistance. Thus, similar to Kyrgyzstan, it began to seek comprehensive interna-
tional aid from vari ous financial institutions early into the crisis, beginning with 
a request for US$1 billion in bud get support from the ADB. By the end of April, 
it had reportedly received significant financing from the World Bank and IMF to 
support its anticrisis mea sures by funding social welfare programs and to stimu-
late its economy (IMF, 2020).
Explanation
Although many point to regime type and state capacity as the major determi-
nants of government responses to crises,  these do not seem to be the crucial 
 factors explaining how swiftly or decisively governments acted to mitigate 
COVID-19  in Central Asia. In fact, one of the main reasons for comparing 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan is that they difer in both of  these key 
explanatory variables. Regarding regime type, across multiple indices, Kazakh-
stan and Uzbekistan have consistently been characterized as consolidated 
authoritarian regimes, whereas Kyrgyzstan has consistently been characterized 
as demo cratic (Haerpfer & Kizilova, 2020). When it comes to state capacity, 
which we conceptualize along two dimensions (administrative reach and fiscal 
resources),  there is greater variation across  these three countries. Kazakhstan 
has a high degree of state capacity, given its centralized structure of decision- 
making and access to oil revenue. Uzbekistan has a medium degree of state 
capacity; like Kazakhstan, it is centralized administratively and yet, as previ-
ously described, has  limited fiscal resources. Kyrgyzstan has a low degree of 
state capacity; it is both administratively and fiscally decentralized in compari-
son to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Further, neither regime type nor state capacity can explain the early relaxation 
or lifting of strict health policy mea sures by governments in all three countries. 
 Here, economic conditions seem to be the key  factor influencing not only the 
extent to which each country could adopt social policies (as previously described) 
but also their willingness and ability to maintain lockdowns. Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan are lower- middle income countries. Kazakhstan is an upper- middle 
income country; nonetheless, the World Bank (2020b) expects that the country 
 will sufer grave economic consequences from the pandemic. Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan are both highly dependent on revenue from  labor migration of their 
citizens. As early as April 2020, the World Bank (2020a) projected that the global 
migration economy  will sufer from the COVID-19 pandemic and that Eu rope 
and Central Asia  will sufer the most. It estimated that the Central Asian coun-
tries dependent on  these remittances would experience a 28  percent decrease in 
remittances this year (World Bank, 2020a).  There is no doubt that the pandemic 
has had major economic consequences across the globe. However, COVID-19 has 
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also shined light on which countries are eco nom ically unable to maintain stay- at- 
home mea sures for the length of time necessary to efectively contain the spread 
of coronavirus. In countries with weak healthcare infrastructure, moreover, main-
taining longer lockdowns seems crucial to averting a full- blown crisis.
Indeed, although Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan vary according to 
regime type and state capacity, what they do have in common is a weak healthcare 
system. As in many other parts of the former Soviet Union, long- neglected public 
healthcare systems meant that during the COVID-19 pandemic, citizens lacked 
access to diagnostic tests and high- quality medical care, and medical workers 
 were particularly vulnerable to infection. COVID-19 has again exposed the fragil-
ity of the underdeveloped and neglected healthcare systems and demonstrated 
the need for further health systems strengthening across the region.
Although Central Asian countries have under gone de cades of healthcare 
reforms since the Soviet Union’s collapse, they have not been sufficient. Central 
Asia  faces the double burden of both from noncommunicable diseases, namely 
cardiovascular and cancer, and from infectious diseases, namely tuberculosis, 
viral hepatitis, and HIV (Adambekov et  al., 2016). The comorbidities that have 
been shown to be associated with complications and deaths from COVID-19 are 
highly prevalent in the region. The leading  causes of death in all three countries are 
ischemic heart disease, stroke, and cirrhosis. Moreover, lower respiratory infec-
tions are in the top ten leading  causes of death in all three countries (CDC, 2019). 
Central Asian countries inherited the Soviet model healthcare systems that are 
hierarchical but also fragmented in ser vice provision. Since the end of the Soviet 
Union, the healthcare systems in Central Asia have further deteriorated  because 
of the po liti cal and economic crises over the past three de cades. For example, the 
availability of hospital beds in acute care has been in the decline since the 1990s 
(World Bank, 2020c). And  human resource capacity has sufered as indicated by 
the decreasing number of physicians per capita, particularly in more rural areas 
(Rechel et  al., 2012). Universal access to  free government healthcare ser vices 
remains; however, we know that informal payments and the increase in private 
healthcare ser vices undermine eforts to achieve health equity and provide quality 
health care to all citizens. All of the countries in Central Asia have experienced 
challenges in healthcare reform and healthcare financing. Although Kazakhstan, 
the most eco nom ically well of, spends more per capita than the other countries in 
the region, health expenditure makes up a smaller percentage of its gross domestic 
product (GDP) than in the  others (Rechel et al., 2012). The Kazakhstani govern-
ment has introduced healthcare reform repeatedly; however, it seems that with 
each new policy introduced, the situation actually worsens (Koneev & Kaldybaev, 
2019). Central Asian countries are also plagued by vast inequities in healthcare 
resources, prob lems with access to care exacerbated by poverty and inefficient 
and poor- quality healthcare ser vices (Rechel et al., 2012).
Thus, even as the governments in all three countries publicly recognized 
their  mistake and reinstituted necessary but unpop u lar policies, most impor-
tantly lockdowns, it was too  little too late. In other words, their policy reversal 
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was insufficient given  these deficiencies in the healthcare infrastructure, which 
proved detrimental to their ability to combat COVID-19. For example,  there  were 
not enough hospital beds and medicines available in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and 
Uzbekistan during the summer when the number of COVID-19 patients need-
ing medical care was surging. Reports from Kyrgyzstan showed that this was 
not just lack of hospital beds, but also ventilators, intensive care unit spaces, and 
lack of healthcare workers (Eshaliyeva, 2020). The deputy health minister of Kyr-
gyzstan reportedly admitted on live tele vi sion in April that just over half of the 
649 ventilators in the country are in working condition. Healthcare workers in 
the region have been particularly negatively afected by the novel coronavirus, 
reflecting the high burden of patient numbers and lack of adequate personal pro-
tective equipment. Although healthcare workers who have been infected with 
COVID-19 have been promised financial compensation from the government, 
 there have been complaints that no payments have been made (Radio Azzatyk, 
2020a). Arguably, the weak healthcare infrastructure before the COVID-19 pan-
demic and the precarious economic situation contributed to the surge in cases 
over the summer in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Although they  were 
able to all react quickly early on, the extended lockdowns  were not sustainable, 
and the healthcare systems  were not strong enough to adequately deal with the 
rapid increase in cases. In fact, this trend was observed across the countries irre-
spective of regime type.
Conclusion
Central Asia is a cautionary tale in three key re spects. First, it demonstrates what 
happens when restrictions are lifted too soon. The dramatic rise in COVID-19 
cases and deaths in June and July 2020 was arguably not a so- called “second wave,” 
but rather, the continuation of its first wave that had been interrupted or at least 
slowed down by the vigilance early on but was accelerated by the relaxation in 
 these policies. Second, the experiences of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbeki-
stan seem to suggest that neither the stringency of policies nor compliance with 
 these policies is primarily about regime type and state capacity. Despite dif er ent 
regime types and varying levels of state capacity, at the start of the pandemic, all 
three countries  were willing to acknowledge its potential severity and take neces-
sary but unpop u lar actions. Yet, all three countries also reversed course. Third, 
the  efectiveness of  these policies is nonetheless tied to health infrastructure. In 
other words, even though all three countries reinstated strict social distancing 
mea sures  after it was clear that COVID-19 was continuing to spread, their ability 
to contain the virus was  limited by their pre- existing weak healthcare systems. As 
countries around the world  will likely be facing a second wave of the COVID-19 
pandemic in fall, Central Asia’s experience demonstrates the importance of focus-
ing on health systems and their capacity to address pandemic threats.
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Notes
 1. It is worth noting that both Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have also been criticized 
for limiting press coverage of COVID-19 in their countries and reporting very few (or 
any) cases of the novel coronavirus. Thus, we cannot compare the outcomes in  these 
countries with the other three, only their policies (or lack thereof ).
 2. This is the gateway to the special trade zone between the two countries.
 3. Kazakhstan was apparently using the same method as Rus sia, which did not include 
 those who had under lying health issues in the count of COVID-19 deaths.
 4. Just a week before, on March 16th, the government had ordered night clubs and 
movie theaters to close as a precaution.
 5. Also like Kazakhstan, this disproportionate impact was apparent early on; medical 
care workers already accounted for roughly 25  percent of all cases in April.
 6. The former speaker of parliament, Mukar Cholponbaev, died of COVID-19 in late May.
 7. A similar fatwa was issued on April 14 prohibiting public gatherings related to 
Ramadan, which began on April 23, 2020.
 8. The country was divided into zones, allowing private cars to travel freely in  those 
“green” areas where the risk was deemed to be low and greater restrictions in  those “red” 
areas where the risk was deemed to be high. (For details, see Kumenov & Imanaliyeva, 2020.)
 9. The number of COVID-19 cases had reportedly begun to decrease.
 10. Real GDP  rose by 4.1  percent in 2019 and unemployment was low (4.9  percent). See 
OECD, 2020a for details.
 11. Decree No. 286 “On mea sures for ensuring social and economic stability” and 
Decree No. 287 “On further stabilization eforts.”
 12. The OECD (2020b) estimated that, “excluding tax breaks and local support,” the total 
package “[would] amount to KZT 4.4 trillion tenge (roughly USD 10bn or 6–7  percent  
of GDP).”
 13. Within a month, over 4 million  people had received  these payments, but over half 
 those who applied  were denied (“4 Milliona Kazakhstantsev Poluchili 42 500 Tenge”  
[“4 Million Kazakhstanis Received 42,500 Tenge”], 2020).
 14. By early April, Kazakhstan was forced to utilize its National Oil Fund to subsidize 
the economy while it faced a decline in both oil prices and production (“Kazakhstan Cuts 
Oil Output Forecast, Sees GDP Shrinking This Year,” 2020).
 15. Kyrgyzstan was the first country to receive emergency funding from the IMF  because 
of the dire situation concerning its balance of payments. In April, President Jeenbekov 
asked China for debt relief.
 16. It also did not prevent the huge increase in food prices, which had reportedly 
doubled by May.
 17. The bazaar’s closure meant unemployment and possibly starvation for approxi-
mately 50,000  people. For details, see Furlong, 2020.
 18. As in Kazakhstan, the pledged relief for SMEs included interest- free loans and tax 
breaks and temporary debt forgiveness.
 19. By some estimates, the number of officially unemployed had risen by 30  percent in 
June as a result of the quarantine (“Chislo Bezrabotnykh V Uzebkistane Dostiglo 2  
Millionov” [“The Number of Unemployed in Uzbekistan Has Reached 2 Million”], 2020). 
This figure does not include the approximately 500,000 who could no longer work 
abroad.
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 12 covid-19 in the United KingdoM
 How Austerity and a Loss of State Capacity Undermined  
the Crisis Response
Gemma A. Williams, Selina Rajan,  
and Jonathan D. Cylus*
When the World Health Organ ization (WHO) declared COVID-19 
a public health emergency of international concern in January  2020 (WHO, 
2020a),  there was much optimism that the United Kingdom was well prepared 
to deal with the outbreak. The threat of a pandemic had been taken seriously in 
the past, with a world- renowned plan to combat an influenza outbreak in place 
and nationwide stress tests of the country’s preparedness for such an eventuality 
first being conducted in 2007 and most recently in 2016 (House of Lords, 2020). 
In the last de cade, an in de pen dent review found that the country had responded 
efectively to the H1N1 influenza pandemic (Hine, 2010), and its actions in helping 
to combat the Zika and Ebola outbreaks received substantial international praise, 
seemingly cementing its place as a leader of global public health (Middleton & 
Williams, 2019). As recently as October 2019, the Global Health Security Index 
ranked the United Kingdom as the second- best prepared country in the world 
to cope with an epidemic or pandemic (GHS, 2019). What has since tran spired, 
however, was far removed from what many predicted: a country that should have 
been one of the best placed to tackle the pandemic has, as of the time of writing, 
been among the worst afected in Eu rope.
By August 2020, the United Kingdom had recorded the highest number of excess 
deaths and among the highest number of infections per capita in Eu rope (Eu ro-
pean Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2020; Office for National Statis-
tics [ONS], 2020a; Tallack, 2020). Over the eleven worst weeks of the crisis, from 
March 23, 2020, to June 7, 2020, the United Kingdom reported an estimated 64,451 
excess deaths (Tallack, 2020). This translates to the second highest excess mortal-
ity rate in Eu rope  after Spain, and the highest in the region when adjusted for age 
(Public Health  England, 2020a; Tallack, 2020).  England was the worst afected UK 
nation, with approximately 991 excess deaths per million population, followed 
by Scotland (880), Wales (701), and Northern Ireland (514) (FactCheckNI, 2020). 
* Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this chapter represent  those of the authors only and 
do not necessarily reflect the views or position of their respective institutions.
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At the peak of the outbreak in April, the United Kingdom had an excess mortality 
rate of more than 100  percent above the five- year average (Figure 12.1), with only 
Spain faring worse (ONS, 2020a).  England recorded the highest peak excess death 
rate in the United Kingdom at 107.8  percent, followed by Scotland (71.7  percent), 
Wales (68.7   percent), and Northern Ireland (48.2   percent) (ONS, 2020a). Yet, 
although  England has been the worst afected nation of the United Kingdom, 
excess death rates in all of the devolved nations are among the highest in Eu rope 
(ONS, 2020a). Moreover, although outbreaks in France, Italy, and Spain  were geo-
graph i cally concentrated, all of the UK regions reported higher excess mortality 
rates than the five- year average. It should nevertheless be emphasized that  there 
was no excess mortality from mid- June to early August 2020. At the time of writ-
ing, the number of infections has generally been in decline since mid- April 2020, 
albeit with a recent uptick driven by localized outbreaks at the end of July.
The high incidence and mortality in the United Kingdom so far raises a key 
question and one we aim to answer in this chapter: Why did a country that should 
have been well prepared for a pandemic fare so poorly? This is inevitably a complex 
question, and many of the reasons are not yet fully clear. However, by analyzing the 
health and social policy mea sures put in place, we can already pinpoint some  factors 
that have likely contributed to the United Kingdom’s experience with COVID-19. 
We show that many of the right decisions  were actually taken to tackle the pan-
demic, with a range of public health mea sures implemented to suppress the spread 
of the virus, health ser vices quickly reconfigured, and the full apparatus of the state 
operationalized to protect livelihoods and the most vulnerable to try to ensure 
every one could adhere to lockdown mea sures. Some key actions  were nevertheless 
implemented too late, when the virus had already spread widely across the country. 
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Figure 12.1. COVID-19 cases and all- cause excess mortality in the United Kingdom.
Source: “Excess Mortality during the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 2020; Johns Hopkins 
University Center for Systems Science and Engineering (2020).
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public health in  England and a prolonged period of underinvestment in public ser-
vices, particularly public health, during ten years of austerity that has eroded the 
country’s ability to respond to emergencies. COVID-19 has also highlighted long- 
standing economic and ethnic inequalities that have caused some communities to 
be disproportionately afected by the virus. We consider some lessons that can be 
learned from the United Kingdom’s response to help the country prepare for  future 
waves and to meet the health and economic challenges of the  future.
Health Policy Mea sures
Public Health Mea sures
Health is a devolved issue in the United Kingdom, with responsibility for organ-
izing and commissioning health and social care ser vices falling to devolved 
administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, and the UK govern-
ment in  England. During the pandemic, emergency legislation, The Coronavirus 
Act 2020, was implemented, giving devolved administrations greater powers in 
the area of public health, such as the ability to restrict public gatherings or close 
down premises that represent a threat to public health (Paun, 2020). Public health 
actions  until mid- May 2020 in all nations  were nevertheless largely aligned.
Test and trace systems for COVID-19  were not scaled up  until  after the peak of 
the outbreak.
A key aim of the United Kingdom’s pandemic response early on was to delay 
the spread of the virus to ensure the National Health Ser vice (NHS) did not 
become overwhelmed. To achieve this, the response was divided into two phases: 
(1) contain, in which early cases  were detected and close contacts followed up in 
an efort to delay the spread of the virus in the population for as long as pos si ble 
and (2) delay, designed to slow the spread of the virus and delay the peak  until 
summer (Department of Health and Social Care [DHSC], 2020a).
Early on in the contain phase, community testing and contact tracing  were 
operational, with the number of tests per day initially second only to China. The 
pro cess was controlled centrally and coordinated regionally by Public Health 
 England (PHE) (an in de pen dent agency of the DHSC), Health Protection Scot-
land, Public Health Wales, Public Health Agency Northern Ireland, and the NHS. 
However, public health laboratories soon reached capacity. On March 12, 2020, 
with suspected widespread community transmission and numbers rising rapidly, 
the country moved into the delay phase, and a consequential decision was taken 
in line with the pandemic plan for influenza: community testing for suspected 
cases was scaled down, with testing capacity pivoted  toward testing symptomatic 
 people in hospitals, care homes, and prisons (Mahase, 2020b). Contact tracing 
was halted, except in specific locations such as prisons and care homes. Up  until 
this point, testing per capita in the United Kingdom had been highest in North-
ern Ireland (503 per 100,000 population) and lowest in  England (320 per 100,000 
population) (Morris & Barnes, 2020).
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The government did not commit to expanding testing eligibility criteria  until 
early April, and no action was taken by the NHS to scale up testing capacity  until 
this time. New regional drive- through and mobile testing units  were introduced, 
along with home testing kits and “satellite” centers at places such as hospitals 
with significant demand, while steps  were taken to increase laboratory capacity 
(DHSC, 2020b). Rather than focus on scaling up localized laboratory capacity in 
the public sector, the government elected to establish several new “light house” 
mega- laboratories (with at least one in each country), with a number of private 
companies and public organ izations partnering with the government to construct 
and run  these new facilities. Unlike the NHS laboratory system, which has estab-
lished local logistic planning and supply chains in place, the “light house” labs cre-
ated a highly centralized system, resulting in transport bottlenecks and delays in 
returning test results (Rajan et al., 2020).
On April 27, 2020, Northern Ireland became the first nation to launch a pi lot 
contact tracing program, which was rolled out nationwide on May 19, 2020. Pro-
grams  were launched at the end of May in  England and Scotland and early June in 
Wales, with every one over the age of five and with COVID-19 symptoms eligible 
for testing. The NHS, local health protection teams, and other public sector actors 
 were tasked with contact tracing in the devolved nations and with tracing com-
plex cases (e.g., in care homes, prisons, schools) in  England. However, contracts 
to run certain other ele ments of test and trace ser vices in  England, including con-
tact tracing for non- complex cases,  were awarded to private companies with  little 
experience in the area. The En glish test and trace system, for which £10 billion of 
funding has been set aside, has since faced a number of challenges, and questions 
have been raised over its value for money (Mahase, 2020a). A major criticism has 
been the low number of contacts traced for non- complex cases, which is currently 
around 49   percent, far below the estimated 80   percent of infections that must 
be traced to contain the spread of the virus and less than the numbers traced by 
smaller local health protection teams (DHSC, 2020c; Mahase, 2020a).  There has 
also been no systematic efort to conduct retrospective tracing to find common 
infection sources (e.g., super- spreader events), which has proved successful in 
identifying clusters of infections in some countries (Crozier et al., 2020). The start 
of contact tracing programs in the United Kingdom  were meant to be supported 
by the launch of new contact- tracing apps. Although Northern Ireland success-
fully launched a decentralized application (app) using Bluetooth technology in 
early August 2020 (which is interoperable with the app available in the Republic 
of Ireland), the rest of the United Kingdom has yet to follow suit.
Unpre ce dented physical distancing mea sures  were implemented, but compara-
tively  later than in some other countries.
A broad range of physical distancing mea sures  were introduced to suppress 
the spread of the virus. At the start of the “delay” phase on March 12, 2020,  people 
with COVID-19 symptoms  were told to self- isolate for seven days, with vulner-
able individuals ( those over seventy years of age,  people with chronic conditions, 
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and pregnant  women), advised to “shield” on March 16, 2020 (NHS  England and 
Improvement, 2020a). On this date, the public was also asked to work at home 
if pos si ble and avoid mass gatherings, public transport, and social venues.  These 
mea sures nevertheless remained voluntary at a time when much of Eu rope was 
already locked down (March 10, 2020, in Italy, March 14 in Spain, and March 17 in 
France). Pubs, restaurants, social venues, and schools  were not ordered to close 
 until March 20, with a UK- wide mandatory lockdown announced on March 23 (in 
efect from March 26 in  England, Scotland, and Wales and March 28 in Northern 
Ireland), when  people  were told to stay at home, except for one form of exercise 
per day, essential work that could not be done at home, and shopping for food or 
collecting medicines (Rajan & Curry, 2020). The police  were granted powers to 
enforce lockdown mea sures through fines and dispersing gatherings in exceptional 
circumstances (Rajan & Curry, 2020). Adherence levels to physical distancing 
mea sures was generally high, with the number of visitors to retail and recreation 
venues, including restaurants, cafes, shopping centers, theme parks, museums, 
libraries, and cinemas and the use of public transportation both falling by more 
than 70  percent from mid- February to early April (Figure 12.2).
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Figure 12.2. Google Community 
Mobility Trends: Visits to retail 
and recreation venues and public 
transport stations, February 17– 
July 31, 2020, United Kingdom.
Source: Ritchie (2020).
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Data suggest that lockdown in the United Kingdom was implemented compar-
atively late and at a time when the virus had already spread throughout the coun-
try. As shown in Figure 12.3, the United Kingdom had a higher number of deaths 
and COVID-19 infections per 100,000 population at the time of lockdown than 
many neighboring countries in Eu rope. It should, however, be strongly empha-
sized that this analy sis comes with the impor tant caveat that comparing deaths and 
cases between countries is difficult  because of the dif er ent ways countries classify 
COVID-19 deaths and the fact that case numbers partly reflect the extent of test-
ing. A former government advisor has nevertheless suggested that the death toll in 
the United Kingdom could have been reduced “by at least half” had a mandatory 
lockdown been introduced a week  earlier (“Coronavirus: ‘ Earlier Lockdown Would 
Have Halved Death Toll,’ ” 2020). The timing of lockdown came eigh teen days  after 
the first death in  England, nine days  after the first death in Scotland, and eight 
days  after the first death in Wales (Centre on Constitutional Change, 2020). The 
number of COVID-19 deaths per 100,000 population at this time was almost twice 
as high in  England compared to the other UK nations, although cases per 100,000 
population  were highest in Wales (see Figure 12.3). The comparatively  later lock-
down may partly have contributed to  England having the worst excess death toll in 
the United Kingdom.
On May 10th, 2020,  the United Kingdom government announced a roadmap 
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Figure 12.3. Mortality from COVID-19 and number of cases at the time of lockdown, 
Eu rope, selected countries.
Source: World Health Organ ization (2020b); data for individual UK nations are taken 
from the UK government (2020) website and include deaths within 28 days of a positive 
test.  These figures are therefore not directly comparable with  those from the WHO.
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health messaging was changed from “Stay home, protect the NHS, save lives,” 
to “Stay alert, control the virus, save lives,” a slogan that received criticism from 
the public and the media, who felt it was confusing and lacked clarity. The new 
slogan was rejected by the devolved administrations, who also announced diver-
gent plans to ease lockdown restrictions at a slower pace than  England  because 
of concerns that deaths and infection rates  were still too high (Fancourt et  al., 
2020).  These actions reduced public confidence in the UK government’s ability 
to manage the pandemic, while trust in devolved administrations remained high 
(Fancourt et al., 2020). Public confidence fell further in late May 2020  after it was 
revealed a key government advisor had broken lockdown rules but would not be 
resigning (Fancourt et al., 2020). Fancourt et al. (2020) have posited that levels 
of trust in government  will afect “ people’s willingness to follow rules and guide-
lines” in the event of  future waves.
By the end of July 2020, most nonessential business in the United Kingdom 
 were open, with some exceptions (e.g., cinemas and theatres), although schools 
had not fully reopened for all pupils to return. Local lockdowns had also been 
imposed in areas of  England and Scotland reporting high infection rates, with less 
stringent mea sures taken in  others (DHSC, 2020d). In  England, criticisms have 
been raised that local mea sures (e.g., a local lockdown in the city of Leicester) 
 were often dictated by central government with  little consultation and coordina-
tion with local governments, creating “confusion” as to why mea sures had been 
taken and  whether they  were “desirable or practical” (Association of Directors of 
Public Health, 2020). Local public health experts have also voiced concerns that 
they have had insufficient early access to local- level data held on national data-
bases that would have allowed them to pre- empt and respond to local outbreaks 
efectively (Stone, 2020).
Self- isolation and quarantine mea sures directed at travelers  were also put in 
place in an efort to contain virus transmission. In January and February  2020 
 these targeted  people returning from Wuhan and Hubei Provinces in China, fol-
lowed by other high- risk areas in Asia and Italy. Returning travelers from other 
countries with known outbreaks  were also asked to isolate if they developed 
symptoms as well as close contacts of confirmed cases. Whole genome sequenc-
ing subsequently confirmed that a very small proportion of cases in the United 
Kingdom originated from China, with most originating from France and Spain, 
which  were not subject to quarantine restrictions (Pybus et al., 2020). UK bor-
ders  were never officially closed. It was not  until the start of the “delay” phase on 
March 12, 2020, that anyone with COVID-19 symptoms, regardless of  whether 
they had recently been in a high- risk area, was told to self- isolate for seven days. 
COVID-19 symptoms  were classified as a continuous cough or fever, a narrower 
range of symptoms than  those included in WHO guidance (2020c), which likely 
reduced the number of  people who felt they had to self- isolate and get a test. 
UK guidance was not updated  until May 18, 2020, when they  were amended to 
include loss of sense of smell or taste as symptoms.
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Guidance on the public wearing cloth masks has evolved slowly during the 
pandemic, from being recommended in early May 2020, becoming mandatory on 
public transport in mid- June 2020 in  England and Scotland (July in Wales), and 
fi nally compulsory in shops in July 2020 (August in Northern Ireland), with  people 
subject to a £100 fine if they do not comply (Rajan & Curry, 2020). Conversely, 
 those working in close contact settings such as hairdressers  were advised by the 
government to wear a visor or a face shield rather than a cloth mask. Despite offi-
cially being mandatory in many indoor settings, approximately 70  percent of the 
population reported using cloth masks in indoor public spaces, as of this writing 
(Le Page et al., 2020).
Mea sures in the Health Sector
The United Kingdom entered the COVID-19 crisis with among the lowest num-
ber of acute care beds per population among comparable health systems in 
Eu rope, and shortages of health and social care workers in all four countries 
(Eu ro pean Commission, OECD, and Eu ro pean Observatory on Health Systems 
and Policies, 2019; Gershlick & Charlesworth, 2019; Rolewicz & Palmer, 2019). 
The devolved health systems took similar mea sures to create extra capacity in 
NHS hospitals by freeing up beds through the postponement of all nonurgent 
elective operations and discharging medically fit patients into the community 
(Hignett et al., 2020). The latter mea sure proved controversial as many patients 
 were discharged into care homes without being tested or isolating as this was 
not required by government guidance at the time, potentially seeding the virus 
to the most vulnerable communities. Several temporary hospitals  were also 
built in major cities to provide surge capacity (Day, 2020), while NHS  England 
took over private sector hospitals and staf in  England for the duration of the 
crisis (NHS  England and Improvement, 2020b). Although hospital bed short-
ages  were predicted during the crisis, this generally did not materialize every-
where; it is unclear to what extent this was  because of the combined mea sures or 
the rate of epidemic growth in dif er ent regions. The availability of health work-
ers was initially maintained by encouraging retired and inactive health workers 
to return to work, extending visas of foreign- trained professionals, and speed-
ing up licensing procedures for newly qualified nursing and medical gradu ates 
(Rajan & Curry, 2020).
One area that has proved particularly challenging during the COVID-19 out-
break has been the procurement and supply of adequate personal protective equip-
ment (PPE). Although some difficulties inevitably result from having to compete 
on a global market where supply has been  limited, procurement inefficiencies have 
exacerbated  these issues. Criticisms in par tic u lar have been raised over emergency 
contracts for the supply and distribution of PPE in  England being awarded to pri-
vate companies with  little experience in the area, some of whom initially failed to 
deliver on targets (McKee, 2020). The United Kingdom also opted not to join an EU 
procurement scheme to bulk- buy PPE and other equipment, despite being invited 
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to participate (Bofey & Booth, 2020). Inadequate supply of PPE early in the crisis 
potentially contributed to spreading the virus in hospitals and care homes, leading 
to deaths among staf, patients, and residents (McKee, 2020). It should neverthe-
less be noted that  after spending an estimated £15 billion to procure PPE (Office for 
Bud get Responsibility, 2020), as of this writing, supply is reported to be adequate, 
and stockpiles are in place ahead of an expected second wave.
Social Policy Mea sures
The UK government implemented an unpre ce dented array of social policy mea-
sures to support jobs, public ser vices, and the most vulnerable through the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The Office for Bud get Responsibility (OBR, 2020) esti-
mates that COVID-19 health and social policy mea sures taken through July 14, 
2020)  will cost £192.31 billion in 2020 and 2021 (see  Table  12.1), approximately 
8.8  percent of national income. Some social policy decisions such as on education 
are devolved  matters, and devolved administrations can determine how funding 
for  these areas is spent (Paun, 2020).
A large focus of social policy mea sures has been on protecting incomes and 
supporting jobs. A coronavirus job retention scheme was implemented, which 
saw the government paying a proportion of the wages of workers furloughed as a 
result of lockdown from April to October 2020, with a separate Self- Employment 
Income Support Scheme (SEISS) launched in May 2020 for the self- employed. 
Up to July  5, 2020, 9.4 million jobs had been furloughed, costing an estimated 
£27.4 billion, with 2.7 million SEISS claims made, at a cost of £7.7 billion (OBR, 
2020). A £1.25 billion coronavirus package to protect firms driving innovation in 
the United Kingdom was also launched. In recognition that young  people often 
bear the brunt of recessions, the government launched a £2 billion “Kickstart” 
Scheme to fund six- month job placements for sixteen- to twenty- four- year- olds, 
 TABLE 12.1. The Office for Bud get Responsibility estimates of the costs (billions £) of 
vari ous COVID-19 policy interventions in the United Kingdom 2020–2021
2020–2021
Total 192.3
Public ser vices spending 18.8
Employment support 62.2
Business support: loans and guarantees 20.0
Business support: tax and spending 30.2
Welfare spending mea sures 9.3
Other tax mea sures 1.7
Summer Economic Update: Plan for Jobs mea sures 19.8
Summer Economic Update: Other mea sures 30.4
Source: Office for Bud get Responsibility, 2020.
Note: The  table shows costs to the Exchequer (i.e., how much a mea sure  will raise public sector borrowing) for 
mea sures announced up  until July 14, 2020.
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with a further £1.6 billion invested in expanding job support schemes, training, 
and apprenticeships (HM Trea sury, 2020a).
Schools in the United Kingdom closed to most pupils on March  23, 2020, 
although they remained open for  children of key workers and vulnerable students 
(e.g.,  those eligible for  free school meals). To ensure disadvantaged students do 
not fall  behind in their learning, a “£1 billion COVID-19 “catch-up” package to 
directly tackle the impact of lost teaching time” was launched in  England (Depart-
ment for Education, 2020). Devolved governments and the UK government in 
 England also agreed to provide  free school meals to vulnerable  children through 
the summer following a highly publicized campaign spearheaded by charities and 
celebrities.
To help adherence to shielding requirements, £900 million was allocated for local 
authorities to distribute a weekly food package to the most clinically vulnerable. An 
additional £63 million was allocated in June to help  those struggling to aford food 
(Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2020a). Changes have 
been made to welfare payments, with universal credit and working tax credits rising 
by £20 each per week on a temporary basis to strengthen the social safety net for vul-
nerable  people. Overall, an estimated extra £6.5 billion has been provided through 
the welfare system to support  those most in need through the crisis.
Local authorities have found temporary accommodation for more than 
90  percent of homeless  people sleeping without shelter to help reduce trans-
mission of the virus (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Govern-
ment, 2020b). An additional £85 million was  later committed to help homeless 
 people move into more secure, long- term accommodation and to access train-
ing and employment opportunities. To support low- income renters, the Local 
Housing Allowance (a government housing benefit) was increased to cover 
30  percent of market rents in each area for twelve months, with the initiative 
costing an estimated £1 billion (HM Trea sury, 2020b). Emergency legislation 
was also implemented to prevent landlords from evicting tenants for a 3- month 
period during lockdown and to provide mortgage holidays for  those unable to 
make payments.
Even before lockdown, travel by rail decreased by 70  percent compared to the 
same time in 2019 as  people adhered to physical distancing recommendations 
(Department for Transport, 2020a). To ensure railways could continue to operate 
to transport key workers and vital supplies, the government agreed to take on all 
revenue and cost risk for six months, at an estimated cost of over £3 billion. Emer-
gency funds of £1.6 billion  were also allocated to Transport for London, although 
conditions tied to the bailout such as removing  free travel for  those  people over 
sixty and  under eigh teen years of age have been criticized for penalizing some 
of the most vulnerable groups. More than £2 billion of spending on cycling and 
walking infrastructure has also been brought forward, including £250 million for 
local authorities to fund “pop-up” infrastructure to facilitate physical distancing 
(Department for Transport, 2020b).
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Why Did This Happen?
 There are no  simple answers as to why the United Kingdom fared so badly during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, and it  will likely take years for the full picture to emerge. 
Nonetheless, we can already see that certain policy choices such as the late deci-
sions to lock down and delays in scaling up test and trace capacity have likely 
proved consequential. Just as impor tant, the virus has exposed long- standing sys-
temic issues in the United Kingdom resulting from a weakening of public ser vices 
and the welfare state in recent de cades and failure to address per sis tent economic 
and ethnicity- related inequalities that have undermined the country’s resilience 
and ability to respond to emergencies.
Some of  these issues can be traced back to 2010, when the Conservative- led 
co ali tion government of the time announced a policy of austerity that would last 
for the next de cade. During this period, the role of the state was diminished in 
 favor of increased marketization, with public spending falling from 42   percent 
of GDP in 2009–2010 to 35   percent in 2018–2019 (Marmot, 2020).  These cuts 
 were regressive with the poorest individuals in the most deprived, working- class 
areas disproportionately afected (Gray & Barford, 2018). Reduced government 
spending was stated as being necessary to eliminate the government’s bud get defi-
cit and reduce national debt in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 economic crisis 
but was also a po liti cal choice in support of neoliberalist policies favoring  limited 
state intervention,  free markets, and  limited protection for workers (Bailey, 2013; 
Farnsworth & Irving, 2018). Indeed, the United Nations’  Humans Rights Coun-
cil (UN HRC) concluded that austerity in the United Kingdom is “a policy pur-
sued more as an ideological than an economic agenda” and one that “has badly 
damaged” the country’s social safety net (United Nations  Human Rights Council, 
2019). Austerity harkened back to the era of Thatcherism in the 1970s and 1980s, 
which began the pro cess of privatizing state- run industries, deregulating financial 
markets, and diminishing the “cradle- to- grave” welfare state (of which the NHS 
was perhaps the crowning achievement) that had been created by the post- war 
 Labour government.
 Under austerity, public spending was cut by 3  percent in real terms in just the 
first five years; welfare, with real- term reductions in bud gets of 30  percent, and local 
government, with cuts of more than 50  percent,  were hardest hit (Gray & Barford, 
2018). In  England,  these cuts came at the same time that the Health and Social Care 
Act 2012 transferred responsibility for the delivery of most public health ser vices to 
local authorities (DHSC, 2012). Strategic Health Authorities, which  were responsible 
for improving regional health ser vices and played a key role in local planning for 
emergencies,  were also abolished. Public Health  England, which took over responsi-
bilities previously coordinated by the NHS was also created, although its bud get was 
ultimately cut by 40  percent in real terms from 2012 to 2019 (Marmot et al., 2020).
 These reforms, in combination with significant underfunding, led to a sub-
stantial weakening of local public health structures, something  preeminent public 
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health experts warned at the time would curtail the country’s ability to respond 
to a pandemic (Horti, 2020). Public health infrastructure has been lost with, for 
example, the number of public sector labs being reduced from thirty, two de cades 
previously, to just eight pre- crisis (Rajan & Curry, 2020). The public health work-
force was also reduced, leading to an institutional loss of knowledge on how to 
deal with pandemics at the national and local level. Ten years  later, this loss of staf 
and infrastructure had significant repercussions for the United Kingdom’s pan-
demic response, including contributing to difficulties in rapidly scaling up test-
ing and contact- tracing capabilities. It is also pos si ble that the weakening of local 
departments to some extent necessitated the centralization of certain programs 
(e.g., test and trace) during the pandemic.
 Under austerity, NHS bud gets grew at less than half the historical average (The 
King’s Fund, 2019), contributing (albeit not solely) to a critical shortage of beds 
and staf before the crisis. This necessitated the implementation of unpre ce dented 
actions to rapidly scale-up surge capacity. Some of  these actions, such as discharg-
ing  people to care homes without testing, have likely contributed to the United 
Kingdom’s high death toll. It should also be stressed that social care has been sub-
stantially underfunded over a number of de cades and has no single representative 
or unifying body other than the Care Quality Commission that regulates it, leading 
to a lack of resilience to cope with the coronavirus crisis.
COVID-19 has also exposed and amplified existing economic and ethnic 
inequalities in the United Kingdom, with death rates disproportionately higher for 
 those in deprived areas and for some ethnic minority groups (National Rec ords of 
Scotland, 2020; Office for National Statistics, 2020b).  These interrelated inequali-
ties have placed  these groups at greater risk of exposure to infection, partly  because 
of a higher likelihood of working essential jobs that cannot be done at home, using 
public transport and living in overcrowded, multi- generational  house holds (Bibby 
et  al., 2020). Socioeconomic inequalities have also been linked to higher rates 
of pre- existing health conditions that raise the risk of COVID-19 complications 
(Marmot et al., 2020). Although a commitment to tackle health inequalities has 
been on the po liti cal agenda in the United Kingdom since the late 1990s, they have 
persisted and widened in recent years  under austerity (Marmot et al., 2020). A 
recent report by PHE has also suggested that inequalities for ethnic minorities are 
linked to structural racism and discrimination, which have reduced life chances 
and access to public ser vices for certain groups (Public Health  England, 2020b).
The per sis tence of  these inequalities in the United Kingdom is perhaps unsur-
prising given that wealth and power in Britain’s majority white and highly class- 
based society has for centuries been concentrated in the hands of relatively few 
wealthy and largely upper- class individuals.  These “elites” have  shaped and con-
tinue to shape institutions, make laws, run the economy, and set the agenda for 
public debate and po liti cal discourse, thereby ensuring their wealth, power, and 
influence is maintained. Although economic inequalities  were reduced during 
the post- war years, they widened substantially following economic reforms in the 
1980s. Eforts to reduce the United Kingdom’s inequalities and poverty levels, which 
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are relatively high for a Western Eu ro pean country, have stalled  under austerity 
 because of wage stagnation and welfare cuts for the poorest at a time when wages 
for the top earners have increased (United Nations  Human Rights Council, 2019). 
The precarious financial situation of many  house holds amplified the need for 
multifaceted social policies during the crisis to protect a vulnerable population. In 
spite of  these mea sures, however,  those with the lowest incomes are reported to 
be three times less likely to self- isolate when required than higher earners, which 
has implications for reducing transmission, in par tic u lar in more deprived areas 
(Atchison et al., 2020).
Although many of the issues that have impeded delivery of an efective crisis 
stem from weakened systems and demographics, policy decisions made during 
the COVID-19 response also must be examined. Lockdown, for example, was 
implemented a week  after the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) 
gave advice to do so and cloth masks only made mandatory a month  after ini-
tially being recommended (Allegretti, 2020; SAGE, 2020). Although this may 
result from a natu ral lag in decision- making, hesitation in implementing manda-
tory physical distancing mea sures may also have been influenced by the liberalist- 
leanings of the Conservative cabinet, who have traditionally opposed the “nanny- 
state” and prefer to limit state interference in personal choices (Raynor, 2019). We 
should note that, although allegations have been made that lockdown delays  were 
due to an initial strategy of developing “herd immunity,” it has been strenuously 
denied this was ever official policy (Gallardo, 2020).
The top- down- approach to decision- making during the pandemic and lack of 
coordination between central and local government in  England is another area 
of the United Kingdom’s response that has been scrutinized. The Association of 
Directors of Public Health, for example, has called the top- down- approach to 
governing “costly,” stating that local public health experts have been sidelined and 
suggesting that a lack of communication and data sharing between central and 
local government has created confusion over why and how local mea sures should 
be implemented (Association of Directors of Public Health, 2020). This top- down 
approach to governing risks undermining local adherence to public health mea-
sures if  there is confusion as to which mea sures are in place where, and if some 
areas are viewed as being unfairly targeted with restrictions. This may in par tic u-
lar be the case if local areas are placed  under lockdown without additional fiscal 
and social policy mea sures being put in place to support businesses and individual 
livelihoods.
Conclusion
Calls have already been made for a public inquiry into the United Kingdom’s response 
to COVID-19 to identify  mistakes that have been made and to learn lessons for the 
 future (McKee et al., 2020). This  will inevitably unearth more information on why 
certain decisions over the implementation of health and social policy responses 
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 were made (or not made) than we know at this time. Yet, even with some uncer-
tainty around what has happened so far, it remains pos si ble to untangle some key 
lessons that can help the country prepare for a pos si ble second wave and to build 
a more resilient economy and national health systems in the longer- term.
First, it is fundamental that a functioning test and trace system is put in place 
ahead of a predicted second wave. At the time of writing, the government’s NHS 
test and trace system in  England, which  will cost an estimated £10 billion, is failing 
to test, trace, and isolate a sufficient number of  people at speed to suppress the 
spread of the virus. Strengthening partnerships with local authorities to enhance 
their capacity to deliver test and trace functions at the local level,  will likely be 
needed to help manage  future outbreaks. This  will also enable systems to be 
designed with the specific needs of the local population in mind (e.g., deliver-
ing non- English language or culturally specific ser vices) and  will be better placed 
to support  people to isolate, something which is essential to break the chain of 
transmission. Overall, greater coordination and communication between central 
and local government on all aspects of the public health response are needed to 
avoid policy missteps and to improve local implementation of and adherence to 
policy actions.
Perhaps one of the biggest lessons to learn from the United Kingdom is that 
stable and adequate investment in public health and wider health ser vices is 
needed to help build health system resilience to ensure it can cope with cata-
strophic events. Cuts to public health  under austerity and sustained underfund-
ing of the NHS over de cades have likely proved to be a “false economy” (Mid-
dleton & Williams, 2019), with injections of emergency funding now required 
to ensure the health system can respond to the challenges posed by COVID-19 
and to help health ser vices return to normal (or the new normal) in the longer 
term. It is impor tant that the NHS learns quickly from the rapid mea sures put 
in place during the crisis to learn which approaches (e.g., an expansion of digital 
health ser vices or dif er ent care pathways) may support delivery of more efec-
tive care. Improving health system resilience should be the goal moving forward 
to ensure the health ser vices of all four nations can meet any  future challenges 
(Thomas et  al., 2020). Providing extra funding to the health sector (including 
public health) should not be seen as a cost, but as a strategic investment that  will 
contribute to improving the health of the nation, something which is essential 
for a well- performing economy (Boyce & Brown, 2019). A significant overhaul of 
the organ ization and funding of social care and public health systems and their 
respective abilities to work with the NHS  will also be needed to ensure that both 
are fit to meet  future population care needs.
Fi nally, the pandemic has exposed entrenched economic and ethnic inequali-
ties in the United Kingdom. Although the virus is still with us, it is impor tant 
that local authorities in the most deprived areas are given additional funding to 
protect their communities.  There is also now a risk that the economic recession 
that is likely forthcoming  will exacerbate  these inequalities in the  future. Rather 
than a return to austerity as happened in the aftermath of the last financial crisis, 
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sustained investment in strengthening public ser vices and providing secure and 
good- quality housing would help make society and the economy more resilient in 
the longer term. The pandemic has shown the value of strong state intervention 
in terms of protecting the economy, jobs, and the most vulnerable. This should be 
harnessed in the  future to help provide good quality education and better- quality 
jobs for all, as well as to implement a comprehensive social protection system that 
can help reduce poverty and vulnerability. Reducing inequalities  will be funda-
mental to promote prosperity and health and well- being in the  future.
Note
 1. Money is distributed to devolved nations based on the “Barnett formula,” which 
allocates money according to population and the comparability of ser vices in each nation.
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 13 the eU ro Pean Union  
confronts covid-19
 Another Eu ro pean Rescue of the Nation- State?
Eleanor Brooks, Anniek de Ruijter, and Scott L. Greer
The politics of Eu ro pean Union (EU) health policy are also the poli-
tics of Eu ro pean integration. Debate about EU policies always entails debate about 
the appropriate role and powers granted to the EU. We ask what policy a member 
state might make, but, in the case of the EU, many ask if the EU should have a 
policy at all. Should it respond, and, if so, how and to whose benefit?
From some  angles, the EU looks more like a federation, comparable to the 
United States or Germany. The EU is deeply entrenched in its citizens’ lives. It has 
a power ful shared culture among leaders and strong, entrepreneurial, and state- 
like po liti cal institutions. Its  legal system is entwined with member state law to 
such an extent that member state courts have driven  legal integration and change 
as much as EU institutions, both in general (Alter, 1998; Mattli & Slaughter, 1998) 
and in health (Brooks, 2012; Greer & Rauscher, 2011a; Greer & Rauscher, 2011b; 
Obermaier, 2008, 2009).
From another  angle, it still looks like an international organ ization, compa-
rable to the World Health Organ ization (WHO) or a regional trade block such as 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or Mercosur. Like international organ-
izations or confederations, though, the EU responds primarily to and is  shaped by 
the demands of its member states. They have actively maintained this dichoto-
mous structure so as to prevent transfer of power and loss of sovereignty. Member 
states ultimately determine the direction of the EU, and they have supported EU 
expansion only when they require a “Eu ro pean rescue of the nation state”—an 
opportunity to use the EU to solve prob lems they share (Milward, 1999). The EU’s 
weak public health and social policy responses to the crisis reflect this efort on 
the part of member states to limit its role over the de cades, whereas the major 
expansion in its role over the summer of 2020 reflects the perceived interests of 
member states, which now seek another Eu ro pean rescue of the nation state.
The roots of the EU’s split personality can be found in its evolution as a market- 
building, economic community. It was built, historically, around the development 
of its internal market and supporting  legal system, maintaining only a small staf, 
non ex is tent coercive capacity, and a minimal bud get. It began as a set of small treaty- 
based organ izations, with the first focused on the regulation of the production 
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and  labor markets for coal and steel. Over time a market for nuclear power was 
formed, and then a much broader, economic community. The latter was based 
on a common market, with a central Common Agricultural Policy, and the back-
ground idea,  after World War II, that Eu rope would never be hungry again.
Although eforts at po liti cal and social  union have consistently followed along, 
the EU has developed, first and foremost, as an economic  union, and for most 
member states the monetary  union is also an impor tant add-on to this member-
ship. By contrast to the Weberian concept of the state, whose key characteristics 
are territory and coercion, this makes the EU primarily a “law- state” (Kelemen, 
2019; Pavone & Kelemen, 2019; Strayer, 1970). Its main tool is deregulation and 
reregulation: actions to eliminate member state rules that might be discrimi-
natory, and to create new, Eu ro pean rules that establish a floor for the relevant 
provisions (Majone, 1996). In this, it has developed much stronger powers over 
its member governments’ regulations than comparable federations possess. For 
example, EU regulation of the recognition of medical professional qualifications 
is much stronger than the equivalent regimes in Australia, Canada, or the United 
States (Matthijs et al., 2019). Once the regulation is established, national courts, 
for the purpose of enforcement of EU law, become “Eu ro pean courts.” EU law 
can create direct rights and obligations for EU citizens (i.e., it has a direct efect), 
and EU law has supremacy over national rules. This is to ensure that EU law is 
applied similarly in all member states. Explicit defiance in one national court or 
by a member state would undercut the efectiveness of EU law,  whether from the 
German constitutional court or Hungary’s authoritarian regime, and thus poses a 
serious threat to the EU’s existence.
This regulatory logic has expanded beyond the internal market to the EU’s 
management of its un balanced currency  union. Rather than commit to serious 
re distribution between countries or citizens, as federations do, member states 
historically opted for harsher and harsher regulation of each other’s fiscal policies, 
setting limits on debt and deficit, threatening sanctions where  these are breached, 
and imposing conditions  until a breach is remedied. This approach has created 
a structural north- south divergence  because the Eurozone— the group of states 
that uses the euro as its currency— locks all of its member states into their trajec-
tories and ofers debtor states no way out, save for massive reductions in wages 
and investment (Hancké, 2013; Johnston, 2016). Many of the EU’s internal ten-
sions spring from this combination of weak re distribution, intense regulation, and 
an imbalanced currency  union (Greer, 2020; Pérez, 2019).  Those tensions appear 
likely to become more acute over time, creating more disparities, internal migra-
tion, and incentives for authoritarianism among peripheral governments that 
could not please their citizens.
Eu ro pean Union Public Health Policy Response
The EU policies in place on the eve of the COVID-19 crisis  were governed by 
this basic, largely regulatory, structure (Greer & Kurzer, 2013; Greer et al., 2019). 
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Member states had  limited the EU’s public health policies and its disaster response 
role to, for the most part, that of an international organ ization (Treaty on the 
Functioning of the Eu ro pean Union, TFEU, Article 168). A small coordinating sys-
tem, much of which was created in the aftermath of previous crises, included a 
health emergencies unit in the Eu ro pean Commission (although with no specific 
bud get), a Health Security Committee of member state representatives, a joint 
purchasing scheme (de Ruijter, 2019), and a small Eu ro pean Centre for Disease 
Control and Prevention (Deruelle, 2016, 2020; Greer, 2012; Guigner, 2007). The 
ele ments of this public health system that  were hosted by the EU enjoyed minimal 
resources,  little recourse to coercion and  limited scope, whereas the intergovern-
mental ele ments (namely the joint procurement mechanism) had greater poten-
tial but remained  little more than a slow and voluntary buyer’s club.
The civil protection system for disaster response, meanwhile, began to develop 
some efective mechanisms for addressing disasters within the EU. Built largely 
within the context of contributions to international disaster relief eforts, it had 
been more deeply institutionalized in 2019 with the addition of RescEU, a co- 
financed stockpile system holding resources such as firefighting equipment. How-
ever, this is primarily a matchmaking system. Rather than controlling resources, it 
maintains a list of member state resources that can be made available and would 
then pair  these with requests for assistance from other states (e.g., deploying 
listed search- and- rescue teams to member states that had sufered earthquakes). 
It depends largely upon member state solidarity and does not function well where 
many states are sufering the same prob lems at the same time.
In sum, although the EU entered COVID-19 better prepared to coordinate 
than it had been when it faced the last pandemic, H1N1 influenza in 2009, its 
capabilities remained  limited to below- the- surface activity and  were secondary 
to national government responses. The EU’s explicit health policies had, over the 
years, exercised an increasing normative influence on technical issues such as epi-
demiological case definition but the more impor tant policies, and  those where the 
EU exerted more state- like powers,  were rooted in the law of the internal market. 
 These exist in areas such as health workforce mobility, the integrated market in 
phar ma ceu ti cals and medical devices, and cross- border consumption of health 
care, where health policy is made  under the guise of facilitating the market’s func-
tioning. Although the EU’s internal market law is less directly concerned with 
health, less immediately relevant to disaster relief, and has not positioned the EU 
to lead the public health response to COVID-19 (Hervey & McHale, 2015; Hervey 
et al., 2017), it was this set of powers that enabled the EU to step in and take a more 
forceful role as the coronavirus pandemic unfolded.
For the first few months of the COVID-19 crisis, March and April 2020 in par-
tic u lar, observers of the EU despaired, and most  people justifiably paid the EU  little 
attention. Member states had successfully ensured that it would not play a leader-
ship role in a major health emergency, and it did not. The first responses of the 
member states showed that they, and their populations, expected national govern-
ments to play the leading role. This involved not only a failure to coordinate, or even 
to identify a shared agenda between member states, but also flamboyant exercises 
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in national egotism. Border closures and bans on the export of key medical sup-
plies to other EU member states  were moves that attacked the core princi ples of 
Eu ro pean integration and the value of solidarity meant to underpin the proj ect.
But although the EU as an international organ ization was forced to work 
below the radar,  these market- distorting actions enabled the EU as a law- state 
to intervene.  Under threat of infringement proceedings from the Eu ro pean 
Commission, border closures within the EU soon came to be accepted as prag-
matic and temporary, and interference with trade in goods— the export bans— 
quickly began to be lifted. Member states could try to invoke the “public health” 
exception to EU law enumerated in Article 36 TFEU, but the Commission, in 
a stroke, redefined public health and transformed it from a member state jus-
tification for an exception, to an EU- level princi ple. To be permitted, export 
bans would have to show a contribution to EU- wide public health, and not just 
national public health, which they almost certainly would not be able to do. 
Thus, the result of the brief burst of national egotism was not decomposition 
but rather a redefinition of public health in EU law. If the Commission’s redefi-
nition sticks, public health  will cease to be a member state- level exception and 
instead become a warrant for positive EU action (de Ruijter et al., 2020; Purn-
hagen et al., 2020).
The speed with which member states undid their export bans and started to 
coordinate their restrictions on travel suggested a realization of shared interest. In 
the same vein, and with the internal market defended, member state leaders soon 
turned to the EU to rescue them more broadly. They reactivated and reinforced 
RescEU, creating EU stockpiles of materials that could be shared with mem-
ber states as needs arose—an achievement in itself given the global scarcity of 
resources relevant to  handling COVID-19. RescEU is fully centralized (overseen 
by the Directorate General for Civil Protection) and can work with as few as one 
member state (to co- finance and  house the given stockpile). The EU also began 
to activate its facilities for joint procurement. The Joint Procurement Agreement 
(JPA) was established in 2014 as part of the 2013 Health Threats Decision and pro-
vides for the collective purchasing of medicines, medical devices, and other goods 
or ser vices, such as laboratory equipment or personal protective equipment, with 
sufficient financing to support high- volume purchases. Since COVID-19 struck, 
four calls for supplies have been launched and resources distributed to several 
member states.
However, whilst the revisions to RescEU increase its speed and flexibility, they 
do little to increase its bud get. Although the existence of a joint procurement 
mechanisms is to be celebrated, the framework remains intergovernmental, vol-
untary, and rather too slow to respond to urgent needs (de Ruijter, 2019). What 
COVID-19 has made clear is that the EU’s lack of distributive capacity, its position 
as “risk assessor” but not “risk man ag er,” and its inability to act as much more than 
a platform for the supporting of national action hinders its ability to act in the 
collective interest. As the first wave of the virus has passed, the EU has capital-
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ized on  these obvious and salient shortcomings to propose a series of longer- term 
changes to its role in  future health crises.
Chief among  these is a new health program called EU4Health. It is a hasty 
redesign that reverses the pre- existing plans for EU health policy post-2020, 
which  were to roll health into the much broader Eu ro pean Social Fund Plus and 
to earmark it just EUR 413 million (Eu ro pean Commission, 2018). EU4Health had 
a proposed bud get for 2021 to 2027 of approximately EUR 10 billion and would 
prevail as a standalone instrument, with its own set of priorities. However,  after 
several rounds of negotiation the bud get was cut to EUR 5.1 billion, still a signifi-
cant increase on the previous program, which was allocated just EUR 450 million. 
The priorities of EU4Health have been identified as protecting  people from cross- 
border threats, improving the availability of medicines, and strengthening health 
systems. Cross- border health threats and health security have long been features 
of EU health programs— EU4Health being the fourth program since 2003— but 
are predictably highlighted and frontloaded in the new text. This focuses on build-
ing preparedness and response capacities, increasing surveillance and monitoring 
of threats, establishing EU level emergency expertise, and ensuring the availability 
of critical health supplies, among other related objectives. But the program also 
retains many of the “pre- crisis” agenda items that the steady expansion of the EU’s 
health influence has been built upon. Tackling cancer and other noncommuni-
cable diseases, reducing health inequalities, exchanging best practice on health 
promotion, and improving the accessibility and efficiency of health systems all 
remain, and  these help to frame EU4Health as a well- rounded, holistic response 
to COVID-19. Although EU4Health is still a large expansion from the previous 
public health programs, it is clear that member states, even  after a crisis, remain 
steadfast in their wish to not establish redistributive health programs to level 
access to health across EU member state borders.
The EU4Health program was published on May 28, 2020, and was followed less 
than three weeks  later by an EU Vaccines Strategy. This again puts front and cen-
ter the pressing need for a vaccine to fight COVID-19, establishing the possibility 
for EU- led Advance Purchase Agreements (APAs) with phar ma ceu ti cal companies 
that have a promising product in development. Beneath the surface, however, it 
also responds to weaknesses in the JPA and RescEU, giving the EU a more central role 
(in signing APAs on behalf of member states) and power to coordinate the supply 
and distribution of any resulting vaccine, and involving the Eu ro pean Medicines 
Agency more directly. Similar themes appear in the EU Phar ma ceu ti cal Strat-
egy, published in November 2020. This  will address the longer- term issues that 
COVID-19 has exposed, including the safeguarding and diversification of supply 
chains for active ingredients, incentivization of phar ma ceu ti cal production within 
the EU, and innovation within the sector. It  will also pick up on some of the priori-
ties identified in the EU4Health program, addressing availability and afordability 
of medicines, for instance, as a historically intractable issue made salient in the 
current crisis.
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This is an impressive list of EU activities and developments. They reinforce 
and greatly expand the EU’s existing public health policies,  whether by legally 
redefining public health or increasing the health program bud get by more than 
ten times. They even create a greater role for the EU in health systems strength-
ening. This reflects the fact that, in an integrated EU, the health status of any one 
country can afect  those of the  others, and the realization on the part of member 
states that a collective response by an empowered EU is thus desirable, even if that 
means some direct support to healthcare systems.
Eu ro pean Union’s Social Policy Response
The EU was poorly placed to respond to the unpre ce dented social and eco-
nomic policy challenges that its member states faced as the pandemic developed 
throughout early 2020. As a regulatory state, it lacked a centralized fiscal capacity. 
None of its tiny bud get was geared to sustain health systems or stabilize econo-
mies in a crisis. If anything, a dominant co ali tion of member states, mostly north-
ern “creditor” ones, had seized the opportunity of the 2010 debt crises to build an 
elaborate structure designed to contain the putatively profligate southern Eu ro-
pean member states (Greer & Jarman, 2016).
Although externally impressive, EU fiscal governance was already a rickety 
structure by 2020. Advocates of forceful and crude austerity policy had to defend 
it against advocates of greater spending, solidarity, and subtlety.  These ranged 
from left parties to governments facing economic decline, to ministries seeking 
additional bud gets, to politicians of any affiliation who wanted to spend more 
on social protection and investment. They used the tricks that any advocate or 
bureaucrat uses to undermine a governance structure such as austerity: expand-
ing the goals, expanding participation, and questioning the indicators. This 
worked well enough to defeat the policy, if not the antidemo cratic potential, of 
the overarching fiscal governance regime (Greer & Brooks, 2020).
The comprehensively undermined fiscal governance structure was, unsur-
prisingly, the first to change when the crisis hit. The EU activated the “general 
escape clause” in April, reflecting the impossibility of hitting deficit and debt tar-
gets in the  middle of a major economic crisis, as well as the difficulty of blaming 
any government for the scale of the meltdown. Although  there  will undoubtedly 
be a push from the po liti cal right against the often- impressive public expendi-
tures that got Eu ro pean governments through the early stages of the crisis, it is 
unlikely that partisans of austerity  will find the existing fiscal governance system 
very useful.
A “general escape” from austerity was one  thing, but that did not solve the 
economic prob lems created by lockdowns, reduced demand in sectors such as 
restaurants and live per for mance, or serious breakdowns in existing patterns of 
world trade. Even a 20  percent reduction in custom  will often be enough to break 
a business, and a 20   percent reduction in tax revenue a power ful shock to any 
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government. Member state governments  were facing falls in GDP of anything up 
to 17   percent (Eurostat, 2020). Just as social and health needs ballooned, Eu ro-
pean states found themselves in dire need of money. The EU has no funds to 
directly address  these prob lems or powers to redistribute; income replacement, 
basic income, business support, and other schemes had to come from member 
states. This meant that the collective Eu ro pean response seemed likely to further 
entrench the enormous economic inequalities that already exist between member 
states (Makszin, 2020).
In economic policy debates, March and April  2020 felt like 2010, with EU 
policy distorted by some governments’ determined re sis tance to EU action even 
as all member states saw dramatic economic declines associated with their shut-
downs and shocks to the world economy. The Eu ro pean Central Bank (ECB) 
jumped to the defense of the Eurozone, initiating a robust crisis response in which 
it dramatically increased its bond- buying program and cut its interest rates to 
deeply negative levels in an efort to provide cheap liquidity. It had taken on a 
similar role, some would argue beyond its mandate, in 2010 and was again forced 
to do so by the lack of a coordinated fiscal policy at the EU level. And although 
national governments have welcomed the ECB’s actions, they have done  little to 
address this policy gap. An instrument to provide loans for employment pres-
ervation measures— Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency 
(SURE)— was  adopted but is temporary and does  little to address medium- and 
longer- term economic stability. The broader, central fiscal policy needed contin-
ues to be opposed by mostly northern, “creditor” states, as they  were in 2010. 
The stances of  these governments  were then and remain normatively indefensible. 
Self- styled “frugal” governments from countries such as Austria, the Netherlands, 
and Finland have been happy to vote through large subsidies to sustain corrupt 
authoritarian regimes in Hungary and Poland (Kelemen, 2017; Magyar & Vasar-
helyi, 2017). Yet they  were determined to impose punishing conditionality on sup-
port to democracies such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece during a crisis and 
seemed bent on maintaining this position through the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, just as the EU pulled out of the assault on the single market and began 
to develop a serious health policy with surprising rapidity, it left the arguments of 
2010  behind quickly and with innovation. So much so that, by late summer 2020, 
scholars  were debating  whether the EU had experienced its “Hamiltonian moment,” 
a reference to the US government’s assumption of the states’ war debts in 1790 and 
the moment the federal government developed its own in de pen dent fiscal capac-
ity. The reason for their excitement was that the EU would now be granted its own 
debt issuance capacity, distributing funds as grants to member states to respond 
to the COVID-19 crisis. Reflecting an  earlier proposal by Emmanuel Macron and 
Angela Merkel, the EU’s recovery plan would see EUR 500 billion, raised by the EU 
using member states’  future contributions as a guarantee, made available as grants 
to  those countries hardest hit by the COVID-19 crisis. For the first time, the EU  will 
issue its own debts to make grants to member states to solve their prob lems. What 
explains this turn  toward more cooperation and solidarity?
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Po liti cal Structure and Context
EU policy— including its health policies and its response to COVID-19— can be 
productively understood by comparing it to other federations (Fierlbeck & Palley, 
2015; Greer, 2020; Greer & Elliott, 2019; Vollaard et al., 2016). It is a sprawling and 
complex system with enumerated powers that make its influence variable from 
issue to issue. It is filled with formal and informal veto points at which interested 
parties can block legislation. Its central institutions are divided, its member states 
power ful and inclined to defer to each other (Kleine, 2013), and its treaties written 
to constrain its activity. Legislative activity requires creativity and workarounds, 
but each creative workaround creates new complexity, special interests, and con-
foundingly intricate  legal situations. This is typical in many federations, but a far 
cry from the often more decisive and coherent unified politics of many EU mem-
ber states. No member state has to have a website explaining what each of its three 
presidents do and how they difer (Eu ro pean Union, 2020).
The EU, then, is something like a weakly resourced federation with an unusu-
ally complex  legal system that operates through regulating and guiding the activi-
ties of other governments. This is the core of the EU system and the source of its 
greatest durable strengths. Where the issue at hand is one of market or economic 
regulation— such as trade in essential medical supplies or the validity of travel 
bans— this  legal system snaps into action, making up for the weak center and 
enabling a state- like reaction. Where the issue is outside of this sphere, however— 
providing frontline response to emergencies, such as deployment of health profes-
sionals or comprehensive and comparable data on infection rates, being  pertinent 
examples— the weakness of the EU’s resourcing is more of a hindrance. In such 
areas, the EU performs as a coordination platform; it can be very efective, as was 
the case, generally speaking, with the provision of timely data and guidance from 
the ECDC, but only in areas where its member states have provided for this and 
cooperate with the relevant bodies.
In this sense, the EU’s response to COVID-19 is explained by its demo cratic 
structure. The EU is an essentially demo cratic regime; most of its member states 
are well- consolidated democracies, and the EU is accountable to voters via elec-
tions to the Eu ro pean Parliaments, as well as the elections that send member 
state representatives to vote in the Council. EU democracy has its weaknesses, 
and a sprawling body of lit er a ture exists regarding the EU’s demo cratic deficits. 
The most impor tant is prob ably the extent to which it indulges the authoritarian 
enclaves Hungary and Poland, and indeed finances  those governments, so as to 
reap the benefits of  those countries’ ruling parties’ votes (Gibson, 2013; Kelemen, 
2017). Nonetheless the EU’s action generally reflects the  will of the majority.
This basic democracy of the EU is nicely illustrated by the experience of health 
policy  under the commission presidency of Jean- Claude Juncker. Juncker’s appoint-
ment and seeming lack of enthusiasm for public health reflected a solid majority 
of member state governments of the right, who  were more interested in an agenda 
of business- friendly economic growth than in solidarity, environmental  regulation, or 
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health. Juncker gave the health commissioner a weak mandate and even issued a 
paper proposing a scenario in which the EU cease to work for health altogether 
(Brooks & Guy, 2020; Eu ro pean Commission, 2017). By the end of his term 
 there was only one open legislative dossier before the health council formation 
(a proposal on health technology assessment), and it was not advancing quickly. 
Although dispiriting and frustrating for health advocates, this lack of action 
reflected the perceived interests of the majority of national governments.
In the summer of 2020,  these perceived interests began to shift. The shift 
reflects not only the unpre ce dented scale and impact of the COVID-19 crisis but 
also the new decision- making landscape created by Brexit. EU health policy, like 
many EU policy areas, has seen a long- standing division between larger states and 
smaller states. Smaller member states are generally more in  favor of strong EU 
capacities and strong EU institutions  because they see that they  will fare better as 
a collective than on their own or in intergovernmental contexts. Bigger member 
states are more likely to see a potential draw on their resources and constraint on 
their freedom of action and may be suspicious of the Eu ro pean Commission and 
its propensity to develop its own po liti cal proj ects.
COVID-19 is changing this dynamic in a way that previous crises have not been 
able.  Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome and 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the 1990s, SARS and H1N1  in the 
2000s, and the vari ous other public health crises that the EU has endured over 
the years  were enough to expose the logic of a Eu ro pean agency for monitoring 
infectious diseases, or a common regulatory framework for food safety, but not 
to prompt a deeper shift. COVID-19 is dif er ent. It threatens to exceed the health 
and social policy capacities of all states, not just  because of the scale of the prob-
lem but also  because of their interconnection: endemic COVID-19 anywhere in 
the EU  will be endemic COVID-19 everywhere in the EU. It is also likely to pose 
this threat for a considerably longer period of time than previous pandemics. As 
such, calls to strengthen the EU’s role in crisis response, public health, and social 
policy reflect member state governments’ perceived interest in responding col-
lectively to a crisis that has afected their interlocking economies and socie ties.
The crisis is also the first time that we are getting a glimpse of the efects of 
Brexit on EU decision- making (Greer & Laible, 2020). Put simply, vote- counting 
in the EU meant that an efective co ali tion had to have a big country: France, Ger-
many, or the United Kingdom. That big country’s votes and leadership could stitch 
together co ali tions. The question was not  whether Finland, Ireland, and Sweden 
are the same, but  whether they tended to agree with the British more than they 
agree with other countries. The United Kingdom had anchored a largely right- 
wing, pro- market arc of states stretching from Ireland to the Baltic states. This 
eco nom ically liberal bloc could easily frustrate more solidaristic proposals from 
countries led by France, and gave Germany and its allies a  great deal of strategic 
flexibility. For most of the twenty-first  century, France was efectively in opposition 
as Germany and its allies frequently shared preferences with the United Kingdom 
and its allies. Brexit, predictably enough, empowered France. In an EU without 
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the United Kingdom, Germany and France have to work together. This new real-
ity is beginning to emerge: a splintering of the northern liberal bloc, which does 
not have the votes to veto or drive policy, and a redefinition of the areas where the 
preferences of French and German governments overlap. A crucial early example 
was the Franco- German proposals for the Eu ro pean recovery, which included an 
agenda for “health sovereignty” and laid the foundations for the common debt 
mechanism now  in operation.
The self- styled “frugals,” an opportunistic co ali tion of Austria, Denmark, Fin-
land, the Netherlands, and Sweden, fought for policy conditionality on EU grants as 
well as a smaller health policy bud get in July 2020. Although they managed to cut 
the increase in the EU health bud get, they  were in an essentially defensive action 
once they had been abandoned by their usual ally Germany in  favor of deals with 
France. This action took place at a Eu ro pean Council negotiation over the Multian-
nual Financial Framework, the EU’s bud get, where any member state can efectively 
veto pro gress. All that the frugals managed to achieve in that very favorable venue 
was to cut the health bud get increase and the new EU grants. A Eu ro pean Union 
dominated by Franco- German relations might be a difficult place for them.
Conclusion: Failing Forward?
The EU’s development is often presented in the form of debates between “inter-
governmentalists” who think that member states largely control the EU, and “neo-
functionalists” who posit that  there are broader and self- sustaining trends  toward 
integration. The EU response to COVID-19 and EU health law and policy analy sis 
more generally has shown the drawbacks of such a stylized approach to Eu ro pean 
integration and public policy. Previous health emergencies all contributed to the 
development of EU capacity and a sense of shared fate among EU governments. 
Public health decision- makers shared a sense that they faced common prob lems 
and could work together, even if normal politics of public health in the EU  were 
fissiparous and crises could just as easily lead to selfishness as collective action.
Perhaps Jean Monnet, one of the most impor tant figures in the history of EU, 
put it better when he said that “L’Eu rope se fera dans les crises et elle sera la 
somme des solutions apportées à ces crises” [Eu rope  will be forged in crises, and 
 will be the sum of the solutions  adopted for  those crises] (1976). Put another way, 
the EU has a long history of “failing forward,” in which:
Intergovernmental bargaining leads to incompleteness  because it forces states 
with diverse preferences to  settle on lowest common denominator solutions. 
Incompleteness then unleashes forces that lead to crisis. Member states respond 
by again agreeing to lowest common denominator solutions, which address the 
crisis and lead to deeper integration. To date, this sequential cycle of piecemeal 
reform, followed by policy failure, followed by further reform, has managed to 
sustain both the Eu ro pean proj ect and the common currency. However, this 
The Eu ro pean Union Confronts COVID-19  245
approach entails clear risks. Eco nom ically, the policy failures engendered by this 
incremental approach to the construction of EMU have been catastrophic for the 
citizens of many crisis- plagued member states. Po liti cally, the perception that the 
EU is constantly in crisis and in need of reforms to salvage the  union is undermin-
ing popu lar support for Eu ro pean integration. (Jones et al., 2015)
EU public health has long been such a case, with vari ous communicable dis-
ease crises putting public health on the EU agenda (de Ruijter, 2019; Greer et al., 
2021). It was the sum of  those crises that created the infrastructure, such as the 
Health Security Committee and RescEU, that the EU initially used to respond. 
This crisis of COVID-19 also promises to leave  behind a dif er ent EU. Between 
the redefinition in salience, resource, and law of public health, shared Eu ro pean 
actions such as blocking travel from some of the EU’s biggest trading partners 
(e.g., the United States), and the development of EU debt for member states, it is 
likely that  future historians of the EU  will see the pandemic as a moment when 
integration stepped forward, in health and beyond.
In a number of the federations that this book discusses, such as Brazil and the 
United States, federalism meant that an otiose central government shirked respon-
sibility or acted erratically, leaving ill- prepared and variable states to compensate. 
Disasters ensued. In the case of the EU, responsibility for managing health emer-
gencies clearly lay with the member states from the outset. The EU’s immediate 
response was therefore constrained to that of an international organ ization, coor-
dinating from the sidelines at the mercy of the resources and solidarity of its mem-
ber states. An initial period of member state dominance— and even egotism— was 
therefore inevitable. But as this first phase passed, and the scale of their shared 
prob lems became apparent, member states’ perceived interest shifted. Their 
response has been to begin to strengthen and expand the EU’s more state- like pow-
ers. A common Eu ro pean debt mechanism, a central role for the EU in vaccine pro-
curement and distribution, even a new agenda in health systems strengthening— 
these are sizeable steps forward, which acknowledge the integral role of Eu rope in 
post- COVID-19 recovery and the positive- sum nature of further integration. It is 
just a beginning. The pro cess  will be long,  shaped by the EU’s peculiar institutional 
structures and the new, post- Brexit real ity of decision- making, but, faced with a 
public health crisis of a magnitude previously unseen, the response so far has been 
to seek another Eu ro pean rescue of the nation state (Greer et al., 2021).
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 14 denMarK’s resPonse to covid-19
 A Participatory Approach to Policy Innovation
Darius Ornston
Denmark’s first case of COVID-19 was detected at the end of Feb-
ruary 2020. Like other West Eu ro pean countries, initial cases  were concentrated 
among travelers returning from Italy, but they accelerated sharply with commu-
nity spread by the second week of March 2020. By the end of the month, Denmark 
was averaging 200 cases a day.  After peaking in early April 2020, cases slowly but 
steadily decreased to 38 a day in the last week of June 2020. By this point, Den-
mark had reported 12,994 cases and 609 deaths. On a per capita basis, this was 
comparable to Germany and lower than many other West Eu ro pean countries. 
Mortality figures reflect this pattern, increasing to 7  percent above expected lev-
els in April  2020 before returning to historical norms in May  2020 (“Tracking 
Covid-19 excess deaths across countries,” 2020).
 There are multiple explanations for this satisfactory per for mance. This chapter 
instead investigates Denmark’s response to the pandemic, focusing on the po liti-
cal variables that influenced  these policy choices. Denmark is a small (six million 
inhabitants), wealthy democracy with a large and capacious public sector (Camp-
bell & Hall, 2009). Its generous and encompassing postwar welfare state, which 
includes universal health insurance, has contributed to a low level of income 
in equality and a high degree of social capital (Esping- Andersen, 1990; Rothstein & 
Stolle, 2003). A minority Social Demo cratic government, a common consequence 
of proportional repre sen ta tion in Denmark, presided over the pandemic. The 
Ministry of Health, which at times ignored the recommendations of its own pub-
lic health agency, was directly responsible for the policy choices described in this 
chapter. In practice, however, most decisions  were subject to cabinet and parlia-
mentary discussion and  were supported by the entire government and all repre-
sented po liti cal parties. Consistent with Denmark’s tradition of “neo- corporatist” 
governance (Katzenstein, 1985), the country’s largest employer associations and 
trade  unions  were also deeply involved in the policy- making pro cess.
We might expect this demo cratic and consensual approach to governance to 
inhibit action.  After all, democracies are more commonly known for cumbersome 
decision- making pro cesses and risk- averse politicians (Greer et al., 2020). To the 
extent that  these countries embrace reform, they tend to import tried- and- tested 
policies from local neighbors rather than pioneering new ones (Weyland, 2009). 
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Denmark, however, was a regional pioneer, consistently experimenting with risky 
and untested strategies. For example, Denmark was one of the first Eu ro pean 
countries to lock down in its economy between March 10, 2020, and March 18, 
2020. This early lockdown was paired with an ambitious and unpre ce dented eco-
nomic assistance program, which would become a template for other countries. 
Although the lockdown enjoyed widespread social support, Denmark led the way 
in reopening its economy in mid- April. The loosening of restrictions coincided 
with a dramatic increase in testing levels to one of the highest in the world. In 
 doing so, the Danish government did not rely on a power ful executive, a legislative 
majority, nor in de pen dent agencies to overpower opponents and special interests. 
Instead, it drew on an inclusive and participatory approach to policy- making, 
negotiating with opposition parties as well as industry and  labor.
Drawing on lit er a ture on small states (Campbell & Hall, 2017; Katzenstein, 
1985; Ornston, 2012b), this chapter explains how institutionalized cooperation 
between policy- makers and civil society, specifically large, encompassing pro-
ducer associations, can accelerate policy reform and social change. First, the trust 
that stems from repeated interaction makes it easier for reform- oriented actors to 
persuade skeptics. Second, widely distributed networks enable policy- makers to 
design more efective interventions using local information. Third, this extends 
to social protection, which can reduce opposition by compensating adversely 
afected actors. Fi nally, consensus improves policy efectiveness by coordinating 
public and private sector action.  Because this inclusive and participatory approach 
is so attractive, the chapter concludes on a cautionary note, identifying limita-
tions and vulnerabilities. Although Denmark appears successful, a brief analy sis 
of another Nordic country, Sweden, illustrates how cohesive and encompassing 
networks can go awry during periods of heightened uncertainty.
Health Policy: From Early Lockdown to Early Exit
Denmark was one of the first countries in Eu rope to begin locking down its econ-
omy in March 2020. Social distancing mea sures began with the recommendation 
on March 5 to stay at home and the cancellation of public events on March 6, 
when the country was averaging less than ten cases a day. As the number of 
detected cases spiked (767 between March 9 and March 13), the minority Social 
Demo cratic government announced more radical mea sures. Ignoring the guid-
ance of its own health agency (Kjær et al., 2020), the government sent all non-
essential public sector employees home with pay and closed high schools and 
universities by March 13 (Olsen & Hjorth, 2020). The country was an early leader 
in this re spect, ranking ninth in the world and fifth in Eu rope ( after Italy, San 
Marino, Kosovo, and Albania) on the Blavatnik Government Response Stringency 
Index (Roser et al., 2020). More restrictive policies would follow. Denmark was 
one of the first countries to close its borders to international travel on March 14, 
2020 (Roser et al., 2020); elementary schools and day care facilities  were closed 
Denmark’s Response to COVID-19  251
on March 16 (Olsen & Hjorth, 2020). By March 18 the government banned assem-
blies of more than ten  people and mandated the closure of restaurants, clubs, 
shopping centers, sports facilities, and other businesses involving close contact 
(Vrangbæk et al., 2020).
Although Denmark was one of the first countries to restrict economic and 
social activity, the lockdown itself was not particularly strict. By the end of March, 
Denmark’s public health mea sures  were in fact among the least stringent in 
Eu rope, exceeded in leniency only by Andorra, Belarus, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, 
and Sweden (Roser et al., 2020). Borders  were closed and assemblies of greater 
than ten individuals  were banned, but the government never required all busi-
nesses to close, did not issue mandatory stay- at- home  orders, never restricted 
internal travel, and maintained public transit (Roser et al., 2020; Vrangbæk et al., 
2020). Visits to public parks and other outdoor spaces, which  were never forbid-
den, increased markedly in March (Roser et al., 2020).
Compliance with  these public recommendations and mandatory  mea sures, 
although imperfect (Vrangbæk et al., 2020), reduced mobility by roughly 40  percent 
by the end of March  2020. This was less dramatic than the shifts observed in 
the hardest- hit West Eu ro pean countries, such as France, Italy, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom, but it rivaled the changes observed in other (albeit significantly 
less afected) Eu ro pean states with mandatory stay- at- home  orders, such as the 
Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania (Roser et al., 2020). Where Denmark truly 
stands out in comparative perspective is the breadth of social support. Unlike 
the United States, all po liti cal parties supported the lockdown, and  there  were 
no protests against social distancing mea sures in Denmark. Public approval of 
the government’s COVID-19 response, which consistently exceeded 80   percent 
between March and June 2020, was among the highest in Eu rope (“COVID-19: 
Government  Handling and Confidence in Health Authorities,” 2020; Devlin & 
Connaughton, 2020).
Despite broad support, Denmark (with Austria) was one of the first countries 
to announce its intention to exit the lockdown on April 6, 2020. The loosening 
of social distancing mea sures, which began on April 15, extended to the reopen-
ing of primary schools, childcare facilities, and some private ser vice providers on 
April  20. Shops, shopping malls, community organ izations, and outdoor sports 
followed on May  11. Restaurants, libraries, and secondary schools  were permit-
ted to reopen on May 18. On June 8, the cap on assemblies was lifted from ten 
to fifty. Travel restrictions  were also rolled back in June, with visitors and Danes 
from selected countries exempted from self- isolation requirements beginning on 
June 17 (Vrangbæk et al., 2020).
Denmark’s timing in reopening its economy is striking and is discussed in 
more depth  later. Unlike the early adoption of social distancing, which followed 
a sharp spike in COVID-19 cases between March 9 and 11, 2020, one cannot link 
Danish leadership in this area to a dramatic decline in cases. The initial plan to 
reopen schools was announced on April 6, the day before Denmark’s highest daily 
case count (393). Unlike other communities, such as several US states, the Danish 
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government was not pressured to reopen by protest activity, skepticism about the 
virus, or an ideological aversion to government intervention. Instead, the decision 
was based on Denmark’s self- perceived shortcomings relative to South  Korea and 
(post- lockdown) China, which  were able to contain the virus with a less restric-
tive program of mass testing, contact tracing, and quarantining. Denmark was an 
early laggard in this re spect. The country strug gled to run a thousand tests a day in 
March 2020, trailing Australia, Austria, Germany, Iceland, Italy, and  others on per- 
capita adjusted mea sures of testing. As a result, testing was restricted to individuals 
with severe symptoms (Ritchie et al., 2020; Vrangbæk et al., 2020).
Testing levels improved in April, particularly  after the announcement of 
a partnership with Denmark’s largest phar ma ceu ti cal firm, Novo Nordisk, on 
April  21, 2020. This deal enabled Denmark to extend eligibility to individuals 
with mild symptoms and close contacts of known cases as well as assem ble test-
ing facilities outside of its hospitals (Vrangbæk et al., 2020). By mid- May, testing 
was opened to the public, including asymptomatic individuals, and Denmark was 
preemptively testing key groups such as healthcare workers (Roser et al., 2020; 
Vrangbæk et  al., 2020). By July, Denmark had become a global leader in per- 
capita adjusted mea sures of testing, trailing only a handful of countries such as 
Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and several Eu ro pean micro- states (Ritchie 
et al., 2020).
Although the shift in testing was more con spic u ous, Denmark also expanded its 
contact tracing and quarantine facilities. Denmark developed the capacity to trace 
all COVID-19 cases beginning on April  23, 2020 (at the time, Luxembourg, Ice-
land, and Italy  were the only other West Eu ro pean countries to do so). By June, the 
government was providing facilities for individuals who  were unable to self- isolate 
 after a positive COVID-19 test or exposure (Vrangbæk et al., 2020). Denmark was 
slower to develop a contact- tracing application  because of concerns about cost- 
sharing and privacy, but a partnership with the private enterprise, Netcompany, 
was approved by parliament on May 15, 2020 and the Smitte|stop app was launched 
on June 18. As of this writing, it is too soon to speculate on its success. Although it 
was downloaded by approximately 10  percent of the population by the beginning of 
July, this was not high enough to replace conventional contact tracing eforts (OPSI, 
2020; Vrangbæk et al., 2020).
The Danish response to the virus did not always involve rapid and radical 
reform.  Because Denmark entered the crisis with a high- quality, comprehensive 
healthcare system and the pandemic was contained, it did not introduce mea sures 
 adopted by some other countries.  Because  legal residents and foreign visitors 
 were already entitled to health care, no eforts  were made to extend access. A cen-
tralized hospital structure facilitated the re distribution of resources.  There  were 
no reports of equipment shortages or rationing care, except for the cancellation 
of noncritical, elective surgeries. Digital consultations became more common, but 
 these  were permitted before the crisis. The government mandated the disclosure 
of private stockpiles of protective equipment, machinery, and medicine and was 
prepared to requisition or mandate the production of  these resources, but it never 
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did so (Vrangbæk et al., 2020). In  these areas, Denmark’s public health response 
was a story about continuity, not change.
Economic Policy: Creative Compensation
Like health policy, aspects of Danish economic policy  were also characterized 
by continuity. With one of the most comprehensive welfare states in the world, 
Denmark was already well equipped to manage disruptive economic shocks such 
as COVID-19. For example,  there was no impulse to increase sickness or unem-
ployment benefit levels,  because  these  were already among the most generous in 
the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD, 2020). 
Denmark’s robust system of automatic stabilizers, in the form of lower taxation 
and higher spending on countercyclical social benefits, was projected to contrib-
ute 5.1   percent of 2019 gross domestic product (GDP) without any government 
intervention (IMF, 2020). As a result, reforms to existing social policies involved 
only minor adjustments rather than extensive restructuring. For example, the 
government temporarily relaxed the tightening of eligibility requirements, which 
had been introduced in  earlier de cades to boost  labor force participation (Mad-
sen, 2003). Between March 17 and 19, 2020, the government eliminated waiting 
periods, increased benefit duration, extended access to quarantined groups, eased 
reporting requirements, and canceled job search requirements. The collective cost 
of  these adjustments was marginal, representing less than 1  percent of Denmark’s 
total economic response package (IMF, 2020; OECD, 2020).
 Because of the unique threat associated with the pandemic and the lockdown 
of the economy, however, Denmark could not rely on existing social policies 
alone. Naturally, monetary policy played an impor tant role, but it did not difer 
significantly from other developed economies (OECD, 2020) and is not discussed 
 here. The most distinctive ele ment of Denmark’s response to COVID-19 was fis-
cal, specifically a job retention scheme, which was unrolled in mid- March. On 
March 12, 2020, the government made minor adjustments to an existing work- 
sharing scheme, in which furloughed employees could collect a supplementary 
unemployment benefit for thirteen weeks. This was superseded three days  later 
by a more ambitious and unpre ce dented midlertidig lønkompensation, or tempo-
rary wage compensation program, in which the government covered 75  percent of 
the wages of furloughed salaried workers (90  percent for hourly workers) up to a 
maximum monthly salary of 26,000 DKK for firms facing a significant decrease in 
demand and the prospect of layofs. In exchange, firms would cover the remainder 
of the salary and refrained from firing their employees, while workers contributed 
five days of annual leave. A separate program for self- employed workers, who 
 were not covered by the initial scheme, was announced on March 19 (ILO, 2020; 
OECD, 2020).
To a German observer, this temporary wage compensation program does not 
look particularly innovative, resembling the Kurzarbeit program, or short- time 
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work benefit that stabilized the German  labor market in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis (Vail, 2018, pp.  140–141). For Denmark, however, this involved 
swimming against power ful historical and institutional forces. In contrast to Ger-
many (Hall & Soskice, 2001), Denmark uses  labor market policies to accelerate 
the re distribution of resources from declining sectors to new ones. For example, 
the country not only champions  free trade and eschews defensive industrial poli-
cies, but also imposes few restrictions on firing workers and invests heavi ly in 
worker retraining (Campbell & Pedersen, 2007; Madsen, 2006; Mjøset, 1987; Orn-
ston, 2012b). As a result, preexisting eforts to protect existing jobs  were marginal, 
employing only 18,000 at the height of the 2008 financial crisis (Jørgensen, 2011). 
By protecting over 200,000 established jobs or 5   percent of the Danish  labour 
force from redundancy between March and May 2020 (OECD, 2020), the tempo-
rary wage compensation program represented a sharp break with past practice.
This volte- face in Danish social policy was taken with surprising speed. 
Although this new “Danish” model would eventually influence policymakers in 
other countries such as Canada and the United States (Bouw, 2020; Thompson, 
2020), it represented a novel response to an unpre ce dented crisis when unveiled 
on March 15, 2020. It was unclear  whether German- style Kurzarbeit could be 
applied to a very dif er ent institutional context in Denmark or  whether it would 
work on this unpre ce dented scale. Moreover, the Danes adapted the program 
in several ways. First, the wage benefit was more generous than the original 
Kurzarbeit program. Second, on March 19, 2020, the Danish government agreed 
to cover 25   percent to 100   percent of the fixed costs for businesses adversely 
afected by the crisis. This represented an even larger commitment to protect 
established enterprises, roughly six times more expensive (65 billion DKK) than 
the temporary wage compensation program (10 billion DKK) itself, and was at 
odds with Denmark’s laissez- faire tradition in industrial policy (Mjøset, 1987; 
Ornston, 2012a). This was flanked by the deferral of VAT payments,  labor market 
contributions, and withheld income tax payments providing roughly 200 billion 
DKK in additional liquidity. The government also used a suite of instruments to 
deliver emergency recapitalization, loan guarantees, export credits, and a sector- 
specific bailout of the travel industry representing approximately 100 billion 
DKK. The total cost of this discretionary fiscal response was roughly 5  percent of 
2019 GDP. When tax deferrals, credit guarantees, liquidity mea sures, and auto-
matic stabilizers are included, the figure is closer to 20   percent of GDP (IMF, 
2020; OECD, 2020).
In the short term, this rapid economic response appears to have  limited the fall-
out from the crisis. A June 2020 analy sis by the Central Bank of Denmark projected 
a 4.1  percent decline in GDP in 2020 and unemployment was just 5.0  percent as of 
May, well below the OECD average of 8.4  percent (OECD, 2020). Firm- level analy-
sis suggests that  these programs, and the temporary wage compensation program 
in par tic u lar,  were successful in reducing layofs (Bennedsen et al., 2020). With the 
decline in COVID-19 cases, the Danish government has already started to transi-
tion from pandemic response to a conventional, economic recovery program. This 
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began with a government announcement that it would frontload investments in 
public housing on May 19 and was followed on June 16 by plans to release frozen 
holiday money (part of a pension reform package) and issue a one- time check to 
pensioners, students, and  others on social transfers (ILO, 2020; OECD, 2020).
Explaining Denmark’s COVID-19 Response:  
Cooperation and Change
Denmark’s response to the pandemic could be depicted as a story about  either 
continuity or change. In some ways, Denmark did not need to reform to manage 
the virus. Its high- capacity public health system successfully absorbed a modest 
surge in COVID-19 cases, its egalitarian social structure reduced (but did not fully 
eliminate) vulnerable populations, and its traditional social policies served as an 
automatic stabilizer, blunting the economic impact of the crisis. Framed in this 
way, the Danish case underscores the value of state capacity (Besley & Persson, 
2011) and universal social policies in par tic u lar (Esping- Andersen, 1990).
Even an egalitarian society with a high- capacity state, however, needed to 
make adjustments.  Here, Denmark’s capacity for rapid and bold reform stands out 
in comparative perspective. Instead of stalling, vacillating, or mimicking neigh-
bors, Denmark was an early adopter of new and relatively untested strategies. It 
was one of the first countries to lock down its economy and also one of the first to 
reverse course in April, replacing the lockdown with a massive expansion of test-
ing and contact tracing. Denmark also creatively adapted Germany’s Kurzarbeit 
program to tackle the economic fallout of the pandemic, popularizing a model 
 others would emulate. How can Denmark’s capacity for change be explained?
First and foremost, the Danish case underscores the complementary relation-
ship between social protection and change (Cameron, 1984; Levy, 1999; Polanyi, 
1944). The Nordic countries have long used generous social policies to reduce 
opposition to po liti cal reform, technological innovation, and economic restruc-
turing (Andersen et al., 2007; Katzenstein, 1985;  Ornston, 2018). COVID-19 was 
no exception, and the second and third parts of this chapter are thus closely con-
nected. Danish workers  were insulated from the economic costs of the lockdown, 
and the pandemic itself, by generous social safety nets. The situation confronting 
employers was dif er ent, but policy innovations such as the temporary wage com-
pensation program dramatically reduced their costs. In contrast to other coun-
tries such as the United States, adversely afected industries  were well covered by 
Denmark’s temporary wage compensation program (Bennedsen et al., 2020). As a 
result, it is hardly surprising that all major  labor market actors and po liti cal par-
ties endorsed the lockdown and protest activity was insignificant.
By contrast, authoritarianism and functional equivalents played a marginal 
role. Other democracies have fostered experimentation by insulating policymak-
ers from popu lar pressure,  either by building “electoral slack” with first- past- the- 
post voting systems (Pierson, 1996), delegating authority to in de pen dent agencies 
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(Fuchs, 2010; Johnson, 1982) or engaging in below- the- radar reform (Block, 2008; 
Breznitz & Ornston, 2013). None of  these apply to Denmark’s COVID-19 response. 
Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s minority government ignored the recom-
mendations of its public health agency and weakened its authority (Kjær et al., 
2020). It also involved both opposition parties and leading producer associations 
in negotiations over the lockdown and related economic mea sures (Bouw, 2020). 
The mid- June release of worker holiday pay, which underpins Denmark’s recovery 
package, was based on a proposal that was originally floated by Denmark’s largest 
trade  union and employer organ ization (ILO, 2020).
This participatory and inclusive approach is a common feature of postwar 
Danish policymaking and the Nordic region more generally (Katzenstein, 1985; 
Pekkarinen et  al., 1992). It has been conceptualized in dif er ent ways. Scholars 
focusing on electoral institutions emphasize proportional repre sen ta tion and 
cross- partisan collaboration (Lijphart, 1977), whereas po liti cal economists privi-
lege the integration of encompassing trade  unions and employer associations 
(Pekkarinen et al., 1992). Other studies highlight the importance of informal rela-
tionships (Katzenstein, 1985) or a cohesive national identity (Campbell & Hall, 
2017).  These conceptual distinctions  matter (Ornston & Schulze- Cleven, 2015), 
but in the case of Denmark (and the other Nordics), they generally coincide, inte-
grated actors within widely distributed, high- trust networks which cut across reli-
gious, regional, sectoral, and po liti cal cleavages (Ornston, 2018).
Although often depicted as inhibiting change (Alesina & Giavazzi, 2006; 
Grabher, 1993; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Immergut, 1992), cohesive and encompass-
ing networks can accelerate it in four ways. First, as noted previously, repeated 
interaction can build consensus by compensating adversely afected actors,  either 
through formal social programs (Andersen et  al., 2007) or alternative arrange-
ments (Katzenstein, 1985). In the Danish case, however, the compensatory scheme 
itself was innovative. This illuminates several additional sources of dynamism.
By facilitating access to high- quality expertise from across society, cohesive 
and encompassing networks facilitate the design of new policies (Breznitz, 2007, 
p. 16). In the case of the temporary wage compensation program, Danish poli-
cymakers could negotiate with or ga nized  labor and industry to ensure that the 
initiative would reach adversely afected firms. By contrast, patchwork consulta-
tions in the United States resulted in the large but comparatively in efec tive Pay-
check Protection Program, which was  limited in its scope and mired by bureau-
cratic obstacles (Bennedsen et al., 2020). Naturally, easy access to information 
also supported the design of other policies, from the construction of socially 
acceptable distancing mea sures in mid- March to the order in which they  were 
reversed.
High- trust networks can also accelerate the difusion of new ideas, making it 
easier for reform- oriented actors to convince skeptics by persuasive argumenta-
tion (Ornston, 2018, p. 17) or patriotic appeals (Campbell & Hall, 2009, p. 552). In 
the case of the temporary wage compensation program, Danish trade  unions and 
employers embraced the proposal within 24 hours (Olsen, 2020). As other chap-
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ters discuss, the high regard for public authority extended beyond economic mea-
sures to public health. Stakeholders did not question the government’s decisions 
but instead endorsed them (Thompson, 2020), and public support remained high 
from the initial crisis into the summer (“COVID-19: Government  Handling and 
Confidence in Health Authorities,” 2020).
Fi nally,  whether achieved by persuasion, compensation, or a combination 
of the two, consensus made it easier to coordinate state and societal action. The 
temporary wage compensation program was based on the expectation that firms 
receiving public support would refrain from firing workers, even without signifi-
cant administrative oversight. The social distancing mea sures it complemented 
also needed societal buy-in, as evidenced by the fact that compliance was corre-
lated with trust in government (Olsen & Hjorth, 2020). When Denmark exited the 
lockdown, mass testing was predicated on a partnership with the private sector, 
specifically Novo Nordisk. The software developer Netcompany supported contact 
tracing with the release of COVIDmeter in April 2020 and, less swiftly, Smitte|stop 
in June 2020.
Viewed in this light, the Danish case represents a contrast to authoritarianism 
and a demo cratic pathway to rapid and bold reform. It succeeded not by repli-
cating authoritarian advantages with a power ful executive, majoritarian electoral 
institutions, or in de pen dent agencies, but instead leveraging the distinct advan-
tages of a participatory and inclusive approach to policymaking. This character-
istically Nordic response supported early and risky policy action by gathering 
information, persuading skeptics, compensating adversely afected actors, and 
coordinating state and societal action.
Conclusion: Denmark in Comparative Perspective
This chapter contributes to a growing body of research about how dense, high- 
trust networks can accelerate change, encouraging experimentation and facili-
tating reform (Campbell & Hall, 2017; Katzenstein, 1985; Rhodes, 2001). This 
argument could be generalized by extending the analy sis to other areas such as 
technological innovation (Ornston, 2012b) or financial markets (Ornston, 2018). 
 Because it is tempting to copy this participatory and inclusive approach, however, 
the chapter instead concludes by identifying several weaknesses.
First and most obviously, the dense, cross- cutting, cohesive relationships that 
underpin the Danish model do not exist in large countries, particularly at the 
national level (Ornston, 2018). Although they can be constructed locally (Fung, 
2009; Katz & Bradley, 2013; Putnam, 1993),  these jurisdictions may lack the fis-
cal resources and regulatory authority to fully replicate the Nordic experience 
(Ornston, 2019). Moreover, the Danish model does not even generalize across the 
universe of small states. Although some small nations are characterized by cohe-
sive and encompassing networks (Campbell & Hall, 2017; Katzenstein, 1985) many 
are more fragmented or polarized (Fioretos, 2013; Ornston, 2018). It is not clear 
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that the intensely participatory pro cess that facilitated reform in Denmark would 
deliver the same results elsewhere.
Second, participation is  limited within Denmark. The government’s com-
mitment to including opposition parties and encompassing business and  labor 
associations did not extend to all actors. As in other countries, cases  were con-
centrated among ethnic minorities (Krause, 2020). Although  legal residents and 
foreign visitors  were entitled to health care, the Danish government made no 
efort to target undocumented or irregular immigrants (beyond mandating their 
confinement in an asylum center if they tested positive for the virus). In another 
example of its restrictive stance on immigration, the government was also quick 
to close its border on March 14, 2020, before the introduction of a general lock-
down (Vrangbæk et al., 2020). Fi nally, the country’s capacity for bold and inno-
vative action in domestic policy did not extend to the Eu ro pean level, where its 
contributions to EU- level action  were decidedly conservative (Kurz, 2020).
Fi nally, it is impor tant to acknowledge the risks of swift and bold action in 
an uncertain environment. Finland and Norway, which  adopted similar strate-
gies,  were broadly successful in containing the virus and the economic fallout 
associated with it, as was Iceland, which paired a looser lockdown with extensive 
testing. Sweden’s approach has proven more controversial. Sweden maintained 
the least restrictive lockdown in Western Eu rope, relying on voluntary social 
distancing rather than mass testing or contact tracing to  handle the pandemic. 
This was innovative and bold in the sense that it deviated from Eu ro pean practice 
and attracted significant international criticism  after mid- March. It is too early 
to comment on the long- term consequences of this strategy, but the short- term 
results  were discouraging. Excess mortality approached 40  percent in April and 
remained elevated for months (“Tracking Covid-19 Excess Deaths across Coun-
tries,” 2020). Nor did the strategy yield immediate economic benefits. Swedish 
per for mance was comparable to Denmark, with unemployment increasing from 
7.1  percent to 9  percent between March and May 2020 and the Central Bank pro-
jecting a 4.5  percent contraction in output (Ringstrom & Fulton, 2020).
Several lessons can be drawn from this brief comparison, besides the obvious 
point that the Nordic region is not a monolithic bloc. First, the proximate cause 
of Sweden’s response to the pandemic is the country’s distinctive constitutional 
structure and the resulting in de pen dence of the Swedish National Health Agency 
(Jonung, 2020; Karlson et  al., 2020). Framed in this way, Sweden underscores 
the risks of delegating authority to experts in response to a pandemic or another 
highly uncertain event. Although public health authorities championed more 
robust social distancing in other countries, in Sweden (as well as Denmark) they 
recommended a more relaxed approach. By delegating authority to an in de pen-
dent agency, Swedish policymakers  were left with few instruments to incorporate 
local information or correct course.
Second, to the extent that Sweden resembles Denmark, it illustrates how cohe-
sive and encompassing networks can get countries into trou ble. Just as overcon-
fidence in financial regulators led to policy errors and banking crises in Finland, 
Sweden, and Iceland (Ornston, 2018), faith in the National Health Agency led the 
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Social Demo crats and all other major po liti cal parties to embrace its recommen-
dations. Satisfied with this response, they not only refrained from introducing a 
more stringent lockdown but also failed to introduce alternative mea sures such 
as Danish- or Icelandic- style mass testing (Roser et al., 2020). Cross- partisan sup-
port for the national health agency was mirrored by the public, where a major-
ity (64  percent) approved of the government’s response as recently as May 2020, 
despite intense international criticism. This was lower than Denmark, but consid-
erably higher than other countries such as France and Spain (“COVID-19: Gov-
ernment  Handling and Confidence in Health Authorities,” 2020). Like Denmark, 
strong social safety nets neutralized dissent, but in this case by making it easier for 
individuals unhappy with Sweden’s lax approach to self- isolate.
If history judges Sweden’s COVID-19 response harshly, it  will be tempting to 
dismiss it as an anomaly, an unusual error by an other wise competent agency 
(Nygren & Olofsson, 2020) or a product of Sweden’s distinctive constitutional 
structure (Jonung, 2020; Karlson et al., 2020). In fact, however, this is a recur-
ring theme in the Nordic region (Ornston, 2018). The same high- trust networks 
that helped André Oscar Wallenberg industrialize Sweden in the late nineteenth 
 century (Sjögren, 2008) enabled Ivar Kreuger to bankrupt it in the 1930s (Partnoy, 
2010). The capacity for collective action, which dramatically increased technolog-
ical research and development in Finland (Moen & Lilja, 2005), created a skewed 
innovation system (Ornston, 2012a) and increased Finland’s vulnerability to dis-
ruptive shocks (Ornston, 2014). In short, the Swedish case is impor tant  because 
it shows that an inclusive and participatory approach to policy making does not 
guarantee optimal results, particularly during periods of heightened uncertainty 
when the best course of action is unclear.
In the long run, the benefits of flexibility have exceeded the costs in the Nor-
dic region. In Sweden’s case, declining government support and growing scien-
tific dissent have already prompted a reassessment of the country’s strategy and a 
(belated) increase in testing. Denmark and even Sweden thus illuminate an alter-
native pathway to rapid and radical reform. Adaptive capacity is based not on 
power ful executives, majoritarian electoral institutions, or in de pen dent agencies, 
but rather an inclusive pro cess that excels at gathering local information, persuading 
skeptics, compensating adversely afected actors, and fostering coordination. It 
is not perfect, but it has enabled  these countries to successfully adapt to a wide 
range of technological, economic, and social challenges.
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 15 france’s MUltidiMensional  
covid-19 resPonse
 Ad Hoc Committees and the Sidelining  
of Public Health Agencies
Sarah D. Rozenblum
Introduction: The Surprising Weakness of the French Arsenal of 
Health Security and Public Health during the COVID-19 Crisis
France was severely afected by COVID-19, with 30,601 recorded deaths in late 
August 2020 (Assemblée Nationale, 2020). Between March and September2020, 
the French government took a series of comprehensive actions to protect its popu-
lation from the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, ranging from health 
ser vices mea sures to socioeconomic policies. This multidimensional response 
 limited the social and health impacts of the crisis (Conseil d’Analyse Economique, 
2020). Although unpre ce dented in their scale and binding nature, public health 
mea sures  were taken rather late, using heterodox methods (Bergeron et al., 2020). 
Public health experts trained in emergency preparedness  were sidelined, while 
the crisis management was centralized by the executive branch, whose members 
have minimal training in public health (Bergeron & Borraz, 2020). The progres-
sive expansion that the public health sphere has under gone since the late 1990s 
was not enough to give public health experts a mono poly of advice and action 
in the eyes of generalist officials, who not only reached out to other professions 
but also treated public health professionals with no special regard (Rozenblum 
et al., 2020). Although  these governance choices do not seem to have undermined 
France’s response to COVID-19, they eroded public trust in the government (Nos-
siter, 2020; Odoxa, 2020) and raise several questions for researchers regarding the 
role and use of public health expertise in times of crisis. The French response com-
bined protective social and economic policies with an ambivalent attitude  toward 
public health institutions and tools, which  were created precisely to respond to a 
pandemic of this magnitude. Their marginalization is all the more surprising given 
that France has created many public health institutions since the late 1990s, which 
could have been more extensively mobilized (Rozenblum et al., 2020).
The French public health arena became a privileged space for po liti cal action 
in the late 1990s, as a direct outcome of several health scandals (Tabuteau, 2002, 
2007).  These crises— including mad cow disease and scandals over tainted blood 
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samples and growth hormones— revealed the shortcomings of the French pub-
lic health approach. As a result, they raised the po liti cal profile of public health 
(Bergeron & Nathanson, 2012). Previously marginalized, public health was rede-
fined in the late 1990s as a responsibility of the French state to protect its popu-
lation against disease risks and to ensure equal access to the healthcare system 
(Rozenblum, in press). This dual responsibility was captured through the newly 
coined  legal notions of sécurité sanitaire (“health security”) and démocratie sani-
taire (“health democracy”). Framing public health interventions in the language 
of “security” changed their place in the hierarchical structure of the state and 
increased their po liti cal salience (Bergeron & Nathanson, 2017). This framing rein-
forced public health as a legitimate field of intervention (viewed as an essential 
function of government, similar to defense) and presented the state as the legiti-
mate protector of population health (Rozenblum et al., 2020).
As “health security” became the centerpiece of the renewed French public 
health arena, more than ten agencies  were created or reor ga nized in its name, 
including the Institute for Disease Surveillance (acronym in French, InVS, 1998), 
the Agency for Medicines and Medical Devices Safety (acronym in French, 
ANSM, 2011), and Public Health France (acronym in French, SPF, 2016). Six laws 
devoted to health security  were passed by the National Assembly in 1993, 1998, 
2001, 2006, 2007, and 2011 (Rozenblum, in press).
France’s public health arena became highly institutionalized over the last three 
de cades. As French researchers observed, “the density of institutional expertise in 
public health in France . . .  is among the most impor tant in Eu rope” (Bergeron & 
Borraz, 2020).  These institutions fall into four categories. First, within the Minis-
try of Health, the General Directorate of Health (acronym in French, DGS) and 
the General Directorate of Health Care Ser vices (acronym in French, DGOS) are 
responsible for defining health policies and ensuring monitoring, forecasting, 
regulation, and health security missions. Public health experts joined the ranks 
of the Ministry of Health in the wake of the 1990s scandals (Tabuteau, 2016). 
Both directorates  were mobilized throughout the COVID-19 crisis. Second, the 
Regional Health Agencies (acronym in French, ARS), created in 2009, carry out 
prevention and health planning missions at the regional level. They played a critical 
role during the COVID-19 crisis (Assemblée Nationale, 2020). Third, “health secu-
rity” agencies, such as the National Drug Safety Agency, ensure medical devices 
and drug safety as well as health surveillance. Fi nally, “expert agencies” issue rec-
ommendations and conduct scientific studies on behalf of the executive (Tabu-
teau, 2016). This category includes— but is not  limited to— the High Authority for 
Health (acronym in French, HAS), the High Council for Public Health (acronym 
in French, HCSP) and Public Health France (Santé Publique France, SPF). Despite 
their expertise and resources,  these agencies  were relegated to a logistical and 
technical role during the COVID-19 crisis. Public health agencies seemed to have 
been sidelined by governments in countries as dif er ent as France, Denmark, and 
the United States (Rozenblum et al., 2020). Their marginalization raises a series of 
questions addressed throughout this chapter. Fi nally, the backbone of the French 
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emergency management system— the sécurité civile [civil protection]— relies on a 
specialized set of actors, including a secretariat supervised by the prime minister. 
The sécurité civile is responsible for emergency planning, and periodically orga-
nizes crisis management simulation exercises (Bergeron et al., 2020).
The COVID-19 pandemic broke out during a particularly tense moment for 
French hospitals. Demanding more resources for public hospitals, healthcare 
professionals had been on strike since November  2019 (Béguin, 2020). More 
than 1,200 hospital professionals resigned on January 14, 2020 (Béguin, 2020). 
As the COVID-19 pandemic spread in France, the government realized— without 
publicly acknowledging it— that essential resources, including protective equip-
ment, hand sanitizers, and diagnostic tests  were scarce nationwide (Gandre & 
Or, 2020). This is the result of ten years of disinvestment in public health that 
followed the mismanagement of the 2009 H1N1 epidemic (Davet & Lhomme, 
2020). In 2009, the government had been accused of overpredicting the num-
ber of H1N1 casualties and purchasing too many masks and vaccines (Gandre & 
Or, 2020). One billion euros  were spent on protective equipment, although the 
virus “only” killed 342 individuals (Davet & Lhomme, 2020). As a result, con-
secutive governments chose to reduce the national stockpile. They required 
hospitals and private companies to build up their own supply of masks. None 
of  these stakeholders, however,  were informed of this new requirement, and 
stockpiles  were scarce both within hospitals and in the private sector  (Gandre & 
Or, 2020). In February 2020, the government only had 100 million surgical masks 
(Rouquet, 2020).
Before January 2020, France’s robust slate of public health institutions looked 
well prepared for a major health emergency, despite a somehow ambivalent 
attitude  toward crisis preparedness that followed the mismanagement of 2009 
H1N1 crisis. By January  2020, French officials could point to extensive institu-
tionalization of public health infrastructure, despite having a relatively smaller 
public health workforce than in the United States (Rozenblum et  al., 2020). In 
March 2020, however, the government set up two ad hoc scientific committees 
tasked with providing strategic public health expertise to the executive branch, 
while established agencies such as SPF and the High Council of Public Health 
did not lead the institutional response to the pandemic. Public health agencies 
appear to have been marginalized by the executive branch when they  were needed 
most.  Were they purposefully sidelined during the crisis? Was the French arsenal 
of public health created over the last three de cades insufficient or inadequate to 
tackle a health crisis of this magnitude? Fi nally, what are the consequences of this 
fragmented scientific landscape for established public health institutions and the 
national responses to COVID-19? Several hypotheses can be examined to answer 
 these questions, which  will ultimately shed light on the politicization of French 
public health expertise during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Hypothesis 1: Public Health alongside French Presidentialism. “Public 
health” is legally conceived in France as the responsibility of the state to protect 
its population from health risks. In this sense, during the COVID-19 crisis, the 
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protection of the population was framed as a mission that should be imposed 
from above by an executive that highly centralized the governance of the health 
crisis (Bergeron & Borraz, 2020; Pedrot, 2020). President Macron compared the 
pandemic to a war on several occasions (Elysée, 2020a). He posed as a military 
leader, who should defeat the virus and  handle the crisis on his own (Elysée, 2020a) 
and played an influential role in controlling the crisis through France’s institu-
tions (Perera & Tarrow, 2020). The centralization of power  under the loi d’urgence 
sanitaire (health emergency law) led to the creation of ad hoc institutions placed 
directly  under presidential control. Such centralization of power was made pos si ble 
by the institutions of the Fifth Republic, which gave the president significant powers 
in times of crisis and allowed him to deviate from preexisting plans and laws.
Hypothesis 2: Multidimensional Crisis Management. The executive branch 
took a series of social, economic, and health mea sures to contain a pandemic 
po liti cally framed as a multidimensional event by the government. Economic, 
social, and public health tools  were given equal importance. This polymorphic 
approach may have overshadowed health agencies whose expertise was deemed 
too technical and narrow. Consequently, public health professionals  were not 
given exclusive authority to design the national COVID-19 strategy, nor exclusive 
control over the tools required to implement this multidimensional strategy on 
the ground (Rozenblum et al., 2020).
Hypothesis 3: Absence of a Culture of Health Security. France, as most Eu ro-
pean countries, has never experienced a public health crisis of this magnitude and 
lacked practice in mobilizing its public health arsenal, formidable as it may have 
been. Over the last ten years,  there also has been a drift  toward terrorism and natu ral 
disaster preparedness, and away from pandemic preparedness in France (Bergeron 
et  al., 2020). Communication between scientific experts and public officials can 
be difficult, and the creation of ad hoc scientific committees allowed the executive 
branch to bridge to gap, while also handpicking members of its own choice.
Hypothesis 4: (Presumed) Slowness of Health Bureaucracy. France’s top 
policymakers may have worried that the bureaucracy of public health institutions 
was incompatible with managing a rapidly evolving crisis that called for quick 
decision- making. Pre- existing plans for responding to pandemics  were perhaps 
thought to be too slow to mobilize the relevant actors, or too complex to be put 
into action. Historically, the French Ministries of Health and the Interior have 
competed against one another to  handle crisis management eforts (Bergeron 
et al., 2020). Interministerial rivalry may have been seen as hindering the response 
to COVID-19. As a result, ad hoc structures  were needed to respond more nimbly.
Centralized, Multidimensional Crisis Response,  
Which Eroded Trust in Government
The crisis led to a delayed but unpre ce dented centralization of health governance. 
The pandemic response was originally led by the Ministry of Health but was then 
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shifted to the prime minister (Assemblée Nationale, 2020). The General Director-
ate of Health activated its Health Crisis Center on January 27, 2020, but failed 
to activate the 2011 Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Response plan. The prime 
minister did not activate the Interministerial Crisis Unit (placed  under the super-
vision of the Ministry of Interior)  until March  17, 2020 (Assemblée Nationale, 
2020). Consequently, this delay confined the response to COVID-19 to a strictly 
medical dimension for two months. The virus was not framed as a public health 
and multidimensional prob lem  until mid- March (Pedrot, 2020). In contrast, some 
countries de cided to give their head of state full authority in defining the national 
COVID-19 strategy early on, including Canada, Estonia, Finland, Israel, Serbia, 
and Ukraine (Greer et al., 2020).
The government’s communication strategy generated confusion among health-
care providers as well as the general population. Although the first cases of coro-
navirus  were detected in France on January 24, 2020 (Assemblée Nationale, 2020), 
the first official recommendations on hand hygiene  were issued “rather late” by 
the Ministry of Health, on March 20, 2020, according to researchers Gandre and 
Or (Gandre & Or, 2020; Ministère de la Santé, 2020). The government reversed 
its position regarding the use of face masks and testing kits on several occasions, 
resulting from the scarcity of  these resources. Deemed “unnecessary” in February, 
face masks became mandatory in all public places in Paris, Marseille, Bordeaux, 
and other major cities on August 27, 2020, as the number of new COVID-19 cases 
increased significantly (Decree of July 17, 2020). Initial quarantine and isolation 
recommendations  were also inconsistent. Travelers flying from Wuhan  were 
quarantined in closed facilities in southern France for fourteen days. Individuals 
coming from Italy, however,  were advised to self- quarantine and monitor their 
symptoms (Gandre & Or, 2020). Known cases  were initially isolated in hospi-
tals, regardless of the gravity of their symptoms. When they reached full capacity, 
COVID-19 patients  were advised to stay at home. The executive branch’s commu-
nication strategy— regarding the use of face masks, quarantine, and management 
of known cases— fluctuated over a short period of time, generating confusion 
among healthcare providers and the population. Fi nally, the state of emergency 
was not declared  until March 23, 2020, much  later than France’s neighbors (Greer 
et  al., 2020). France’s health ministry approved hydroxychloroquine for emer-
gency prescriptions on March 25, 2020, only to revoke this decree on May 27, 
2020, on the grounds that  there was no proof that it helps patients and citing data 
that showed it could pose health risks.
Physical distancing mea sures expanded gradually but also generated confu-
sion. The government banned large gatherings of more than five thousand indi-
viduals (on March 4, 2020), then of more than one thousand  people (on March 8), 
then of more than one hundred (on March  13) (Assemblée Nationale, 2020). 
Nursing homes  were closed to the public on March 11, and schools and universi-
ties closed on March 13 (Assemblée Nationale, 2020). Surprisingly, even though 
all public places except grocery stores  were closed, the government declined to 
reschedule municipal elections held on March 15. The elections do not seem to 
France’s Multidimensional COVID-19 Response  269
have intensified the spread of the disease at the national level according to a study, 
but the incongruity of this decision provoked widespread controversy (Zeitoun 
et al., 2020). Only three days  later, the government unilaterally imposed a national 
lockdown. Instead of relying on previously tested policy solutions such as quar-
antine, contact tracing, and school closures, President Macron chose to declare a 
lockdown whose socioeconomic consequences had never been modeled before, 
and which had not been planned for by the 2011 Influenza Pandemic Prepared-
ness Response plan (Bergeron et  al., 2020; Gandre & Or, 2020). All employers 
 were required to let their employees work remotely, except for essential workers. 
Individuals  were allowed to leave their homes only to get food, seek medical assis-
tance, or for short recreational activities near their place of residence (Gandre & 
Or, 2020).  Those mea sures  were enforced by police officers patrolling the streets 
and fining violators. Local authorities took additional mea sures at the regional 
level. The lockdown was supposed to come to an end on April 15 but was extended 
 until May 11 (Assemblée Nationale, 2020).
In terms of systemic health mea sures, the government launched the Plan 
blanc on March 6, 2020, but disregarded the 2011 Influenza Pandemic Prepared-
ness Response plan. The Plan blanc entailed postponing all nonurgent procedures 
in French hospitals, and creating new orga nizational mea sures to provide emer-
gency care for the influx of patients (Gandre & Or, 2020). As a result, most hos-
pitals reor ga nized their operations, expanded intensive care capacity, and created 
specialized COVID-19 units. Contrary to the 2011 plan, however, the Plan blanc 
was not designed to help healthcare professionals treat contagious patients for an 
extended period of time (Bergeron et al., 2020). Meanwhile, on March 14 the gov-
ernment enacted the ORSAN REB plan, which ended systematic COVID-19 test-
ing for symptomatic patients, prioritizing antibody tests. Between March 1 and 
June 16, France recorded approximately 29,547 deaths, 19,090 of which occurred 
in the hospital. Of  these, 10,457 occurred in assisted nursing homes (acronym 
in French, EHPAD) and other social medical establishments (Milon, 2020). The 
French government strug gled to get data on the spread of coronavirus from nurs-
ing homes.  These data  were not included in the government’s daily count  until 
April 27.
Santé Publique France created a reporting tool as a result of strong pressure 
from public opinion. Shortly  after this new reporting system was  implemented, 
it became clear that nursing homes  were major hotspots: around one- third of 
all deaths incurred by COVID-19 occurred in nursing homes. As of Septem-
ber 3, 2020, 43,000 COVID-19 cases had been reported in nursing homes (Santé 
Publique France, 2020b). A fourth of the residents (10,514) who contracted the 
disease in  these facilities  later died from it (Santé Publique France, 2020b). This 
pre sen ta tion, however, overlooked the large number of infected nursing home 
residents who had been sent to the hospital and died  there from COVID-19 com-
plications. According to Santé Publique France, as of May 7, 3,428 out of the 12,958 
individuals who died from COVID-19 in French hospitals initially contracted the 
disease in nursing homes and other medical centers (2020). Nursing homes  were 
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allowed to hire community- based physicians and nurses to increase their work-
force capacity during  these critical times (Gandre & Or, 2020).
France officially began transitioning out of the first lockdown on May 11, 2020 
(Santé Publique France, 2020a). The government imposed targeted restrictions at 
the regional or local levels during the summer. In an interview with the newspa-
per Le Monde published on July 29, the head of the parliamentary inquiry com-
mission, Eric Ciotti (a member of the right- wing opposition), stated that “public 
health mea sures have been cruelly deficient . . .  Few mea sures  were taken before 
the month of March, and the management of the crisis seemed particularly cha-
otic” (Hecketsweiler & de Royer, 2020). This statement is partially justified given 
France’s inability to limit the extent of infection and subsequent high COVID-19 
infections and mortality rates, especially among the el derly. The government, 
however, mobilized its safety net to protect its population from the financial, eco-
nomic, and social consequences of the pandemic.
Health Response Accompanied by Unparalleled Social  
and Economic Mea sures
France’s efort to provide financial relief to struggling individuals and businesses 
during the crisis was unequaled both in Eu rope and worldwide. First, most health 
expenses linked to COVID-19  were covered by the National Health Insurance 
Fund (NHIF, known as Sécurité sociale in France). Second, France’s safety net 
played a critical role in protecting the population. Several EU governments have 
taken social and economic mea sures to mitigate the efects of the crisis on their 
population and economy. The Danish government defined COVID-19 as a work- 
related injury that qualifies for government compensation (Jarman et al., 2020). 
The German Education Ministry committed to providing loans for students expe-
riencing financial difficulty  because of the pandemic. Austria strengthened social 
benefits for individuals financially afected by the crisis (around 1  percent of the 
population fell into the “risk groups” entitled to public assistance). In France, the 
government has taken unpre ce dented mea sures to help workers, vulnerable pop-
ulations, and business. The president acknowledged the “social” and “economic” 
dimensions of the crisis early on, on April 13, 2020 (Elysée, 2020b). In a subse-
quent address to the nation on June 14, President Macron committed to prevent 
layofs and help young professionals remained employed (Elysée, 2020c).
The French NHIF covered most expenses incurred for COVID-19 testing, 
treatment, and hospital stay. Most hospital costs  were reimbursed, although 
patients  were required to pay a daily rate of EUR 15 to 20, which could be covered 
by complementary health insurances. COVID-19 diagnostic tests  were charged 
EUR 54 (Gandre & Or, 2020). The NHIF covered 60  percent of the test if it was 
administered in a community- based setting and 100  percent of it was carried out 
in a hospital setting. As France transitioned out of the first lockdown in May 2020, 
COVID-19 tests became fully reimbursed,  whether carried out in hospital or 
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community- based settings (Gandre & Or, 2020). Teleconsultations  were entirely 
covered by the NHIF  until December 31, 2020 (Gandre & Or, 2020). Physicians, 
nurses, midwives, speech therapists, occupational therapists, and psychometri-
cians  were able to use teleconsultations without restrictions. The government also 
took a series of mea sures to improve access to care for vulnerable groups during 
the pandemic. They included mechanisms for mi grants to receive state medical 
assistance (Aide Médicale d’Etat) and patients with chronic conditions who ben-
efit from the long- term illness scheme (Affection Longue Durée). The NHIF also 
immediately covered expatriates who came back to France during the pandemic 
(Gandre & Or, 2020). Fi nally, the executive opened eighty- eight residential centers 
for homeless  people infected with the virus and set up a  free hotline to provide 
medical advice to homeless individuals with COVID-19 symptoms (Ministère de la 
Cohésion des Territoires, 2020).
The French government has also taken a series of proactive mea sures to sup-
port businesses and mitigate the impact of the crisis on the economy. The law 
n°2020–290 du 23 mars 2020 (loi d’urgence pour faire face à l’épidémie de Covid-19 
[Emergency law to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic]) and the law n°2020–289 du 
23 mars 2020 (loi de finances rectificative pour 2020 [Amending finance law for 
2020]) both include large- scale mea sures to support businesses.  These mea sures 
 were gradually adapted as the situation evolved. The government created a “soli-
darity fund” on March 25, 2020, to provide financial assistance to small businesses. 
As of May 27, 2020, two months  after its creation, the fund had granted more than 
EUR 3.4 billion in aid (Assemblée Nationale, 2020). The government loaned 66.46 
billion euros to more than 400,000 struggling businesses by May 12 (Assemblée 
Nationale, 2020). According to the Economic Council, responsible for advising 
the government on economic policy, the loans “put in place to support business 
liquidity have been efective” (Conseil d’Analyse Economique [CAE], 2020). The 
volume of state- guaranteed loans disbursed (EUR 105 billion by June 26) is higher 
in proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) than in the other major EU coun-
tries, with the exception of Spain. The executive also postponed the payment 
dates for social security contributions and tax withholdings for March, April, and 
May for a total amount of EUR 42 billion. Fi nally, the government granted secto-
rial aids, targeting industries that had been deeply afected by the crisis, including 
tourism, culture, construction, and air travel.  Were  these mea sures sufficient to 
prevent an economic crisis? According to the Economic Council, the executive 
took a series of “reassuring” mea sures during the lockdown (CAE, 2020). The eco-
nomic “shock” the country experienced, however, was “stronger than elsewhere.” 
The GDP decreased by 5.3  percent during the first quarter of 2020. This trend was 
comparable to what was observed in Spain and Italy, but more than double the 
2.2  percent drop in the German GDP (CAE, 2020). Early evidence suggests that 
the COVID-19 crisis  will deepen inequalities in the long term, disproportionately 
afecting young adults  under 30 (Observatoire des Inégalités, 2020).
The government’s response targeting the workforce has been structured along 
three main objectives: maintaining employment, preserving workers’ financial 
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resources, and ensuring safety for all employees— especially health profession-
als and essential workers. First, the government ensured income replacement 
for  those who could not work  because of physical distancing requirements or 
business closure (Jarman et al., 2020). This system, known as the “partial activ-
ity scheme” or “partial unemployment scheme” (dispositif d’activité partielle or 
dispositif de chômage partiel), existed before 2020. The government significantly 
expanded it on March 25, 2020, allowing employees to temporarily stop work-
ing, while retaining their jobs and receiving an income  until December 31, 2020 
(Assemblée Nationale, 2020).  Under this special job furlough scheme, employees 
on furlough received 84  percent of their net wage (100  percent for employees on 
the minimum wage). This allowance was paid by the employer but was entirely 
funded by the government and was exempt from social insurance contributions.
According to data collected by the Ministry of  Labor, this scheme benefited 
12.9 million employees and 1.04 million firms as of May  26. The equivalent of 
5.6 million hours  were paid for by the government (approximately twelve thirty- 
five- hour weeks) (Ministère du Travail, 2020). According to the Economic Coun-
cil, this job furlough scheme efectively protected French  house holds’ income. 
Although the national income fell by more than a third during the eight- week 
lockdown, individual income fell by 5   percent (CAE, 2020). In addition to the 
dispositif d’activité partielle, the government exempted from taxation overtime 
earnings for workers mobilized during the crisis. Fi nally, financial bonuses  were 
paid to health professionals, civil servants, and contractual workers employed by 
the state, local governments, and public hospitals who  were mobilized during the 
state of emergency.
Despite  these supplemental incomes, health professionals expressed their 
frustration over public hospitals’ scarce resources and deteriorating working 
conditions. As France transitioned out of the first lockdown in May  2020, the 
government convened a health consultation called Ségur de la Santé (name  after 
Ave nue de Ségur, the Pa ri sian street on which France’s health ministry is located), 
which only partially met their demands (Stromboni, 2020). Self- employed physi-
cians who experienced a significant loss of income  because of reduced activity 
during the lockdown received a financial aid from the government (Gandre & Or, 
2020). The executive branch also ofered financial bonuses aid to public hospital 
workers— regardless of their activity during the pandemic— and to profession-
als working in private hospitals that treated COVID-19 patients.  These bonuses 
ranged from EUR 500 to 1,500, depending on the number of patients their hospi-
tal treated (Gandre & Or, 2020).
Last, but not least, the government sought to protect vulnerable families 
through financial assistance and housing protection. Modest  house holds received 
an “exceptional solidarity assistance” payment of EUR 150, to which EUR 100  were 
added per dependent child. This mea sure was funded by the state and represented 
EUR 900 million (Assemblée Nationale, 2020). The government also enacted rules 
to protect tenants and prevent evictions resulting from the pandemic. France’s 
trève hivernale (“winter truce”)— during which landlords may not evict tenants for 
France’s Multidimensional COVID-19 Response  273
any reason— usually runs for five months from November 1  until March 31, but 
it was extended  until July 10. The rules instituted by the government during the 
pandemic also prevented landlords and providers from cutting of gas, heat, and 
 electricity to tenants during this period. Fi nally, students and young professionals 
 under twenty- five who  were laid of during the pandemic received EUR 200 from 
the government. Maintaining emergency public health actions such as a national 
lockdown required social and economic policies that ensured widespread compli-
ance with governmental mea sures. France’s safety net and emergency mea sures 
helped mitigate the social and economic consequences of the crisis on the pop-
ulation. The long- term consequences of the crisis, however,  will require  future 
studies to be fully understood. Evidence so far suggests that the crisis  will have 
a dramatic and long- lasting socioeconomic impact on France’s most vulnerable 
populations, including young adults (Observatoire des Inégalités, 2020).
Insufficiencies and Contradictions of French Public Health Agencies 
Revealed by the Crisis
Relegated to missions of epidemiological surveillance and logistical organ ization, 
Santé Publique France did not play a strategic role during the first months of the 
crisis.  Under Article L.1413-1 of the Code of Public Health, SPF is charged with 
monitoring health conditions in France, and with alerting public authorities “in 
order to aide decision” (optique d’aide à la décision) (Che et al., 2016). But to the 
extent that SPF was mobilized during the COVID-19 crisis starting on January 10, 
2020, it was in a strictly operational and nonstrategic capacity. The missions it 
was given by the executive branch, although within its capacities, did not exhaust 
them. For example, SPF was instructed to mobilize one thousand volunteer health 
professionals as part of a health reserve. Through a decree on March 30, 2020, 
it was given an emergency bud get of EUR 4 billion to finance the acquisition of 
masks, ventilators, and medicines to replenish France’s depleted supplies (Assem-
blée Nationale, 2020). In findings released in February 2020, the Institut Pasteur 
accurately modeled French hospitals’ growing inability to treat COVID-19, but the 
government disregarded  these findings (Bergeron et al., 2020). The Haut Conseil de 
la Santé Publique (HCSP)— whose mission is to provide counsel to elected author-
ities on emerging health prob lems— saw a similar fate (Pedrot, 2020). Although 
the  HCSP did formulate a number of proposals on subjects including at- risk 
patient care or the use of hydroxychloroquine (Assemblée Nationale, 2020), it 
never became a privileged interlocutor of the government (Pedrot, 2020). SPF 
nonetheless oversaw numerous surveillance eforts, despite finding itself over-
whelmed by the task at hand. SPF’s Data Division was understafed at the onset 
of the crisis, relying on only fifty data analysts. Between January and mid- March, 
SPF was unable to share information with Regional Health Agencies and public 
hospitals. Its indicators mapped out the spread of the virus at the national level only 
and  were described as “shallow” by the prime minister himself (Hecketsweiler & 
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de Royer, 2020). Beginning on March 19, 2020, SPF created a mechanism of epi-
demiological surveillance for cases of severe infections of COVID-19  in inten-
sive care. And on March 31, 2020, it designed a similar surveillance system for 
COVID-19 cases in nursing homes (Assemblée Nationale, 2020). Based on  these 
surveillance eforts, SPF published weekly epidemiological bulletins on its web-
site. Additionally, it established a weekly publication of scientific articles on the 
coronavirus (Pedrot, 2020).
According to its mandate  under Article L.1413-1 of the code of public health, 
one of SPF’s core missions is to “prepare and respond to health threats, alerts, 
and crises.” It is therefore supposed to play a role beyond epidemiological surveil-
lance and logistical organ ization. By law, SPF’s role  ought to include developing 
and implementing strategies to contain health crises. But this strategic function 
was largely delegated to two scientific committees created at the request of Presi-
dent Macron, which he relied on to provide expert legitimacy for his po liti cal 
decisions. Some of  these decisions proved controversial among experts and the 
general public.
The response to COVID-19 was led by the French government, with the sup-
port of two scientific committees set up on March 12 and March 24, 2020 (Assem-
blée Nationale, 2020). The president also relied on a defense and national secu-
rity council to  handle the pandemic. This council existed before the crisis but 
was designed to manage issues pertaining to wars and domestic or international 
conflicts only. The council gained significance over the summer and became the 
main deciding body on questions related to physical distancing and other restric-
tive mea sures. The first scientific committee was composed of twelve scientists, 
including medical experts, a sociologist, and an anthropologist (Assemblée Natio-
nale, 2020). It was initially created to provide guidance on questions related to 
treatment and testing, but it  later saw its mandate expand to include recommen-
dations on all questions related to the pandemic. A second scientific committee, 
known as the CARE (Committee for Analy sis, Research, and Expertise) was set 
up to make recommendations on therapeutic options for COVID-19 patients 
(Assemblée Nationale, 2020).  These committees  were mostly made up of medical 
doctors, thus giving greater weight to clinical judgments than public health rea-
soning in the decision- making pro cess. Public health officials and social scientists 
 were sidelined by biomedical expertise, however much clinical medicine and life 
sciences research might be ill- adapted to population- level prob lems (Rozenblum 
et al., 2020). Between March 12 and May 18, 2020, the first council made thirteen 
recommendations. A number of  these  were  adopted by the government in relation 
to po liti cally sensitive actions. Notably, the committee recommended, in its first 
opinion on March 12, putting in place “barrier gestures” (gestes barrière) to ensure 
social distancing. Its second opinion on March 14 detailed par tic u lar mea sures to 
conduct the March municipal elections. The third opinion on March 16 outlined 
the terms of the nationwide lockdown, and its fourth opinion on April 2 specified 
the conditions  under which the lockdown could be lifted. President Macron spe-
cifically invoked the committees’ decisions to justify controversial decisions such 
as the holding of municipal elections. However, in other instances, such as the 
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opening of schools or the end of the lockdown, the government did not follow the 
scientific committees’ opinions. The first scientific council also proposed creating 
a liaison committee with the public and called for more systematic public engage-
ment with the scientific community.  These latter proposals  were not  adopted by 
the government.
The creation of two ad hoc scientific committees was surprising in several 
re spects. The executive branch could have mobilized France’s existing  public 
health agencies to create a strategy to contain the virus. In its first report regard-
ing the government’s response to COVID-19, the parliamentary mission high-
lighted the “unpre ce dented” nature of the pandemic to justify the creation of 
two scientific committees (Assemblée Nationale, 2020). The novelty of the  crisis 
does not, however, fully explain why “one of the densest public health networks 
in Eu rope” was underutilized by the government when it was needed the most. 
In a recent interview, the sociologist Daniel Benamouzig, one of the two social 
scientists on the first committee, explained that “the role of the scientific coun-
cil was to guide public action by identifying the major aspects of a strategy 
against the epidemic. The scientific counsel had no operational responsibility” 
(Guénard & Naudet, 2020). Benamouzig continued, “The aim [of the scientific 
council] was less to set specific results than to evaluate the extent to which new 
findings— provided they  were true and authenticated— could allow us to envi-
sion new instruments for efective public action to define strategies to reduce 
risk” (Guénard & Naudet, 2020). This approach is not unique to France. Several 
countries created ad hoc expert groups tasked with reviewing scientific evidence 
and communicating advice on appropriate health system mea sures to the gov-
ernment and the public. Examples include Belgium, Canada, Estonia, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain, which established new expert 
advisory groups to bring scientific evidence into policy responses to COVID-19 
(Williams et al., 2020).
The scientific councils  were not subordinate to public powers (Benamouzig, 
2020; Delfraissy, 2020). A number of their opinions  were nonetheless published 
 later by the government (Benamouzig, 2020; Delfraissy, 2020). It is worth noting 
that SPF and the HCSP  were invited by the scientific council to attend meet-
ings as “permanent observers,” without actually participating (Delfraissy, 2020). 
As Benamouzig said, “As I see it, one of the strengths of the scientific council 
was the construction of broad orientations, what we might call ‘pandemic think-
ing,’ shared by all” (2020). The purpose of the scientific councils was to provide a 
strategic approach ordinarily reserved for the public health agencies, whose roles 
 were reduced to logistical and operational  matters.
Conclusion
The French response to the coronavirus crisis is instructive. Widely judged as 
“tardy” and “chaotic” by observers (Delfraissy, 2020; Pedrot, 2020), it was none-
theless distinct from that of neighboring countries. Despite the country’s robust 
276  Coronavirus Politics
public health infrastructure, the government chose to create ad hoc bodies to 
define a public health strategy. If France reacted relatively late to the public health 
threat in mid- March— thereby losing time to acquire key protective equipment 
and tests— the government’s socioeconomic strategy allowed it efectively to 
reduce the impact of the crisis on its population (CAE, 2020). But despite having 
a robust arsenal in the field of “health security” and numerous pre- existing public 
health agencies, the government found it necessary to create two ad hoc scientific 
committees to advise the executive and draft a strategy to confront the pandemic. 
No  matter how consolidated, the French public health profession and institutions 
did not seem to enjoy a mono poly of advice or action—as in the United States with 
both the politicization and the marginalization of the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Rozenblum et al., in press).
The experience of  these committees calls into question  either the efective-
ness of the pre- existing public health institutions or their place within the hierar-
chical structure of the state. As mentioned in the introduction, the sidelining of 
France’s public health agencies might be attributable to the government’s desire 
and inability to control  these institutions. The  executive branch may have also 
wanted to claim credit for its public health strategy, which it cannot do if it leaves 
control in the hands of external and in de pen dent public health actors. Another 
plausible explanation may be that the president wanted to create flexible scientific 
taskforces unconstrained by administrative rules (and therefore able to advise him 
quickly and proactively). Although  these hypotheses deserve further investiga-
tion, our preliminary research suggests that the French government wanted to 
both control the production of public health norms and prompt their dissemina-
tion within the French population. This was made pos si ble by the government’s 
ability to concentrate powers during the state of emergency.
COVID-19 therefore shed light on the limits of the public health profession and 
institutions, which did not control its own key instruments, nor did it appear to be 
a legitimate and sufficient source of production of public health norms and recom-
mendations (Rozenblum et al., 2020). In summary, the French case provides two 
key insights: a multidimensional health and socioeconomic response allowed the 
government to protect the population from the worst efects of the coronavirus in 
the short term; but at the same time, its public health agencies  were revealed to be 
insufficient, if not inadequate, sources of strategic guidance in the face of a major 
public health crisis.
References
Assemblée Nationale. (2020, June 3). Rapport d’information sur l’impact, la gestion et 
les conséquences dans toutes ses dimensions de l’épidémie de Coronavirus- Covid-19 
[Information report on the impact, management and consequences in all its dimen-
sions of the Coronavirus- Covid-19 pandemic].
Béguin, F. (2020, January 14). Crise de l’hôpital public: 1 200 médecins hospitaliers 
démissionnent de leur fonction d’encadrement [Public hospital crisis: 1,200 hospital 
healthcare professionals resign from their supervisory role]. Le Monde.
France’s Multidimensional COVID-19 Response  277
Bergeron, H., & Borraz, O. (2020, March 31). Covid-19: Impréparation et crise de l’Etat 
[Covid-19: Unpreparedness and state crisis]. AOC.
Bergeron, H., Borraz, O., Castel, P., & Dedieu F. (2020). Covid-19: Une crise organisation-
nelle [Covid-19: An orga nizational crisis]. Presses de Sciences Po.
Bergeron, H., & Nathanson, C. (2012, February). Construction of a policy arena: The case 
of public health in France. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 37, 1.
Bergeron, H., & Nathanson, C. (2017). Crise and changes: The making of the French FDA. 
The Milbrank Quarterly, 95(3), 634–675.
Bernard Stoecklin, S., Rolland, P., Silue, Y., Mailles, A., Campese, C., Simondon, A., 
Mechain, M., Meurice, L., Nguyen, M., Bassi, C., Yamani, E., Behili, S., Ismael, S., 
Nguyen, D., Malvy, D., Lescure, F- X., Georges, S., Lazarus, C., Tabaï, A., . . .  Stempfelet, M. 
(2020). First cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in France: surveillance, 
investigations and control mea sures, January 2020. Euro Surveillance, 25(6).
Che, D., Barret, A- S., & Desenclos, J- C. (2016). Maladies infectieuses émergentes [Emerg-
ing infectious diseases]. In Traité de Santé publique (3rd ed.). Lavoisier Médecine 
Sciences.
Conseil d’Analyse Economique (CAE), Martin, P., Pisani- Ferry, J., and Ragot, X. (2020, 
July). Note du CAE n°57. “Une stratégie économique face à la crise” [An economic 
strategy against the crisis].
Conseil Scientifique COVID-19 [COVID-19 scientific council]. (2020, March 12). Avis 
du Conseil scientifique COVID-19–12 mars 2020 [Recommendation of the scientific 
council of March 12, 2020].
Conseil Scientifique COVID-19 [COVID-19 scientific council]. (2020, March 14). Avis 
du Conseil scientifique COVID-19–14 mars 2020 [Recommendation of the scientific 
council of March 14, 2020].
Conseil Scientifique COVID-19 [COVID-19 scientific council]. (2020, March 16). Avis 
du Conseil scientifique COVID-19–16 mars 2020 [Recommendation of the scientific 
council of March 16, 2020].
Conseil Scientifique COVID-19 [COVID-19 scientific council]. (2020, April 2). Avis du 
Conseil scientifique COVID-29–2 avril 2020 [Recommendation of the scientific 
council of April 2, 2020].
Davet, G., & Lhomme, F. (2020, May 5). La France et les épidémies: 2010–2011, le change-
ment de doctrine. [France and epidemics: 2010-2011, the change in doctrine]. Le Monde.
Décret n°2020–884 du 17 juillet 2020 modifiant le décret n°2020–860 du 10 juillet 2020 
prescrivant les mesures générales nécessaires pour faire face à l’épidémie de covid-19 
dans les territoires sortis de l’état d’urgence sanitaire et dans ceux où il a été prorogé 
[Decree n ° 2020–884 of July 17, 2020 modifying decree n ° 2020–860 of July 10, 2020 
prescribing the general mea sures necessary to deal with the epidemic of covid-19 in 
the territories emerging from the state of health emergency and in  those where it has 
been extended].
Delfraissy, J- F. (2020, June 18). Président du Conseil scientifique Covid-19. Audition devant 
la Mission d’information parlementaire [Chairman of the Covid-19 scientific council. 
Hearing before the parliamentary information Mission]. Assemblée Nationale.
Elysée. (2020a, March 16). Adresse aux Français du Président de la République Emmanuel 
Macron [Address to the French nation].
Elysée. (2020b, June 13). Adresse aux Français du Président de la République Emmanuel 
Macron [Address to the French nation].
278  Coronavirus Politics
Elysée. (2020c, June 14). Adresse au Français du Président de la République Emmanuel 
Macron [Address to the French nation].
Gandre, C., & Or, Z. (2020). France. COVID-19 Health System Response Monitor. Eu ro-
pean Observatory for Health Systems and Policies.
Greer, S., Jarman, H., Rozenblum, S., & Wismar, M. (2020). Who is in charge and why? 
Centralization within and between governments. Eurohealth, 26(2).
Guénard, F., & Naudet, J. (2020, July 1). Covid-19 et expertise sanitaire— Entretien avec 
Daniel Benamouzig [Covid-19 and health expertise— Interview with Daniel Benam-
ouzig]. La Vie des Idées.
Hecketsweiler, C., & de Royer, e- S. (2020, July 29). Eric Ciotti: “Notre système de santé a 
bel et bien été débordé’ par le coronavirus” [Eric Ciotti: “Our healthcare system has 
indeed been overwhelmed” by the coronavirus]. Le Monde.
Jarman, H., & Rozenblum, S., & Greer, S. (2020, May 11). What US states can learn from 
Covid-19 transition planning in Eu rope. The Conversation.
Jarman, H., Rozenblum, S., Greer, S., & Wismar, M. (2020, May 7). What do govern-
ments need to consider as they implement transition plans? Eu ro pean Observatory 
on Health Systems and Policies. Covid-19 Health System Response Monitor. https:// 
analysis . covid19healthsystem . org / index . php / 2020 / 05 / 07 / what - do - governments - need 
- to - consider - as - they - implement - transition - plans/
Milon, A. (2020, June 24). Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires sociales  
sur la proposition de résolution tendant à créer une commission d’enquête pour 
l’évaluation des politiques publiques face aux grandes pandémies à la lumière de la 
crise sanitaire de la covid-19 et de sa gestion. [Report written on behalf of the Social 
Afairs Committee on the motion for a resolution to create a committee of inquiry to 
assess public policies in the face of major pandemics in the light of the Covid-19 crisis 
and its management]. Social Afairs Committee, Sénat.
Ministère de la Cohésion des Territoires et des Relations avec les Collectivités Ter-
ritoriales [Territory Ministry]. (2020, April 23). COVID-19: Hébergement d’urgence 
[COVID-19: Emergency Accommodation] [Press release].
Ministère de la Santé [Health Ministry]. (2020, May 20). COVID-19: Comment faire un 
lavage de mains efficace? [Covid-19: How to wash your hands efectively?], Vidéo.
Ministère du Travail [Ministry of  Labor]. (2020, May 27). DARES. Situation sur le marché 
du travail au 26 mai 2020 [Situation of the  labor market as of May 26, 2020].
Nossiter, A. (2020, June 5). Macron beat back the coronavirus. France is not impressed. 
The New York Times. https:// www . nytimes . com / 2020 / 06 / 05 / world / europe 
/ coronavirus - france - macron - reopening . html
Observatoire des Inégalités [Observatory for Inequalities]. (2020). Rapport sur la pau-
vreté en France [Report on poverty in France].
Odoxa. (2020, April). Baromètre politique pour CGI, la presse régionale, France Inter et 
l’Express [Po liti cal barometer for CGI, regional press, France Inter and Express].
Pedrot, F. (2020, July 20). Covid-19: Les alertes ignorées de la veille sanitaire [Covid-19: 
Alerts ignored by the health surveillance system]. AOC.
Perera, I., & Tarrow, S. (2020, August 26). What Amer i ca got wrong about COVID-19 and 
what we can learn from France and Italy. Public Seminar.
Rouquet, A. (2020, May 5). La tragédie industrielle et logistique des masques: Récit en 
cinq actes [The industrial and logistical tragedy of masks: A story in five acts]. The 
Conversation.
France’s Multidimensional COVID-19 Response  279
Rozenblum, S. (in press). The French public health system. In S. Greer & M. Mäzke (Eds.), 
Comparative Public Health Politics.
Rozenblum, S., Greer, S., & Jarman, H. (2020, May 20). Coronavirus: “Les stratégies de 
déconfinement sont pour l’essentiel graduelles, reversible et régionalisées, comme en 
France ou en Espagne” [Coronavirus: “The transition strategies are for the most part 
gradual, reversible and regionalized, as in France or Spain”]. Le Monde.
Rozenblum, S., Greer, S., & Jarman, H. (2020). Quo Vadis? Under- performance of public 
health in France and the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic. Manuscript 
submitted for publication.
Santé Publique France. (2020a, June 30). Recensement national des cas de COVID-19 
chez les professionnels en établissements de santé [National census of COVID-19 
cases among professionals in healthcare settings]. Études et enquêtes.
Santé Publique France. (2020b, July 30). Covid-19: point épidémiologique du 30 juillet 
2020. [Covid-19 : Briefing on Covid-19 statistics].
Stromboni, C. (2020, July 14). L’hôpital va continuer à se casser la figure: Après les 
accords du Ségur, des soignants de nouveau dans la rue [The hospital  will continue to 
fall apart:  After the Ségur agreements, caregivers are back in the street]. Le Monde.
Tabuteau, D. (2002). La sécurité sanitaire [Health security]. (2nd ed.). Berger, Levrault.
Tabuteau, D. (2007, Autumn). La sécurité sanitaire, réforme institutionnelle ou résur-
gence des politiques de santé? [Health security, institutional reform or resurgence of 
health policies?]. Les Tribunes de la Santé, SEVE, 16.
Tabuteau, D. (2016). Principes et organisation de la sécurité sanitaire [Princi ples and 
organ ization of health security]. In Traité de Santé publique (3rd ed.). Lavoisier 
Médecine Sciences.
Williams, G., Ulla Diaz S., Figueras J., & Lessof, S. (2020). Translating evidence into policy 
during the Covid-19 pandemic: Bridging science and policy (and politics), Eurohealth, 
26(2).
Zeitoun, J- D., Faron, M., Manternach, S., Fourquet, J., Lavielle, M., & Lefèvre, J. (2020, 
May 19). Reciprocal association between participation to a national election and the 
epidemic spread of COVID-19 in France: Nationwide observational and dynamic 
modeling study. MedRxiv.
 16 Po liti cal resonance in aUstria’s 
coronavirUs crisis ManageMent
Margitta Mätzke
Po liti cal Feasibility and Compliance in Austria’s  
COVID-19 Response
Austria shares some of the disintegration tendencies in electoral alignments and 
party systems that trou ble many representative democracies and put po liti cal insti-
tutions  under strain. The country has seen both  grand co ali tions, with enormous 
need for interest mediation, producing sluggish decision procedures, and po liti cal 
constellations prone to reform gridlock and hardly qualified for swift action and 
resolute crisis management (Bröchler, 2014).  Every so often, though, the country’s 
electorate and po liti cal system are capable of empowering uncommon govern-
ment co ali tions, allowing for right- wing populist participation in central govern-
ment, a po liti cal leadership team of extremely young  people, or most recently an 
entirely novel partisan alliance in government. Such was the situation when the 
coronavirus reached Eu rope in February 2020. The national government had been 
in office for less than fifty days. It was a new government co ali tion of Christian 
Demo crats and the Green party, keen on proving itself capable of governing  after 
a period of  great po liti cal turmoil. A lot of damage previously had been done to 
Austria’s po liti cal institutions by its right- wing government pre de ces sors.
Against this backdrop it came as a surprise to many observers of Austrian 
coronavirus policies that the country’s initial crisis response was so swift and 
efective (Czypionka, 2020; Hofmarcher- Holzhacker, 2020). Austrian authorities 
had gotten of to a bad start  handling COVID-19, when they did not even attempt 
to contain the spread of the disease in an early cluster in one of the country’s ski 
resorts in late February 2020 (Fleischhacker, 2020; Lehermayr & Reinhart, 2020, 
p. 33). Subsequently, though, and possibly  under a lot of international pressure 
from the many Eu ro pean countries where COVID-19 was brought home from 
Tyrolean vacations, a strategy for fighting COVID-19 was devised promptly and 
available resources coordinated efectively. The Austrian federal government also 
put  great efort into a po liti cal communication campaign, presenting the contain-
ment mea sures as good common sense and the generally agreed- upon course of 
action, with  little by way of vis i ble public controversy or discord among expert 
advisors and participants in decision- making.
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The strategy succeeded in that compliance was generally high, even in the 
face of severe infringements on civil liberties and private property rights, and the 
spread of the disease could be controlled efectively. “One week  after the intro-
duction of strict mea sures, the number of daily new cases began to decline, while 
the reproduction number had already dropped immediately  after the mea sures 
 were implemented” (Heger & Moshammer, 2020). The number of coronavirus 
deaths remained very low and did not start to rise again  until late June 2020, and 
at no time was the health system even close to being overwhelmed by the number 
of coronavirus patients in need of hospital care or intensive care.
As undisputed as entering the lockdown was, decisions on when and how to 
start exiting it and cushioning its economic and social repercussions  were much 
more controversial, as was the right course of action in the second wave of the 
disease in the fall of 2020. It was at  these subsequent stages that the Austrian 
federal government has been subject to increasing criticism. The timing of the 
exit from lockdown, distortions in the sequence of loosening the contact limita-
tions (Sprenger, 2020; Wetz, 2020), and inequalities in the coronavirus aid mea-
sures  were the center of critical commentary. Some of the decisions on what kind 
of business may reopen and what other stores have to remain closed  were even 
declared unconstitutional by the constitutional court. Furthermore, increasing 
numbers of observers and parliamentarians found the following inappropriate, 
if not indicating illegitimate amounts of executive dominance: the federal gov-
ernment’s inclination to make unilateral decisions with not much explanation 
nor opportunity to discuss the course of action taken and a somewhat overpro-
fessional public relations strategy, with which the federal government sought to 
uphold compliance and bolster its image as heroic crisis man ag ers (Ehs, 2020).
As this chapter demonstrates, Austria’s success at imposing contact restrictions 
swiftly and efectively and some of the controversial aspects of the decisions about 
exit strategies and coronavirus aid programs are two sides of the same coin. The 
inequalities in the burdens of crisis that dif er ent groups in society have to bear are 
in no way unexpected; they are all- too- familiar in the context of the conservatism 
of Austria’s social protection system and po liti cal culture. At the same time, the 
relative ease with which the Austrian government could decide and implement the 
early lockdown likewise hinged on Austria’s well- oiled po liti cal and administrative 
machinery. No country was fully prepared for the pandemic, and Austria was no 
exception. As in many other countries, po liti cal and administrative elites scrambled 
for a  viable strategy to fight the disease, learn about its epidemiology, collect infor-
mation on their healthcare capacities, boost their testing facilities, and get hold of 
protective gear and distribute it among healthcare providers. But they scrambled 
more successfully than elsewhere and got a grip on the disease’s first wave.
This chapter argues that this success— the relative ease of finding a  viable 
mode of operation for early crisis management— has been greatly helped along 
by initial cooperative and power- sharing institutions and be hav iors, key proce-
dural traits of consensus democracy (Crepaz & Lijphart, 1995; Lijphart, 1999). The 
multilateralism typical of that form of po liti cal organ ization makes po liti cal and 
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administrative actors, even potential veto players, bent on collaboration, and it 
makes them skilled at it. Moreover, consensus democracy’s structured inclusive-
ness produces the social capital (Bartscher et al., 2020) on which broad and reli-
able acquiescence in the broader society hinges.
Two aspects of policy are of  great help if a po liti cal response to an epidemic 
is to be successful. One is po liti cal feasibility: Governments must be able to enact 
policies in the first place, and they must also be able to get policies implemented 
in public health bureaucracies that are decentralized in almost  every country. The 
other impor tant property of containment strategies is compliance. Compliance 
depends on many  factors: a developed system of social protection, trust in gov-
ernment, and some basic accord about crisis management among po liti cal elites. 
In situations of  great uncertainty, though, feasibility and compliance do not hinge 
merely on actors’ motivation.  There is also a cognitive ele ment to po liti cal feasi-
bility and compliance, which benefits from decision- making procedures and sub-
stantive policies that are not completely arbitrary and alien. Po liti cal feasibility 
and compliance are a  great deal more likely where policies and procedures are 
predictable to some extent and po liti cally resonant in impor tant re spects.
Po liti cal resonance is critical; both the advantages and the flaws of Austrian po liti-
cal institutions reproduce themselves in a crisis. Although of course highly excep-
tional in the extent and type of state intervention, the Austrian COVID-19 policies 
enacted in the second quarter of 2020 are not unfamiliar. In part precisely  because 
of the unequal burdens they impose, they relate to established ways of organ izing 
politics and society in Austria. For example, an impor tant institution of Austrian 
consensus democracy, social partnership, made a significant contribution to over-
coming the previous (economic) crisis of 2008 and 2009 (Eichhorst & Weißhaupt, 
2013). Social partners  were habitually consulted when it came to implementing the 
same type of  labor market policy mea sures in 2020. Therefore, to some extent, crisis 
management is po liti cally resonant to the extent that it draws on old ideas about 
policy mea sures and modes of po liti cal decision- making (Mätzke & Ostner, 2010). 
Substantively the old ideas ingrained in some of the coronavirus policies drew on 
core norms of Austria’s conservative welfare state. Procedurally they partially took 
advantage of central traits of the country’s famed consensus democracy, but they 
also assumed tendencies in the development of po liti cal institutions and be hav iors— 
some of them problematic ones— that had been underway before the crisis.
Fighting the Spread of COVID-19: Largely Effective  
“Reasons Remain Opaque”1
The most salient aspect of Austria’s public health mea sures is the relative ease with 
which the Austrian federal government could make and implement a U- turn from 
its passive stance in February 2020  toward a resolute and invasive course of action 
in the second week of March 2020. This was unexpected from a brand- new govern-
ment co ali tion of two parties that had never formed a federal government together. 
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This new government had taken over bureaucracies that  were still busy pro cessing 
a lot of orga nizational dislocation caused by the preceding government’s attempts 
at consolidating its power in the country’s public administration. Observers of 
Austrian politics in the country and abroad would not have trusted the country to 
pull that of and manage the emergency situation so efectively,  because they usu-
ally complain about fragmentation of the country’s healthcare system (Aiginger, 
2011; Mätzke & Stöger, 2015; Meggeneder, 2004), poorly developed public health 
capacity (Sprenger, 2020), and a po liti cal system not set up for quick and efective 
decision- making (Bröchler, 2014). Relative to the country- specific course of the 
disease, the Austrian response came very early. Austria was among the first Eu ro-
pean countries to impose a lockdown and among the first who could start lifting 
contact restrictions again.
The Austrian COVID-19 response started with recommendations concern-
ing hand hygiene and physical distancing, the latter of which quickly turned into 
mandatory mea sures (Neubauer & Schnidt, 2020). 2 From the beginning the 
federal government assumed the leading role, with regional and district govern-
ments in charge of implementation. Parliament enacted a comprehensive package 
of lockdown mea sures on March 15, 2020, which took efect March 16. This first 
COVID-19 act empowered the federal health ministry to decree emergency mea-
sures. Apart from select regions,  there was no complete curfew in Austria, and 
every one was allowed to leave their homes for working, buying essential food 
supplies, and helping  others. Also permitted was  going out to get some fresh air 
or walking the dog, as long as physical contact with other  people was avoided 
and distancing rules  were followed. Less invasive than in some of the Eu ro pean 
neighbors, the Austrian lockdown remained in place for a long time, roughly 
seven weeks (Hofer et al., 2020). Stores began to reopen in mid- April 2020 and 
schools in mid- May  2020, but it all happened very slowly with setbacks and a 
timing and sequencing that many, including the constitutional court, did not fully 
understand. As of April  6, 2020, wearing face masks in public (indoor) places 
became mandatory. The lockdown was accompanied by an extensive health edu-
cation campaign, with many televised spots, which the relevant federal ministry 
had developed in collaboration with the Red Cross Austria.
Social distancing became easier to implement as summer progressed and 
many activities could take place outside. As vacation times arrived, the challenges 
of home schooling and home office faded from the center of attention to some 
extent. It was then, in late June and July 2020, that new infections started to spread 
again, and a number of new hotspots of the disease emerged across the country. 
To prevent a second lockdown from becoming necessary, much efort was put 
into better fine- tuning of distancing mea sures and only imposing local or district- 
level contact restrictions. For this purpose, a system of district- level traffic- light 
coding, based on the number of positive tested cases per 10,000 inhabitants, was 
implemented (Complexity Science Hub Vienna, 2020).
Capacities and procedures  were developed for monitoring the spread of the 
disease, tracing individual infection chains, and monitoring home quarantine. 
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Test capacities  were expanded from just a few hundred  toward a target of 15,000 
tests per day, to be carried out in a decentralized structure of forty laboratories 
across the country. Likewise, a system for taking stock of the country’s extensive 
hospital sector and overall medical and nursing workforce was devised, to get a 
sense of the resources available. As a result, it became clear as early as in the end 
of March 2020 that  there was no danger at any time that the number of COVID-19 
cases would overwhelm the capacity of the Austrian healthcare system.
By and large the Austrian range of interventions is consistent with the activi-
ties of many other countries, with the one qualification that Austria can draw on 
one of the most extensive welfare states and healthcare systems worldwide, with 
per capita healthcare resources (especially hospital care) among the strongest in 
the world. This made crisis  handling easier. Some felt the crisis policies and their 
implementation  were less than perfectly or ga nized, but it would be an exaggera-
tion to call crisis management chaotic (Tóth, 2020).  There is no evidence that it 
was dramatically less competent than elsewhere; the opposite is true. However, 
it is admittedly somewhat odd that, in a moment of national emergency, a non- 
governmental organ ization (NGO), the Red Cross Austria, played such a central 
role in organ izing the procurement and distribution of protective gear, developing 
the federal government’s information campaign, and programming the country’s 
coronavirus warning application.
In princi ple, though, it is not alien to Austrian policy implementation that a 
social welfare association such as the Red Cross is involved in the implementation 
and logistics of public policies. Cooperative policy implementation is the estab-
lished mode of problem- solving in Austria. It is po liti cally resonant and allows for 
efective po liti cal responses even where administrative capacity is not particularly 
strong. Although Austria has an extensive healthcare system, the country does 
not have much by way of public health capacity.  There are few universities that 
ofer public health training, few  people who would describe themselves as public 
health experts (as opposed to medical professionals), and organ izations in charge 
of public health that range far below institutions such as the German Robert Koch 
Institute or the American Centers for Disease Control when it comes to public 
visibility and presence in the mass media. Public health tasks are folded into the 
organ izations of the healthcare system:  there are few organ izations exclusively in 
charge of public health. This is a long- standing condition of health care in Austria 
and has extensively been bemoaned by observers and academics keen on hav-
ing an American- style, autonomous, and highly vis i ble public health agency, sur-
rounded by prestigious research universities specialized on public health. This 
does not exist, and not much specialized public health nor epidemiological exper-
tise is available in Austria (Sprenger, 2020, p. pos. 1682), which has consequences 
for the kind of expert advice that a government can obtain in Austria (Redl, 2020). 
Indeed, it is primarily medical or mathematical model- building expertise that the 
Austrian federal government draws on as sources of information about the spread 
of the disease. This may be less than optimal conceptually, but when it came to 
the practice of public health intervention, this practice in fact did not hinder the 
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adequate response to COVID-19. In the very beginning even the federal health 
ministry found itself in a vulnerable position (Fleischhacker, 2020, pp.  46–49), 
 because it had recently under gone major reor ga ni za tion: the minister had been 
in office for no more than ten weeks when the public health crisis started. The 
ministry’s council of expert advisors, “the National Sanitary Council, whose term 
had expired on 31 December 2019, had not been re- established. The position of 
the National General Director for Public Health had been removed by a previous 
government and never been reinstalled and the country’s pandemic plan dated 
back to the emergence of H5N1 and H1N1 and focused on influenza” (Müller, 
2020, p. 353).
But this highlights precisely the point:  there is an impor tant role for po liti-
cal institutions and po liti cal culture. In a polarized po liti cal system with intense 
po liti cal competition, this orga nizational weakness of public health might have 
been the  recipe for failure, but not so in the po liti cal environment of consen-
sus democracy. That environment is nonconfrontational, and its power- sharing 
arrangements allowed the federal government to (re-)organize and consolidate 
state capacity as the situation evolved. Public health capacity is scattered across 
Austria’s large health system, welfare state, and public administration. Folded into 
primary care, forming part of regional bureaucracies or local public administra-
tion,  there is  little room for maneuver for defining an explicit population perspec-
tive and a distinctive public health agenda, but it is certainly suitable for imple-
menting the federal government’s emergency mea sures.
So it was the classical setup of consensus democracy that ensured the efective 
crisis response: the social partners  were consulted habitually. They  were involved 
in the implementation of some of the policies, and they advised employers and 
employees about the labor- law and  labor market policy aspects of crisis man-
agement. Most impor tant, they contributed to unfussy policy implementation, 
 because their consent helped secure their members’ acquiescence, one of the 
classical roles of corporatist social partner participation in policy- making (Cam-
eron, 1984). A second key veto player of consensus democracy, the constitutional 
court, is also intact; it began its task of quality- monitoring legislation some time 
 after it was enacted. As a result of time pressure and high workloads of the min-
isterial bureaucracy, decrees and legislation had a number of loose ends. On 
July 14, 2020, the Austrian constitutional court declared unconstitutional some 
of the restrictions concerning citizens’ entering public space and concerning the 
selectivity in the regulations on what retail businesses  were allowed to reopen 
first (Verfassungsgerichtshof Österreich, 2020). As of this writing, both policies 
are no longer in efect, though, and the question of what to do with penalties for 
violating  these restrictions is still subject to discussion (e.g., Should  there be a 
general amnesty?).
Fi nally, Austrian federalism and administrative decentralization play an impor-
tant role in public health policy, in that the regional governments, districts, and 
municipalities are in charge of implementing most of what is de cided in Vienna 
(e.g., providing hospital facilities, enforcing contact restrictions and quarantine, 
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or actually performing large parts of the testing). This indirect federal adminis-
tration has produced some variation in policy implementation. Some districts in 
Tyrol, where the spread of the disease was most dramatic, imposed strict curfews, 
whereas in the rest of the country  people  were allowed to leave their homes. A 
greater source of annoyance was uneven enforcement of the federal social dis-
tancing decrees or incomprehensible decisions about closures of public places. 
The Viennese could visit their city parks at all times, but they could not go to 
Schönbrunn or Augarten,  because  those  were federal parks. Small- scale bicker-
ing occurred, which sparked some criticism, but it would be an exaggeration to 
call this orga nizational dysfunction. Regional variation is a feature of coronavi-
rus policies in many countries, and by and large decentralized implementation of 
the federal degrees worked, so that overall Austria’s “cooperative federalism has 
passed its test in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic” (Bußjäger, 2020).
Even though the coronavirus epidemic is an emergency situation, in which the 
main po liti cal responsibility rests with the federal government, the policy challenges 
 were addressed in power- sharing arrangements, in which cooperation was pos si ble 
across vari ous orga nizational and territorial bound aries. Collaboration did not even 
require  great efort. It was not mentioned in the media; most actors involved in it 
hardly considered it consciously: it was simply the most plausible course of action. 
This is po liti cal resonance, and this made the stark mea sures in the beginning of 
crisis management po liti cally feasible. It allowed a young government, less than a 
quarter- year in office, to deliver their journeyman’s piece with a set of public health 
policies enacted at the right moment, efectively, and more or less efficiently.
Collateral Damage of Lockdown and the Social Policies  
of the Conservative Welfare State
It could have been their masterpiece, but for this, easing the lockdown mea sures 
should have been just as timely, and the economic and social fallout of lockdown 
would have to be distributed more equitably. This was not the case. Although 
many of  those who lost their jobs or income during the time of the lockdown 
 were compensated for their losses through state aid programs, which quickly 
swelled to an overall amount of more than EUR 50 billion, one- tenth of Austria’s 
gross domestic product (GDP), some groups in society  were overlooked. Aid for 
 these groups came late and reluctantly and fell short of both their needs and the 
amounts that other groups received.
Is this surprising? No, it is not, and this lack of surprise, too, is po liti cal reso-
nance, the tendency to  favor familiar policies over novel ones. Resonance is an 
aspect of policies geared  toward po liti cal feasibility and compliance; it is not a 
safeguard of their quality, legitimacy, or desirability.
The very first COVID-19 law began making resources available for aiding 
 people who lost their income or business as a result of the lockdown mea sures. 
One of the core instruments was short- time work, the option to reduce employ-
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ees’ working hours up to 90  percent and pay them a subsidized income of 80 to 
90   percent of their previous net income. The benefit can be received for three 
months, with an option of extending it for another three months. This stabi-
lizes employment and businesses’ liquidity and protects the connection between 
employees and their firms and thus their job- related knowledge. It is an old mea-
sure of active  labor market policy, hugely popu lar (Schnetzer et al., 2020), with 
more than 1.3 million  people receiving benefits in June 2020. But it is po liti cally 
resonant and popu lar precisely  because it is so seamlessly in sync with the way 
in which Austria’s conservative, social insurance- based welfare state organizes 
social protection: negotiated and implemented with the social partners, closely 
tied to the employment relationship, focused on  people who have regular jobs, 
and planned with income- related benefits careful not to disturb the wage distri-
bution. This is also the character of the way in which many of Austria’s extensive 
regular social protection systems operate in the  labor market crisis caused by the 
COVID-19 response. Benefits for the unemployed, for instance, echo this story: 
they can be generous, but they are also unequal, and they are not for every one.
 There is also a range of aid programs more specifically designed to compen-
sate for income losses resulting from the lockdown. Several coronavirus aid pro-
grams allow private enterprises to maintain liquidity. Some of them, the earliest 
programs of state aid, are targeted  toward small business,  others are for larger firms. 
Of course,  there are also spectacular bailout deals, such as the one for the Lufthansa 
subsidiary, Austrian Airlines. Public aid programs for enterprises grew into a broad 
range of tools, including subsidies, credits, and tax policy mea sures (Bundesmin-
isterium Finanzen, 2020). Likewise, support mea sures for families and individuals 
 were developed, mostly in the form of targeted mea sures for  people in need and—as 
part of an aid package devised quite late, in June 2020— also as a one- time bonus for 
families with  children (Bundesministerium Arbeit, Familie, Jugend, 2020). Support 
mea sures have been mushrooming into complex schemes of dif er ent benefits, in 
which over time assistance was made available for most groups in need.
Two aspects stand out as characteristic traits of coronavirus aid in Austria, 
and both aspects are familiar to the point of tedium. They demonstrate the extent 
to which resonance— for good or for bad—is shaping policy designs and their 
po liti cal feasibility. One is the strenuous and lengthy pro cess it took  until  people 
precariously employed could receive support. “Precariously employed” refers, 
for example, to  people working in the arts and entertainment industry, many of 
whom are self- employed or earn their living with contracts for ser vices or non- 
standard combinations of several smaller work contracts. They  were the first to 
get hit by the contact limitations, the last to be allowed to work again, and among 
the  people hardest hit. Yet support programs for artists  were slow to develop, and 
it also took a long time  until they reached a magnitude and generosity that would 
allow cultural workers to secure their existence in 2020 (Kulturrat Österreich, 
2020). As much as this treatment of the artists and many Third Sector organ-
izations stands out as an unresolved prob lem of Austria’s COVID-19 response, 
it is still unsurprising,  because it merely reflects how many artists work and live: 
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precariously. It also reminds us that “precariousness” is a po liti cal construction, 
and that  there is no divine verdict that it has to be reproduced and amplified in 
the coronavirus crisis. Since po liti cal resonance is at work driving feasibility and 
likelihood of policies, though, it comes as no surprise that the situation of cultural 
workers persists, maybe becomes worse,  under the conditions of COVID-19, the 
 great accelerator of existing inequalities.
The second outstanding characteristic of the social policy side of Austria’s 
coronavirus response is the role of the  family in the crisis.  Here it is not only 
the design of public financial assistance but also, more impor tant, the timing and 
sequencing of lockdown mea sures and exit strategies that amounts to burdens 
that no other group in society has to bear. The long duration of the lockdown was 
criticized especially in this context,  because the combination of home office and 
home schooling was embraced as a solution with very  little energy spent on try-
ing to find alternative orga nizational solutions. Educational institutions  were the 
first to be closed, and when it came to opening public places again, it was shops, 
garden centers, and hardware stores that opened first, while schools remained 
closed.  Little attention was paid to the families who may have neither a garden 
nor a porch and spend spring days in their apartments, with public parks and 
playgrounds closed, trying to support their kids with home schooling and rec-
oncile that with home office. In po liti cal discussions about the lockdown, the 
social challenges of the long school closures  were noticed, early, but nothing 
was done. Shops and restaurants had priority when it came to lifting the con-
tact restrictions. Aid for families afected by the COVID-19 crisis for the longest 
time remained within the domain of targeted benefits: need- based, individual-
ized support for “hardship cases” and extraordinary crises. Decisions about a 
more universalistic policy design of across- the- board benefits  were not made 
 until mid- June 2020. It was not  until  after the summer that extended periods of 
home- schooling  were recognized as a highly problematic approach to containing 
the spread of the disease.
Is this surprising? No. On the contrary; it resonates: pro gress  toward  family 
policy modernization has been slow in Austria (Morgan, 2013). The designers of 
social protection are inclined to seek the solution to some of the greatest chal-
lenges of social care, organ izing childcare and care for the el derly, in the privacy 
of the  family. Often families receive financial support from the state; sometimes, 
if their way of life is not in line with social norms, they do not (Strell & Duncan, 
2001). Gender analyses of social policy have called an organ ization of social care 
with no alternatives to family- based care familialism (Leitner, 2003), and analyzed 
countries, policy fields, or developments over time with regard to the question of 
 whether alternatives to family- based care are available, or are becoming avail-
able. This would allow individuals and potential  family caretakers to opt for insti-
tutionalized settings, if they choose. What ever pro gress has been made  toward 
recognition of the right to choose care arrangements, this has been undone in the 
COVID-19 crisis, and with it much of what has been gained in terms of a more 
equitable distribution of care obligations at home.
Po liti cal Resonance in Austria’s Coronavirus Crisis Management  289
In that re spect COVID-19 has acted as a conservative force. No question, open-
ing the schools and childcare facilities has indeed been a hard question,  because 
the risks associated with school opening are hard to assess. However, the col-
lateral damage of keeping the  children at home for the better part of March 2020 
through August 2020 is a certainty, not a risk. It is faithfully mentioned in discus-
sions about lockdowns. Beyond that it has not informed policy.
The same resonance that allowed politics to act quickly and efectively  favors 
conservative solutions when it comes to policy content. If the familiar and plau-
sible COVID-19 mea sures are the ones most seamlessly in sync with existing 
Austrian social protection institutions, then their primary aim is not to compen-
sate for inequalities resulting from the uneven efects of illness and lockdown. 
Explic itly redistributive policies are the exception than the rule in some areas of 
Austria’s conservative welfare state. One of them is social care. The unpaid (or 
poorly paid) care work hidden in families is often used as a quick fix when educa-
tion and childcare require solutions that are or gan i za tion ally and financially more 
demanding than deemed appropriate. Therefore, the plausible solution, the po liti-
cally resonant one, is a conservative solution  here too.
Old Policies for New Challenges: Explaining the  
Lure of Resonance
To be po liti cally feasible and command compliance, COVID-19 mea sures had 
better be po liti cally resonant and not stray too far of the beaten path of how 
social policy is “normally” or ga nized in Austria. For one  thing, it is often the regu-
lar social protection schemes that  people turn to in times of COVID-19- induced 
need.  These may be generous, but not necessarily so, and not for all. Second, 
COVID-19 responses are po liti cally resonant when they draw on policies that 
are tried and tested, such as short- time work. Third, resonance can also take the 
form of prioritizing policy designs that match the traditional princi ples under-
lying social protection in Austria: conceptualizing coronavirus aid programs as 
targeted support for hardship cases, treating dif er ent groups of  people unequally 
when it comes to the timeliness and generosity of aid, and relying on unpaid work 
in the  family for impor tant functions of care and education.
 Because of the impor tant role of po liti cal resonance, COVID-19 policies 
emphasize the conformist ele ment that is always an aspect of consensus and 
cooperation. As the lure of po liti cal resonance may refer us back to the famil-
iar policy solutions, it may even become an impulse that undermines social and 
po liti cal pro gress in some areas: reversing headway made  toward a more gender- 
egalitarian distribution of care obligations and defeating steps of improvements 
 toward greater tolerance vis- á- vis diverse ways of life, demeanors, dress codes. 
COVID-19, in other words, may not only induce a surge of digital innovation and, 
for better or worse, transform the way we work, it may unfold a strong conserva-
tive bias.
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Po liti cal resonance does not pertain only to substantive policy content, though; 
it also has a po liti cal pro cess dimension, in which policy- making is better or ga-
nized, policy implementation more efective, and administration more competent 
when it is in sync with established procedural and behavioral norms in a polity. In 
Austria this procedural template is tied to the institutions of consensus democ-
racy. One key po liti cal pro cess and counterpart of consensus democracy is demo-
cratic corporatism, as superbly described by Peter Katzenstein in Small States in 
World Markets (1985).  Here the connection between the characteristics of po liti cal 
pro cess and a policy outcome— capacity to adjust to industrial change—is explic-
itly established. In the case of the small Eu ro pean countries adjustment capacity is 
a function of cooperation across vari ous orga nizational and po liti cal bound aries, 
multilateral clearing of dif er ent interests in a structured and fairly centralized 
system of interest repre sen ta tion, and a spirit of social partnership that allows 
for consensual decisions. It is “low- voltage politics” as Katzenstein (1985, p. 32) 
characterizes this mode of unexcited cooperation, in which po liti cal competition 
is sidelined in  favor of an orientation  toward the task at hand, and even the big 
heroic leadership gestures depend, for their implementation, on the collaboration 
of  others with large degrees of discretion. As procedural template for COVID-19 
policy- making this set of institutions and behavioral norms was po liti cally reso-
nant and presented the most plausible course of action. As it turns out, it explains 
adjustment capacity not only in the slow- moving pro cess of industrial change 
that Katzenstein has described but also the relatively successful response to the 
COVID-19 crisis in Austria: low- voltage politics, facilitating high- voltage policies.
 There are two causal mechanisms that explain why po liti cal resonance is so 
significant. The first focuses on the cognitive aspects of policy pro cesses. In this 
perspective po liti cal resonance provides focal points, which can coordinate activi-
ties in multiactor settings. The coronavirus crisis is not an emergency that can be 
managed single- handedly. In the large areas of parliamentary politics, healthcare 
provision, epidemiological research, and implementation of non- pharmaceutical 
intervention by public administration and police departments, separate agen-
das and activities must be coordinated by guiding ideas. It pays of if  these ideas 
are old,  because then they are mature: they are tried and tested, at times even 
evidence- based, and they are familiar (Mätzke & Ostner, 2010, pp. 132–135). As 
such they can be the lubricant of collaboration in complex po liti cal and adminis-
trative systems.
The question of  whether actors can perceive a course of action is only part of 
the story, though. The second part concerns willingness, the motivational aspect 
of policy pro cesses. Why should actors in the broad decision- making and imple-
mentation system comply with decisions that are not their own? Administrative 
decree alone is often not sufficient for securing compliance, and systems of sanc-
tions and punishment are neither efficient nor desirable. In that situation, po liti-
cal resonance provides the glue that makes policy decisions stick, and again it is 
old ideas that are better suited as resonant points of reference. In an adaption of 
Schumpeter (1975 [1942]), who observed that “restrictive practices” of precapitalist 
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organ ization made entrepreneurship and innovation pos si ble in the first place, we 
can think of po liti cal resonance, with its attachment to the familiar procedures 
and solutions, as providing guarantees and promises of protection, where protec-
tion pertains not only to well- being and material livelihood, but importantly also 
to status and position in an established structure of in equality. Such promises 
have always been instrumental in sustaining a politico- administrative system or, 
in Schumpeter’s terms, they provided “the flying buttresses that prevented its col-
lapse” (p. 139) in the face of  great uncertainty
Po liti cal Resonance and State Capacity
This account of the COVID-19 response in Austria emphasizes the importance of 
po liti cal resonance, that is, of old ideas for  handling new policy challenges success-
fully. Procedurally this means that rather than inventing a completely new, extraor-
dinary set of procedures for the state of emergency, it may pay of to draw on, 
rather than suspend, established modes of decision- making and implementation. 
In Austria that established mode of operation is multilateralism. Multilateralism 
and collaboration make an efective crisis- response pos si ble, despite the fact that 
institutionally the country is in many re spects less than optimally prepared for 
 handling a public health crisis of that magnitude. Where specialized public health 
capacity similar to Robert Koch Institute is lacking, competence for  handling the 
crisis can very efectively be created out of problem- solving capacity in the broader 
polity.
 There are two general lessons from Austria’s  handling of the coronavirus pan-
demic. One is that we should prob ably think about the ability to manage the pan-
demic not in terms of resources, institutions, and workforce already in place, but 
in terms of a more dynamic and open- ended pro cess of resource acquisition and 
capacity building over the course of the response to the crisis. The other lesson 
may be an Austria- specific one: adjustment capacity and the ability to appropri-
ate  those public health resources  were a collective accomplishment. It resulted 
not only from compliance on the part of the broader society, but importantly also 
from cooperation of actors within the po liti cal system across a multitude of orga-
nizational and spatial bound aries. To the extent that  there is a success story to be 
told— and this chapter has argued that this is warranted only partially and only 
preliminarily— then this is not first and foremost one about executive leadership, 
but one about cooperative followership and collaboration.
This is what the federal government’s increasingly professionalized public 
relations management misses. Strict message control and daily press conferences3 
trying to tell the media what to think mark a tendency  toward a more personal-
ized politics, focused on key figures of the federal executive (Ehs, 2020). Present-
ing crisis management as unilateral executive decision- making not only misses 
an impor tant part of the story, though. Federal Chancellor Sebastian Kurz was 
even biting the hand that was feeding him when he presented himself as the 
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pivotal crisis man ag er, for as this chapter has shown, crisis response capacity is a 
systemic, collective capability, not a quality of solitary heroic leadership.
Notes
 1. This is actually a commentary by one observer regarding the resilience of the Aus-
trian health system during the crisis. See Hofmarcher- Holzhacker (2020), but it is also an 
apt portrayal of crisis management at large.
 2. Sonja Neubauer and Andreas Schmidt (2020) compiled all information about 
Austrian response to COVID-19 in the country report in the COVID-19 Health System 
Response Monitor, compiled by the Eu ro pean Observatory of Health Systems and Poli-
cies. This section draws on their compilation as principal source of information.
 3. Ninety- nine COVID19- related press conferences  were held between Feb. 27 and 
May 31, 2020.
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 17 three aPProaches to  handling the  
covid-19 crisis in federal coUntries
 Germany, Austria, and Switzerland
Thomas Czypionka and Miriam Reiss
Despite their geo graph i cal and cultural proximity, Germany, Austria, 
and Switzerland can teach very dif er ent lessons on how to  handle the COVID-19 
pandemic. Timing and severity of outbreaks  were fairly similar in Germany and 
Austria (see Figures 17.1 through 17.3), whereas Switzerland faced a higher infec-
tion rate at the peak of the crisis (although far from rates in France or Italy). 
Response mea sures eventually taken by the three countries  were not too dif er-
ent,  either, but how decisions  were made and subsequently communicated to the 
public varied considerably.
In all three countries, containment mea sures  were met by a high level of 
adherence within the population, as mobility indices illustrate (see Figures  17.1 
through 17.3). As a result, the three countries fared well in reducing transmission 
rates and never came close to reaching capacity limits in their health systems. This 
chapter aims to examine the outbreak responses of the three countries and give 
insight into the dynamics and rationales  behind  these responses.
Health Policy Mea sures
Although Germany had its first case of SARS- CoV-2 confirmed as early as Janu-
ary  27, 2020, in Bavaria (a man who contracted the virus from a Chinese col-
league), official case numbers increased at a rather slow pace in the subsequent 
weeks and  were still below one hundred by the end of February. Hence, public 
health mea sures at that time  were essentially  limited to testing, contact trac-
ing, and isolation of confirmed and potential cases, as well as communication 
of recommendations regarding hygiene and  physical distancing. In early March, 
however, the identification of multiple clusters across the country (Robert Koch 
Institute, 2020b) led to growing public awareness and triggered the gradual intro-
duction of containment mea sures.
Although some recommendations  were issued by the federal government 
(“Spahn Empfiehlt Absage” [“Spahn Recommends Cancellation”], 2020), early 
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Figure 17.1. Daily confirmed cases of COVID-19, all- cause excess mortality, and change  
of mobility in Germany.
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Figure 17.2. Daily confirmed cases of COVID-19, all- cause excess mortality, and change  
of mobility in Austria.
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Figure 17.3. Daily confirmed cases of COVID-19, all- cause excess mortality, and  
change of mobility in Switzerland.
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policy responses  were mostly on the state level as they hold the legislative and 
executive competences in case of a pandemic (Robert Koch Institute, 2020c). 
Bavaria and North Rhine- Westphalia, where some of the first clusters emerged, 
 were the first states to ban events with more than one thousand participants 
on March  10, 2020 (“Bayern Untersagt Wegen Corona Großveranstaltungen” 
[“Bavaria Bans Major Events  Because of Coronavirus”], 2020; State Government 
of North Rhine- Westphalia, 2020). In the following days, the majority of states 
de cided to close schools and nurseries (“Nachbarn Schliessen Grenzen” [“Neigh-
bors Close Borders”], 2020). Increasingly, regional diferences in essential restric-
tions of daily life and businesses led to considerable public dissatisfaction and 
calls for more centrally aligned interventions (Welty, 2020). Bavaria in par tic u lar 
pressed ahead with restrictive mea sures such as stay- at- home  orders (“Katastro-
phenfall” [Emergencies], 2020).
Coordinated action on the federal level was eventually taken on March  16, 
2020, when Chancellor Angela Merkel announced containment mea sures for the 
entire country agreed upon by the federal and state governments.  These mea-
sures included closure of nonessential shops and sports facilities, school closures, 
and restrictions for restaurants (Winkelmann & Reichebner, 2020). Furthermore, 
borders with Austria, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, and Switzerland  were shut 
down (“Kampf Gegen Coronavirus” [“Fight against the Coronavirus”], 2020). Con-
sidering the exponential growth path of case numbers, RKI— Germany’s federal 
scientific institution in the field of biomedicine— raised the epidemic risk level 
to “high” on March 17, 2020 (Robert Koch Institute, 2020b). As Eu ro pean Union 
(EU) leaders de cided on a thirty- day entry ban for non- EU citizens, Germany also 
widened its travel restrictions to EU citizens from countries classified as high- risk 
areas (“Deutschland,” 2020).
A further notable tightening of lockdown mea sures followed on March  22, 
2020, when the federal government and the sixteen state governments agreed to 
ban gatherings of more than two  people and to mandate a minimum distance of 
1.5 meters in public with the exception of families, partners, and persons living in 
the same  house hold. Residents  were only allowed to leave their homes for work, 
basic errands, helping  others, and exercising. The agreement also included the 
closure of all restaurants and personal ser vice facilities, allowing individual states 
to impose further restrictions (Federal Government of Germany, 2020a).
Within the health system, ser vice provision was reor ga nized to safeguard 
sufficient capacities for management of the pandemic. From mid- March, hos-
pitals  were ordered to postpone elective surgeries and nonurgent treatments, 
while specialized treatment centers for COVID-19 patients as well as an inten-
sive care registry  were set up (“Corona: Krankenhaeuser” [“Corona: Hospitals”], 
2020; Robert Koch Institute, 2020a). In parallel, restrictions on video consulta-
tions and telemedicine in outpatient practice  were relaxed, and physicians  were 
granted a temporary provision to issue or renew prescriptions, referrals, and sick 
notes digitally or via telephone (“COVID-19,” 2020). As in many other countries, 
 there  were shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE) in the early phase 
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of the pandemic.  These  were particularly severe in general prac ti tion ers’ (GP) 
offices, but supplies  were also insufficient in hospitals and long- term care facili-
ties; this led to reusing disposable masks. In response, the procurement of PPE 
was transferred from the states to the central level and handled by the Ministry 
of Health from early March onward. In addition, Germany prohibited exports of 
PPE, which led to tensions with other Eu ro pean countries (see  later in this chap-
ter) and was  later partially revoked (Winkelmann & Reichebner, 2020). What is 
more, production capacities (e.g., in the textile industry)  were soon repurposed 
to producing masks and respirators.
Testing volumes have been comparatively high in Germany from the begin-
ning of the crisis and  were continuously increased (Winkelmann & Reichebner, 
2020). Access to testing kits was facilitated by the fact that the first polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) test for SARS- CoV-2 was developed by the German Cen-
ter for Infection Research at Charité Berlin (Charité— Universitaetsmedizin 
Berlin, 2020). Public and private laboratories  were quickly mobilized to increase 
testing capacities.  Because testing is rather decentralized and performed at 
vari ous types of health facilities, data on test numbers are merged only once a 
week at RKI.
In the face of a sharp decline in daily new infections, lockdown mea sures 
 were gradually relaxed beginning April 20, 2020. From April 17, 2020, onward, 
the majority of states introduced some form of mandatory use of face masks with 
regulation relaxations, but specific regulations varied by state (Winkelmann & 
Reichebner, 2020).
Although the introduction of restrictions had to some extent been coordi-
nated on the federal level, exit from lockdown was again mostly guided by the 
individual states. This can be considered a re- shift to common prepandemic pol-
icy, in which federal states  were considered to hold the decision mandate (Schlette 
et al., 2020). In light of the debate on constitutionality, legality, and proportional-
ity of the restrictions that had been imposed, discussions about mea sure appro-
priateness and noncoordinated action continued throughout May and June 2020. 
From the standpoint of demo cratic politics, it was clear that with the acute phase 
of the crisis abating, imposing new restrictions or extending restrictions had to 
be justified more rigorously, whereas relaxation had to be the norm (“Merkel zur 
Corona- Krise” [“Merkel about Coronacrisis”], 2020; Papier, 2020).
Austria had its first two cases of SARS- CoV-2 confirmed on February 25, 2020 
(a young  couple that had recently been to Lombardy), four weeks  later than Ger-
many’s first case. In early March 2020, however, it became apparent that a major 
infection cluster had been active in the Tyrolean ski resort town of Ischgl from 
late February onward.  Because of the late detection of the hotspot and delayed 
action from regional authorities, the virus was then carried to other countries 
(mostly Germany and Nordic countries) and regions by returning tourists who 
had contracted it in Ischgl.
On March 10, 2020, the Austrian federal government announced that events 
with more than five hundred participants would be banned and that universities 
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and upper secondary schools would have to switch to distance learning (“Corona-
virus: Starke Einschraenkungen Beschlossen” [“Coronavirus: Severe Restrictions 
 Adopted”], 2020; Tritschler, 2020). The latter was then extended to all schools; 
primary and lower secondary schools, however, stayed open for supervision 
where  children could not be looked  after privately (Peitler- Hasewend & Jung-
wirth, 2020).
Continuously increasing case numbers and alarming footage from neighbor-
ing northern Italy led the government to announce far stricter lockdown mea-
sures only few days  later, on March  13, 2020. The Austrian regulations, which 
 later served as a model for the German mea sures, included shelter- in- place  orders 
with few exceptions, a mandatory 1- meter distance to non house hold members 
and closures of restaurants and nonessential retail. On the same day, in addition 
to travel warnings and flight bans for several high- risk countries, Austria closed 
its borders to Italy almost entirely. Furthermore, some severely afected munici-
palities (including Ischgl)  were put  under curfew (“Ausgangsbeschraenkungen” 
[“Curfew”], 2020; “Austria’s Tyrol Province  Orders Lockdown,” 2020).
On March 30, 2020, additional restrictions  were announced, most notably the 
requirement to wear face masks in stores (and  later also in public transport) (Habi-
mana et al., 2020). Austria was among the first countries in Eu rope to introduce the 
mandatory use of face masks. Furthermore, companies  were obligated to enable 
employees belonging to risk groups to work from home. Accompanying this regu-
lation, a salary replacement scheme for reimbursement of employers’ costs was 
introduced (“Maskenpflicht” [“Mandatory Face Masks”], 2020; Parliament of the 
Republic of Austria, 2020).
As in Germany, hospitals in Austria  were called upon to postpone all nonur-
gent surgeries and examinations (“Operationen Verschieben Statt Risiken Einge-
hen” [“Postpone Operations Instead of Taking Risks”], 2020). Specific hospitals 
or hospital units across the country  were designated for treatment of COVID-19 
patients (“59 Spitaeler” [“59 Hospitals”], 2020). Physicians  were enabled to issue 
prescriptions electronically, sick notes via telephone, and teleconsultations in psy-
chotherapy  were made reimbursable by health insurance funds (“OEGK,” 2020). 
Procurement and distribution of PPE  were coordinated by the Ministry of Health 
from early March 2020 onward. Controversy arose when shipments of PPE des-
tined for Austria  were held back at the German border  because of the export ban 
while the health and long- term care sectors began to run short of supplies (“Lkw 
Mit Schutzmasken” [“Trucks with Face Masks”], 2020). The issue was resolved in 
mid- March at the EU level when a joint procurement by the EU Commission and 
export restrictions to non- EU member states was agreed upon (Repre sen ta tion of 
the Eu ro pean Commission in Germany, 2020).
Testing of suspected cases was initiated  either by a call to the helpline 1450 or 
by a GP (Federal Ministry of Social Afairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protec-
tion, 2020b). Testing volumes  were ramped up  after increasing criticism that the 
available capacities  were not being used optimally. The target of fifteen thousand 
tests per day as communicated by the government has, however, not been reached 
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as of this writing (“Coronavirus: Das ‘Nadeloehr’ bei den Testungen” [“Coronavi-
rus: The ‘Eye of the Needle’ in Testing”], 2020). When daily new cases began to 
decline, freed-up capacities  were partly used for targeted testing of healthcare 
professionals, residents of nursing homes, and persons working in critical infra-
structure (“Coronavirus: Gezielte Tests,” 2020). Although  there is a uniform defi-
nition of testing criteria,  actual practice varies by state (Federal Ministry of Social 
Afairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protection, 2020b).
The favorable development of infection rates allowed Austria to begin lifting 
some lockdown mea sures as early as mid- April 2020 (“Coronavirus: Fahrplan,” 
2020). Starting with opening shops and restaurants and followed by resumption 
of classroom teaching in schools, mea sures  were relaxed mostly at two- week 
intervals to allow for monitoring efects on the epidemiological development and 
to potentially reassess the strategy (“Coronavirus: Ausgangsbeschraenkungen 
Laufen Aus” [“Coronavirus: Curfew Expires”], 2020). In late July, the health min-
ister announced the introduction of a traffic- light system that would determine 
the requirement for a regional re introduction of containment mea sures based on 
a set of indicators.  These indicators include epidemiological mea sures as well as 
regionally available resources (Gaigg & Mueller, 2020).
In Switzerland, the first case of SARS- CoV-2 (a seventy- year- old man who had 
recently visited Milan) was confirmed on the same day as in Austria (i.e., Febru-
ary 25, 2020). Only three days  later, Switzerland was among the first countries in 
Eu rope to impose containment mea sures as the Federal Council banned events 
with more than one thousand participants (Federal Council, 2020c).
Case numbers continued to rise fast in early March— significantly faster than 
in Germany or Austria at that time— especially in urban areas (Trein & Rodwin 
Wagner, 2020). The ban of events was extended to events with more than one 
hundred  people on March  13, 2020, and classroom teaching was suspended in 
schools and universities, while childcare facilities had to remain open for  children 
where parental supervision was not pos si ble (Federal Council, 2020a).
In the face of continuously increasing case numbers, the Federal Council 
declared the “extraordinary situation” on March  16, 2020, which allowed them 
to uniformly impose containment mea sures across all cantons. Like in the other 
countries, restaurants and nonessential shops had to close. In addition, border 
checks  were introduced and entry bans imposed. Besides transit and goods traffic, 
only Swiss citizens, persons holding a residence permit, and persons working in 
Switzerland  were allowed to enter the country (Federal Council, 2020d; Mantwill 
et al., 2020).
Further physical distancing regulations  were announced by the Federal Coun-
cil on March 20, 2020,  after the number of daily new cases had risen to more than 
fourteen hundred (S. Buehler et al., 2020). Gatherings of more than five persons 
 were banned and a distance of 2 meters between persons not living in the same 
 house hold was mandated. Although the industry and construction sectors  were 
allowed to continue operating, they  were required to follow strict regulations 
regarding hygiene and physical distancing. In case they did not comply, cantons 
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 were allowed to close down individual companies (Federal Council, 2020b). This 
was  later extended by the possibility to shut down  whole sectors on canton level if 
deemed necessary (Federal Office of Public Health, 2020d).
A notable mea sure related to the health system was the authorization of can-
tons to oblige private hospitals to  free capacities for the treatment of COVID-19 
patients (Federal Office of Public Health, 2020f). All hospitals  were prohibited 
from performing nonurgent procedures and examinations. Furthermore, the dec-
laration of the extraordinary situation allowed to mobilize up to eight thousand 
armed forces to assist with healthcare logistics and security (Federal Council, 
2020d). Switzerland also faced a shortage of PPE at the outbreak of the crisis, 
which led to criticism of the authorities for taking action too late (see  later in 
this chapter). As Switzerland, unlike Germany, does not produce much protective 
gear, it had been heavi ly reliant on imports. As a result, tensions arose between 
Switzerland and Germany when shipments of PPE headed to Switzerland  were 
temporarily detained at the German border, as it was  later also the case with Aus-
tria (“Mask Hysteria,” 2020). In April, Switzerland began to produce protective 
masks (“Coronavirus: Switzerland,” 2020).
Testing volumes had been relatively high in Switzerland, albeit not as high 
as in Germany. Criteria for testing  were defined on the national level and had 
been evolving in the course of the crisis. The  actual administration and proce-
dure of testing fell, however, within the responsibility of the individual cantons. 
They determined  whether tests  were to be performed in designated hospitals, at 
GP practices, or by mobile teams (Mantwill et al., 2020). By June 2020, the fed-
eral government agreed to assume the total costs for all PCR and antibody tests 
performed. Before that, the costs  were split between health insurers and cantons 
(Federal Office of Public Health, 2020c).
Switzerland began easing restrictions on April 27, 2020, when hardware stores, 
hairdressers, and other personal ser vice providers  were allowed to reopen and 
elective medical treatments could be performed again. From mid- May, res-
taurants and shops  were opened and classroom teaching in schools gradually 
resumed (Federal Office of Public Health, 2020b).
The rather coordinated manner of economic reopening throughout May 
was  later met with challenges,  because the Federal Council withdrew from the 
extraordinary situation and dissolved its crisis unit on June  19, 2020 (Federal 
Office of Public Health, 2020e). From that point onward, the Federal Council pub-
licly stressed its withdrawal from extraordinary exertion of power and the prime 
responsibility of cantons to manage a renewed increase in infections (Federal 
Office of Public Health, 2020e). In the light of slightly increasing case numbers 
and the occurrence of super- spreader events, this coordinated action proved chal-
lenging on questions such as mask regulations in cross- canton public transports 
or coordinated contact- tracing strategies (U. Buehler, Mueller, & Fritzsche, 2020).
 Because Germany, Austria, and Switzerland are so closely interconnected in 
both economic and cultural terms, cross- country travel and transit has been a highly 
relevant aspect during the crisis. The three countries belong to the Schengen area 
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and therefore normally do not apply any border controls. However, all three coun-
tries closed their borders in March 2020, and entry was only granted to foreign 
citizens  under certain exceptions.  These exceptions included (essential) work, 
transit, and goods traffic. In mid- May 2020, the first easing of entry restrictions 
between Austria, Germany, and Switzerland was announced. Exceptions to the 
entry ban  were extended to also include visits of partners or relatives, impor tant 
 family occasions, care for animals, or maintenance of property (Federal Ministry 
of the Interior, Building and Community, 2020). As of June 15, 2020,  there  were no 
more border controls between the three countries.
Social Policy Mea sures
As of this writing, the German federal government issued two major economic 
relief packages: the first of EUR 156 billion (approximately 4.9  percent of the gross 
domestic product, GDP) from mid- March and the second of EUR 130 billion 
(approximately 4.0  percent of GDP) in late June (International Monetary Fund, 
2020). The packages comprise a broad range of mea sures aimed at stimulating the 
economy, supporting businesses, protecting jobs, and mitigating the efects of the 
crisis on socially deprived groups.
Short- time work (Kurzarbeit) benefits, which Germany already heavi ly relied 
on during and  after the financial crisis of 2008,  were introduced as part of the 
first package. Benefits have since been increased and extended multiple times and 
access has been eased. The plan allows for benefits of up to 80  percent of former 
net income, with even higher benefits for workers with  children (International 
 Labour Organ ization, 2020b).
Access to basic income support for the unemployed was eased, and unem-
ployment benefits  were partially extended. To support families, they received a 
one- time “ family bonus” of EUR 300 per child and increased parental- leave ben-
efits, while access to childcare benefits for low- income families was eased (Inter-
national  Labour Organ ization, 2020b). Single parents  were granted additional tax 
allowances (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2020). In the field of housing, a rental 
protection act was enacted that temporarily prevented lessors from terminating 
rental agreements  because of outstanding rent payments (“What’s in Germany’s 
Emergency Coronavirus Bud get?,” 2020).
Self- employed workers and small businesses could apply for a one- time emer-
gency aid if they  were heavi ly afected by the crisis (Arbeitsagentur, 2020). Credit 
guarantees  were granted, and companies expecting losses for 2020 may clear 
 these with tax prepayments they have already paid for 2019. Furthermore, several 
tax reliefs  were granted, including moratoriums on tax debts, adjusted prepay-
ments, and suspensions of sequestrations (International  Labour Organ ization, 
2020b). VAT rates  were temporarily reduced from 19  percent to 16  percent and 
from 7  percent to 5  percent, respectively (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2020). Sup-
port packages specifically for start- ups and artists also  were set up. In addition to 
Approaches to Handling the COVID Crisis in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland  305
 these federal- level mea sures, many states individually passed further relief pack-
ages (Federal Government of Germany, 2020b).
In Austria, a crisis management fund amounting to EUR 4 billion was issued 
on March 15, 2020, but the fiscal package has since been extended to a total of 
EUR 50 billion (approximately 9.5  percent of GDP) (International Monetary Fund, 
2020). The bud geted mea sures are similar to the ones taken in Germany.
The central mea sure taken in the field of the  labor market was the short- time 
working scheme specifically developed for the COVID-19 crisis. As in Germany, 
the scheme was extended several times. It allowed working hours to be reduced to 
a minimum of 10  percent at 80  percent to 90  percent of regular pay (International 
 Labour Organ ization, 2020a). An adapted short- time working scheme in force 
from October onward involved training opportunities for workers with reduced 
hours (Reisner, 2020).
The unemployed received a one- time additional benefit of EUR 450, and access 
to several other social benefits was eased (“Arbeitslosengeld” [“Unemployment 
Benefit”], 2020; “Austria Plans Coronavirus Help,” 2020). Families in need could 
apply for a benefit of up to EUR 1,200 per month for a maximum of three months 
from the so- called Corona  Family Hardship Fund (Federal Ministry of  Labour, 
 Family and Youth, 2020a). Furthermore, workers with care responsibilities can get 
additional paid leave of up to three weeks (Federal Ministry of  Labour,  Family and 
Youth, 2020b).
Support for businesses includes a so- called “hardship fund” that grants one- 
time cash payments to individual entrepreneurs and small businesses afected by 
the crisis (International  Labour Organ ization, 2020a). Another fund covers guar-
antees for loans and subsidies for up to 75  percent of fixed operating costs of busi-
nesses that accrued during the lockdown. Special guarantee schemes  were estab-
lished for exporting companies and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the 
tourism sector (Reisner, 2020). Furthermore, the obligation to file for insolvency 
in case of overindebtedness was temporarily suspended (Scherbaum Seebacher, 
2020). Relaxed tax regulations included the temporary deferral of personal and 
corporate income taxes and social security contributions as well as of value- added 
tax payments. Employers could apply for reimbursement of social security con-
tributions by the government if operations had to be suspended during the lock-
down (Reisner, 2020).
Beginning on March 13, 2020, the Federal Council in Switzerland announced 
several relief packages that amount to a total of CHF 73 billion (approximately 
10.4  percent of GDP; International Monetary Fund, 2020) as of this writing.
As in Germany and Austria, firms in Switzerland could claim benefits from a 
short- time working scheme. The scheme was extended several times. It was adapted 
to also cover on- call workers and some self- employed, and the application pro cess 
has been simplified (International Monetary Fund, 2020).
Furthermore, the Swiss support packages involved partial unemployment 
compensation and compensation for loss of earnings for the self- employed and 
for some employees afected by the lockdown. In par tic u lar, parents with caring 
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responsibilities resulting from school closures  were eligible for income support 
(Federal Department of Economic Afairs, Education and Research, 2020a; Fed-
eral Office of Public Health, 2020a).
Mea sures aimed at businesses included direct financial aid for severely afected 
firms (e.g., in the tourism sector), a loan guarantee program, and bridging loans 
for SMEs and start- ups and temporary interest- free deferral of social- security 
contribution payments (International Monetary Fund, 2020). The government 
also granted specific compensations for the railway and aviation- related busi-
nesses, as well as for cancelled events (Federal Department of Economic Afairs, 
Education and Research, 2020b, 2020c).
Explanation
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland are textbook examples of federal countries, in 
par tic u lar when it comes to the organ ization of health and social care. However, 
in the specific context of the pandemic, federal structures came into play in very 
dif er ent ways across the three countries.
In Germany, responsibility for epidemic management fell largely to the six-
teen states as well as local public health authorities. Similarly, other policy areas 
that became relevant in the context of crisis management (e.g., education, regu-
lations for businesses)  were largely within state responsibility. Hence, especially 
in the early phase of the outbreak, Germany’s response was mostly character-
ized by heterogeneity across the individual states. The spread of the virus was 
rather uneven across the states, which led some state governors to press ahead 
in imposing mea sures, whereas  others remained hesitant (Schlette et al., 2020). 
State- by- state management was also foreseen by the German National Pandemic 
Plan, which was published in 2005. Considering the lack of historical pre ce dent 
for the current situation, however, it quickly became clear that more coordinated 
action would be required at least in some policy areas.
As the crisis evolved and case numbers began to increase all over Germany, the 
federal government began to weigh in. The power of the Ministry of Health was 
temporarily expanded on the basis of the “Act for protecting the public health in 
an epidemic situation of national importance,” which granted it competences in the 
provision of phar ma ceu ti cal and medical devices, as well as in the planning of the 
medical workforce (Greer et al., 2020). Furthermore, the so- called Small Corona 
Cabinet, consisting of the ministers of defense, finance, interior, foreign afairs, 
health, and the head of the Federal Chancellery, began to play a more central role 
during this phase (Winkelmann & Reichebner, 2020). However, major decisions on 
mea sures such as contact restrictions and border closures still had to be taken in 
coordination with the states. In extensive and reportedly conflictual telephone con-
ferences, Chancellor Angela Merkel and the members of the Corona Cabinet dis-
cussed with state governors  until a certain degree of consensus was reached (Fried 
& Herrmann, 2020). When first reopening steps  were considered, state interests 
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regained weight, and the level of disagreement between state governors and the 
federal government increased. As a result, state governors again took the lead in 
lifting restrictions from early May onward.
In general, regional interests appeared to outweigh party interests in Ger-
many, as state governors heavi ly criticized mea sures taken by other governors 
from the same party, resulting in polyphony about correct behavioral mea sures in 
the pandemic. However, this controversy also was fueled by the current discus-
sion around Merkel’s succession, both as the leader of the Christian Demo cratic 
Union (CDU) and as candidate for chancellorship in the next elections. The party 
congress scheduled to agree on the new party leader had to be postponed  because 
of the outbreak. The crisis gave some conservative state governors the chance to 
strengthen their profiles and increase their stakes in the succession race. Before 
the outbreak, three men  were officially in the race for party leadership of the CDU 
and expected to  later on run for chancellor. Among them was Armin Laschet, 
state governor of North Rhine- Westphalia, whose candidacy was eventually sup-
ported by Health Minister Jens Spahn (Karnitschnig, 2020).  Because his state was 
among the first with large infection clusters, Laschet attempted to use the result-
ing media attention to his advantage, but seemed to have failed to convince the 
public during his public appearances. Instead, Markus Söder, state governor of 
Bavaria and leader of CDU’s  sister party, Christian Social Union (CSU), received 
wide praise for his  handling of the crisis and has since gained popularity all across 
Germany.  Because the two  sister parties, CDU and CSU, traditionally appoint a 
joint candidate for chancellorship, he has increasingly been discussed as the most 
promising candidate in that race (Rossmann, 2020).
In Austria, although competences on health  matters are distributed between 
the federation and the states, the field of public health— including the manage-
ment of epidemics and pandemics, according to the Epidemics Act— largely falls 
within the responsibility of the federation (Bussjaeger, 2020). From the beginning 
of the crisis, the chancellor and vice- chancellor as well as the ministers of health 
and the interior  were the central figures in the fight against the epidemic. The new 
government had just been sworn in in early January 2020  after several months of 
po liti cal turmoil and lack of po liti cal leadership on the national level. This made 
the conservative- green co ali tion particularly  eager to show resolve and unity in 
their crisis response (Czypionka et al., 2020).
The states  were clearly in a subordinate role. The system of indirect federal 
administration required them (and consequently the district authorities) to exe-
cute regulations passed at the federal level. In addition, it remained the task of 
the states to provide sufficient capacity in hospitals or with regard to testing and 
contact tracing (Bussjaeger, 2020). Furthermore, the states had the power to apply 
stricter mea sures in some areas, which allowed the states of Tyrol and Salzburg 
to impose curfew regulations on some municipalities that  were more heavi ly 
afected by the outbreak (Gamper, 2020).
Switzerland lies somewhere between Germany and Austria when it comes 
to the role of federalism in the COVID-19 crisis. The twenty- six cantons usually 
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hold a large share of competences in vari ous policy fields, including health policy. 
Hence, in the early phase of the crisis, some cantons took action in de pen dently and 
imposed first containment mea sures. However, declaration of the extraordinary 
situation activated the Epidemics Act, which authorized the Federal Council to 
impose public health mea sures on a national level; this in turn shifted the weight 
of decision- making to the federal level (Belser et al., 2020; Mantwill et al., 2020).
As in Austria, the cantons  were responsible for the implementation and detailed 
configuration of mea sures while also organ izing and maintaining their cantonal 
health systems (Mantwill et al., 2020). Any restrictions imposed by cantons that 
went beyond the ones de cided upon on at the federal level  were at first regarded 
unlawful by the Federal Council. In par tic u lar, this became relevant when the can-
ton of Ticino required all nonessential manufacturing to close despite the fed-
eral decision to allow firms to continue production. However, continuous protest 
from several cantons led the Federal Council to change their stance in late March 
and allow cantons to make exceptions from the federal decree (Belser et al., 2020; 
Trein & Rodwin Wagner, 2020). In the transition phase  toward exit from lock-
down, an east- west rift arose, as the German- speaking cantons called for an end 
to the lockdown, whereas the more severely afected Italian- and French- speaking 
cantons preferred to keep restrictions in place (Trein & Rodwin Wagner, 2020). 
This controversy was among the reasons why the Federal Council de cided to leave 
the potential re introduction of lockdown mea sures to the cantons in case of a 
surge in infection rates.
 Whether a federalist or centralist organ ization of the pandemic response yields 
better results is a controversial question. Leaving the responsibility with regional 
authorities allows for testing dif er ent policy approaches and subsequently adopt-
ing the ones that prove to work best in other regions as well.  Because the virus 
spread unevenly and public health capacities varied by region, a regional response 
also gave states/cantons the chance to tailor mea sures to their individual situation 
(Schlette et al., 2020). Furthermore, regional governments could eventually be held 
accountable for their decisions (Sturm, 2020). In Germany, for example, policy 
makers and media stressed federalism as conditional for successfully providing tar-
geted responses and tailored prevention approaches (Esslinger, 2020; Hipp, 2020; 
Pergande, 2020; von Marschall, 2020). However, a federalist organ ization of the 
response also has substantial downsides. A lack of coordination and the resulting 
regional diferences in regulations can create undesired incentives (e.g., “tourism” 
to regions with stricter or less strict regulations) (Belser et al., 2020). It may also 
result in confusion and a lack of ac cep tance in the population, as it may be diffi-
cult to justify dif er ent responses in regions facing similar situations. Moreover, a 
centralist approach allows for fast responses  because it does not require extensive 
negotiations and coordination eforts. In addition, knowledge resources on how 
to fight a pandemic may also have considerable economies of scale. Accordingly, 
evaluations of the three countries’ outbreak responses with re spect to the role of 
federalism vary considerably (Belser et al., 2020; Bussjaeger, 2020; Gamper, 2020; 
Sturm, 2020).
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Another aspect that was handled very diferently across the three countries 
was communication. This refers to how the public was informed about the virus, 
the epidemiological situation and the mea sures taken, but also who the central 
figures in crisis management and communication  were. Hence, this aspect was 
interconnected with the role played by experts during the crisis.
In Germany, the role of information provision with re spect to the virus and the 
epidemiological situation—in part resulting from the polyphony from the po liti-
cal players in the beginning of the crisis— was to a  great part taken on by the RKI, 
which can be regarded Germany’s national public health institute, and Christian 
Drosten, director of the Institute for Virology at Charité Berlin. During the peak of 
the crisis, the RKI and its team of scientists created a steady flow of information by 
giving daily press conferences and publishing numerous risk assessments, strategy 
documents, response plans, surveillance reports, and technical guidelines (Wieler 
et al., 2020). Its recommendations and guidelines  were also  adopted by authorities 
in other countries (e.g., the Austrian Ministry of Health; Federal Ministry of Social 
Afairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protection, 2020a). In her press appearances 
related to COVID-19, Chancellor Merkel was usually flanked by Lothar Wieler, the 
head of the RKI. Christian Drosten, an expert on the SARS- CoV-1 virus, became 
one of the central figures in German media coverage on the virus. He had also 
been part of the team that developed the PCR diagnostic test and  later started a 
daily half- hour podcast with the broadcaster NDR. The charismatic scientist was 
dubbed by German media “the nation’s corona- explainer- in- chief” (Oltermann, 
2020a). Especially in the early phase of the pandemic, the RKI and Drosten  were 
the main advisors to the federal government and the populace in Germany. As the 
crisis evolved and impacts on other spheres than just health became apparent, 
the government extended its advisory group to include other disciplines (Schlette 
et al., 2020).
In comparison, the federal government of Germany played a less prominent 
role in crisis communication. Although some media viewed her as a leading fig-
ure in Eu rope’s fight against the pandemic, Chancellor Merkel, a scientist herself, 
in fact left the floor mainly to the medical experts. Her communication mainly 
consisted in calm explanations of the rationales  behind strict lockdown mea sures 
and appeals for solidarity, stressing the importance to uphold basic  human rights 
(Miller, 2020; Oltermann, 2020b). Especially during Merkel’s self- quarantine  after 
having been in contact with a doctor who tested positive, Health Minister Jens 
Spahn took on a bigger role in the government’s communication, which increased 
his popularity ratings. As a result, although he had previously announced not to 
run, he re- entered discussions around Merkel’s succession as party leader and 
chancellor candidate (Rossmann, 2020).
In Austria, the characteristics of crisis communication  were entirely dif er ent 
from Germany. The federal government was the central entity in decision- making 
and took the lead in nearly all aspects of communication. Chancellor Sebastian 
Kurz, Vice- Chancellor Werner Kogler, Health Minister Rudolf Anschober, and 
Interior Minister Karl Nehammer became the  faces of crisis management, as they 
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gave press conferences  under  great media fanfare almost on a daily basis at the 
peak of the crisis.
The Austrian government did to some extent rely on expert advice. The scien-
tific advisory board of the “Taskforce Corona” at the Ministry of Health included 
experts in vari ous medical fields. Furthermore, decisions  were aided by an agent- 
based simulation model of epidemic spread developed by a group of researchers 
at the Vienna University of Technology (Czypionka et al., 2020). However,  there 
was a lack of transparency regarding on which evidence decisions  were eventually 
based, and members of the advisory board began to publicly voice criticism. For 
example, experts had warned officials to take care of the procurement of sufficient 
protective equipment and test kits already in February, which would have pre-
vented shortages that occurred at the peak of the crisis. Moreover, several of the 
advisors in the “Taskforce Corona” had argued for a less strict and more targeted 
lockdown to contain social and economic impacts. However, in both instances, 
the government preferred not to follow the expert advice (Tóth, 2020).
Instead, leaked protocols revealed that Chancellor Kurz had, at the peak of 
the crisis, aimed for a strategy driven by fear (“Regierungsprotokoll” [“Govern-
ment Protocol”], 2020). His rhe toric was  shaped accordingly, very much in con-
trast to Merkel’s calming and unemotional demeanor. He repeatedly drew lines 
to the disturbing footage from Italian hospitals and famously said in an interview 
on March 30, 2020, that “soon, every one  will know someone who has died of the 
coronavirus,” although at that time daily new infections had already been decreas-
ing (“Regierungskommunikation” [“Government Communication”], 2020). This 
strategy was heavi ly criticized by the opposition. Furthermore, at multiple occa-
sions, it was implied in press conferences that certain activities  were prohibited, 
whereas this was in fact not in line with the  actual legislation (“Corona- Verbote,” 
2020). A lot of controversy also arose around the constitutionality of the mea-
sures taken. In the meantime, the Constitutional Court ruled that the legislation, 
in  par tic u lar a ban on entering public spaces, was partly unlawful, which provoked 
even more criticism from the opposition (“VfGH” [“Constitutional Court”], 2020). 
Nevertheless, the government enjoyed high approval ratings throughout the crisis 
(Seidl, 2020).
In Switzerland, official crisis communication was also centered around the 
federal government, but not as exclusively as in Austria,  because the princi ple 
of collegiality is firmly rooted in its Swiss government. The government’s press 
conferences featured all seven ministers of the Federal Council, most prominently 
Interior Minister Alain Berset, who is also responsible for health  matters. As the 
mea sures taken  were not particularly harsh considering the country’s fast increase 
in infections, the government’s communication strategy was characterized by a 
mea sured tone appealing to the public’s rationality and solidarity (Wong Sak Hoi, 
2020). Berset’s promise from April 16, 2020, to act “as quickly as pos si ble and as 
slowly as necessary” became the mantra of the Swiss crisis management and was 
even printed on t- shirts to raise money for charity (“Minister’s Quote,” 2020).
Besides the federal government, the central figure in COVID-19– related com-
munication was Daniel Koch, who at the time was the head of the infectious dis-
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eases unit at the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) and was named the gov-
ernment’s COVID-19 delegate. Especially early on in the crisis, the civil servant 
with a medical background was praised by the press for his calm explanations of 
the epidemiological situation (Romy, 2020).
However, both the government and Koch also had to face some criticism, espe-
cially from epidemiological experts. In late January, Swiss epidemiologists pub-
lished a study on the transmission of SARS- CoV-2 (Riou & Althaus, 2020) and 
contacted the FOPH to ofer their help in preparing for a potential spread of the 
virus to Switzerland. Officials reportedly  were not interested in cooperation, and 
Koch instead made several statements about the virus not being more dangerous 
than the common flu. In late February, renowned scientists Marcel Salathé and 
Christian Althaus publicly criticized Koch and Berset for ignoring their advice and 
taking action too late, resulting in a severe shortage of masks at the outbreak of the 
crisis (S. Buehler et al., 2020). The Federal Council eventually de cided to set up the 
“Swiss National COVID-19 Science Task Force,” an expert advisory board that also 
includes Salathé and Althaus. The task force was, however, established as late as 
March 31 when national lockdown mea sures had already been in place for almost 
two weeks (S. Buehler et al., 2020; Mantwill et al., 2020).
The Swiss po liti cal system is famous for its tradition of debate and compro-
mise  because it constantly needs to coordinate the interests of its twenty- six can-
tons. With some exceptions— most notably the divide between eastern and west-
ern cantons about the lifting of lockdown measures— this spirit was also upheld 
during the COVID-19 crisis and the government’s response was mostly based on 
a broad po liti cal and regional consensus (Trein & Rodwin Wagner, 2020).
Conclusion
Although the three countries studied in this chapter are all prime examples of 
federalism, Austria and Switzerland showed a decisive, uniform public health 
response resulting from epidemic laws granting the central level pre ce dence 
 under such circumstances. By contrast, a lot of confusion arose when states in 
Germany engaged in a wide variety of interventions introduced at dif er ent times 
including even difering social distancing rules.  After a phase of more coordi-
nated policy action brought about by Chancellor Merkel, the question of how 
and when to lift lockdown became fuzzy again. At least in the beginning of the 
crisis and in the absence of unity in the po liti cal leadership, guidance primarily 
came from prominent scientists. The crisis also found the country in the midst of 
a strug gle for Angela Merkel’s succession and its protagonists as competitors in 
the fight against the virus. Politicians and the public strongly relied on the advice 
of the Robert Koch Institute and Christian Drosten, a world- leading expert on 
coronaviruses. By contrast, the Swiss federal government, with its strong tradi-
tion of collegiality, steered the country calmly despite a comparably higher death 
toll. A rift in the unan i mous response arose only on the question when to lift 
the lockdown mea sures, with Italian- and French- speaking cantons more cautious 
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than the German- speaking ones. The main media attention in Switzerland, often 
dubbed the “land of direct democracy,” centered around Daniel Koch, an expert 
civil servant, at least  until he became heavi ly criticized by prominent Swiss epide-
miologists. In Austria, the newly formed and novel (Conservative- Green) govern-
ment was bound to show strength and unity and implemented comparably harsh 
lockdown mea sures at an early stage. Prob ably reflective of this hegemony of poli-
tics over s cience, the main  protagonist on the media during the crisis was not a sci-
entist, but rather Chancellor Kurz. Close ties to Italy and disturbing footage from 
Italian intensive care units helped to garner support in the population, but  were 
likely also used strategically in government communication to instill a sense of fear.
Although all three countries managed to get through the crisis—or at least the 
first wave— relatively well, it remains to be seen what efects the dif er ent policy 
approaches  will have in the long run. As more and more background information 
on the dynamics and motivations  behind decisions made during the crisis comes 
to light, policy- makers  will be held accountable for their actions. No doubt the 
comparably good outcome has increased approval ratings for the ruling parties in 
all three countries. It remains to be seen, however,  whether this is a lasting efect 
or  whether some questionable actions (e.g., the disorderly lockdown and transi-
tion phases in Germany or the fear- based communication strategy in Austria)  will 
catch up with the ones in charge at the time. This and the question of constitution-
ality of some of the mea sures have likely also contributed to the growing number 
of “corona- deniers.” But even the majority of the population may eventually grow 
tired of mask- wearing and physical distancing. Together with other aspects like 
prevention in schools or concurrence of COVID-19 and influenza- like illnesses, 
 these challenges  will continue to put health systems and po liti cal leadership to the 
test in the face of resurging infection waves.
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 18 italy’s resPonse to covid-19
Michelle Falkenbach and Manuela Caiani
With close to 250,000 confirmed cases and more than 35,000 
deaths, as of this writing (World Health Organ ization [WHO], 2020b), Italy was the 
first country on the Eu ro pean continent crippled by the coronavirus. Although a 
state of emergency was declared at the end of January 2020, just a few days  after the 
first case was discovered, country leaders as well as medical professionals under-
estimated the outbreak. Authoritarian public health mea sures  were not promptly 
implemented; instead regions  were initially left to deal with the virus as they saw fit, 
thereby creating a fragmented approach to containment. Luca Zaia, governor of the 
Veneto region, stated at the beginning of March 2020 that he remained convinced 
that a standardized approach “from north to south” should be persued, “given that 
the virus knows no bound aries” (“Coronavirus, le Regioni Contro il Governo” 
[“Coronavirus, the Regions against the Government”], 2020).  There was no imme-
diate country lockdown; this came about two weeks  after the third confirmed death 
(Hirsch, 2020). Alternatively, the country took a gradual approach quarantining 
hard- hit municipalities first, then locking down certain northern regions and cul-
minating in a complete country lockdown by March 9, 2020. Precious time was 
wasted with miscommunication and a general miscalculation of the severity of the 
disease, ultimately resulting in a strict and lengthy countrywide lockdown that led 
to drastic socioeconomic efects.
Although the citizens’ trust in Prime Minister Conte was high,  there was 
noticeable disagreement among the parties, resulting in the politicization of the 
pandemic (Capano, 2020). Populist radical right (PRR) parties such as the  Brothers 
of Italy led by Giorgia Meloni or Matteo Salvini’s Lega party regularly criticized 
the government for its weak leadership and the Eu ro pean Union (EU) for its lack 
of solidarity. Naturally, this decreased the level of trust in the Italian government 
for some citizens, often making it difficult to understand the drastic mea sures 
that  were eventually set. The other pole of citizens showed much solidarity with 
governmental messaging, launching the initiative “andrà tutto bene” [every thing 
 will be fine], where banners could be seen from the win dows of almost  every Ital-
ian  house hold from the north to the south. In addition, the musical “flash mobs” 
on balconies garnered much attention as did the commitment of many popu lar 
TV show actors and singers in the organ ization of “educational” entertainment for 
Italian citizens at home.
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In sum, the country’s unpreparedness and inexperience coupled with a weak 
administrative and po liti cal capacity cost the country much time and allowed the 
virus to spread, practically unhindered. Not  until Conte’s “stay at home” decree was 
implemented on March 10, 2020, did the government begin to move in a quicker 
and more efficient way. This demo cratic regime had a difficult time with com-
munication, coordination, and implementation strategies as some po liti cal par-
ties opted to use the pandemic for po liti cal gains, leading to the government’s 
decision to take more forceful action (high fines for violations of the strict cur-
few and drone surveillance to keep  people inside and safe) against noncompli-
ant citizens.
This chapter begins by laying out the public health and health systems mea-
sures that the country  adopted to protect the public and contain the virus.  After 
which, the social policy mea sures implemented to counterbalance the hard- hit 
country are discussed, followed by potential explanations as to why Italy was so 
hard hit. The chapter closes with an analy sis regarding what was learned from 
the Italian case and where further research may be necessary in gaining a more 
holistic understanding of the Italian government’s response to the pandemic and 
its consequences.
Health Policy Mea sures: Public Health, Health Systems,  
and Borders
The Italian government played a big role in the implementation of public health 
and containment mea sures throughout the coronavirus outbreak. The lockdown 
of the entire country helped stop the spread of the virus into the far less finan-
cially and medically equipped southern Italy, but the initial nonuniform approach 
allowed some municipalities in the north, such as Brescia, Bergamo, and Piacenza, 
to opt out of more restrictive lockdown mea sures, resulting in staggering death 
rates and  legal hassles.
The Italian Healthcare System
In 1978 the Italian National Health Ser vice (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale, or SSN) 
was created and subsequently ranked as one of the best in the world (WHO, 
2000). The SSN is or ga nized on a regional level and controlled by all three levels 
of government: national, regional, and local. Article 32 of the Italian constitution 
ensures that all residents, in any region, have access to ser vices  either completely 
 free of cost (even for surgeries) or at a cost that is much lower than the market price 
(Presidenza della Repubblica, n.d.); while Article 117 clarifies the distribution of 
 legal power between the federal government and the regions. The regions are then 
responsible for organ izing and distributing healthcare resources through local 
healthcare units (Armocida et al., 2020). In addition, the national government, 
through the Ministry of Health, is also responsible for defining the essential levels 
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of care and constructing policy and planning frameworks. This role, however, is 
shifting more and more to the Government Regions Committee (De Belvis et al., 
2012). Public health is also interwoven throughout the SNN structure. On the 
federal level, the Ministry of Health works with vari ous national public health 
agencies to determine appropriate policies, and the regions are then in charge of 
implementing them through their health departments (Poscia et al., 2018). Basi-
cally, the national government’s role is one of guidance and strategy in terms of 
health policy while also guaranteeing the financial resources to maintain the sys-
tem. The regions deliver the essential levels of care and are held responsible for 
any deficit incurred while  doing so (see Ferré et al., 2014 for more information on 
the Italian healthcare system). The implication  here is that each region can deter-
mine its own healthcare system structure, resulting in essentially twenty dif er ent 
health systems within the same country.
The prob lem with this type of system in a healthcare crisis is that the Italian 
government is left with a weak strategic leadership role, which was reflected in 
the inconsistency of data between dif er ent administrative levels during the pan-
demic (see Berardi et al., 2020). Additional problematic ele ments in Italy’s health 
system include years of fragmentation (Adinolfi, 2014), de cades of financial cuts 
(De Belvis et al., 2012; Prante et al., 2020), privatization (Quercioli et al., 2013), 
and deprivation of  human and technical resources (Armocida et al., 2020; Rocco & 
Stievano, 2013).  These considerations help explain how a healthcare crisis of such 
magnitude was pos si ble in Italy.
Coronavirus Pandemic and Public Health Responses
On January 23, 2020, Italy reported its first two coronavirus cases carried into the 
country by Chinese tourists. By January 25 health checkpoints  were erected at all 
Italian airports for passengers coming from China; five days  later, Health Minister 
Roberto Speranza suspended all flights to and from China (“Misure Profilattiche 
Contro Il Nuovo Coronavirus” [“Prophylactic Mea sures against the New Corona-
virus”], 2020). On January 31, 2020, shortly  after the World Health Organ ization 
declared the coronavirus a pandemic, the government and the Council of Minis-
ters declared a six- month state of emergency and appointed Angelo Borrelli, head 
of the Civil Protection, as special commissioner for the coronavirus emergency 
(Ministerio della Salute, 2020) whose job it would be to coordinate the interven-
tions necessary to deal with emergency.
By the beginning of February 2020, three cases of the virus had been discov-
ered; all  were individuals who had recently returned from China. Not  until Feb-
ruary 20 was the first case diagnosed, in Lombardy, without pos si ble exposure 
from abroad (Torri et al., 2020). By February 2020, outbreaks  were counted in 
eleven municipalities (Vo’ Euganeo, Codogno, Castiglione d’Adda, Casalpuster-
lengo, Fombio, Maleo, Somaglia, Bertonico, Terranova dei Passerini, Castel-
gerundo, and San Fiorano) across the province of Lodi (Lombardy) and the region 
of Veneto. As a result of  these outbreaks, the Ministry of Health ordered a manda-
Italy’s Response to COVID-19  323
tory supervised quarantine for anyone that had come into contact with individu-
als confirmed positive for the virus (Ministero della Salute, 2020). Furthermore, 
it became mandatory to notify the Department of Prevention, the section of the 
Local Health Authority in charge of public health, if an individual entered the 
country from a high risk area (Signorelli et al., 2020); this was followed by manda-
tory quarantine and surveillance.
Following the municipal outbreaks in the regions of Lombardy and Veneto, the 
prime minister, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, issued the decree- 
law 6/2020 (Presidenza della Repubblica, 2020) on February 23, 2020, introduc-
ing urgent containment mea sures and management of the epidemiological emer-
gency. This decree, requiring authorities in the impacted municipalities to take all 
containment mea sures necessary to manage the spread of the disease adequately 
and proportionately, led to the creation of “red zones” in the eleven aforemen-
tioned municipalities. On March  2, 2020,  there was a proposal to expand the 
“red zones” to include the heavi ly impacted municipalities of Brescia, Piacenza, 
and Bergamo, but this was not  adopted. (For an overview of the epidemiological 
trends see Berardi et al., 2020, Figure 1.)
It was not  until March 9, 2020, however, that Prime Minister Conte signed the 
prime ministerial decree extending the reinforced mea sures to contain the virus 
to the entire country and forbidding individuals to gather in public places (Gov-
erno Italiano, 2020b), essentially placing the entire country on lockdown.  After the 
decree went into efect on March 10, further ordinances and decrees  were passed, 
prohibiting the access to public parks, play areas, or gardens (March 20), prohibiting 
individuals from leaving the municipality in which they  were located (March 22), 
and suspending all production (March 25); see  Table 18.1. Masses and religious ser-
vices  were forbidden, a difficult decision considering the countries primarily Catho-
lic population, but parishes found alternatives. Pope Francis set the creative tone 
by livestreaming prayers, and priests created a WhatsApp group for parishioners 
(Roberts & Stamouli, 2020). The country remained in this state  until May 4, 2020, 
 after which a slow reopening of the country, beginning with factories, ensued.
 There was an almost two- week gap between the creation of the first red zones 
and the lockdown of the entire country, allowing the virus to spread throughout 
the entire region of Lombardy down into the region of Emilia Romagna and west 
into the regions of Piedmont and Liguria. The daily deaths per 100,000 inhabit-
ants in  these four regions  were the highest in the country at 5.7, 3.2, 2.3, and 1.9, 
respectively (Ciminelli & Garcia- Mandicó, 2020). This suggests that the initial step- 
by- step public health containment mea sures adapted in Italy  were unsuccessful 
in stopping the spread of the virus in most regions1 and that the northern regions 
would have benefited from a general lockdown much sooner.
Health System Responses
From a health systems point of view, mea sures to combat the pandemic  were also 
characterized by an uneven approach among the Italian regions. Three dominant 
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orga nizational models crystalized throughout the country: (1) hospital- centered 
approach, (2) community care approach, and (3) an integrated approach (Ciccetti, 
2020).  These three approaches and their relation to testing, hospital use, primary 
and community care involvement, intensive care units, and digital solutions can 
been seen in  Table 18.2. Each of the twenty Italian regions can be placed in one 
of  these orga nizational models based on the characterization of their health sys-
tem (Ciccetti, 2020). The Veneto model, with a strong community network, tested 
both symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals, was characterized by a very 
 limited use of hospitals (less than 20  percent hospitalizations), vigorously traced 
contacts, and focused on at- home care provisions, proved to be the most success-
ful in combating the virus. The integrated approach minimized  collateral  damage 
with its focus on  mental health aspects, chronic diseases, as well as testing and col-
laborative mobile strategies. The regions with a heavi ly hospital- centered approach 
(over 40   percent hospital utilization), most notably Lombardy, that tested only 
symptomatic individuals had a more difficult time managing the virus from a 
health systems point of view.
 TABLE 18.1. Health protection and containment mea sures
Date Mea sure implemented Place Authority
January 25 Health checkpoints for passengers 
coming from China
All Italian airports Minister of 
Health
January 30 Air traffic from China banned All Italian airports Government
January 31 State of emergency and  
appointment of Special  
Commissioner for the  
coronavirus emergency
All of Italy Government
February 21 Mandatory notification to health 
department for  those coming 
from high- risk areas followed by 






February 23 Red zones— containment areas 11 municipalities 




March 2 Proposal to expand red zones  
to include municipalities  
in Brescia, Piacenza,  
and Bergamo





March 10 National lockdown All of Italy Government
March 22 Suspension of all commercial activities 
non- indispensable for production
All of Italy Government
March 23 Extension of limitations on  
individual freedom and other 
business activities not  
previously mentioned
All of Italy Government
Sources: Adapted from Signorelli et al. (2020) and Ministerio della Salute (2020).
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Most of the ordinances and decrees passed during the initial phase of the 
coronavirus pandemic concerned public health and containment mea sures; two, 
however, addressed the health system. On March 6, 2020, the Council of Minis-
ters approved a decree law set to reinforce the National Health Ser vice. The aim 
of the decree was to strengthen the territorial assistance network and the func-
tions of the Ministry of Health by increasing  human and instrumental resources. 
This would include recruiting specialist doctors, bringing retired doctors out of 
retirement, and increasing the hours of outpatient specialists (Governo Italiano, 
2020a). Shortly  after the national lockdown, on March 11, 2020, the Council of 
Ministers approved an additional amendment to further strengthen the support 
provided for the health system by increasing the financial resources available for 
civil protection and security (Governo Italiano, 2020a).
National eforts to strengthen the Italian health system as a  whole through 
increased resources (financial,  human, and instrumental) proved essential during 
the crisis; the fact that they  were even necessary highlighted the country’s years 
of health bud get cuts. The diferences in regional health systems, made apparent 
through varying regional characteristics, left some regions better of than  others. 
The bottom line was this: public health and health system response in Italy was 
good, but not fast and good enough for  every region.
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Boarders
In contrast to many other Eu ro pean countries who closed their borders (i.e., 
implemented strict controls) to specific countries (i.e.,  those whose infection rates 
 were high: Italy, France, United Kingdom, Spain), Italy never officially closed its 
Schengen borders. Initially, Prime Minister Conte stated that he was opposed to 
suspending the Schengen agreement, claiming that the suspension “is a draconian 
mea sure that does not meet the needs of Italian citizens in the field of contain-
ment of infection” (“Italy Refuses to Suspend Schengen Agreement Amid Corona-
virus Outbreak,” 2020).  There are two reasons the government never had to close 
the borders: (1) all the neighboring countries had already done so and (2) in Italy 
 after March 10, 2020, you needed to fill out an autodeclaration form to leave your 
home. In fact, leaving ones home and the municipality in which a person lived 
was absolutely banned without proof that a person was  going to work (medical 
professionals), had health issues in which case a certificate would be necessary, or 
could prove that leaving the  house was a necessity. Thus, getting across a border 
was the least of citizens’ worries.
Social Policy Mea sures
Socioeconomic Response to the Crisis
The lockdown implemented by the Italian government to counteract the spread 
of the coronavirus, ( later adjusted together with the help of the ad hoc appointed 
Scientific Task Force2), drastically impacted the Italian economy, making evident 
the need for stronger (than the ordinary ones) social protection mea sures. To 
mitigate the socioeconomic efects of the pandemic the Italian government issued 
three decree laws in March, April, and May, distributing approximately EUR 80 
billion to  those sectors of the population most in need. The first, Cura Italia, 
was published on the March 17, 2020, as a collection of mea sures foreseeing the 
distribution of EUR 10 billion. This money would not only further empower the 
national healthcare ser vice but would also guarantee the economic sustainability 
of families, workers, and enterprises impacted by the pandemic.
The most impor tant mea sures foreseen by the decree, including social safety 
nets, can be summarized as follows:
• Workers from both the private and the public sector would be guaranteed 
pay if laid of.
• Each worker from both private and public sectors with  children (max twelve 
years old) could ask for fifteen days of paid parental leave. No age threshold was 
given for parents with  children who have a severe disability.
• Baby sitting vouchers amounting to a maximum of EUR 600 per month  were 
foreseen as an alternative mea sure to the parental leave.
Italy’s Response to COVID-19  327
• The parental leave was extended for  those families that had a relative with a 
severe disability.
• EUR 3 billion  were allocated to autonomous workers and professionals. 
Approximately 4,854,000  people received EUR 600 for the month of March.
• An additional EUR 300 million  were allocated and specifically dedicated to 
all  people in need who did not qualify for aid in the above- listed categories.
On April 8, 2020, the “liquidity decree” was announced, granting credit and 
deferring tax obligations for companies as well as extending administrative and 
procedural terms in the health fields (Liquidity Decree, 2020).
On April 24, 2020, the Italian Parliament passed the decree No. 18 of 2020 
(“Cura Italia” decree). The so- called “Cura Italia” law (Cura Italia Law, 2020) was 
published in the official journal on April 29, 2020, and implemented on April 30, 
2020. During the pro cess of converting the decree into law, some of the provisions 
introduced to address the economic impact of the pandemic (e.g., employment 
mea sures, financial mea sures, taxes, and public law provisions)  were amended 
by Parliament (see “COVID-19: Cura Italia Decree Converted into Law,” 2020 for 
more information).
Reinforcing the Socioeconomic Response
 These first mea sures of government support  were not adequate enough to coun-
teract the efects of the crisis and its social repercussions.  After a brief period 
of time, the so- called Reddito di emergenza (“Relaunch Decree”) was established 
with the decree n. 34 of May 19, 2020, (Decreto- Legge, 2020). On July 19, 2020, 
the Relaunch Decree went into efect, thereby leading to the amendment of sev-
eral provisions introduced to address the economic impact of the pandemic. The 
law granted a generous two- month income replacement between EUR 400 and 
800 to  those families mostly heavi ly exposed to the economic fallouts produced 
by the crisis (Brocardi, 2020). Moreover, it increased the available resources for 
the realization of volunteers’ association and social promotion association dedi-
cated to face the social and welfare emergencies deriving from the COVID-19 
crisis. Similarly, and with the same intention, the government also  adopted the 
prohibition to lay of workers.
Fi nally, to sustain the supply of adequate nutrition, the government, in close 
connection with Civil Protection, passed a solidarity- nutrition- measure (Borrelli, 
2020), wherein EUR 400 million  were collected and distributed among the most 
impacted municipalities.  These three mea sures had two core objectives: main-
taining the country’s purchasing power and supporting the country’s stability.
What is striking about  these mea sures is that Italy, already heavi ly in debt and 
struggling to keep its expenditures  under control, wanted to guarantee a large 
credit program for companies (32.1  percent of 2019 GDP), while the Italian fiscal 
stimulus tended to be normal in relation to other EU countries at 3.4  percent of 
2019 GDP (Anderson et al., 2020).
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Explanation
 Limited Public Health Investment
Since the 1990s Italy has implemented reforms attempting to contain costs associ-
ated with the healthcare needs of an aging population. The goal was to cut down 
on the country’s debt and public deficits to meet the Maastricht criteria and the 
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact (Erber, 2011). Further cuts to the 
already strained system followed with the global  financial crisis (2007–2008) and 
the euro crisis (2009), resulting in even more restrictions to healthcare spending 
(Pavolini & Vicarelli, 2013; Figure 18.1). The result of  these thirty yearlong cuts to 
the public health system led to two very impor tant developments discussed in 
detail by (Prante et al., 2020): (1) The number of acute care hospitals (inpatient 
hospitals as opposed to outpatient hospitals)  were drastically reduced from 2.5 
per 100,000 in the 1990s to no more than 1.6 by 2014, falling below the EU aver-
age. (2) The number of acute care beds, central in combating the coronavirus, in 
Italy  were reduced by a staggering amount. In 1990 the country still had seven 
beds per 1,000 inhabitants. This number was cut to 2.6 per 1,000 by 2017.  Because 
of  these reductions, it is not surprising that the number of ICU beds, also funda-
mental in the treatment of the coronavirus, decreased by 19  percent over a ten- 
year time period (Prante et al., 2020).
Two concerns presented themselves during the pandemic as direct conse-
quences of  these consistent and substantial cuts to the public health system: 
(1) a lack of medical equipment (e.g. medical masks, protective suits, respirators) 
and (2) not enough medical staf. The lack of medical equipment must first and 
foremost be attributed to a poor disaster preparedness strategy, which afected 































Figure 18.1. Healthcare expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic  
product (GDP).
Source: World Bank (2020).
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than other countries, and authorities failed to update the preparedness plan 
in case of a pandemic  (Graziani, 2020). Second, a lack of solidarity among EU 
countries delayed and downright prevented the transfer of medical supplies to 
Italy during the initial phases of the pandemic (Sardone, 2020). Fi nally,  because 
of the fact that Italy had much less medical equipment to begin with, it was 
especially difficult to make  these purchases amid a pandemic in which every one 
needed the same supplies. The chief executive, Robert Hamilton, of the world’s 
largest ventilator producer, Hamilton Medical, mentioned that “Italy may have 
less than a quarter of the breathing machines necessary to help patients” (Miller, 
2020).
The Italian prob lem with doctors is and has been that, although the country 
has a proportionally high amount of doctors compared to the EU average (Eu ro-
pean Observatory on Health Systems, 2019), more than 50  percent of  these are 
above the age of fifty, and 15.5  percent are over the age of sixty- five (Figure 18.2). 
For this reason and  because many medical professionals  were contracting the dis-
ease as a direct result of insufficient protective gear, medical retirees  were asked 
to come back to work and medical students in their last year of education  were 
employed by hospitals.
The long history of financial cuts to the healthcare sector in Italy directly 
impacted the country’s death toll. Without adequate and sufficient medical sup-
plies, the disproportionately older medical staf was contracting the virus, thereby 
causing a shortage of doctors within the system. This, in turn, reduced the num-
ber of  human resources the country had to combat the spread of the virus, result-















Figure 18.2. Italian physicians by age in 2017.
Source: Adapted from Eurostat (2019).
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Po liti cal and Administrative Capacity Combined  
with Inexperience
Three intertwined prob lems made it difficult for the Italian government to 
respond efficiently and efectively to the virus and the ensuing social crisis that 
resulted from the lengthy lockdown period. The first focuses on Italy’s fundamen-
tal unpreparedness and inexperience. Although a national pandemic plan was pre-
sent (Italian Ministry of Health, 2002), it was outdated and practically never used, 
and thus all the procedures had to be reinvented in the midst of the pandemic. 
The result was, among other  things, that overfilled hospitals began transferring 
infected patients to retirement homes, leading to mass deaths among the el derly 
(Priviteria, 2020). In addition,  because  there had been no similarly severe out-
breaks in recent years, the Italian government was slow to move from a period of 
“denial” (denying the severity and potential repercussion of the virus) to trying to 
normalize the threat, to actually beginning to recognize that the threat was a real 
prob lem that required a solution. What resulted was complete disarray among 
institutional actors (national and regional governments). The government began 
creating red zones in certain municipalities, and the opposition leaders requested 
that  these be revoked, only to then request that the entire country be closed of 
(Capano, 2020).
The second prob lem highlights the country’s weak administrative capacity 
(also problematic in other Western countries). This could most clearly be seen 
in eforts to supply aid packages to citizens and businesses. At the beginning of 
May, President Conte apologized on behalf of the government  because thou-
sands of Italian workers had not yet received state aid (Good, 2020). Many mea-
sures meant to help families, businesses, and individuals  were hampered by long 
administrative delays typical of the inefficient Italian bureaucracy (Bouckaert & 
Jann, 2020), ultimately resulting in increased inequalities (Brunori et al., 2020; 
Pavolini, 2020). Simply put,  people  were not receiving the promised financial 
support.
The final and biggest prob lem points to  limited po liti cal capacity. Recent po liti-
cal developments in the country, including the PRR Lega entering into a gov-
ernmental co ali tion with the equally instable 5 Star Movement in 2018 and then 
leaving the co ali tion  after a failed takeover (see Poli, 2020 for more information), 
resulted in a “ruling government that was composed of many ministers with a 
substantial lack of experience and very short po liti cal  careers” (Capano, 2020, 
p. 340). This fact produced not only conflictual policy agendas, thereby decreas-
ing the government’s consensual ability to design coherent policies, but also a 
government that did not want to make drastic decisions for which they would 
then be held accountable. The result was twofold: on the one hand, the po liti cal 
discourse taking place in the country during the pandemic became increasingly 
unproductive, and on the other, experts and technocrats  were called upon to help 
the government out of its po liti cal stalemate as well as share the responsibility and 
eventual blame that accompanies decision- making (Capano, 2020).
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Although the involvement of experts3 helped convince the public that the gov-
ernment recognized the relevance and importance of the prob lem and was taking 
concrete steps to counteract it, the im mense number of experts presented two new 
prob lems. It showcased the fundamental uncertainty of Italian officials in making 
decisions, and it risked weakening the demo cratic accountability of the entire po liti-
cal system. In other words, involving such a high number of experts in the decision- 
making pro cess impacted the transparency of the pro cess itself. This resulted in 
questions such as, Who is in charge of making decisions? Are  these the best deci-
sions only  because experts suggested them? Although it is surely fundamental to 
establish a technical committee during a pandemic, why  were so many experts actu-
ally involved, and why  were they involved in issues not strictly related to healthcare?
The Pandemic and the Italian Party Politics
What is perhaps most in ter est ing in terms of the pandemic in Italy is not so much 
how party politics impacted the management of the pandemic, but rather how the 
pandemic impacted party politics. The pandemic resulted in an increased elec-
toral appeal for certain parties, specifically PRR parties; however, the nature of 
this efect is still ambiguous and in pro gress. At the beginning of the pandemic, 
some commentators argued that the coronavirus would represent the end of pop-
u lism in Italy (“Italy’s Young Doctors Protest Lack of Training Pushing Them to 
Go Abroad,” 2020; Kendall- Taylor & Nietsche, 2020; Rossi & Parodi, 2020); as 
if the biological virus could counteract the “populist virus.” However, the real ity 
turned out to be diferent.
Both the Populist Radical Right leader, Salvini, and the representative of the 
radical right party Fratelli d’Italia, Meloni, initially negated the evidence of the 
pandemic. Salvini’s Facebook posts encouraged followers to continue with their 
normal lives, while Meloni told her Facebook followers not to believe anything 
that was being said on TV (Nardelli & D’Urso, 2020a).  After the lockdown, they 
both adapted their rhe toric to the  normalization and consequent awareness of the 
emergency, wherein Salvini argued that the lockdowns  were not  going far enough 
and that every thing needed to be shut down. Both PRR leaders started attacking 
the EU’s response to the crisis, and they released a video stating that the virus 
was bioengineered in China (Nardelli & D’Urso, 2020b). At that point, the slow-
ness in the implementation of the above- mentioned mea sures to counteract the 
socioeconomic crisis became the substance of the PRRs po liti cal discourse and 
the parties capitalized on the crisis to reinforce their anti- EU stances. In parallel 
to the evolution of their rhe toric, the consensus for their leadership also changed 
throughout the course of the pandemic. The PRR flank (represented by Salvini’s 
Lega and Meloni’s  Brothers of Italy) blamed the government for not being able to 
make substantive decisions and implementing them. During times of crisis, Ital-
ians, like any other citizens, appeared to look for solemn and stable leaders. Despite 
still being the strongest party in terms of consensus, Salvini’s Lega lost 4 percentage 
points of support since the end of February and ten points since last summer’s peak 
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(Roberts, 2020), putting it at 27  percent as of July 2020. At first glance, this might 
confirm the notion that the coronavirus is killing the PRR; however, the decrease in 
consensus for the Lega made room for the even more right- wing  Brothers of Italy 
 under Giorgia Meloni. This party saw a rise in support from approximately  7 to 
14 percentage points, the highest level ever reached by the party (Roberts, 2020). 
To be sure, the (slight) increase of Meloni’s success looks like a consequence of the 
loss of appeal by Salvini.
In addition, as Salvini’s favorability decreased, Luca Zaia, the governor of Veneto 
and more moderate figure within the Lega party, experienced a po liti cal boost. 
Zaia’s  handling of the crisis in Veneto, one of the regions most afected by the pan-
demic, garnered him much support, leading to his third term as governor (Piani-
giani, 2020) and making him the second most loved politician in Italy (51  percent 
of the consensus)  behind Prime Minister Conte (Roberts, 2020). Although Sal-
vini’s light might be fading,  there is no shortage of PRR politicians waiting for 
their chance at center stage.
Furthermore, right- wing forces capitalized on the crisis scapegoating on their 
traditional targets (i.e., immigrants and minorities). The coronavirus pandemic 
coupled with the increased support for the PRR shed a new light on the prob-
lems associated with the managing of refugees and mi grants in the country. To 
begin with, refugees, asylum seekers, and mi grants  were among the most severely 
impacted by the crisis (“Life in Italy  Under COVID-19,” 2020). Second, the issue 
of how to provide the basic voluntary and welfare ser vices while also guaranteeing 
the safety of their personnel and volunteers had been amplified. As the corona-
virus makes its reappearance in Italy during the writing of this conclusion (Sep-
tember 2020), mi grants are being made into a recurring target for PRR politicians 
who (continue to) claim, despite official data proving the contrary, that they are 
transporting the virus into Italy.
Fi nally, it should be noted that, while the visibility and success of the right- 
wing forces increased during the first wave of the pandemic, the two po liti cal 
parties in government (i.e., the 5SM and the Demo cratic Party) did not seem to 
be able to increase their support. In fact, only support for Prime Minister Conte 
increased.
However, on a more positive note, the pandemic also gave way to a strong 
and collective civil society led by activists that created new forms of expressing 
their grievances (della Porta, 2020). In Italy, for example, “100,000 doctors signed 
a petition calling for the territorially decentralized organ ization of healthcare 
provision,” and in Milan “the health care personnel of private hospitals staged 
‘stay- ins’ (keeping social distance) to protest the deterioration of their working 
conditions” (della Porta, 2020). In this sense, civil society actors  were not only 
suggesting alternative approaches to the management of the crisis, as well as many 
other economic categories, but also indicating that the path to achieving favorable 
results would not be through the centralization of po liti cal decision- making and 
even less through technocratic actions, but rather by increasing the participation 
of the citizens (della Porta, 2020).
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Conclusion
The corona pandemic engulfed Italy while it was still trying to recover from 
de cades of strict cost- containment mea sures, particularly impacting hospital 
capacity, the healthcare workforce, public expenditure for phar ma ceu ti cals, and 
out- of- pocket payments for patients. This fact combined with an outdated disas-
ter preparedness plan and an inexperienced government resulted in 35,724 deaths 
(as of September 2020), second only to the United Kingdom in Eu rope.
The Italian government’s coronavirus approach went from a period of denial 
to a federal patchwork strategy of containment, to a very rigid and strict lock-
down. During the initial containment strategies, certain federal, regional, and 
municipal officials took the virus more serious than  others, leading to confusion 
and disagreement among some of the Italian public. Statements such as the ones 
made by Prime Minister Conte and other officials blaming Italy’s high number 
of infections on the aggressive testing of  people without symptoms in the north, 
which they argued only created hysteria and tarnished the country’s image abroad 
(Horo witz, 2020), not only slowed the drive for increased testing in many north-
ern regions but also signaled to the public that the virus was not that danger-
ous. Similarly, Italy’s Foreign Minister Luigi di Maio and Health Minister Roberto 
Speranza told international journalists at the end of February that Italy had gone 
from an “epidemic risk to an ‘info- demic’ of confirmed disinformation, which at 
this moment is hitting our flow of tourists, our business and our  whole economic 
system” (D’Emilio & Winfield, 2020) certainly did not help the credibility of pro-
posed lockdowns a few weeks  later.
The Italian case is one that has and  will undoubtedly continue to be studied not 
only  because it was the first country drastically impacted by the virus but also 
 because the virus claimed a disproportionately high number of lives, for which the 
reasons are still highly debated. Furthermore, the impact of the pandemic on Italy 
was strong not only from a health standpoint but also from an economic one. Italy 
entered the pandemic in a less stable economic state than its neighboring countries 
with a government debt of 132  percent of GDP in 2018 (Gramlich, 2020), never  really 
having recovered from the 2008 economic crisis. The Eu ro pean Commission’s pro-
jections for the Italian postpandemic economy are a decrease of 11.2   percent of 
GDP for 2020 and an increase of 6.1  percent of GDP for 2021 (Eu ro pean Commis-
sion, 2020). What makes the economic situation in Italy particularly bad is that 
overdue reforms  were held up  because of the complex and old- fashioned Italian 
bureaucracy, the slow judicial system, and outdated infrastructure. Within such a 
context the social assistance and aid for citizens and business heavi ly impacted by 
the crisis was undeniably slow and filled with administrative hurdles.
Subsequent research could investigate the most efficient and efective ways the 
country could use the EUR 209 billion, a combination of grants and loans from the 
EU, to stabilize the economy, reinvest in health care and public health, and perhaps, 
most importantly, take initial steps in simplifying the overly complicated Italian 
bureaucracy and reforming the slow judicial system. In addition, eyes should be 
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directed to the PRR leaders as they continue to polarize society and capitalize on 
the pandemic. By accusing mi grants and minorities as virus spreaders (della Porta, 
2020), blaming the EU for their lack of solidarity, and the denouncing EU loans as 
weakening Italian sovereignty, these parties are refueling heated Italexit debates 
(see Di Quirico, 2020 for more information). The needs of the Italian citizens and 
the Italian economy must be addressed, and one might be left wondering  whether 
the substantial weaknesses displayed by the po liti cal parties in government vis- à- 
vis the increased visibility of the radical Right could have negative efects on the 
Italian po liti cal system  after the pandemic.
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Notes
 1. The region of Veneto is an exception as mass testing, at- home care provision, and 
contact tracing significantly helped curb the death rate in this region, which was the low-
est out of all the Northern regions with 1.1 daily deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (Ciminelli & 
Garcia- Mandicó, 2020).
 2. The term scientific task force refers to a group of scientific experts appointed by 
the Italian government to limit and counteract the efects of the COVID-19 crisis on the 
population. Lead by Walter Ricciardi, Paolo De Rosa, and Fidelia Cascini, the core objec-
tive was to provide regions with guidelines on hospital reor ga ni za tion, community care 
networks, and related facilities.
 3. Fifteen dif er ent taskforces  were established at the national level, some of them with 
curious and in ter est ing roles (see Capano [2020] for more details).
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Kenneth A. Dubin
A World- Class Health System?
Spain has been hit hard by COVID-19, with more than 300,000 cases, 28,498 con-
firmed deaths, and around 44,000 excess deaths, as of Aug 4, 2020. More than 
50,000 health workers have been infected, and nearly 20,000 deaths  were in nurs-
ing homes. With a population of 47 million,  these data place Spain among the worst 
afected countries. Spain is also reported to have one of the best performing health 
systems in the world and ranks 15th in the Global Health Security index. So how is 
it pos si ble that Spain now finds itself in this position? (García- Basteiro et al., 2020)
So begins an open letter in The Lancet by twenty public health experts calling 
for an in de pen dent evaluation of Spain’s COVID-19 response. They demand that 
the evaluation consider “governance and decision- making, scientific and techni-
cal advice, and operational capacity,” along with rising economic in equality. This 
chapter provides an early look at  these very questions.
The Spanish government was slower to respond to rising infection rates than 
most of its closest peers, leading to some of the world’s highest infection rates and 
mortality rates, particularly in its two largest metropolitan areas, Madrid and Barce-
lona. The central government then proceeded to institute one of the strictest lock-
downs in Eu rope, with mobility data suggesting some of the highest rates of compli-
ance (Otero- Iglesias et al., 2020) anywhere. Given  these high compliance rates and 
the long lockdown (five fifteen- day extensions of the initial two- week state of alarm), 
one might have expected authorities to be prepared to manage the subsequent relax-
ation of controls on movement. Unfortunately, Spain experienced one of the most 
rapid increases in infection rates anywhere, with authorities woefully  unprepared to 
manage isolated outbreaks as infection rates threaten to spiral out of control.1
Public Health and Health System Response in Spain
Spain is a quasi- federalist system (Dubin, 2019). All seventeen regional governments 
(autonomous communities, or ACs) have been responsible for the delivery of 
health care since 2002 and, beyond basic standards set by the central government, 
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enjoy substantial discretionary authority over the structuring of health delivery. 
Health policy is in princi ple coordinated through a variety of intergovernmen-
tal working groups; however,  these mechanisms have long been characterized by 
the reluctance of some regions, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, to 
participate.
Pandemic response in Spain has been managed through a National System 
of Early Alert and Rapid Response (acronym in Spanish, SIAPR) led by a subdi-
rectorate of the Ministry of Health, the Center for the Coordination of Warnings 
and Health Emergencies (acronym in Spanish, CCAES). The CCAES is the lead 
node of a network composed of representatives from the AC health ser vices, with 
support from vari ous agencies of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, 
the Agency for Food Security and Nutrition (acronym in Spanish, AESAN), the 
Agency for Medicines and Health Products (acronym in Spanish, AEMPS) and 
the national health research center, the Instituto de Salud Carlos III (Ministerio 
de Sanidad, 2013).
The 2019 Global Health Security Index evaluated Spain’s system highly in terms 
of its ability to detect epidemics (ranked eleventh out of 195 countries) but called 
into question its ability to respond.  There is an Interterritorial Council within the 
SIAPR to facilitate technical coordination with the regions but no formal mecha-
nism for policy coordination and no role whatsoever for the private sector. More 
critically, the SIAPR lacks a dedicated bud get, a fact that led the Global Health 
Security Index to rank Spain in position 131 with re spect to financing. Indeed, the 
entire bud get for public health only represented approximately 1   percent of the 
country’s total health bud get (Otero- Iglesias et al., 2020).  There is also no provi-
sion for external evaluation ( whether public or private) of the SIAPR’s planning, 
as evaluation was delegated to a working group formed by technical personnel 
participating in the SIAPR, the Ponencia de Alertas y Planes de Preparación y 
Respuesta (Arteaga, 2020).
Chronology of Crisis
Community transmission in Spain began in mid- February  2020. On March, 5, 
2020, the Ministry of Health issued its first protection protocol for healthcare 
workers, leaving each AC health ser vice to decide if cases met the definition of 
“high- risk exposure,” warranting a fourteen- day withdrawal from active ser vice. 
However, testing was only recommended for  those exhibiting symptoms and 
quarantine was not addressed (Ministerio de Sanidad, 2020). The circular was 
updated on March 14, 2020, classifying staf interactions according to intensity of 
contact and  whether PPE (personal protective equipment) was in use. The gov-
ernment now recommended home quarantine in cases of high- risk exposure with 
a polymerase chain reaction (PCR) diagnostic test  after seven days.
On March 7, 2020, lockdown was ordered in several neighborhoods of the 
town of Haro in the region of La Rioja  after the failure by a group of thirty- nine 
residents infected with the virus at a funeral to follow self- confinement. The Civil 
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Guard was ordered to ensure the peace and the regional president threatened 
fines of up to EUR 60,000 for  those failing to observe quarantine.
The following day 120,000  people in Madrid attended the International 
 Women’s Day march and some 9,000  people attended an indoor rally by the far- 
right VOX party to protest against demands for greater gender equality. Two days 
 later the VOX general secretary tested positive, leading to the suspension of the 
national parliament for two weeks and self- quarantine for all fifty- two VOX depu-
ties. On March 9, 2020, the Madrid regional government closed all schools, ush-
ering in an exodus of madrileños from their urban apartments to second homes 
around the country in anticipation of a national lockdown announcement, carry-
ing the virus out across the nation (Minder, 2020).
On March 10, 2020, all direct flights to Italy  were suspended  until March 25, 
and on March 12 all traffic was suspended with Morocco. By March 12, all ACs 
had ordered the closure of schools and the Ministry of the Interior had imposed 
a nationwide prison lockdown. On that same day, the Catalan regional govern-
ment ordered confinement for four towns covering some 70,000  people  after an 
outbreak afecting mostly hospital personnel (EFE, 2020).
The following day the prime minister declared a constitutional state of alarm 
for fifteen days beginning on March 14.2 A full thirty days had passed since the 
first confirmed COVID-19 death in Spain (and forty- three days since the first con-
firmed case) and the banning of nonessential movement, the closing of nones-
sential shops, and the closing of schools (Pappas, 2020). The central government 
took control of the regional health systems and all regional and local policing bod-
ies, although operational management structures remained unchanged. It also 
reserved for itself the right to direct the actions of private health providers.3 On 
March 16, 2020, Spain closed its land borders, interrupting the Schengen Agree-
ment, with the exception of returning citizens and residents, diplomatic person-
nel, and workers involved in supply chains of essential goods.4 A more restrictive 
state of alarm was imposed for fifteen days on March 28, 2020, with all nones-
sential workers now required to remain in their homes and firms prohibited from 
laying of workers for quarantine- related  causes.
Confinement would be extended five more times, lasting  until midnight on 
June 20, 2020, with some nonessential workers able to return to work on April 12. 
In the April 24 meeting of the Inter- territorial Health Council (Consejo Interter-
ritorial de Salud), the health system directors of each AC presented their proposals 
for relaxing confinement to the Minister of Health. Some regions favored unified 
criteria managed by the central government (Valencia, Andalucía, Castile- La Man-
cha, and Castile- León), whereas  others preferred an asymmetric and self- managed 
approach (“Asimétrica y Dirigida por el Gobierno” [“Asymmetric and Led by the 
Government”], 2020). The Ministry’s request for more detailed information pro-
voked widespread criticism, particularly from the Catalans and Basques. The 
renewal of the state of alarm on April  26 permitted  children  under fourteen to 
leave their homes for one hour a day in the com pany of an adult member of their 
 house hold.5
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Each renewal of the state of alarm required ratification by a  simple major-
ity in the Congress. By the time the fifth state of alarm was declared on May 6, 
2020, support for the mea sure was beginning to slip. Pablo Casado, leader of the 
largest opposition party, the conservative Popu lar party (PP), denounced the gov-
ernment for imposing a “constitutional dictatorship” and abstained rather than 
voting in  favor as it had done four times previously. The government was thus 
forced to make further concessions to gain the support of the conservative Basque 
Nationalist party (PNV) and the liberal Citizens party (Ciudadanos). The Basques 
achieved “joint” decision- making between the central government and the ACs 
in the relaxation of confinement and greater regional discretion in “interpreting” 
ministerial  orders. They also obtained government approval to celebrate regional 
elections in July 2020 (Castro & Riveiro, 2020).
The final state of alarm was declared on May 20, 2020. The government had 
initially sought to extend this final alarm a full month, but to gain the support of 
the Citizens party, it was, like the previous ones,  limited to fifteen days. For the 
first time, the PP voted against the mea sure, demanding the end of quarantine for 
international tourists.
The government’s asymmetrical plan for relaxing confinement established 
four phases, allowing regions to proceed at dif er ent rates. In princi ple, each 
Wednesday the ACs would pre sent their phase proposals for the following week, 
and on Friday the government would announce which regions could move from 
phase to phase and with which mea sures. Some ACs defined their entire territory 
as a single zone, whereas  others distinguished between more or less populated 
areas; however, the primary region for relaxation criteria was the province (of 
which  there are fifty), as  these most closely correspond to the country’s main met-
ropolitan areas (Otero- Iglesias, 2020). From phase 3, the ACs took over manage-
ment of the crisis.
The Ministry of Health would make its decision based on regional transmis-
sion rates and regional health system capacities— early alerts and epidemiologi-
cal tracking, rapid identification and control of contagion, capacity for isolating 
confirmed and potential cases, primary health capacity, hospital capacity (1.5 to 
2 2 UCI beds/10,000 inhabitants; 37–40 beds/10,000 inhabitants), and prompt 
and high- quality reporting of the information requested from ACs on March 15 
(Boletín Oficial del Estado. 15 de marzo, Orden SND/234/2020; Boletín Oficial del 
Estado, 3 de mayo 2020; Boletín Oficial del Estado; SND/387/2020, de 3 de mayo 
[ Orders of the National Dependent Care System]).
Exiting Lockdown
On June 9, 2020, the government published its decree law outlining mea sures 
to keep the pandemic  under control  after a phased exit from the state of alarm.6 
Masks  were required for all persons age six and older on all public transporta-
tion and any public or private space, indoor or outdoor where a distance of 1.5 
meters could not be maintained, with fines of up to EUR 100. Specific limits on 
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gatherings  were left to the ACs. Firms  were required to promote remote work 
where pos si ble, maintain distances of 1.5 meters where pos si ble, and provide spe-
cial protections when impossible.  There  were no additional special mea sures for 
schools.
Residences and day centers for the el derly  were required to coordinate mea-
sures with the AC health ser vices to identify cases quickly among  residents and 
workers and to ensure safe visits and outings. The ACs  were asked to “guarantee” 
PCR or equivalent tests for any suspected cases “as soon as pos si ble,” particularly 
in primary care, and to report all cases and outbreaks as established by protocols 
to be approved in the Inter- territorial Council of the National Health System. The 
protocol objectives  were defined as homogeneity in control, information, data 
flows, and timely analy sis.
The government also created a contact- tracing smartphone application (app) 
called “Radar COVID.”  After a pi lot program on La Gomera in the Canary Islands, 
the app was released on August 10, 2020. However, each AC had to connect the 
app to its own contact- tracing system to activate it, and they  were not required to 
do so  until September 15, 2020 (“Radar COVID,” 2020).
On June 11, 2020, the government approved a pi lot proj ect for tourists from 
other Schengen countries, as long as both the country and the Balearic Islands 
had COVID-19 infection rates below 9 per 100,000 inhabitants for at least seven 
consecutive days. Visitors  were required to provide proof of a minimum five- night 
stay with a return ticket to the same airport.7
Social and Economic Policy Mea sures to Ease the Crisis
On March 12, 2020, the government approved a decree law to advance EUR 2.87 
billion to the fifteen ACs in the common financing system8, half on March 23 and 
the remainder in mid- April. The decree included monetary or in- kind assistance 
for families with school- aged  children who qualified for assistance with school 
meals as long as schools remained closed.9
On March 17, 2020, the government published a battery of extraordinary mea-
sures to combat the efects of the social and economic crisis. Working time reduc-
tions and temporary layofs  were incentivized by eliminating or reducing firms’ 
social security obligations for the afected workers during the crisis, eliminating 
minimum working periods for access to benefits and excluding payments received 
from workers’ overall eligibility. Workers could receive a maximum of 70  percent 
of their salary, up to EUR 1,412/month. The self- employed gained easier access 
to unemployment benefits, and workers with new, crisis- related dependent care 
responsibilities  were provided with exceptional facilities to adapt working hours 
and conditions.10
A mortgage payment moratorium was approved for qualified debtors, and 
utility providers  were prohibited from cutting of  water, electricity, and gas to the 
vulnerable; providers  were also prohibited from cutting of basic telephone and 
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internet ser vice to existing subscribers. EUR 300 million was provided to the ACs 
(which they could transfer as needed to provincial and local governmental entities) 
for COVID-19 social ser vices delivery costs such as meals for the el derly, home 
care and telemedicine, PPE purchases, and additional staf for retirement homes.
The government also set aside EUR 100 billion for funding and financing pro-
grams for businesses. The Ministry of Economy and Digital Transformation was 
able to provide loan guarantees of up to EUR 100 million through December 31, 
2020. The ceiling for total outstanding credits issuable by the Official Credit Insti-
tute (ICO) was increased by EUR 10 billion, with special emphasis on expanding 
credit access for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the self- employed. Up 
to EUR 2 billion was set aside for export lines of credit, again with special empha-
sis for SMEs and the self- employed. Meanwhile, a battery of extensions  were set 
out for individual and corporate tax payments.
Fi nally, funds  were mobilized for COVID-19- related research. The Carlos III 
Health Institute, an entity within the Ministry of Health, was granted EUR 24 mil-
lion to subsidize third- party research proj ects and EUR 1.2 million for increased 
internal costs such as overtime. The country’s main public research institute, the 
CSIC, was granted EUR 4 million for virus- related proj ects.
On May 29, 2020, the co ali tion government introduced by decree law a nation-
wide minimum income for impoverished  house holds.11 Spain had been the only 
EU member state without such a program at the national level. Although several 
of the ACs ofered some kind of basic income support, only the Basque Country’s 
program had been significant enough to have a mea sur able impact on poverty 
(Ayala et al., 2020). This conditional basic minimum income was a cornerstone 
of the Socialist- Podemos co ali tion government formed on January 7, 2020, rather 
than a direct product of the crisis. Notably, in a moment of intense partisan con-
flict, the mea sure was supported by all parties except the extreme- right VOX. The 
maximum benefit was set at EUR 461 for individuals and EUR 1,015 for families of 
five or more. The government allocated EUR 3 billion/year for the program and 
estimated that it would benefit 2.3 million citizens and  legal residents (of which 
1.6 million  were living in extreme poverty) aged 23 to 65 with at least one year reg-
istered with the Spanish social security and incomes of less than EUR 451/month 
(individuals) or EUR 993 (families with 5 or more members), excluding benefits 
from AC and other basic income programs. More than 1.3 million  children  were 
expected to benefit from the mea sure. Beneficiaries had to register with the public 
employment ser vice and participate in schemes to improve social inclusion.12
Explanations
Proximate  Causes of Spain’s COVID-19 Disaster
The immediate  causes of high infection and mortality rates during March and 
April 2020 and the rapid increase in infection rates  after the relaxation of lock-
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down are relatively clear: a failure to stockpile sufficient PPE and test kits as the 
threat of the pandemic grew, a failure to isolate facilities for the el derly,  limited data 
about the evolution of cases, and a failure to put in place a robust system of testing 
and contact tracing before relaxing lockdown. All of  these  factors can be traced 
back to prob lems in the structure and dynamics of the Spanish national health 
system and its po liti cal institutions more generally.
Severe Material Shortages
The Spanish pandemic preparedness system was woefully underfunded, had few 
strategic reserves, and was largely unprepared to take over purchasing from the 
regions or even to coordinate AC purchases. Despite warnings from the World 
Health Organ ization (WHO) on February 2, 2020, and again on February 11 and 
from the Eu ro pean Commission (EC) two days  later to ensure adequate supplies 
of medical equipment, Spain only began to purchase additional materials on 
global markets  after lockdown was declared, paying enormously inflated prices 
for goods that  were defective or simply never arrived (Lamet, 2020).
The abject failure of central and regional governments to ensure an adequate 
supply of PPE at the beginning of the crisis can be seen in the rate of infection 
of healthcare personnel. By late April, according the Eu ro pean Centre for Dis-
ease Protection and Control, healthcare personnel represented 20   percent of 
COVID-19 cases in Spain, double the rate in Italy, and much higher than any-
where  else. This figure excluded rates of infection among  those caring for the 
el derly in retirement homes and day centers, but a review of AC data on infections 
in this latter group suggests that they represent roughly 7 to 8  percent of all cases 
in Spain (Güell, 2020).
 There does appear to be some belated learning on this issue. On August 6, 
2020, the government reached an agreement with the ACs for a new public tender 
to purchase EUR 2.5 billion in strategic supplies (gowns, gloves, masks, PCR test 
kits) for COVID-19. The tender was delayed for two weeks while the government 
negotiated with four regions who initially did not ask to be included. In the end 
all but Valencia (which claimed that local SMEs could not meet provider solvency 
conditions) agreed to participate (Sevillano, 2020).
Faulty Data Collection and Reporting
Data collection and reporting prob lems have hampered Spain’s coronavirus 
response throughout the crisis and raised serious doubts about the reliability of 
reported data.  Until February 25, 2020, the Ministry of Health  limited testing to 
 people who had been in Wuhan, leaving authorities blind to local contagion. Not 
 until April 3 did the government issue an order requesting epidemiological infor-
mation on nursing homes from the regions (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 4 April 
SND/322/2020 [Order of the National Dependent Care System]), even though 
they  were the epicenter of the epidemic.
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Once data  were requested, the ACs failed to upload much of the requested 
individual data to SiVies, the National Epidemiological Center’s platform. On 
March 16, 2020, some ten thousand cases  were reported in Spain; the platform only 
reported some seven hundred. At the end of March 2020, Catalonia, the Basque 
Country, and Galicia (the first two particularly hard hit) had only uploaded some 
20  percent of their known cases to SiVies, and Castile- La Mancha none. Only on 
May 12, 2020, did the government formalize its request for individualized data. 
However, the pro cess was managed so badly that from May 21 to June 10, 2020, 
the Ministry’s panel data for the “Covid-19 Situation” was not updated (Llaneras, 
2020).
Why has reporting been so difficult? Central and regional government infor-
mation systems are often obsolete, operations are understafed, and reporting 
pro cesses and systems difer across regions, sometimes even from health unit to 
health unit.  These prob lems predated the crisis but  were compounded by repeated 
changes in the information requested (Andrino et al., 2020). The crisis manage-
ment team was improvising  because no previous central government had legis-
lated an obligatory harmonization of epidemiological information or provided the 
regions with the resources to put such a solution into place.
Insufficient Contact Tracing
According to a member of the interdisciplinary committee charged with plotting 
the lockdown relaxation strategy, the first and most impor tant pillar of their strat-
egy was “the capacity to test, trace and isolate (potential) cases and to have the 
strategic healthcare infrastructure to deal with a pos si ble new outbreak” (Otero- 
Iglesias, 2020).
However, in both Catalonia and Madrid, the two hardest- hit ACs during the 
first phase of the crisis, governments proved themselves unwilling or unable to 
recruit even remotely enough contact tracers to meet international best prac-
tices. Instead, both governments have sought volunteers and outsourced eforts 
to contractors already providing operators for standard emergency ser vices. 
Contract tracers receive insufficient training and coordination with primary care 
centers— identified by the ministry as the key actor to ensure prompt testing and 
tracking—is tenuous at best (Galaup, 2020; Rodríguez & Puente, 2020). Why? 
Press reports suggest a reliance on volunteers that never appeared, a reluctance to 
increase staffing and a belief that cases would not increase  until the fall left many 
regions unprepared for the rapid increase in cases (e.g., Pérez Mendoza & Cabal-
lero, 2020).
The Tragedy of Elder Care
From 2005 to 2015, Spain increased the number of dedicated spaces in nursing 
homes from twenty to almost forty- five per one thousand inhabitants over the 
age of sixty- five. The rapid demand for such beds took place against a backdrop 
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of increasing austerity, encouraging the ACs responsible for  these homes to invite 
private sector participation as a cheap way to satisfy a growing po liti cal demand. 
Large firms entered the sector, taking advantage of abundant low- skilled  labor and 
lax inspection regimes (Palomera Zaidel, 2020).
The Ministry of Health estimates that from April 6 to June 20, 27,359  people 
died in nursing homes, some 69   percent of all COVID-19 deaths. Many died 
unnecessarily, and many died alone with inadequate palliative care. The Span-
ish chapter of Doctors Without Borders provided support to almost five hundred 
homes, mostly in Barcelona and Madrid, and has recently published a scathing 
report (Médicos sin Fronteras, 2020). Almost uniformly, the homes  were under-
resourced and lacked contingency plans.  Little testing was available, and no clear 
protocol existed for patients and staf testing positive. Many homes lacked the 
space to isolate patients. Personnel  were forced to provide quasi- medical sup-
port without adequate training; when staf fell sick, remaining colleagues  were 
totally overwhelmed.  There was scarce collaboration between AC departments 
of health and  human ser vices, provincial authorities, municipal authorities, and 
nongovernmental providers (nonprofit foundations and for- profit corporations). 
Requests to admit the sick to hospitals  were often denied, even though  there  were 
beds available (Médicos sin Fronteras, 2020).
Not  until early August 2020 did the Ministry of Social Rights reach an agree-
ment with the ACs and the Federation of Municipalities and Provinces with 
 recommendations for nursing homes in case of new outbreaks (Borraz & Zas 
Marcos, 2020). Yet diverse criteria continue to be applied, with, for example, some 
regions requiring PCR tests for visitors and personnel,  others only for person-
nel, and still  others not requiring them at all. As of late August 2020, numerous 
COVID-19 cases  were again being reported in nursing homes.
Structural Explanations
Few countries have seen COVID-19 infection and mortality rates as high as Spain, 
and no Eu ro pean country has seen its infection rates rise as quickly  after lock-
down was lifted. This is, at its surface, surprising given the strong international 
reputation of Spain’s national health system. Yet, in many ways, an airborne virus 
has brought to the surface  every weakness of the Spanish public health system and 
its po liti cal institutions. Before analyzing  these institutional prob lems, however, 
we need to take note of the structural challenges that exacerbated the institutional 
challenges faced by the country’s po liti cal leaders.
Spain has one of the oldest populations in the world.  Because the virus is 
particularly lethal for older  people, it makes sense that Spain’s mortality rate 
would be relatively high. This demographic challenge has been compounded by 
urban development and long- standing cultural patterns that  favor virus trans-
mission. The territory of Spain is sparsely populated; however, if we consider 
only the areas where  people live, then Spanish population density is second only 
to Malta in the Eu ro pean Union (Rae, 2020). Spaniards are also quite social, and 
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socializing in Spain traditionally involves close physical contact, with frequent 
hugging and kissing; physical distancing is not a part of the Spanish social reper-
toire. Spaniards are also familial in comparison to northern Eu ro pe ans. Although 
multigenerational homes are less common then they once  were, extended  family 
meetings are frequent, and visits to the el derly are common (Otero- Iglesias et al., 
2020).
Spain’s economy also relies heavi ly on sectors that facilitate the spread of air-
borne viruses. Almost 15  percent of the economy is based on tourism, and much of 
that tourist infrastructure is devoted to delivering intensely social experiences for 
foreigners on beaches and in city and town centers. Spain is also one of Eu rope’s 
leading producers of fruits and vegetables. The harvesting season extends across 
much of the year, and mi grant laborers move from region- to- region following 
seasonal harvests.  Labor laws are poorly enforced and living conditions often 
abysmal. About 18  percent of outbreaks since the relaxation of confinement have 
been concentrated among seasonal agricultural workers, particularly in Catalonia 
and Aragón. However, the government failed to provide the ACs with specific 
instructions for tracking this population  until July 27, 2020 (Estévez Torreblanca & 
Oliveres, 2020; Estévez Torreblanca & Sánchez, 2020).
Fi nally, Spain is one of the most unequal socie ties in Eu rope, with the EU’s 
second- highest rate of students who fail to complete high school. Tourism, hos-
pitality, construction, and other personal ser vices mean low- wage jobs that can-
not be done remotely. Low- wage work also means low incomes, which force a 
significant segment of the population into crowded, often substandard housing. 
For almost all of the Spanish population, social distancing is culturally foreign; for 
much of the population, it is also logistically complex.
Institutional Explanations
Spain’s quasi- federalist constitutional system is characterized by what I have else-
where labeled “the politics of who not what” (Dubin, 2019). The 1978 Spanish Con-
stitution balanced the demands of regional nationalists, especially the Basques 
and the Catalans, with  those of fervent Spanish nationalists close to the previ-
ous Francoist regime by creating a “State of the Autonomies.” The entire country 
was divided into these po liti cal units, limiting the asymmetrical powers demanded 
by the regional nationalists. Although certain powers  were devolved to the historic 
regions more rapidly, all ACs enjoyed full competencies over health and educa-
tion by the early 2000s. Decision- making is coordinated vertically and horizontally 
through sectoral interregional councils. However, nationalist politicians in the 
historical regions seek a more bilateral relationship with the central government—
or simply go their own way— whenever they can.
As a result, intergovernmental cooperation is often po liti cally charged, even 
when the issues at stake are largely technical (Aja & Colino, 2014). For example, 
when the director of the Catalan health ser vice attended meetings of the Inter- 
Spain’s Response to COVID-19  349
Territorial Health Council in the weeks before the March state of the alarm dec-
laration, it was the first time in years that the Catalan regional government had 
sent a representative to this forum. Similarly, the Conference of AC Presidents 
convened by the prime minister on March 22, 2020, was its first meeting in four 
years. By July  30, 2020, the leaders of both Catalonia and the Basque Country 
 were refusing to attend the President’s Conference convened for July 31 (Ormaza-
bal, 2020).
Contested federalism discourages data sharing and learning and stymies the 
emergence of a culture of evaluation (López- Valcarcel & Barber, 2017). The struc-
ture and culture of national institutions sufer similar prob lems. The Spanish 
public administration is dominated by a corporatist bureaucracy with a change- 
resistant culture that discourages information flows. Inattention to policy evalu-
ation is reinforced by a per for mance evaluation system focused on outputs rather 
than outcomes, not surprising in a civil ser vice dominated by  legal backgrounds 
and where data specialists are in short supply (Lapuente et al., 2018; Longo et al., 
2020). At the same time, Spanish po liti cal appointments reach down to the sec-
retary general level (two levels below ministers or their AC equivalents). The 
result is a highly politicized policy- making pro cess that prizes loyalty over com-
petence and policy- making autonomy over policy- making efectiveness (“who 
not what”).
 These dynamics have long forestalled eforts to coordinate and develop pol-
icy areas such as public health, which are not po liti cally salient in normal times 
(Artells et al., 2014). Consider one paradigmatic example. Drafts of the 2011 Gen-
eral Framework Law for Public Health proposed the creation of an in de pen dent 
agency to develop, coordinate, and evaluate national and regional health policy 
rather than leaving such mea sures to internal units within the Ministry of Health 
and the respective AC health departments. However, the idea was resisted by an 
Economy Ministry concerned about the bud get implications and a Health Min-
istry loath to cede territory. The final law called for the creation of a much more 
 limited State Center for Public Health, which is only now, in the wake of the pan-
demic, moving beyond the proposal stage (Aguado, 2018).
All of  these institutional prob lems  were compounded by the increasingly par-
lous state of the country’s health system. When Spain was forced to pursue deep 
cutbacks in public spending in the wake of the Eu ro pean financial crisis in 2011, 
the government of Mariano Rajoy pushed much of the burden of adjustment on 
to the regions, as had, to a lesser degree, the previous socialist government of José 
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Cut of from sovereign debt markets, the ACs had no 
choice but to impose deep cuts in health spending. Where total public spending 
fell 6  percent from 2009 to 2013, public health spending fell by 14  percent (López- 
Valcarcel & Barber, 2017). Many regions responded by privatizing the develop-
ment and management of public care as a way of reducing capital expenditures. 
They also introduced sharp cuts in primary care and public health spending. How-
ever,  there was  little in the way of systematic eforts to rethink health priorities 
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(Padilla, 2020).  These changes would prove enormously problematic during the 
pandemic.
Conjunctural Po liti cal  Factors
Spain’s ability to address the pandemic was further hampered by conjunctural 
po liti cal circumstances. Pedro Sánchez took charge of the country’s first co ali-
tional government in January  2020. The Socialists’ agreement with Podemos 
included the division of the Ministry of Health, Consumption and Welfare (Sani-
dad, Consumo y Bienestar Social) into three separate ministries. Health would 
remain with the socialists, although María Luisa Carcedo, a healthcare special-
ist and previous minister, was replaced by Salvador Illa, a veteran of the social-
ist organ ization with no healthcare management experience. Social Ser vices and 
Agenda 2030  were entrusted to the new vice- president of the government from 
Podemos, Pablo Iglesias, and Consumption to another Podemos minister. Mul-
tiple reports suggest that the restructuring and reassignment of civil servants in 
January and February hindered the already  limited coordinating capacities of the 
central government (León, 2020).
The epidemic also took place at a moment of enormous partisan conflict in 
Spain. First, the pro- independence position of the co ali tion government in Cata-
lonia and, to a lesser extent, the Basque Country, has, as noted, complicated 
cooperation with the national government. The Euro crisis and the Catalan 
in de pen dence drive created a space for the far- left Podemos the quasi- liberal, 
Spanish nationalist Citizens party, and now the emergence of VOX, the first 
far- right party to gain a significant presence (15   percent of seats) in parlia-
ment since the return to democracy. This transformation of the party system 
has unsettled electoral dynamics, leading to four general elections since 2015, 
including two in 2019, and contributed to a polarization of public discourse. 
Where COVID-19 has muted oppositional discourse in most Eu ro pean coun-
tries, it has generated furious opposition from the right and regional national-
ists against Spain’s new government.
However, polarization and contestation does not seem to be a good explana-
tion for Spain’s catastrophic pandemic response. On the one hand, coordination 
failures have afected all of the regions; partisan affiliation does not appear to 
have afected responses positively or negatively. On the other hand, public sup-
port for the mea sures taken by the government has been overwhelmingly posi-
tive: 97.3  percent of the Spanish population believed the mea sures  were “neces-
sary” or “very necessary” (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2020), and 
self- reported mask- wearing rates  were among the very highest in Eu rope (Otero- 
Iglesias et al., 2020). In other words, the many failures of the Spanish authorities 
documented in this chapter are largely attributable to long- standing prob lems in 
the country’s institutional structure, its po liti cal culture (“who not what”), and 
the prob lems generated by disinvestment since the financial crisis rather than the 
partisan challenges of the current moment.
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Conclusion: Late- Summer Winds of Change?
As of this writing, new cases of COVID-19 have increased more rapidly in 
Spain than any other EU nation since early August  2020. Given the failures 
of the ACs to prepare adequately for the test and trace regime stipulated by 
the government during the phased relaxation of confinement and the many 
structural  factors favoring transmission, this is not wholly surprising. Never-
theless, one can detect small signs of positive change. The central government 
appears disinclined— and perhaps lacks the parliamentary support—to reimpose 
another state of alarm and so deprive the ACs of control within their regions. It 
is now the ACs who  will be making critical and highly vis i ble policy decisions 
about testing and tracing, protecting elder care facilities, and school openings. 
Citizens  will be more likely to hold their AC po liti cal leaders responsible for 
regional outcomes over the coming weeks and months, raising the stakes for 
regional decision- makers.
This emerging po liti cal real ity and a sharp uptick in new cases is beginning 
to concentrate the minds of AC and national- level po liti cal leaders alike. First, 
 after much hesitation, the hardest- afected regions are fi nally beginning to roll out 
large- scale testing programs. Although the efectiveness of  these eforts remains 
to be seen, their rapidly increasing, if unequal, intensity is undeniable (Cabal-
lero, 2020; Puente, 2020). Second, many ACs are now asserting their authority 
to manage the crisis. Some of their more recent eforts to restrict movement in 
specific localities, impose mask requirements, and limit leisure establishments 
have been met by judicial re sis tance. However, regions such as Catalonia have 
used decree laws to strengthen their authority, and as such mea sures grow more 
frequent, judicial doctrine may increasingly accept the ACs’ assertion of constitu-
tional authority to take the mea sures they see fit to control pandemics within their 
territories (Boix Palop, 2020; Herrera, 2020).
Fi nally, for the first time since the crisis started— indeed, for the first time 
since the transition to democracy— the ACs and the central government reached 
a unan i mous agreement on August 14, 2020, in the Interterritorial Health Coun-
cil to impose mea sures to track and limit contagion. Many of the mea sures  were 
inspired in initiatives of some ACs; in any event, their implementation  will depend 
on their transposition to each AC’s regulations (González, 2020; Ministerio de 
Sanidad, 2020d). The agreement is a potential landmark marking a new approach 
to the crisis.
The first serious response to COVID-19 in Spain began with an unparalleled 
degree of recentralization of health policy (Viciosa, 2020). Given the profound 
prob lems with intergovernmental coordination in a country where po liti cal lead-
ers often view competencies more as trophies than mandates, this initial response 
by the central government was perhaps understandable. Nevertheless, the conse-
quences for Spaniards of a poorly coordinated central government response have 
been devastating.  Going forward, coordinated action facilitated by the central 
government but led by the regional governments who enjoy the  legal mandate 
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to develop and executive health policy may be the only way to avoid a repeat of 
Spain’s disastrous initial response to the virus.
Notes
 1. Over the two weeks preceding August 18, 2020, Spain was reported to have the EU’s 
highest per capita infection rate, with an accumulated incidence over the previous 14 
days of 131.1 cases per 100,000 residents. Romania was a distant second at 77.1 (Centro de 
Coordinación de Alertas y Emergencias Sanitarias, 2020,  Table 4).
 2. Article 116 of the Spanish Constitution defines three levels of crisis response: alarm, 
emergency, and siege, in ascending order.
 3. Real Decreto 463/2020, de 14 de marzo, por el que se declara el estado de alarma 
para la gestión de la situación de crisis sanitaria ocasionada por el COVID-19 [Royal 
Decree 463/2020, 14 March, declaring a state of alarm for the management of the health 
crisis situation created by COVID-19].
 4. Orden INT/239/2020, de 16 de marzo, por la que se restablecen los controles en 
las fronteras interiores terrestres con motivo de la situación de crisis sanitaria ocasion-
ada por el COVID-19 [Interministerial order 239/2020, 16 March, which reestablishes 
controls in internal ground borders given the health crisis created by COVID-19].
 5.  Children had previously been allowed out only to accompany one parent to make 
necessary purchases. Most  children had not left their homes for more than six weeks.
 6. Real Decreto- ley 21/2020, de 9 de junio, de medidas urgentes de prevención, 
contención y coordinación para hacer frente a la crisis sanitaria ocasionada por el 
COVID-19 [Royal Decree- law 21/2020, 9 June, urgent mea sures of prevention, contain-
ment and coordination in response to the health crisis created by COVID-19].
 7. Orden SND/518/2020, de 11 de junio, por la que se regula la autorización de 
un programa pi loto de apertura de corredores turísticos seguros en la Comunidad 
Autónoma de Illes Balears mediante el levantamiento parcial de los controles tempora-
les en las fronteras interiores establecidos con motivo de la situación de crisis sanitaria 
ocasionada por el COVID-19 [National Dependent Care System Order 518/2020, 11 June, 
regulation of the authorization of a pi lot program to open safe tourism corridors in the 
Autonomous Community of the Balearic Islands through the partial lifting of the tem-
porary controls on internal borders established in response to the health crisis situation 
created by COVID-19].
 8. The 15 ACs in the Common Regime receive obtain most of their funding from taxes 
collected by the state and then transferred; the Basque Country and Navarre collect most 
taxes in their regions and transfer a portion to the State for state- delivered ser vices. In 
practice, the latter system provides  these two regions with far more resources per capita 
than their Common Regime counter parts. See Dubin, 2019 for additional details.
 9. Real Decreto- ley 7/2020, de 12 de marzo, por el que se adoptan medidas urgentes 
para responder al impacto económico del COVID-19.
 10. Real Decreto- ley 8/2020, de 17 de marzo, de medidas urgentes extraordinarias para 
hacer frente al impacto económico y social del COVID-19 [Royal Decree- law 8/2020, 17 
March, urgent extraordinary mea sures in response to the social and economic impact of 
COVID-19].
 11. Real Decreto- Ley 20/2020, de 29 de mayo, por el que se establece el ingreso mínimo 
vital [Royal Decree- Law 20/2020, 29 May, for the establishment of a minimal basic income].
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 12. Early reports suggest bureaucratic red tape is limiting the arrival of aid. As of 
August 7, 2020, it appeared that less than 1  percent of applications had been approved 
since the program opened on June 15, even though the relevant minister expected some 
50  percent of applications to ultimately quality (Zuil, 2020).
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 20 a tale of two PandeMics  
in three coUntries
 Portugal, Spain, and Italy
André Peralta- Santos, Luis Saboga- Nunes,  
and Pedro C. Magalhães
On February  20, 2020, a young man admitted to the hospital in 
Italy with COVID-19 marked the start of uncontrolled COVID-19 transmission 
in Eu rope (Livingston & Bucher, 2020). Like other times in the past, Italy played 
the central role in the history of Eu ro pean epidemics: from the Antonine plague, 
described by Galen during the Roman Empire, to Genoa and the Black Death in 
the  fourteenth  century.
Over the next two weeks, in late February and early March 2020, the epidemic 
kept expanding in the Lombardian region in Italy. On March 8, 2020, the Italian 
government implemented a localized lockdown in the region, restricting move-
ment to minimize social contact (Remuzzi & Remuzzi, 2020). The lockdown was 
expanded to the entire country on March 9, 2020.
In Spain, transmission had been underway, mainly undetected, since mid- 
February (Fuertes et al., 2020). On February 28, the Basque Country reported the 
first case, and by March 13, 2020, its regional government declared a health emer-
gency. By then, all the provinces already had cases, motivating the national govern-
ment to issue a royal decree (463/2020), declaring the state of emergency and a 
curfew.
In Portugal, the first cases  were detected on March 2, 2020, in the northern 
regions, with links to Italian cases. The government rapidly convened the National 
Public Health Council, a committee composed of national experts (Peixoto et al., 
2020), to gather advice about the necessary mea sures to control the pandemic. 
This council suggested on March 12 (Gomes, 2020) that no action be taken, but 
the prime minister ignored this advice, and between March  13 and March  16, 
2020, a total lockdown of the country was implemented, even before the first 
death from COVID-19 was registered.
The synchronicity of physical distancing policies between  these south Eu ro-
pean countries hides dif er ent epidemic dynamics, as well as diverse speeds in 
responding to the events. It is also noteworthy that dif er ent structural challenges 
existed when it came to responding to the most challenging health crisis in over a 
 century. The COVID-19 pandemic is remarkable in many ways: first, never before 
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in the history of modern health systems in Eu rope have we witnessed the spectacu-
lar collapse of two of the most regarded national health systems (Arango, 2020; 
Horo witz, 2020; Remuzzi & Remuzzi, 2020), the Italian and the Spanish; second, 
the resilience of the Portuguese health system in the early stages of the pandemic 
was, in many ways, surprising, given de cades of underfunding reinforced by more 
recent austerity policies.
 After the  great lockdown that took place during the months of March and April 
of 2020, the epidemic took another twist in the subsequent months. Spain and Italy 
managed to suppress the transmission to levels of less than 20 cases per 100,000 
inhabitants. Instead, the pandemic resurged in Portugal, in the deprived areas on 
capital suburbs, with reports of outbreaks in factories and among the immigrant 
population. Combined with inefficient contact tracing, this led to a prolonged pla-
teau of the epidemic curve. Although the health system managed to avoid collapse 
at the time, the inability to suppress the transmission led to Portugal’s exclusion 
from the safe travel  bubbles and to consequent damage in the tourism industry.
This chapter explores the structural similarities and diferences between  these 
three countries: on the one hand, in their respective health sectors’ capacities and 
reor ga ni za tion; and on the other hand, in the dif er ent degrees of state capacity to 
respond to the pressing needs of their populations. In the last  great epidemic, the 
1918 flu,  there was a transparent north- south gradient in the extent to which Eu ro-
pean countries  were hit by the pandemic, with Portugal, Spain, and Italy among 
 those that  were hit the hardest (Ansart et al., 2009). How was it this time? To what 
extent does the impact of COVID-19 reflect resilient societal and institutional vul-
nerabilities in  these countries? And to what extent have national specificities inter-
acted with  those shared vulnerabilities, leading to dif er ent outcomes?
Public Health
Public Health Strengths and Vulnerabilities
Italy, Spain, and Portugal’s health systems are financed through general taxa-
tion, are generally  free at the point of care, and provide universal health coverage 
(de Almeida Simões et  al., 2017; García- Armesto et  al., 2010; Lo Scalzo et  al., 
2009). The three national health systems emerged in the late 1970s, in Italy as 
the result of the collapse of the previous social health insurance system and in 
Spain and Portugal as part of their democ ratization. They share some standard 
orga nizational and per for mance features that constitute potential strengths and 
vulnerabilities when facing a pandemic event.
One of the most salient of  these features is the impact of a de cade of fis-
cal austerity. During the  Great Recession and the Eurozone crisis, the govern-
ments of Italy, Spain, and Portugal decreased the bud get available for health 
care (Stuckler et  al., 2017), leading to cuts in long- term infrastructure invest-
ments and making it even more difficult to deal with the prob lem of an aging 
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workforce (Karanikolos et al., 2013; Legido- Quigley et al., 2016). Nevertheless, 
compared with northern Eu ro pean countries,  these countries have very efficient 
healthcare systems (Cylus et al., 2017; Perleth et al., 2001). In other words, the 
return in terms of population health is very good for  every Euro invested. How-
ever, in what is only apparently a paradox, efficiency is not an advantage dur-
ing a pandemic. If all the resources are fully optimized, any significant surges in 
demand, such as  those experienced during early March 2020 in Italy and Spain, 
this  favors a collapse of the health system. Portugal seemed especially vulnerable, 
as it had the lowest number of intensive care unit beds per inhabitant in Eu rope 
and one of the lowest levels of investment in public health ser vices in Eu rope 
(Rhodes et al., 2012). In 2015, on average, the countries of the Organ ization for 
Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) allocated 2.8  percent of their 
total healthcare bud get to health promotion and disease prevention. Portugal 
and Spain devoted below 2  percent to prevention, whereas Italy (2.9  percent) was 
above the OECD figure (OECD, 2017).
Another feature impor tant to consider is the governance structure of the 
national health system. Italy and Spain have a rationalized governance model in 
which regions play a more decisive role in the definition of delivery, managing 
 human resources and bud get allocation (García- Armesto et al., 2010; Giovannini 
& Vampa, 2019; Lo Scalzo et al., 2009). In contrast, Portugal has a highly central-
ized health system, with a national agency responsible for bud get, and regional 
health administrations play only a minor role in health system organ ization, serv-
ing mainly as links in the transmission chain  under the command of the national 
level. In theory, Spain and Italy’s regional organ ization has many advantages, such 
as greater flexibility in adjusting delivery to local needs and preferences and an 
increased room for innovative experiences in delivery models. However, during 
a pandemic that requires an unpre ce dented level of coordination and speed, this 
regionalization can be a disadvantage. A centralized governance model such as 
the one in Portugal  will tend to be faster in implementing the dramatic reor ga ni-
za tion that is needed. In sum, efficiency level and governance model are the salient 
features that directly determine the capacity of the health system to respond to 
the pandemic.
Public Health Response to the Pandemic
Why did the Italian and the Spanish health systems collapse in the early stages of 
the pandemic, and not the Portuguese? A quote attributed to Franklin D. Roo-
se velt illustrates one of the reasons for this diference: “I think we consider too 
much the luck of the early bird and not enough the bad luck of the early worm.”1 
Italy and Spain  were the first countries experiencing uncontrolled transmission in 
Eu rope, when a lot was still unknown about the virus, from clinical management 
to the appropriate non- pharmacological interventions. As late as February 2020, 
the ability of this virus to lead to a health system collapse in high- income countries was 
not yet evident. The influential paper by Neil Ferguson, the British mathematician 
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and epidemiologist, stating that only suppression (lockdowns) mea sures would 
prevent health system collapse was published March  16, 2020 (Flaxman et  al., 
2020; Walker et al., 2020). The knowledge transferred by Italian doctors to the 
Eu ro pean medical community was an impor tant  factor in changing clinical prac-
tices and helped health systems elsewhere (Grasselli et al., 2020). In sum, the bad 
luck of being an early worm should not be understated, as countries that  were hit 
 later had the opportunity to benefit from the knowledge transfer from Italy and— 
partially— Spain. Portugal was one of  these countries.
Furthermore, when Italy and Spain had accumulated one hundred cases, their 
levels of mobility  were still close to normal. In contrast, by the time Portugal 
reached the same number of cases, mobility was already more than 30   percent 
below average. The first death attributed to the virus in Italy was reported on 
February 22, 2020. The Italian press was caught by surprise by the quick spread-
ing of the pandemic and did not act in sync with government decisions regarding 
the best ways to prevent the virus to spread. On March 8, 2020, the day before the 
northern region of Lombardy, Italy’s COVID-19 epicenter, went into lockdown, 
Corriere della Sera, Italy’s most widely read newspaper, published an early draft of 
the government decree ordering inhabitants to stay indoors. This leak provoked 
a general upheaval, and more than 41,000  people anticipated their traveling plans 
and moved around the country without any barriers or control. Prime Minister 
Giuseppe Conte was forced (amidst an outcry from some po liti cal parties, echoed 
by the press) to close the country the next day. Similarly, in Spain, wealthy and 
middle- class madrileños flight to their second homes— spreading the virus over 
the weekend before the first state of alarm was declared— had a huge impact in the 
countryside levels of contagion. In contrast, a social self- lockdown was already 
happening in Portugal even before governmental actions, as the media  were sat-
urated with catastrophic news about Spain and Italy.
The diferences in the virulence of the COVID-19 epidemic among Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal are best shown comparing excess mortality from all  causes (Kontis 
et al., 2020). How many more  people are  dying than usual for a specific time of 
the year? Italy and Spain have staggering numbers of 44  percent and 56  percent, 
respectively, and  these numbers hide significant variations between regions (e.g., 
in Madrid the excess mortality is 157  percent higher than usual). In Portugal, the 
excess mortality increased by only 11  percent. This put Portugal close to Germany, 
Austria, and Denmark, countries with some of the best per for mances on this indi-
cator. Hence, diferences between Portugal, on the one hand, and Italy/Spain, on 
the other, are a tale of two pandemics in three countries. At the  earlier stage of 
the pandemic, Portugal managed to protect the population more efficiently and 
avoid the detrimental efects of the collapse of the health system in the COVID-19 
hotspots.
However, in the months right  after the end of the lockdowns, June and 
July 2020, Spain and Italy achieved a level of suppression of transmission never 
achieved by Portugal. On the one hand, Italy and Spain had decreases in mobility 
that  were more severe than in Portugal, whereas “deconfinement”— the return 
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to a new baseline close to normal— happened faster in Portugal. On the other 
hand, Portugal’s inability to “crush” the epidemic curve in the same way as Italy or 
Spain can also be explained by a public health workforce that was not sufficiently 
large to deal with the pandemic, and by difficulties implementing an efective test- 
trace- isolate- support system. The epidemic in Portugal maintained a “slow burn” 
level in the deprived areas in the outskirts of the Lisbon metropolitan region, in a 
population that was dependent on crowded public transportation, living in sub-
standard housing conditions, and sufering low literacy levels (Instituto Nacional 
de Estatística, 2020). Although the health system was never in danger of collaps-
ing in Portugal, the “slow burn” and the inability to “crush the curve” damaged the 
country’s image of having excelled in pandemic management.
Fi nally, all three countries faced common governance prob lems. Several studies 
have suggested that national variations in the quality of response to the COVID-19 
pandemic across the world seem to be linked to countries’ diferential state capac-
ity (Bosancianu et al., 2020; Liang et al., 2020; Serikbayeva et al., 2020).  Whether 
 these broad cross- sectional snapshots  will find confirmation as more evidence 
emerges and the full consequences of the pandemic unfold is yet to be deter-
mined. However, a priori, none of  these three countries seemed particularly well 
positioned from this point of view. Although commonly used cross- national and 
cross- regional indicators have shown signs of improvement in the quality of gov-
ernance in Portugal and northern Spain (Charron & Lapuente, 2018), government 
efectiveness in all three countries— particularly Italy—is below the average of the 
high- income OECD countries (Kaufmann et al., 2010).
How this played out in the ability to mount an efective public health policy 
response in the three countries can be illustrated in dif er ent ways. In Portu-
gal, as concerns about the spread of infection in nursing homes mounted, it was 
soon “discovered” that  there  were more illegal such establishments in the coun-
try than  legal ones, hosting close to 35,000 older or disabled adults and raising 
enormous challenges for testing, isolation and contact tracing (Penela, 2020). 
In Italy, although approved in mid- April 2020, the “test, trace, and treat” strat-
egy was still not entirely on the ground by mid- June (Capano, 2020), whereas in 
Spain, data collection and contact tracing sufered from lack of expert personnel 
and minimally appropriate information systems (Llaneras, 2020). Although the 
supply of medical material was problematic in many Eu ro pean countries, such 
prob lems  were particularly egregious in Spain, as defective equipment continued 
to be deployed by the Ministry of Health and used by professionals for several 
weeks despite early suspicions (Ramos, 2020). Characteristically, although the Por-
tuguese government approved a plethora of highly detailed rules about “physical 
distancing” as the country abandoned confinement in May 2020, the government 
was ultimately forced to admit that it was “impossible” to enforce some of  those 
rules, particularly  those related to safety in public transportation (Santos, 2020). 
As stated by Saboga- Nunes et  al., the decrease of preventive disease mea sures 
and proactive health promotion strategies is detrimental to the pandemic control 
(Saboga- Nunes, 2020).
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In sum, deficits in  these countries’ “state capacity,” understood as “their ability 
to exert control over their populations and territories, and their ability to for-
mulate and implement policy,” (Bosancianu et al., 2020) encumbered their public 
health response to the crisis.
Social Policy
Socioeconomic and Po liti cal Vulnerabilities
Portugal, Spain, and Italy also share several features that made their socie ties 
and economies particularly vulnerable to the pandemic. The first is a very strong 
economic dependence from the tourism sector. In 2019 the total contribution 
of travel and tourism to the gross domestic product (GDP) of Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal was, respectively, 13   percent, 14   percent, and 17   percent, far above the 
median of high- income countries and, in all cases, only  behind the contribution 
of financial ser vices and— another hard- hit sector— retail (WTTC, 2020). Sec-
ond, a comparatively high proportion of the workforce in  these countries is com-
posed of low- skilled manual and ser vice sector workers (Afonso & Bulfone, 2019) 
as well as by temporary employees (22  percent in Spain, 17  percent in Portugal, 
and 13   percent in Italy, against an EU average of 11   percent) (Eurostat, 2020b). 
That results in large shares of jobs at risk of destruction by the pandemic and 
that cannot be performed remotely (OECD, 2020), and, on the other hand, in 
comparatively high numbers of employees that enjoy  limited social protection 
and job security (Sabat et  al., 2020). Fi nally, the three countries have been fis-
cally constrained for a considerable time. The consequences of the austerity poli-
cies  adopted to address the 2010–2013 financial crisis left a resilient mark in the 
material and  human resources available to their public sectors (Petmesidou et al., 
2014). Although the worst depths of the crisis had been overcome by the end of 
2019, Italy, Portugal, and Spain still had the second, third, and sixth largest public 
debts in the Eu ro pean Union.
The lockdowns that followed the epidemic combined with  these vulnerabili-
ties to generate profoundly negative economic consequences and limit the scope 
and depth of the pos si ble policy responses. On the one hand, during the second 
quarter of 2020, our three countries, along with France, experienced the most sig-
nificant economic contractions among all Eurozone countries (Eurostat, 2020a). 
On the other hand, although their governments provided cash- based transfers, 
wage subsidies, and increased benefits to a variety of vulnerable sectors of the 
population (Gentilini et  al., 2020),  these mea sures represented a significantly 
lower share of each country’s GDP than similar policies in less constrained econo-
mies. Instead, the lion’s share of the fiscal efort in southern Eu rope was devoted 
to deferrals of tax and social security contributions (in Italy and Portugal) and 
credit lines/liquidity guarantees (again in Italy, and to a lesser extent, in Spain) 
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(Anderson et al., 2020), “a textbook example of what  limited fiscal elbow room 
allows when the rainy days come” (Nicola Rossi, 2020).
Fi nally, in the same way deficits in state capacity encumbered the health policy 
response, they also encumbered the social policy response. In all three countries, 
social and economic support strategies  were afected by inefficiencies and delays. 
In Italy, redundancy funds for employees of small firms and credit guarantees 
for enterprises sufered from extremely cumbersome procedures, with the result 
that, by July 2020, such mea sures had only reached a small number of the poten-
tial beneficiaries (Mascio et al., 2020). In Portugal, the implementation of credit 
lines for enterprises and financial support for self- employed workers was also 
protracted (Andrada, 2020). Meanwhile, unemployment benefits for temporar-
ily redundant workers failed to reach many thousands of beneficiaries in Spain 
(Rodriguez, 2020).
Explanation
The Challenges of Multilevel Governance
 There is, however, one aspect in which our countries difer significantly. As argued 
by Dergiades and  others, “the greater the strength of government interventions 
at an early stage, the more efective  these are in slowing down or reversing the 
growth rate of deaths” (Dergiades et al., 2020; see also Petherick et al., 2020). And 
in this re spect, Portugal benefited not only from avoiding being “the early worm” 
but also from its centralized chain of command, allowing a faster and broader 
implementation of the lockdown mea sures.
Portugal is a unitary state, and one of the most centralized in Eu rope. Although 
the country is divided into regional health authorities, responsible for implement-
ing national health goals, they respond directly to the Ministry of Health, which 
concentrates planning, regulation, and management of the national health ser-
vice. In other words, “[i]n Portugal, most of the health system steering happens at 
a central level” (OECD, 2015). Centralization facilitated a unified and coordinated 
emergency response, and it has also helped deliver one of the Portuguese system’s 
significant strengths, a well- developed, coherent, and rich information infrastruc-
ture (OECD, 2015).
In contrast, in the other two southern Eu ro pean countries, regions (Italy) and 
autonomous communities (Spain) enjoy vast competencies in health care, elder 
care, and economic assistance policies. That has the potential to create coordi-
nation prob lems. In Italy, the regional governments started by completely fail-
ing to implement their regional pandemic plans as requested by the Ministry of 
Health in January. In Lombardy, for example, the regional government leader 
started by downplaying the threat posed by COVID-19 and criticized lockdown 
decisions based on their potential economic consequences. That led the national 
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government to dispense consulting with regions when issuing lockdown deci-
sions (Capano, 2020). Still, despite the explicit advice from experts to declare two 
municipalities in the province of Bergamo as “red zones,” both the central and 
the regional government failed to do so, an omission now is seen as having had 
catastrophic consequences but that both the central and regional governments, 
in typical blame- shifting mode, have assigned to each other’s inaction. A funda-
mental misalignment between the central government and regional authorities 
seems to have contributed to “severely undermine the management of the crisis, 
increase confusion, and create an image of chaos outside” (Ruiu, 2020).
In Spain, the initial coordination prob lems between the seventeen autono-
mous communities and the central government around the closing of schools 
appeared to be solved with the state of emergency decree’s approval on March 14, 
2020 (Jiménez, 2020). However, such prob lems  were soon to make their come-
back. By late March 2020, at the height of the rise in new cases, the much- needed 
reallocation of resources and personnel between regions struck very diferently 
by the pandemic was “a bureaucratic tangle in which, for the moment, no com-
munity wants to get bogged down” (Sevillano & Linde, 2020). Dif er ent proto-
cols and resources for contact tracing, isolation of infected medical professionals, 
and collection and sharing of data about new cases and fatalities contributed to a 
high asymmetry of information and per for mance between communities (Fresno, 
2020). None of this is particularly new: the lack of coordination between health 
ser vices of the dif er ent communities has long been signaled as a pending issue 
in Spain’s healthcare reforms (Sánchez Fierro, 2016), which the pandemic only 
served to bring to fore with par tic u lar intensity (Molina et al., 2020).
Facets of Public Response
How did the publics of  these countries respond to the pandemic crisis and the 
mea sures  adopted to face it? A look at survey data allows us to trace a few similari-
ties and diferences among Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Approval of the government’s management of the pandemic seems to show dif-
fer ent patterns in the three countries. In Portugal, a government whose popularity 
had changed  little since the October 2019 elections experienced a small decisive 
burst  after the pandemic. Studies conducted in both March and May 2020 showed 
that more than 70  percent of respondents trusted the government’s and national 
health authority’s response to the pandemic, an attitude only weakly related to 
partisanship or ideology (Magalhães et al., 2020). The governing party experienced 
a five- point increase in voting intention from February  until May  2020, which 
remained stable  until early August (“Eu rope Elects: Portugal,” 2020). In Italy, the 
government started facing the crisis in a more disadvantaged position, with an 
approval rate below 40  percent and a significant gap in evaluations by partisans 
of the MS5 and Partito Demo cratico in government and by  those of the opposi-
tion parties. Since then, however, the government appears to have benefitted from 
a “rally ‘round the flag” efect (Segatti, 2020) that has dramatically neutralized 
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partisan diferences in government evaluations. The primary victim seems to be 
Lega Nord, which experienced a significant drop in the polls in one of hardest 
hit regions by the crisis in Italy. Fi nally, in Spain, no “rally ‘round the flag” efect 
seems to have existed. The approval level of the government’s response to the cri-
sis always stayed below Portuguese and Italian levels (“COVID-29: Government 
 Handling and Confidence in Health Authorities,” 2020), and voting intentions for 
the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and for United We Can (Unidas Podemos), 
the main parties in government, have remained mostly stable. The perception of 
government competence in dealing with the pandemic and how that translates 
to government approval seem to be very heterogeneous in  these three countries. 
However, the unfolding public health and economic situation in all three coun-
tries could change this picture quickly. For example, in a similar poll conducted in 
September 2020, confidence in the Portuguese government’s public response to 
the pandemic had already dropped almost twenty points in relation to May.
A second impor tant dimension concerns the adoption of personal mea sures to 
avoid contagion. Italians and Spaniards led Eu ro pean countries (on which we have 
data) in the use of masks. By late March 2020, 70  percent in Italy, 42  percent in Spain, 
and 27  percent in Portugal reported the use masks in public places, above countries 
such as France, Germany, and, especially, the United Kingdom and Scandinavian 
countries. By May 2020,  these percentages had increased to much higher levels, 
around 80  percent, and have remained mostly stable ever since. Similar patterns 
can be found in the self- reported avoidance of crowded public spaces, increased 
personal hygiene, and avoidance of physical proximity (“COVID-29: Government 
 Handling and Confidence in Health Authorities,” 2020). In other words, with a 
lag that approximately fits the staggered severity of the pandemic in each country, 
the self- reported adoption of personal protective mea sures seems generalized in 
the south by July 2020 to a majority of citizens. However, a false sense of safety, 
economic necessity, and deeply ingrained patterns of sociability seem to have con-
spired, at least for a minority of citizens, to reverse some of previous be hav iors. In 
Spain, for example, the resurgence of cases in August was attributed to a return to 
close interpersonal contacts, partying, and social gatherings (Güell, 2020).
A third relevant dimension concerns citizens’ support for the government’s 
mea sures to contain the pandemic. By April  2020, when the epidemic situa-
tion remained most challenging, and all three countries had their most stringent 
mea sures in place, one distinguishing feature of Southern Eu ro pean countries was 
more robust support of their populations for such restrictive mea sures than that 
found among Northern Eu ro pean countries (“COVID-29: Government  Handling 
and Confidence in Health Authorities,” 2020). That could correspond to a worse 
situation on the ground: by mid- April, Spain and Italy  were experiencing, respec-
tively, twelve and eight new COVID-19- related daily casualties per million inhabit-
ants. However, Portugal’s situation was much less dramatic, with about three new 
daily casualties per million, numbers that  were not very dif er ent from  those in 
countries that had less stringent policies at the time, such as Germany or Denmark. 
This suggests— and  will need to be more systematically tested— that cross- national 
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diferences in popu lar support for stringent mea sures seem to be more directly 
related to what government policies happen to be at the moment than with the 
epidemiological situation on the ground. Congruently with this notion, as both 
Spain and Italy started adopting mea sures reversing some aspects of deconfine-
ment in July 2020, support for enforced quarantines, which had been dwindling 
since April 2020, increased again (“COVID-29: Government  Handling and Confi-
dence in Health Authorities,” 2020).
Another (and potentially darker) aspect of this endorsement of government 
policies is vis i ble in the public support for mea sures that might impinge more 
grievously on privacy and personal freedoms. For example, by April 2020, a study 
had already found that the most polarizing issue in Eu rope was the use of mobile 
data for tracking cases and their contacts, with impor tant shares of the population 
in Denmark, Netherlands, and Germany opposing such mea sures. Such use, how-
ever, found greater ac cep tance in Italy or Portugal (Sabat et al., 2020). Similarly, 
a panel study showed that,  after the outbreak, Spaniards became more willing to 
support “strong leaders,” give up individual freedoms, and endorse technocratic 
governance (Amat et  al., 2020). However, as we have discussed previously in 
the case of Spain, although ele ments of po liti cal culture— such as the compara-
tively lower value placed on individual freedom and autonomy in southern than 
in northern Eu rope (Welzel, 2013)— may contribute to produce a more passive 
ac cep tance of government- dictated restrictions, that may not be enough to curtail 
deeply ingrained patterns of sociability.
Po liti cal Polarization
The prob lems faced by Italy and Spain have been compounded by the more intense 
po liti cal rivalry and polarization that can be observed in  those two countries when 
compared to Portugal. In the former, Matteo Salvini, the leader of the populist 
Lega Nord, the party controlling two of the most afected regions— Lombardy and 
Veneto— but out of the co ali tion supporting the national government since Sep-
tember 2019, was intensely critical of the government’s response from the start, 
beginning by downplaying the importance of the pandemic, then criticizing the 
slow response, and  later the delay in ending the lockdown. One study suggests 
that this overt public dissent afected compliance with lockdown  orders: reduc-
tions in mobility—as captured through geolocation data—in response to physical 
distancing  orders  were less sharp in areas with higher vote shares for Lega Nord, 
whereas they  were sharper in areas with higher shares of votes for the largest 
party in government, MS5 (Barbieri & Bonini, 2020). The same efect was seen in 
the United States (Adolph et al., 2020).
In Spain, a background of rising po liti cal acrimony, afective polarization, and 
distance between the po liti cal parties on the country’s crucial ideological issue— 
the territorial cleavage (Alfonso, 2020)— has also played out in the management 
of the COVID-19 crisis. Following a brief period of respite at the height of the 
pandemic, disputes about the extension of lockdowns, strug gles between the gov-
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ernment and nationalist parties around the centralization of health policy, blame- 
shifting between the government and opposition- controlled municipalities, and 
even the refusal of one the major parties— the far- right Vox—to discuss  future 
COVID-19- related mea sures with the government (Gallardo, 2020) have been 
observed. Sánchez, Spain’s prime minister, ultimately evoked Portugal’s case and 
the leader of its opposition party, the PSD, as an example of cooperation that was 
missing in Spain. However, the absence of a territorial cleavage in Portugal, the 
much smaller po liti cal weight of the populist far- right, and a horizon of likely 
governmental stability and distant elections  were background conditions favoring 
a more robust po liti cal consensus that Spain could not replicate.
Tourism and the “Race to the Bottom”
One of the pandemic’s impressive po liti cal dimensions is the impact of the mea-
sures imposed to travelers to and from dif er ent Eu ro pean countries, whereby some 
nations imposed quarantines— not fully endorsed by the scientific community—to 
their own citizens if they had traveled from nations deemed of high risk. The cen-
tral po liti cal aspect that emerges is southern Eu ro pean countries’ willingness to 
take more risks of admitting citizens from other countries with worse incidence 
indicators. That aspect was very salient for Italy, Spain, and Portugal, where no 
travel restrictions  were imposed for countries such as the United Kingdom. That 
shows that the economic relevance of keeping the tourism economy afloat was 
more impor tant than the risk of importation of COVID-19 cases. Spain was in the 
first UK safe- travel list published on July 3, 2020; it was  later removed on July 25, 
2020, at the time with a lower incidence of COVID-19 than the United Kingdom. 
Portugal was only added to the list on August  22. The exclusion from the UK 
safe- travel list prompted a ferocious po liti cal response at the highest level, label-
ing this exclusion unfair and arbitrary. The “Race to the bottom” term was used 
to describe the competition between countries for lower taxes to attack foreign 
capital (Plümper et al., 2009). A similar efect seems to be happening in the com-
petition for tourism in southern Eu ro pean countries.
Conclusions
This chapter explores the similarities and diferences between Portugal, Spain, 
and Italy, and how they played out in the response to public health and social 
policy responses to the pandemic. Italy, Spain, and Portugal shared similar vul-
nerabilities before the pandemic started: a de cade of austerity,  limited fiscal room 
to implement new social policies, and an employment sector poorly prepared for 
working from home and vulnerable to unemployment resulting from lockdowns. 
However, Italy and Spain faced an additional challenge: a multilevel government 
structure, where taking and implementing po liti cal decisions takes more time and 
is more complicated. The inability to coordinate a fast response in the early days 
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of the pandemic seems to have played a role in the initial collapse of the health 
system in Italy and Spain and in the higher levels of excess all- cause mortality. 
Higher levels of po liti cal polarization in Spain and Italy and the weight of the 
populist far- right  were also  factors that have surely not contributed to a more 
efective po liti cal response.
In contrast, Portugal benefited not only from the early warning from Spain and 
Italy, but also from a faster, more coordinated, and po liti cally consensual response. 
The Portuguese health system avoided collapse, and mortality was kept at com-
paratively lower levels in the early stages of the pandemic. However,  after the first 
lockdown, and as restrictions eased, this relative advantage of Portugal began to 
dissipate. Deficits in state capacity and economic pressures created conditions that 
prevented the country from maintaining the previous levels of suppression of the 
transmission, leading to a prolonged plateau of the epidemic curve. As the “second 
wave” unfolded in the last quarter of 2020, the structural similarities between the 
three countries exerted their influence, leading to much less dissimilar outcomes 
than  those that could be observed at the earliest stages of the pandemic.
Note
 1. Letter from FDR to Judge Henry M. Heymann, December 2, 1919.
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 21 greece at the tiMe of covid-19
 Caught between Scylla and Charybdis
Elena Petelos, Dimitra Lingri, and Christos Lionis
For on one side lay Scylla and on the other divine Charybdis terribly sucked down 
the salt  water of the sea. Verily whenever she belched it forth, like a cauldron on 
a  great fire she would seethe and  bubble in utter turmoil, and high over head the 
spray would fall on the tops of both the clifs.
— Odyssey 12.235–240
On February 26, 2020, two weeks before the World Health Organ-
ization (WHO) declared the severe acute respiratory coronavirus-2 (SARS- 
CoV-2) pandemic, the Ministry of Health announced the first confirmed case of 
COVID-19 in Greece, a  woman who had just arrived from neighboring Italy. Italy 
and many other Eu ro pean countries had already had their first cases three to four 
weeks  earlier. In Greece, not having similar levels of winter tourism, nor business 
travel, a  simple temperature screening only for passengers arriving from China 
had been deemed an adequate mea sure. Within hours of the announcement, 
all leave of absence was revoked for administrative personnel at the Ministry of 
Health and for medical and scientific personnel across the country (Ministry of 
Health, 2020).
The range of containment and mitigation policies  adopted in Greece  ought 
to be examined within the broader context in which  these policies  were  shaped 
and implemented. The preceding financial crisis brought about a series of specific 
consecutive Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) (including the “Supplemental 
Memorandum of Understanding: Greece,” 2019). The MoUs  were agreed upon by 
the Greek government and the Eu ro pean Troika (i.e., the International Monetary 
Fund, Eu ro pean Central Bank, and Eu ro pean Commission) and set out conditions 
and prescribed reform mea sures. Financial assistance depended on their imple-
mentation, according to the princi ple of conditionality (Kivotidis, 2018). Although 
the aim was reform, the significant bud getary restrictions compromised implemen-
tation and resulted in reduced capacity across all levels of care (Economou et al., 
2017).
The case of Greece carries high relevance for Balkan and Southern Eu ro pean 
countries and beyond. Disconnectedness between public health bodies and insti-
tutions, as well as the organ ization of care delivery across the levels of health and 
social care are issues afecting many settings. The first months of the pandemic, 
given the level of uncertainty,  there  were no clear guidelines in terms of referral 
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protocols, risk communication, and mechanisms for tackling misinformation, a 
situation prompting fear and apprehension among patients and citizens across 
Eu rope and, indeed, the world.
In Greece, the previous de cade had been one of depleted resources, restricted 
capacity, and inefficient resource allocation. Despite the fragmented eforts of dif-
fer ent governments,  there is still no comprehensive primary health care (PHC) 
system. The rise in life expectancy and the low fertility rates have resulted in a 
population with more than 22  percent of the  people being aged 65 years or over. 
In 2017 life expectancy at the age of 65 was 20.1 years (i.e., slightly higher than that 
of other Eu ro pean Union [EU] countries). However, Greek  people could expect 
to live only 40  percent (vs. 50  percent in the EU) of  these years without disability 
(Cassini et al., 2019; “State of Health in the EU: The Country Health Profile Series,” 
2019). Furthermore, under lying social disparities remain largely unresolved, both 
from a  legal and a social standpoint.
Greece has a low score on the Global Health Security Index (Global Health 
Security Index, 2019), the first comprehensive assessment benchmarking health secu-
rity across 196 countries, that is, the States Parties to the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) (WHO, 2014). It has one of the lowest scores in the national 
planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens, which is critical for prevention and 
preparedness. Additionally, it does not have a public workforce strategy with 
mechanisms or indicators to identify gaps. Results from a previously conducted, 
rudimentary from a global health perspective, gap analy sis  were incorporated 
into the National Strategy on Health 2014–2020, but without any quantifiable 
ele ments.
The relevance of the EU is high in terms of the overall pandemic impact. Rein-
forcing joint procurement and cooperation beyond disease management and con-
trol have been considered, including monetary, bud getary, and macroeconomic 
mea sures, including the tourism and aviation industries. The Greek government 
proposed vari ous EU- level actions, including two specific mea sures, an initiative 
on intellectual property rights, including diagnostics and therapeutics, and vac-
cines, in an efort to ensure accessibility and afordability, and, jointly with several 
other EU countries, the “Coronabond” to ofset the damage to the economy. The 
exchanges ensuing highlight this crisis was rather dif er ent to the 2012 crisis when 
Greece and Germany  were at opposing ends of which policies  ought to be fol-
lowed. With some of the biggest economies, now, requesting help, the Eu ro pean 
institutions  were much more willing to extend support, including a dif er ent kind 
of response from the Eu ro pean Central Bank (ECB) (Johnson, 2020).
EU- wide cross- sectoral collaboration for certain infectious diseases (zoonotic 
diseases) has been integrated through EU policies (e.g., One Health approach) 
and implemented through the Eu ro pean Centre for Disease Control (ECDC). 
However, EU public health competences are  limited. Instruments such as the 
Decision on Serious Cross- border Healthcare, Early Warning and Response Sys-
tem (EWRS) (“Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the Eu ro pean Parliament and of the 
Council,” 2013; Moore & Furberg, 2014) allow for recommendations regarding 
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cross- border mea sures by the Health Security Committee (HSC), and even joint 
procurement (Eu ro pean Union, 2013; Greer & de Ruijter, 2020). Key recommen-
dations, such as  those issued by the ECDC on testing and tracing (ECDC, 2020), 
are not binding for Member- States, thus leading to highly divergent responses in 
border control. Health information from heterogeneous sources prompts ambi-
guity, leaving at worst a margin to po liti cal rather than expert interpretations. 
Health information has been of inconsistent quality and detail level, for example, 
not all countries shared data on the number of cases by age and sex (Renda & 
Castro, 2020). Furthermore, the EU’s Global Health Strategy (GHS) lacks a coher-
ent frame beyond the IHR to align responsibility and accountability among the 
WHO, the EU, and Member- States. Eforts for an up- to- date GHS (Steurs et al., 
2017) and urgent calls for a robust and cohesive strategy remained largely unad-
dressed (Speakman et al., 2017). The importance of such mea sures and a cohesive 
strategy is magnified when it comes to countries with  limited preparedness exper-
tise, capacity, and resourcing. This becomes even more critical when  these coun-
tries are at the borders of Eu rope and have high geopo liti cal importance, with 
potentially conflicting state, EU, and global priorities, and the strong emergence 
of strong biogeopo liti cal dynamics at the Southeastern EU borderland of Greece 
and Turkey (Jauhiainen, 2020).
In Greece, mea sures  were mainly introduced through legislative acts handled as 
emergency procedures. The Emergency Act instrument is used in cases of threats 
to national sovereignty and security from external or internal enemies of the state. 
According to the Constitution of the Hellenic Republic (Art. 44 par. 1) emergency 
acts can be introduced as an Act of Legislative Content (ALC) or by declaration of 
a state of siege (Art. 48 par. 1 and 5, The Constitution of Greece, 2008). ALCs are 
issued in case of unpredictable need by the President of the Republic, upon pro-
posal by the Cabinet, but without prior suspension of  human rights, contrary to the 
acts issued following the declaration of a state of siege. Critically, ALCs are adminis-
trative acts issued only for a  limited period of time,  unless submitted to and ratified 
by the Parliament within a specific period of time. According to the jurisprudence 
of the Council of the State, the exceptional nature of the par tic u lar circumstances 
that led to the publication of an ALC is not subject to judicial review (Symvoulion 
Epikrateias, 1987, 1989, 2002, 2003, 2015b), contrary to its content, which is, theo-
retically, subject to judicial control (Gerapetritis, 2012); such was recently the case 
of the Austrian COVID-19 legislation, which was considered to be partially illegal 
according to the jurisprudence (Verfassungsgerichtshof, 2020).
COVID-19 ALCs introduced structural dispositions but also substantial 
 human rights’ limitations to safeguard public health, which is considered an 
ele ment of public interest. According to the Hellenic Constitution, but also to 
the Eu ro pean  Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),  human rights limitations 
should be prescribed by law, be of legitimate aim and proportionate, a necessary 
condition in a demo cratic society according to the ECHR (Renucci, 2005). Seven 
ALCs  were introduced into national  legal order, ratified in due course by the Par-
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liament, thus, acquiring timeless retrospective force. By acquiring a rather per-
manent character, the totality of the mea sures introduced through delegated acts 
(ministerial decisions) rendered them susceptible to common judicial review.
Health Policy Response
Since 2008, Greece has been severely afected by the financial crisis and the ensu-
ing austerity mea sures. This protracted efect had direct impact on the state- 
funded National Healthcare System (NHS). Despite the focus on reform and PHC 
provision with two legislative bills, implementation was hindered by contextual 
 factors and po liti cal agendas. The reform was protracted, with multiple govern-
ments involved in its negotiation and implementation. One government negotiated 
its initial funding (New Democracy, the liberal- conservative party), and another 
de cided on how it was to be executed in terms of the creation of the PHC network 
(SYRIZA, the left- wing party ruling from 2015 to 2019). A third government, pre-
viously being the opposition, which had strongly opposed most of the steps taken 
between 2015 and 2019, came to power less than a year before the pandemic (New 
Democracy came into power in June 2019). It was this government that was called 
to continue a reform implementation. A direct country- specific recommendation 
regarding PHC, with explicit mention of the need to establish an adequate number 
of functional PHC units (the new institution of PHC unit called Topiki Monada 
Ygias [TOMY] in Greek, which was a key aspect of the introduced reform), and the 
need for investment to enhance access to  these newly created TOMYs, as well as 
inclusive, afordable and high- quality social ser vices, was included in the Eu ro pean 
Semester of June 2019 (Eu ro pean Commission, 2019a). The Enhanced Surveillance 
Report (ESR) of June 2019 (Commission Economic & Afairs Eu ro pean Economy 
Institutional Papers, 2019) coincided with the time of the national election and 
the change of government to the New Democracy party. The ESR, also, noted the 
reform was proceeding at a slow pace and with marked disparities (i.e., less than 
one- fifth of the population was registered in the new PHC system) with unresolved 
issues regarding recruiting prac ti tion ers. In view of the flawed eforts, besmirched 
by inconsistency and lack of sustainable financing, and with the Eurogroup com-
mitment to open 240 TOMYs by mid-2020, one won ders how, pandemic excluded, 
this milestone would have ever been reached.
Given this backdrop, the government moved with exceptional speed. Proce-
dures for staf recruitment  were initiated on the very day of the first confirmed 
case. All scheduled leaves of absence  were canceled across all levels of care, from 
the National Center for Emergency Care, to urban tertiary care institutions, and 
across regional and local settings. At the beginning of March 2020, approximately 
5000 temporary vacancies (medical, nursing, and supporting personnel)  were cre-
ated. Within a month, almost 50  percent of  these vacancies  were filled. In terms 
of incentives, both health and civil protection workers received a special bonus, 
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extensively reported in the press. This, however, generated mixed reactions, as the 
workers eligible to receive it  were only  those in COVID-19 clinics and reference 
hospitals caring for patients sufering severe symptoms.
The first mea sure afecting the wider population focused on massive social dis-
tancing, that is, the cancellation of carnival cele brations on March 1, 2020, a long- 
standing tradition in Greece. The mea sure was considered to be excessive, result-
ing in heated debate, in view of the fact similar cele brations took place in several 
other countries as usual. At the time, less than one hundred cases of COVID-19 
 were confirmed, whereas no death had been reported. Within a month of the first 
case, the number of cases had risen to almost seven hundred; in anticipation of 
the March 25 National Day cele bration, a nationwide lockdown was enforced.
On the day of the lockdown enforcement, more than eight thousand volunteers 
registered in the digital platform of the Ministry of Health. According to the Eu ro-
pean Observatory’s COVID-19 Health System Response, ten thousand volunteers 
registered to ofer their ser vices in a program aiming to use the ser vices of available 
qualified physicians, nursing personnel, paramedics, medical students, and retired 
prac ti tion ers (Eu ro pean Observatory, 2020). Criticism came from vari ous quar-
ters in terms of the permanence and the efectiveness of the public safety mea-
sures. Nevertheless, a feeling of solidarity was generated given the strong response 
to the call for volunteers. Notably, the public health reform bill that was enacted 
a few weeks before the pandemic was declared, and which was drafted before 
COVID-19 emerged, was strongly criticized by professional associations, the oppo-
sition, and even members of the ruling party in that  the success of the measures and 
actions proposed in it largely relied on voluntary actions and donations. Although 
the spirit of the bill and the encouragement of voluntary action  were positively 
received, concerns  were raised on the expertise, skill set, permanence, coordina-
tion, and efectiveness such an approach can yield for a sustainable health system, 
particularly when funding mechanisms are not in place to ensure coordination and 
training even on a voluntary basis, let alone overall sustainability.
All COVID-19 mea sures  were emergency actions. They  were relevant for a 
 limited period and  were questionable in terms of ofering an efficient and efec-
tive longer- term solution, particularly in terms of potential trend of rapidly rising 
cases, which up to the point of this writing (July 2020), Greece managed to avoid. 
Characteristically, legislation pertaining to employment of private physicians in 
public hospitals to deal with emergencies referenced two months, with the possi-
bility of extending contracts for an additional two months. This approach was not 
complemented by any long- term planning or the parallel development of contrac-
tual provisions for public- private partnerships with permanence, and certainly 
with no development in terms of enhancing capacity in PHC and social care. This 
was noted by researchers and prac ti tion ers, including the implications for poten-
tial exclusion of specific social groups (Giannopoulou & Tsobanoglou, 2020).
Overall, mea sures  were focused on ICU beds and hospitals, in other words, 
on tertiary care. Despite the  limited number of cases in Greece, capacity was seri-
ously challenged, with clinics and wards being redesignated as COVID-19 facili-
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ties and cancellation of scheduled surgeries and outpatient appointments for 
weeks to months. Although po liti cal rhe toric brought PHC ser vices to the fore in 
April 2020, with the designation of health centers in major urban areas,  these  were 
not integrated centers to provide outpatient care and to meet the needs of patients 
with chronic needs or  those particularly vulnerable, but rather, simply centers to 
solely screen patients with respiratory infections. Mobile units for testing, used 
to ensure primary care ser vices  were provided in de pen dently of care provision to 
acute cases, remained a debate issue in the spring and early summer of 2020.
Health policy mea sures introduced by ALCs  were  either structural/or gan i za-
tional mea sures for the healthcare system or pertained to limiting freedoms on 
the grounds of the need to protect public health. According to Article 21 par. 3 
of the Constitution (The Constitution of Greece, 2008), public health constitutes 
not only a fundamental right but also an ele ment of public interest (Symvoulion 
Epikrateias, 2015a, 2017), justifying legitimate limitations of individual rights and 
freedoms. Interestingly, during the period of the financial crisis, this represented 
the grounds for justifying the limitation of financial rights and freedoms to pro-
tect the provision of public healthcare ser vices, and public health.
ALCs led to broader limitations, which this time touched upon the core of 
the fundamental rights, such as the freedom of movement and education. The 
ALC of February 25, 2020, prescribed compulsory clinical and laboratory medical 
examination, health monitoring, vaccination, medi cation, and hospitalization of 
all persons for whom  there was reasonable suspicion that they could transmit the 
disease directly or indirectly. Additionally, it provided for the need to impose any 
necessary clinical and laboratory medical examinations, as well as mea sures of 
preventive health monitoring, vaccination, medi cation, and preventive treatment 
of persons coming from areas where the spread of the disease has been observed. 
Further restrictive mea sures of the freedom of movement included confinement 
of persons susceptible to transmit the disease and limitation of transport within 
the country. Moreover, staying- at- home restrictions could be imposed on a per-
son or persons to prevent actions that could be considered to cause the disease 
to spread.
ALCs also prescribed that interested (afected) persons could submit objec-
tions against the mea sures taken against them before the President of the Admin-
istrative Court of First Instance, who decides irrevocably on the specific case. Fur-
thermore, it was stipulated (FairTrials, 2020) that persons failing to comply could 
be subjected to punishment by imprisonment of up to ten years according to the 
stipulations of the Greek Criminal Code. Indeed, two circulars  were issued by the 
Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court (Areios Pagos, Eisaggelia, 
2020a, 2020b), informing the Prosecutors’ Offices at the First Instance Court and 
the Courts of Appeal about the immediate need for vigilance and constant inter-
vention to  prosecute crimes relating to COVID-19, including violations of imple-
mented or forthcoming mea sures for its suppression, as well as relevant crimes of 
the Greek Criminal Code, incl., the violation of mea sures for prevention of disease 
(Poinikos Kodikas, 2020).
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The need to move forward with substantial reform in chronic care ensuring 
integrated care provision was previously highlighted by public health experts and 
primary care researchers within and outside Greece (Lionis et al., 2018; Tsiachris-
tas et al., 2015). It was also noted that the system was  under significant risk of 
collapse with all that this would imply for  those directly afected, as well as for 
the well- being of all citizens. The lack of integration between public health and 
PHC, as well as social care, remains a challenging issue with severe implications in 
terms of COVID-19 collateral damage, with a concrete risk of magnifying adverse 
impacts, particularly for the chronically ill, their carers, their families, and their 
friends (Lionis & Petelos, 2020).
Social Policy Response
Greece is characterized by high income in equality. It is also the country with the 
lowest impact of social transfers (social benefits in cash or in kind) in the EU 
(15.83  percent in 2017 vs. an EU average of 33.98  percent).  These transfers to per-
sons or families are intended to lighten the financial burden or to protect from 
vari ous risks. In the Council recommendation of June 2019, an explicit recom-
mendation was for targeted investment to enhance access to inclusive, afordable, 
and high- quality social ser vices, as well as on the development of day care cen-
ters (Eu ro pean Commission, 2019b). Emphasis was given on providing support 
to the most deprived and promoting the social integration for  children at risk of 
poverty, persons with disabilities, and mi grants and refugees, while highlighting 
the opportunity to improve social inclusion by paying attention to geo graph i cal 
disparities. With an interval of a few months between this recommendation and 
the pandemic and the lockdown,  there had been no focused investment for  these 
population groups, thus leaving the most vulnerable at higher risk of collateral 
damage from containment mea sures, as well as from the pandemic.
Part of the recommendation on mitigating the impact of the crisis was to ensure 
adequate income replacement to all afected workers and the self- employed, duly 
considering gaps in access to social protection. Vulnerability, unemployment, and 
illegal work  were highlighted as needing prompt attention to strengthen social 
safety nets, particularly through ensuring a minimum income support and com-
prehensive access to social ser vices, including for  people with disabilities, refu-
gees, and asylum seekers. It was further noted that long- term care was ill devel-
oped, with the need to establish schemes for vulnerable homeowners particularly 
for  house holds at risk of poverty through state- subsidized mortgages. In Greece, 
thousands of refugees and mi grants reside in settlements run beyond capacity 
where distancing is impossible. Early calls to decongest  these centers remain 
unanswered  until now (July 2020) (Hargreaves et al., 2020; Subbaraman, 2020) 
with reasons for concern well beyond the COVID-19 pandemic
Many mitigating mea sures  were taken cross- sectorally to combat the efects 
of the pandemic, and at  these early stages, additionally to containment mea-
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sures. According to the National Reform Program for 2020 (Hellenic Republic, 
2020) submitted to the Council of the EU in April 2020, key mea sures related to 
COVID-19, mostly enacted through ALCs and often with applicability of  limited 
time periods, include the following:
• Special allowance of EUR 800 to com pany employees afected by the COVID-19 
crisis in case of their employment contract being suspended, as well as for free-
lancers, the self- employed, and the sole proprietors of small businesses
• Suspension of payment of value- added tax (VAT) and other tax liabilities 
and insurance contributions for companies, freelancers, and sole proprietors
• Insurance contributions of com pany employees afected by the COVID-19 
crisis whose employment contract has been suspended, as well as the con-
tributions of the self- employed who are treated as employees for tax reasons 
 will be covered through public funds
• Financial scheme in the form of a repayable advance with a five- year repay-
ment period and a grace period of one year to companies afected by the 
crisis and having ser viced loans, based on the reduction of turnover or other 
 factors
• Supporting business loans by providing additional liquidity from the Eu ro-
pean Investment Bank (EIB) to banks for granting new business loans, cre-
ating a guarantee mechanism that  will provide support for loans related 
to investment proj ects and interest rate subsidy for loans to small- and 
medium- sized enterprises (SMEs) with payment coverage interest on per-
forming loans of companies afected for a period of three months, if  these 
companies retain jobs
• Possibility for employees to provide distance work, as well as flexible work-
ing hours and special purpose leave, partially financed by the state
• Extraordinary financial aid of EUR 400 to the long- term unemployed and 
extension of the payment of unemployment benefit
The Council Opinion on the basis of the 2020 National Reform Programme 
(NRP) of Greece placed strong emphasis on certain key aspects to be considered 
(Eu ro pean Commission, 2019a). More specifically, socioeconomic consequences 
 were likely to be unevenly distributed, given dif er ent specialization patterns for 
regions relying on tourism and on face- to- face business to consumers. The Coun-
cil went further to highlight the widening disparities of insular and mountainous 
regions, already intensified during the financial crisis. As of this writing, specific 
mea sures have yet to be taken for  these regions. The recommendation highlighted 
risks regarding the overall convergence between Member- States, taking into 
consideration both the 2020 Stability Programme, essentially, rules designed to 
ensure EU countries are pursuing sound mea sures in terms of public finances and 
regarding the coordination of their fiscal policies and the 2020 NRP.
Considering COVID-19 mea sures proportionate and relevant to tackle it, the 
Council warned of the economic impact of such mea sures. The critical aspect of 
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tourism was named as the most impor tant ser vice export. It stated that confine-
ment mea sures would result in lower disposable incomes and increased unemploy-
ment, the expectation being demand would significantly contract. In response to 
this, additional eforts  were made to boost tourism, including domestic tourism. 
The criteria for eligibility for the Social Tourism Program  were expanded, whereas 
a global advertising campaign was mounted. For many Greeks, particularly  those 
for whom tourism is not a source of income, the decision to open the borders was 
made on the basis of financial interests rather than public health considerations. 
Also, whereas social distancing mea sures  were discussed (e.g., more routes for 
fewer  people to travel with ships, planes, buses, and trains), the necessary changes 
never fully materialized.
Explanation
According to WHO, a challenge to sustained action on preparedness is inconsis-
tent financing (WHO, 2017). Also, sound preparedness is compromised without 
a pro cess to include evidence in public health decision- making and for evidence- 
informed policy, in preparation, and during public health emergencies (ECDC, 
2018). Greece has had  limited financial resources, including sustainable financing 
and contingency funding for the COVID-19 response. Greece also lacks devel-
oped health technology assessment (HTA) or procurement linked to evidence- 
based assessment and appraisal. For sustainable financing, detailed long- term 
national strategic plans with bud get allocations should be developed in partner-
ship between government, national stakeholders, and non- state actors. Sustain-
able funding must be defined and adjusted to develop and maintain outbreak 
 preparedness core capacities such as surveillance, laboratory diagnostic capability, 
training, designated treatment facilities, equipment and supplies, risk commu-
nication,  human and logistics resources, and so on. The lack of a solid, proac-
tive (rather than reactive) comprehensive communication strategy and policy to 
facilitate understanding of mea sures became apparent over time, compromising 
risk perception over the summer months and representing a critical risk for the 
ensuing season.
The plethora of information resulted in an excessive amount of information, 
which was often unreliable, the infodemia witnessed across the world. Infodemic 
management and tackling misinformation  were not addressed systematically. 
Citizens and healthcare professionals, alike, often relied on information coming 
from the press, diaspora scientists taking initiatives through social media, and 
TV broadcasts. This was the case across a broad spectrum of topics, such as tests, 
medicines, vaccines, and even protective mea sures. In the case of healthcare pro-
fessionals, multiple closed groups  were created in social media, where the diffi-
culty in interpreting guidance was difuse and consistently rising.
The COVID-19 pandemic highlights once again the need to implement coor-
dinated evidence- informed actions to be able to respond to public health emer-
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gencies when time is of the essence, scientific uncertainties and po liti cal pres-
sures tend to be high, and irrefutable evidence may be lacking. To strengthen 
the impact of scientific evidence, while eliminating uncertainty, such mechanisms 
 ought to encompass interdisciplinary evidence generation and the uptake thereof 
through sound decision- making pro cesses. Decision- making must be proactive 
and transparent.
Eforts should be made to foster cooperation and generate incentives, for exam-
ple, in local contexts, to avoid conflict stemming from partisan politics. In Greece, 
the lack of participation and engagement of the local authorities to support local 
and regional planning, spread the right messages, and ensure timely behavioral 
change raises serious concerns on what the autumn and winter months of the first 
year of the pandemic  will bring, particularly as  people return to urban centers, and 
academic centers and schools re- open.
The key to community engagement is consistent and coordinated risk com-
munication. This aspect has simply not been adequately addressed. The beginning 
of summer and the opening of the borders brought tourists to Greece. Naturally, 
cases  were imported. Intense po liti cal debate ensued, with panic in some com-
munities and indiference in  others. What became apparent was the confusion 
of the  people as a contributing  factor to the nonadherence to the basic protective 
mea sures. Furthermore,  there was a lack of understanding as to what personal 
accountability and responsibility practically meant as opposed to an intentional 
disregard for one’s own safety and the safety of  others. As of this writing,  there 
is intense debate as to  whether schools should reopen. Initial response by the 
Ministry of Education was prompt, with the launch of digital tools enabling dis-
tance learning. Although access was theoretically universal, implementation was 
compromised, with many not having access to the Internet or home computers, 
or even a quiet place to study at home (Markus, 2020). An integral part of smooth 
implementation also necessitates appropriate resources to provide psychosocial 
support (UNESCO, 2020).
The po liti cal and  legal narratives of Greece remain tightly intertwined. It is 
worth examining legislative proposals of the past first six months of 2020  in a 
broader context; that is, examining the rights and rights- based approach to the 
provision of care. The financial crisis and the period of austerity that preceded saw 
both social and individual rights being compromised. The impact on the health of 
individuals, community resilience, and societal cohesion was never systematically 
evaluated and assessed nor was it incorporated in the planning of ser vices over 
the past de cade.
Greece was already scoring low in terms of resilience, with privacy and gender 
issues, exacerbated inequalities, and a rift between what constitutes public ver-
sus private interest, with polarized rhe toric in partisan politics. The COVID-19 
pandemic reached Greece at a time of depleted resources, amid an incomplete 
primary care reform, at the exact moment where the role of the state in public 
health was being discussed. Legislation on public health had just gone through the 
parliament, placing emphasis on voluntary eforts and promotional actions, without 
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due consideration to the integration of public health and primary care. The legis-
lation did not include a coherent preparedness plan in terms of how centralized 
and local decision- making would ensure alignment, sound communication, and 
implementation of decisions in local settings. Most impor tant, sound governance 
structures and allocated resources in terms of investment, prioritization, and 
assessment of interventions are still desperately needed.
Conclusion
The initial response in Greece demonstrated timely mea sures and sound choice of 
communication channels (i.e., TV broadcasts  every after noon), which seemed to 
perfectly match the needs of the population. The low number of cases and fatali-
ties, contrasted to the alarming rates of other EU countries, largely contributed to 
the wide ac cep tance of the mea sures and approval of the government’s response 
as far as the management of the pandemic in the first stage was concerned.  People 
demonstrated unpre ce dented trust  toward the government and the state, accept-
ing the strict mea sures with sound compliance and excellent results in the spring 
months. At the same time, this success generated a false sense of safety, rather 
unwarranted considering the degree of spread prior to the lockdown.
Nevertheless, the time gained through the initial timely response was not 
used to re- orient healthcare ser vices  toward an integrated care policy. The main 
means of increasing preparedness targeted an increase in personnel and an efort 
to double the capacity of ICUs. Primary care remained neglected as means to 
ensure elimination of disparities, detection of vulnerability, and establishment of 
syndromic surveillance in key nodes to ensure timely monitoring of  future disease 
waves.
Most impor tant, at a time of the parallel infodemic, an opportunity to have an 
active link to citizens and communities through PHC, thus reinforcing prepared-
ness, was missed. This would have allowed the Greek government to combat misin-
formation regarding vaccines, to eliminate hesitancy, and to prepare the ground-
work for ac cep tance of mea sures and enactment of sound public health strategies. 
In well- integrated care systems, primary care can inform public health strate-
gies and policymaking priorities through local data and by harvesting data from 
electronic health rec ords. In the Council of the Eu ro pean Union, the recommen-
dation initially assessed the current state, highlighting the fact early indications 
suggested boosting primary care capacity is proving to be key to protect citizens 
and limit the spread of the virus and ensuring the full capacity of the system can 
be employed to treat patients according to their needs. With no pro gress on sus-
tainable financing and adequate structural mea sures to ensure a strong health 
system, a protracted COVID-19 pandemic may be the straw to break the camel’s 
back, so to speak. The lack of HTA further contributes to the notably weak cen-
tralized procurement mechanism, while the Greek healthcare bud get still remains 
well below the EU average.
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Po liti cal decision- making has had to proceed on the basis of trade- offs 
between safeguarding the public health of Greek  people and ensuring the mini-
mum pos si ble impact on the economy, navigating through dangerous  waters, 
and in search of au then tic leadership, much like Odysseus navigating the Mes-
sina Strait. Rather than moving forward to economic growth and sustainable 
development, Greece may have to face the worst financial impact among EU 
countries. Particularly in cases of protracted lockdowns and inadequate social 
protection and mitigation mea sures, COVID-19 may bring yet another cycle 
of financial and po liti cal instability. The newly elected government found itself 
in the position of tackling a borderless threat at a time of intense debate on 
mi grants and refugees.
Still, the pandemic introduced an opportunity to develop an integrated health 
and social care system, with emphasis on health promotion and on the basis of 
demo cratic dialogue and participatory decision- making, with engaged communi-
ties and empowered stakeholders. As of this writing, it remains to be seen  whether 
this challenge  will be successfully met, moving the country to more resilient and 
safe communities or  whether it  will remain unaddressed, sending the country 
down yet another spiral of increasing disparities and irreversible damage to the 
societal cohesion.
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 Public Health Centralism
Saime Özçürümez
The COVID-19 pandemic threatened  people’s health, social lives, 
and economies around the world. In this challenging era, national governments 
stood out as the prominent actors to manage all coordination and communication 
eforts in response to existing and  future pandemics (World Health Organ ization 
[WHO], 2009). As the pandemic ran its course, the variation among states’ insti-
tutional capacities and po liti cal strategies while coping with the consequences 
of the pandemic became more obvious. The deficiencies in national pandemic 
preparedness, such as in Italy where  there was a shortage of incentive care units 
(ICUs) from the early weeks of the pandemic, resulted in public health disasters 
(Torri et al., 2020; Van Beusekom, 2020). The initial approaches of po liti cal lead-
ers while addressing the severity of the pandemic had devastating consequences 
for the countries in question and also globally. Among  these  were the leaders of 
Brazil (“Coronavirus,” 2020) and the United States (Brooks, 2020), who underes-
timated the efects of the pandemic in all spheres of life, and did not implement 
timely and comprehensive precautions, risking the health of their own popula-
tions and the  whole world. In the COVID-19 pandemic context, many states could 
not implement public health mea sures swiftly. They could not assess healthcare 
system preparedness and improve institutional capacity to facilitate healthcare 
ser vice delivery while protecting healthcare workers. They could not enhance 
national and international communication and collaboration strategies to fight 
against the pandemic together. Although states insisted on continuing to respond 
to the COVID-19 pandemic with their own resources and mea sures, the cross- 
border, multisector, and global negative impact of the pandemic became more 
severe, and the need for global cooperation became more evident than ever.
Turkey entered the COVID-19 pandemic context with a well- functioning and 
inclusive healthcare system and  adopted a serious health crisis and risk man-
agement approach, which could be characterized as public health centralism. 
Reforms in Turkey’s healthcare system improved access for the  whole population: 
for example, the total number of infant and newborn intensive care beds increased 
by 82   percent from 2011 to 2018 (“Türkiye’de Hangi Bölgede Kişi Başına Kaç 
Yoğun Bakım Yatağı Düşüyor?” [“How Many Intensive Care Hospital Beds . . .”], 
2020), and overall, hospital bed capacity had increased by 60  percent from 1997 
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to 2018 (“Türkiye’nin Hastane Yatağı Kapasitesi Kaç?” [“What Is the Hospital Bed 
Capacity in Turkey?”], 2020).  Until August 2020, the capacity of hospitals and the 
healthcare system as a  whole seemed adequately resourced to meet the pandemic 
challenge.1 All public actors in Turkey displayed a very serious approach  toward 
the COVID-19 pandemic since its beginnings in Wuhan On January  10, 2020, 
the Ministry of Health, for example, established a Coronavirus Scientific Advi-
sory Board (CSAB), consisting mainly of specialists in pulmonology, infectious 
diseases, clinical microbiology, virology, internal medicine, and intensive care 
(“Bilim Kurulu Üyeleri Kimler?” [“Who Are the Members of the Science Coun-
cil?”], 2020). The CSAB began working on the necessary mea sures quickly and 
professionally to devise and implement a COVID-19 pandemic response strategy.
The Ministry of Health announced its COVID-19 response strategy as imple-
menting the restrictive public health mea sures. The Presidential System in Turkey 
ensured the compulsory and country- wide implementation of all the mea sures 
resulting from the centralized po liti cal system, state- centric governance, and the 
strong executive role of the presidential office. As the social, economic, and health 
efects of the pandemic began to reveal themselves in several months, the setbacks 
in the design and implementation of the COVID-19 response by public actors 
and the public themselves became apparent. Among the challenges in Turkey’s 
response strategy  were (1) implementing public health mea sures efectively and 
continuously; (2) establishing trust among the public and securing owner ship of 
the mea sures to ensure sustainability of carry ing out of public health precautions 
by all sections of the society; (3) compensating adequately for the devastating 
efects of the pandemic ridden economic downturn for all sectors; (4) devising a 
proper pandemic- specific data collection, public information dissemination, and 
communication strategy covering COVID-19 cases data as well as the emerging 
impact of the pandemic in social and economic life in the country; (5) administer-
ing a gradual “normalization” pro cess; (6) introducing pandemic- specific reforms 
to ameliorate national- local level governance collaboration and knowledge and 
know- how exchange among dif er ent national and local agencies; (7) involving 
all pertinent stakeholders such as the Turkish Medical Association consistently 
throughout the pro cess of combating COVID-19 pandemic.
Timeline Analy sis: An Introductory Overview  
of Turkey’s Response to COVID-19
Dr.  Fahrettin Koca, Minister of Health, officially announced the first case of 
coronavirus on March  11, 2020, a Turkish citizen arriving from Eu rope (“Tur-
key Announces Its First Case of Coronavirus,” 2020). Since then the CSAB and 
the Minister of Health  were the most vis i ble public actors in Turkey’s response 
to COVID-19 pandemic (Kodaz, 2020). From the outset, the public agencies in 
Turkey introduced public health mea sures of social distancing and self- isolation 
within the country, travel restrictions (intercity and international), border 
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 closures, and bans on international destinations as well as repatriation of citizens. 
 There are strong indicators that the public agencies  adopted a gradual, not- so- 
transparent, and not- so- public strategy to mitigate the efects of the spread of the 
virus even before the public announcement of the first case. The timeline of the 
policy initiatives before March 11, 2020, is as follows.
On January 22, 2020, the Ministry of Health introduced thermal cameras at 
airports and began to increase healthcare personnel presence at ports and air-
ports. On January 24, thermal cameras began to scan all passengers from China. 
On February 1, 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Afairs evacuated Turkish citizens 
from Wuhan, and on February 3, all flights from China  stopped with the recom-
mendation of the CSAB. Beginning February  6, all passengers arriving from 
abroad  were subject to thermal screening. On February 23, Turkey  stopped cross- 
border mobility between Iran and Turkey. On February 27, the Ministry of Health 
established field hospitals in Ağrı, Dilucu, Van, and Hakkâri, near its eastern bor-
ders. On February  29, all incoming flights from China, Iran, South  Korea, and 
Italy  were discontinued. On March 8, in some provinces, disinfection activities 
 were initiated in public places, public transportation, vehicles, and schools.
 After the first case was announced, the mea sures to fight the coronavirus 
expanded, diversified, and intensified. On March  12, 2020, primary, second-
ary, and high school level education was interrupted, initially for a week, and 
higher education for three weeks. Sports competitions  were expected to be held 
without audiences, and public officials  were restricted from traveling abroad. 
On March 13, flights to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Germany, France, Spain, Norway, 
Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Sweden, and the Netherlands  were suspended and 
day care centers  were closed with no reopening date specified. On March 14, 
the COVID-19 hotline was established (Hotline ALO 184; https:// sabim . gov . tr). 
On March  15, flights  stopped from Germany, Spain, France, Austria, Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and bars and nightclubs  were 
closed. On March 16, mosque attendance, especially for Friday prayers, was inter-
rupted, and cinemas, concert halls, wedding halls, cafes, massage parlors, and gyms 
 were temporarily closed. On March 17, the first loss of life resulting from coro-
navirus was publicly announced by the Minister of Health. On the same day, 
the Ministry of National Education announced that all schools would start dis-
tance education as of March 23, and institutions of higher education also began 
their preparation to transition to distance learning. On March  19, the Minis-
try of Youth and Sports announced the postponement of spectator sports. On 
March 20, the Ministry of Health announced that all private and foundation hos-
pitals  were re- designated as pandemic hospitals and that all types of scientific 
and cultural activities, including concerts and per for mances, had to be canceled 
or postponed  until the end of April. From March  21, comprehensive quaran-
tine mea sures began to be implemented, including  those aged sixty- five and over 
being required to stay indoors at all times, imposing restrictions on urban and 
intercity transportation from March 24, and announcing distance education for 
all levels for the entire spring semester.
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On April 3, 2020, a curfew was imposed for  those born on January 1, 2000, and 
 later throughout the country  until further notice; wearing masks in supermarkets 
became obligatory, and entrance and exit to thirty metropolitan cities and Zon-
guldak was halted for fifteen days (except for  those with special permits), or  until 
further notice. On April 10 at 10 a.m., the Ministry of the Interior announced a 
curfew for the weekend starting on April  11 at midnight.  After the announce-
ment, many  people rushed to the supermarkets, which  violated all kinds of social 
distancing and self- isolation mea sures essential to controlling the spread of the 
infection. This led the minister of the interior to publicly apologize for the com-
munication strategy mishap and its pos si ble health ramifications; he announced 
his resignation from office, which was rejected by the president. From April 11 on, 
 there  were curfews  every weekend starting from midnight on Friday  until Mon-
day morning.
Given the projected socioeconomic impact of  these initial public health mea-
sures, on April 16, 2020, Turkey’s parliament ratified a government bill including 
mea sures to temporarily relieve financial pressure on the population, municipali-
ties, and private enterprises by postponing or waiving certain rent payments, lay-
ofs and redundancies, loans, fees, taxes, dividends, and other obligations, while 
the government postponed some activities of its sovereign wealth fund and some 
local elections. The Bill also included strict controls on price increases and man-
dated a supervisory committee to monitor and fine (from 10,000 to 500,000 liras) 
stockpiling or price- gouging activities.
On May 4, 2020, President Erdoğan announced a schedule for easing of the 
pandemic response restrictions: from May 7,  those aged sixty- five and over and 
 under twenty  were allowed to go outside for a number of hours on designated 
days, and shopping malls and hairdressers  were allowed to open for a  limited 
number of hours conditional to their following virus control regulations (Bor-
zou, 2020). The weekend of May 16, 2020, was announced as a four- day curfew, 
including the Monday before the May 19 Youth and Sports Day. As of May 21, 
citizens living in twenty- five provinces with the most coronavirus cases  were 
obliged to wear masks in public spaces. As of June 1, 2020, travel restrictions had 
been lifted. Restaurant, cafe, pastry shops, swimming pools, and spa- type busi-
nesses  were open  until 10 p.m. within the determined regulations. Restrictions 
on the use of beaches and parks  were removed. On June 9, it was announced that 
citizens over sixty- five can go out between 10 a.m. and 8 p.m.  every day of the 
week (Deutsch- Türkische Industrie- und Handelskammer, 2020). Countrywide 
high school entrance examinations and university entrance examinations  were 
held on June 20, 27, and 28 with the administration of vari ous COVID-19 mea-
sures (Gemici, 2020). More than 3.8 million students took  these exams in closed 
spaces. During the exams, the air conditioners  were not operated, the students 
 were placed in the classes observing social distancing rules, and  free masks  were 
distributed to the students who would take the exams. A curfew was additionally 
imposed during exam hours so that students who took the exam  were protected 
and could travel safely to their exam venues (Gemici, 2020). On July 29, it was 
COVID-19 in Turkey  397
announced that no restrictions would be imposed  under the COVID-19 mea-
sures during the Eid al- Adha (“Koca,” 2020). All  these initiatives  were announced 
against a backdrop of a steady decrease in coronavirus- related mortality in Turkey 
(Figure 22.1), but warnings of a second wave of infections globally.
The pandemic response policies in Turkey can be characterized as constitut-
ing a centralized governance model around public health centralism. The model 
is challenged by controversy over the accuracy of the data collection and pub-
lic dissemination and the efectiveness and sustainability of the mea sures imple-
mented by the authorities. Physicians who work in the Ministry of Health and 
the CSAB participated in the consultative pro cesses for managing the pandemic 
before the shaping of strategies based on emerging data and finalization of execu-
tive decisions. Several questions have been raised publicly in terms of the extent 
to which the CSAB’s input was incorporated into the final policy decisions con-
cerning the COVID-19 response; however, the body continued to operate in the 
governance model made up of reputable medical doctors. Through open col-
laboration with public health specialists in an advisory role and the Ministry of 
Health steering the implementation of all public health mea sures and treatment 
protocols, the governance model aimed to accomplish two tasks: to legitimize the 
public health restrictions with medical justification and to ensure control over the 
hospital bed capacity (Cakir, 2020). The centralized, executive actor and health 
specialist– centered governance model seemed dependable in the initial stages of 
the COVID-19 response in Turkey with significant accomplishments in control-
ling the spread of the virus. However, over time, as cases and  those in need of 
treatment increased, the firm institutional foundations of the governance model 
have proven to be less adaptive than expected to the diversifying and rapidly 
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Figure 22.1. Coronavirus cases and mortality trend in Turkey.
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Health Policies
Health care system reforms dating back to the period between 2003 and 2013 
resulted in a transformation pro cess aimed at improving and reshaping the pri-
mary care structure. The  Family Medicine (FM) model was at the core of the trans-
formation pro cess for efective primary care ser vice provision and for enabling 
easy public access to  these ser vices. Universal health coverage has also been 
established to improve the healthcare ser vices at all stages in Turkey (Sumer et al., 
2019). In terms of healthcare resources, just before the outbreak began, Turkey 
was performing close to the Organ ization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) average on health indicators such as population in poor health, 
risk  factors for health, and quality of access to care, but below average on health 
resources such as health spending per capita, health spending share as a percent-
age of gross domestic product (GDP), the number of practicing physicians and 
nurses per 1000 inhabitants, and physician density across localities (OECD, 2019).
During the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic, hospital bed capacity 
was considered sufficient; however, concern arose over sustaining this capacity to 
meet patient needs, which depend on the spread of the pandemic and the acute-
ness of the cases. At the end of March 2020, the Ministry of Health announced 
that it would recruit an additional 32,000 healthcare professionals to fight the 
pandemic (Milliyet, 2020). At the beginning of April, plans for the construction of 
two new hospitals  were announced (Kurukız, Aktürk, & Aktürk, 2020), and two 
additional city hospitals became operational, increasing available beds in Istanbul 
(“Başakşehir Şehir Hastanesi’nin Ilk Etabı Açıldı” [“First Phase of Başakşehir City 
Hospital Has Been Opened”], 2020). The Ministry of Health (2019) implemented 
the National Pandemic Preparedness Plan and started preparatory mea sures in 
early January, at the time when the initial reports of COVID-19 appeared. The 
National COVID-19 Treatment Protocol was drawn up at an early stage and was 
regularly updated by the CSAB (Güner et al., 2020). In August 2020, the data on 
the number of cases across cities indicated that the demand for care and treat-
ment must be addressed diferently in Istanbul, Ankara, and other cities and prov-
inces. The contact tracing method of screening the chain of contact remained 
critical in predicting the likelihood of the changes in demand in dif er ent cities 
(Demirtaş & Tekiner, 2020).
Public health centralism characterizes Turkey’s healthcare policies and mea-
sures in the COVID-19 pandemic response strategy. The Ministry of Health estab-
lished an operation center within the General Directorate of Public Health in 
Ankara. CSAB began to play a pivotal role in this operation center to manage the 
pro cess and monitor all data flow at the local, national, and international levels. 
Public health centralism aimed to accomplish nationwide standardization of all 
health- related agenda items, policy decisions, and procedures for implementation 
across all provinces. All  testing, examination and treatment procedures, and pro-
tocols regarding the COVID-19 pandemic  were applied uniformly. However, rec-
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ognizing a need for local- level responses, on March 28, 2020, Provincial Pandemic 
Committees (PPCs), chaired by governorships in each province,  were established. 
Provincial- level actors began to cooperate to identify their own needs and imple-
ment targeted mea sures for their own provinces (Erdoğan, 2020). PPCs continued 
to be responsible for identifying province- specific precautions and implementing 
mea sures based on epidemiological data on the COVID-19 pandemic available at 
the provincial level. PPCs work with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of 
Interior closely during carry ing out their responsibilities.
The public health centralism governance model operates through collabo-
ration among many public actors.  These actors include the General Director-
ate of Border and Coastal Health, the General Directorate of Public Hospitals, 
and Turkish Airlines to manage the pro cess through the steering of the central 
institutions by taking into account the multifaceted nature of the pandemic and 
emphasizing efective policy implementation (Kılıç et  al., 2020). The scope of 
efective collaboration and coordination among public and private actors at the 
local, national, and international levels shapes any country’s per for mance in cop-
ing with the pandemic. The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Interior have 
engaged in wide- ranging and inclusive multiactor cooperation and coordina-
tion networks, enhancing their institutional capacity to identify new strategies 
to mitigate the negative impacts of the pandemic. The collaborative governance 
involves (1) supranational and international organ izations, particularly the WHO, 
EU, World Bank, and UNICEF (Worldbank, 2020a), (2) civil society organ izations 
(TUSEV, 2020), (3) municipalities and local governing bodies (“Municipalities, 
Support Groups Help Foreigners Living in Turkey,” 2020), (4) professional organ-
izations including the Turkish Psychiatry Association (2020), (5) universities and 
innovation centers such as Erciyes University Vaccine Research and Development 
Center and Ankara University Biotechnology Institute (“Turkish Researchers 
Take Initial Step for Development of Covid-19 Vaccine,” 2020, April 9), as well as 
Bilkent University’s UNAM (UNAM, 2020) and  Middle East Technical Univer-
sity’s TEKNOKENT, and (6) the private sector (“Sağlıkta Üretim Atağı” [“Produc-
tion Leap in Health”], 2020).
 These actors exchange knowledge around mea sures to prevent the spread of the 
virus and work together on supplying medicine; producing masks, ventilators, and 
medical supplies as well as PPE for healthcare workers; addressing the economic 
challenges caused by pandemic response mea sures; and ensuring continuous 
food supply and distribution. The Ministry of Health’s public information cam-
paigns have been supported by NGOs, public institutions at all levels, and inter-
national organ izations. Spontaneous collaborative networks also formed, bring-
ing together research institutions, private sector, and individual entrepreneurs. 
One such entrepreneur was the Turkey COVID-19 Shared Intelligence Platform, 
a mainly voluntary efort to fund innovative ideas and proj ects to address the 
pandemic- related challenges, including production of test kits and other diagnos-
tic tools, new medicine for treatment and cure, and proj ects with social impact 
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geared  toward alleviating the economic and social shock that shook the structure 
of social relations in the country (TR- Covid-19, 2020).
The centralized pandemic governance with an extensive cooperation network 
and well- established critical care system enabled public agencies to implement 
nationwide standardized procedures such as  free testing, contact tracing, and 
quarantine practices (Cakir, 2020). All COVID-19 related treatments in Turkey are 
accessible  free of charge regardless of individuals’ insurance schemes. The Ministry 
of Health announced COVID-19 treatment algorithms and updated them regu-
larly (Ministry of Health, 2020a). Turkey (2) treated each patient with hydroxy-
chloroquine and azithromycin initially, (2) treated ICU patients with favipiravir, 
(3) provided a tocilizumab treatment option in the ICU for patients with severe 
COVID-19– related cytokine release syndrome, and (4) added anticoagulant drugs 
to the treatment algorithm (Kodaz, 2020). The filiation system is a significant part 
of the Ministry of Health’s strategy to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. The system 
established by the Ministry of Health to disrupt the chain of transmission to pursue 
a pro cess of tracing patients systematically to isolate susceptible individuals. The 
system was implemented by the nationwide medical teams administered by the 
Ministry of Health all over Turkey. Turkish Public Health Management System’s 
tracing module enabled medical filiation teams to monitor patients and susceptible 
individuals closely to prevent the transmission of COVID-19 within the country 
(Demirtaş & Tekiner, 2020). The system of “HayatEveSığar” (HES, Lifefitsinthe-
home) operated through an application that can be downloaded to mobile phones 
to receive data on the situation in the immediate surroundings of the subscriber. 
Moreover, citizens  were expected to acquire HES codes before they traveled across 
cities (Ministry of Health, 2020b). Healthcare ser vices  were continuously provided 
during the COVID-19 pandemic period with no reported discernible disruption to 
the healthcare ecosystem. The number of ICUs, ventilators, and health personnel 
 were reported as sufficient (Ersoy, 2020) through August 2020.
Although the multisector, multiactor, and multilevel collaboration functioned 
well in the first months of the pandemic response, the consequences of the easing 
of mea sures from the first week of June onward revealed the trou bles of public 
health centralism model. Public compliance with social distancing and social iso-
lation decreased significantly, resulting in an increase in the number of infected 
individuals, a jump in the number of patients in need of hospital treatment, and a 
peak of the spread of the virus among healthcare workers. However, the publicly 
announced data concerning the number of cases  after the end of July did not seem 
to reflect the observations of the public in their immediate environment, which 
led to a drop in confidence in the publicly available epidemiological data, results 
of polymerase chain reaction tests, and the efectiveness of mea sures. Moreover, 
critical non- state actors such as the Turkish Medical Association raised concerns 
about the inclusiveness of the governance model. The Turkish Medical Associa-
tion was the most active professional association informing the public through 
publication of updated, evidence- based reports on the pro gress against the pan-
demic; knowledge dissemination on the public health precautions through broad-
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casts, newspapers, and social media; and on the needs of healthcare professionals 
for protective equipment. In early September  2020, representatives met exclu-
sively with the Minister of Health to represent the concerns of the Turkish Medi-
cal Association concerning the pro gress in the pandemic response (Ministry of 
Health, 2020c).
Social Policies
Turkey’s annual growth rate has been unstable since 2012, and  there was a sharp 
decline from 7.5  percent in 2017 to 0.9  percent in 2019 (Worldbank, 2020a). Unem-
ployment rate came to the forefront as the main challenge for the Turkish econ-
omy, particularly since 2015. Between 2012 and 2019, the unemployment rate in 
Turkey increased from 8.15  percent to 13.49  percent (Worldbank, 2020b).  Labor 
force participation rate in Turkey has also been declining since May 2019.  Labor force 
participation rate decreased from 51.8   percent to 47.5   percent in Turkey from 
April 2020 onward (“Turkey  Labor Force Participation Rate,” 2020).
The Turkish economy had not been performing well even before the pandemic 
had started. The main challenges of the economy  were increasing inflation, higher 
unemployment rates, and the exchange rate crisis, which have become more 
severe with the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The restrictions and curfews 
imposed  under the COVID-19 pandemic posed a  great threat to trade, education, 
and tourism. On March 18, President Erdoğan announced the Economic Stability 
Shield and Social Protection Shield packages.  These policy packages  were pre-
pared in a collaboration with the Ministry of Trea sury and Finance (MoTF) and 
the Ministry of  Family,  Labor and Social Ser vices (MoFLSS). Economic Stability 
Shield and Social Protection Shield packages mainly included providing short- 
term employment allowance, providing 4.4 million families in need with 1,000 
Turkish liras, postponement of payment of student loans and rental payments 
for three months on several types of state- owned immovable properties, provid-
ing support of 39.24 Turkish liras per day to workers forced to take unpaid leave 
 because of the coronavirus outbreak for three months, enabling municipalities to 
be able to postpone  water bills for three months for private homes and compa-
nies, and providing financial support to natu ral and  legal persons, and prohibit-
ing termination of workers’ contracts for three months except in unconscionable 
situations, and encouraging the introduction of social credit packages for citizens.
Economic Stability Shield and Social Protection Shield programs aimed at 
protecting the economy and Turkish citizens from the devastating economic and 
social efects of the COVID-19 pandemic. With the normalization pro cess that 
was announced on the May 4, 2020, the economy was expected to recover even 
if slowly. The state support aimed to encourage citizens to spend holidays to sup-
port the tourism sector, cover wedding expenses, and shop through social and 
personal credit packages (Invest, 2020, April).The main rationale for such pro-
motion of credit availability was to jump- start the economy, which had become 
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stagnant to an unpre ce dented degree  because of the COVID-19 pandemic, and to 
mildly compensate for the financial loss in vari ous sectors.
The president’s office pursued a communication strategy emphasizing national 
unity and solidarity in the fight against the pandemic and promoted fund rais-
ing campaigns calling for all citizens to donate to public funds (“Bizbize Yeteriz 
Türkiyem Kampanyası Başladı” [“We Are Enough for Each Other Campaign Has 
Begun,” 2020). The main campaign, “Together we are enough for each other, my 
Turkey” aims to secure and expand the financial resources available to low- income 
groups.  These campaigns initially caused some controversy over why the state 
needed to appeal to a public already sufering from the socioeconomic impact of 
the pandemic and raised anxiety over  whether the state had sufficient resources 
to properly respond to the pandemic (“ ‘Biz Bize Yeteriz’ Kampanyasına Tepki 
Yağıyor” [“Protests Against the ‘We Are Enough For Each Other’ Campaign Are 
Increasing”], 2020). Moreover, tensions around party politics and national- local 
level responsibilities concerning which actor may legitimately engage in fund rais-
ing and distribution of social assistance became apparent in social media. When 
metropolitan municipalities controlled by the main opposition party, Istanbul and 
Ankara in par tic u lar, launched their own donation campaigns to support local 
 house holds in need (Turetken, 2020), the Ministry of the Interior questioned the 
validity of  these municipal campaigns and attempted to stall the activities involved, 
such as paying an anonymous gas bill through the internet, which resulted in ten-
sion among the population throughout the country reflected in the social media 
(“ ‘Biz Bize Yeteriz’ Kampanyasına Tepki Yağıyor” [“Protests Against the ‘We Are 
Enough For Each Other’ Campaign Are Increasing”], 2020).
Vulnerable Populations: The Case of Forcibly Displaced  People
Turkey hosts around 4 million forcibly displaced individuals, mainly from 
Syria but also from Af ghan i stan, Iran, Iraq, and Somalia, and mi grants. At over 
4.8   percent of its total population, they constitute a very significant vulnerable 
group within the country. Around 98  percent of registered Syrians  under tempo-
rary protection (SuTP) live in urban settings across the country (UNHCR, 2020), 
and they are mostly concentrated in ten cities near Turkey’s southeastern border 
(Özçürümez & İçduygu, 2020). SuTP can access healthcare ser vices. Turkey had 
recently introduced Mi grant Health Centres before the pandemic began as part 
of a comprehensive efort to advance health care access to this population. The 
Fourth Annual Report on the Eu ro pean Union Funded Coordination Strategy, the 
Fa cil i ty for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT), published on April  30, 2020, highlights 
Turkey’s “magnificent eforts in hosting and addressing the needs of almost four 
million refugees,” including in the healthcare sector (WHO, 2020). The COVID-19 
pandemic context, however, exposed striking challenges concerning the needs of 
the forcibly displaced as well.
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At the end of February 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic was picking up pace, 
Turkey declared that refugees aiming to cross to Eu rope would not be  stopped as of 
February 29, 2020. As a consequence of the EU- Turkey Statement of March 2016, 
Turkey had agreed to stop irregular migration  toward Eu rope, which had peaked 
in fall 2015, and received humanitarian assistance in return. However, growing dis-
content among the local population  toward having to host the forcibly displaced 
since 2011 and neighboring a protracted conflict in Syria, the Turkish state had 
conducted military operations to build a “safe zone” as well as extend humanitar-
ian assistance inside Syria in collaboration with many international organ izations 
such as UN OCHA.
As vio lence escalated in the Idlib province over the summer of 2019, Tur-
key began to voice objections to receiving another mass influx of hundreds of 
thousands of refugees. In the same period, the EU continued to support human-
itarian assistance programs inside Syria while remaining vague about the EU’s 
“strategic position”  toward solving the Syrian conflict (Eu ro pean Commission, 
2020a; Stanicek, 2020). In an uneasy context about both the Syrian conflict and 
the presence of Syrians in Turkey, news of the deaths of thirty- three Turkish sol-
diers killed in an attack in Idlib on February 28, 2020, constituted a justification 
for the state to deliver a long- overdue message to the international community 
and the EU. This message, from Turkey’s perspective, was about the multilayered 
po liti cal calculus of prolonged refugee protection for a middle- income country 
with a fragile economy, and the approaching financial, social, and health- related 
turmoil of the global pandemic. It raised the possibility of yet more uncertainty 
about sharing responsibilities around international protection in a context where 
a protracted conflict continued to displace populations with no end in sight. As 
tens of thousands of refugees arrived at Greece’s borders, the Prime Minister 
of Greece openly declared that “Greece does not bear any responsibility for the 
tragic events in Syria and  will not sufer the consequences of decisions taken by 
 others” (Van Hagen, 2020). No  matter how controversial the Turkish state’s strat-
egy was of announcing that it would stop controlling irregular migration  toward 
Eu rope from a humanitarian,  human rights, and international protection regime 
perspective, Turkey accomplished its objective of focusing the EU’s attention on 
the situation in Northwest Syria, and as a cause of, refugee flows (Eu ro pean Com-
mission, 2020b).
Turkey and the EU immediately started negotiating policy preferences, align-
ing interests, and sifting through alternatives for governing irregular migration 
flows. However, the Turkish Medical Association’s report examining the situa-
tion of refugees at the Turkey- Greece border during that time pointed out serious 
health risks resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and bullet wounds caused 
by weapons fire by the Greek border guards (Turkish Medical Association, 2020). 
At the end of March 2020, the Ministry of the Interior announced the transfer of 
all the refugees to temporary settlements in nine dif er ent cities to observe the 
fourteen- day quarantine mea sures (“Refugees Waiting at Greek Border Settled 
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in Repatriation  Centers in  Turkey,” 2020). In the meantime,  Turkey prepared 
and announced a circular on COVID-19– related health ser vices, which commu-
nicated that COVID-19– related health ser vices would be provided  free regard-
less of the registration status of the mi grants and refugees, facilitating access to 
around 500,000 undocumented mi grants (Official Gazette, 2020, April  9). In 
August 2020, data on the severity with which mi grants and the forcibly displaced 
had been afected during the pandemic indicated that many lost their jobs and 
continued to strug gle in need of cash support, psychosocial assistance, and basic 
health and hygiene supplies (International Organ ization for Migration, 2020, 
August 6). In times of crisis, even if the host state may be pursuing an efective 
pandemic response strategy, the forcibly displaced individuals and mi grants 
remain the most vulnerable group susceptible to sufer the devastating health and 
socioeconomic efects of the pandemic.
Explanations
The pandemic response in Turkey had, as of this writing, so far maintained a 
steady course. However, as with all response strategies, the inherent contradic-
tions of the po liti cal system may challenge its structure, per for mance, and sus-
tainability. In this section, we discuss and explain the impact of the two most 
prominent challenges: the po liti cal system (presidentialism) and party politics as 
well as national- local responsibility sharing in pandemic response strategies.
Presidentialism as Enabler and Inhibitor of Sustained  
Pandemic Response Effectiveness
Turkey shifted from a parliamentary system to a new po liti cal system that is close 
to super- presidentialism (Cinar, 2015; Özbudun, 2015). During the COVID-19 
pandemic, Turkey took quick and firm steps to implement public health mea sures. 
The results of  these initiatives can be observed as high capacity of public agencies 
to implement authoritative policy tools such as curfews, travel restrictions, and 
keeping citizens at home with accompanying compliance mea sures such as high 
fines for violations. However, although the presidential system in Turkey enables 
authorities to act and implement public health mea sures swiftly in the form of 
decisive policy responses, some scholars cast doubts on  whether the presidential 
system is inherently prone to cause some setbacks in policy design and imple-
mentation  because of authoritative tendencies in the system (Bakir, 2020). Some 
examples of the drawbacks of pursuing a centralized strategy implemented with 
executive dominance surfaced in the early days of the response: for example, 
during the minister of the interior’s resignation  because of the panic resulting 
in crowd contact, risking further infection in the hours before the start of the of 
first curfew implementation in April; the public’s total disregard of the COVID-19 
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mea sures during the ceremony for opening Hagia Sophia to worship in late July; 
and  later gathering in large groups in weddings, cele brations, and funerals.
The public communication strategy for the fight against the COVID-19 pan-
demic includes framing the coronavirus as constituting a “serious danger” to and 
an “ enemy” of humanity. Public authorities and the media reminded  people of 
the need to observe public health mea sures, especially social distancing, wearing 
masks, and hygiene practices. In the summer months, the communication strat-
egy focused on emphasizing the likelihood of repeated peak periods and why 
continuous solidarity for observing the mea sures is necessary  because the public 
began to discard compliance with the mea sures, especially at seaside resorts. 
Medical specialists from the CSAB stress the significance of strict compliance 
with restrictive mea sures such as wearing masks in open public spaces and all 
communal closed spaces as critical for controlling the spread of the pandemic. 
Public authorities work to ensure compliance with restrictive mea sures through 
increased surveillance and issuing of fines to  those who violate the regulations, 
such as not wearing their masks in designated areas. Against a backdrop of 
increased medical warnings and public authorities’ stringent policy implementa-
tion eforts, the regular epidemiological data from the Ministry of Health reported 
 little increase in the number of new cases or deaths (Ministry of Health, 2020d). 
This discrepancy undermined the public’s trust in the announced data and 
legitimacy of the mea sures related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The presidential 
system and the centralized governance model accelerated the decision- making 
speed and policy implementation capacity; however, the heavy- handedness of 
implementation swayed public opinion  toward concerns over  whether the pan-
demic is another excuse for increasing po liti cal control. The major setback in 
this setting is that the public becomes less convinced and less willing to sustain 
the public health mea sures. This is a huge obstacle for success in the fight against 
COVID-19  because all mea sures rely on taking individual responsibility for one’s 
own health to ensure the well- being of the community as a  whole.
Party Politics and National- Local Responsibility Nexus
In the fight against COVID-19, Turkey’s governance model constitutes public 
health centralism steered by the Ministry of Health and complemented by an 
extensive cooperation network in all sectors at both central and local levels. The 
organ ization of the policy pro cess reflected Turkey’s presidential system, estab-
lished with a referendum held on the April, 16, 2017, and began with June 2018 
parliamentary and presidential elections, in which the Justice and Development 
Party (JDP) became the majority, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as the 
president with popu lar vote. Between 2017 and 2019, a majority of metropolitan 
municipality mayors and the president  were from the ruling party (JDP), which 
reinforced unwavering cooperation between the central and local administration. 
However, in March 2019 elections, Turkey’s major metropolitan centers (Istanbul, 
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Ankara, Izmir, Antalya, Adana, and Mersin) elected mayors from the main oppo-
sition party, Republican  People’s Party (RPP). The strain between the president’s 
office and the metropolitan mayors of the opposition party was reflected also in 
the COVID-19 pandemic response.
Local governments in Turkey had been playing a key role in the fight against 
the COVID-19 pandemic to reduce the negative economic and social efects of 
COVID-19 among local populations. They pursued activities such as (1) awareness- 
raising campaigns, (2) fund rais ing, (3) providing humanitarian assistance for 
vulnerable groups and  people who are afected negatively from the COVID-19 
pandemic  because of job losses, (4) pursuing solidarity strategies to enhance 
cooperation among citizens, and (5) disinfection of streets, public transporta-
tion vehicles, and other public places. As key local actors, metropolitan mayors 
from RPP seized the opportunity to increase their efectiveness at the local level 
through their practices against the pandemic. The central government became 
uneasy about the opposition party’s potential for po liti cal gain from establish-
ing a close relationship with the  people through the municipalities. Based on this 
observation, the central government took several steps, such as the cancellation 
of fund rais ing campaigns and blocking the donation accounts of municipalities 
to restrict mayors’ from the opposition party to increase their sphere of influ-
ence (Zaman, 2020). Although party politics and controversy over national- local 
level actors’ dominance over policy implementation strategies may interfere with 
the success of the COVID-19 response, especially  because of vis i ble economic 
hardship, in an environment of heightened anxiety among the public about 
being infected, such structural tensions may be sidelined. This, however, seems 
to depend upon the public health centralism model of governance resuming its 
initial accomplishments of relatively low infection rates, efective access to treat-
ment, data transparency, and collaboration with multiple actors to circumvent the 
pos si ble detrimental efects of the inherent contradictions in the po liti cal system.
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic response per for mance of Turkey through public health 
centralism, as of this writing, depended on several  factors: (1) the efectiveness of 
screening for infection using filiation methods; (2) the level of public compliance 
to stringent social distancing and hygiene practices during “normalization” pro-
cesses; (3) the impact of eforts to mitigate the efect of the economic crisis on the 
socioeconomic determinants of health; (4) the comprehensiveness of the legisla-
tion on workplace health and safety for healthcare workers, including availability 
of high- quality personal protective equipment for healthcare personnel and the 
resources to be allocated to implement the legislation (Turkish Medical Associa-
tion, 2020e); (5) the efectiveness and range of psychosocial support available to 
healthcare professionals  under severe stress as well as the general public (Turkish 
Medical Association, 2020b); (6) the support for and pro gress of research on the 
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epidemiology and transmission of coronavirus in Turkey, which was reportedly 
experiencing delays in the pro cess of the Ministry of Health approval for data 
collection; (7) the policy design with which epidemiological evidence and public 
policy responses  were constructed and maintained, including the management of 
the “normalization” pro cess; (8) the regional and city- level diferences in the chal-
lenges induced by the pandemic as well as the success of the responses to  those 
challenges; (9) the countrywide capability to meet the intensifying and emerging 
needs of vulnerable populations in a context of increasing inequalities, (10) po liti-
cal tension among main po liti cal parties and between central government and 
municipalities, and (11) building social and institutional trust in society related to 
the data released and mea sures taken against the COVID-19 to secure nationwide 
compliance.
All countries seemed to monitor the success of their pandemic response strat-
egy by examining the extent to which their policy preferences, choices, practices, 
and capacity resulted in a reduction of national and local rates of the COVID-19- 
related mortality and viral spread. However, the globally difuse and long- term 
characteristics of the coronavirus pandemic  complicate any attempt to identify 
sufficiently reliable local indicators of success. Battling a global pandemic requires 
global response strategies, and it is imperative that humanity act in solidarity and 
cooperate  toward a common comprehensive solution. The success of any coun-
try’s response to the pandemic is, in the last instance, constrained or enabled by 
the success of each country’s contribution to the global ensemble.
Note
 1. As of this writing, the COVID-19 pandemic is still an ongoing pro cess. The argu-
ment mentioned in this section is based on the period  until August 2020. Some estimates 
are made that prob lems related to hospital capacity may occur in the upcoming period, 
depending on the spread of the virus.
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 23 covid-19 in central and eastern eU roPe
 Focus on Czechia, Hungary, and Bulgaria
Olga Löblová, Julia Rone, and Endre Borbáth
Countries of central and eastern Eu rope (CEE) are rarely accus-
tomed to praise when compared to their western Eu ro pean neighbors. During the 
early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, as core Eu ro pean countries 
such as Italy, Spain, or the United Kingdom reported hundreds of confirmed cases 
and even deaths per day, all CEE countries managed to contain the disease with 
considerably lower rates of infection and deaths. This changed with the second 
wave in late summer and fall of 2020, when many CEE countries overtook western 
Eu rope in the number of new COVID-19 cases, as well as deaths, per population, 
but for a few months the region could enjoy its unusual accomplishment.
A number of hypotheses have been suggested to explain the surprising con-
tainment success in the spring, including the widespread prevalence of the bacille 
Calmette- Guérin tuberculosis vaccine, lower population density and exposure to 
tourism, lack of trust in the healthcare system and government in general (leading 
the population, in theory, to fear the health threat more than in wealthy coun-
tries), low testing numbers (which may have led to underreporting of cases), and 
an autocratic advantage leaders of imperfect democracies, such as in CEE, enjoy 
when imposing lockdowns and other restrictive policies (Cepaluni et al., 2020; 
Gotev, 2020; Shotter & Jones, 2020; Toshkov et al., 2020; Walker & Smith, 2020). 
One  thing is certain: in the spring, CEE governments implemented strict mea-
sures to protect public health at a time when their countries had few COVID-19 
cases and deaths at most in the single digits.
This chapter focuses on three CEE countries: Czechia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. 
 These three countries are not necessarily representative of all CEE countries, but 
they share several impor tant structural characteristics with the rest of the region. 
Before COVID-19, the three countries  were hardly obvious candidates for suc-
cessful health threat management. All three are often categorized as backsliding 
democracies (Cianetti et al., 2018; Dimitrova, 2018; Hanley & Vachudova, 2018). 
Compared to western Eu rope, they score lower on indexes of government efec-
tiveness and regulatory quality (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2020) and, despite a common 
legacy of strong public health governance (Apostolova, 2020; Szabó & Wirth, 2020), 
their investment in health care has been lower than in countries of the Eu ro pean 
414  Coronavirus Politics
core (“Healthcare Expenditure Statistics,” 2020). The Global Health Security Index 
(2019) ranked Hungary, Czechia, and Bulgaria thirty- five, forty- two, and sixty- one, 
respectively, in terms of pandemic preparedness, well  behind projected frontrun-
ners such as the United States, United Kingdom, or Sweden.
Even when focusing on agency instead of structural  factors, as emphasized by 
recent re- examinations of the public health preparedness lit er a ture (Kavanagh & 
Singh, 2020), the three countries hardly had an advantageous starting position: 
their po liti cal leaders (prime ministers in all three cases) are frequently quali-
fied as populist,  either of the radical right, authoritarian variety as in Hungary 
(Mudde, 2019; Scheiring & Szombati, 2020), the anticivic kind in Bulgaria (Kabak-
chieva, 2020), or the technocratic sort in Czechia (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). In 
this they resemble the trend of demo cratic backsliding  under populist/illiberal 
leadership, observed in other postcommunist EU member states, such as Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, or Slovenia (Cianetti et  al., 2018). Populist leaders’ policies 
are often understood to be of questionable rationality, driven by clientelism or 
the whims of public opinion, and, crucially for a health threat, antiscientific and 
anti- elitist (Scheiring, 2020). Their actions are rarely seen as responsible policy- 
making in the public interest— this hypothesis was to a large extent confirmed 
during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic by the populist leaders of 
the United States, United Kingdom, or Brazil (see chapters 12, 26, and 27), as well 
as by the Czech, Bulgarian, and to some extent Hungarian, governments  later in 
2020. In health policy, an emerging lit er a ture has tentatively associated populist 
leaders and parties with negative consequences for public health (Falkenbach & 
Greer, 2018; Rinaldi & Bekker, 2020). The initial strong emphasis on public health 
protection in Czechia, Hungary, and Bulgaria is therefore puzzling from theoreti-
cal and comparative empirical perspectives.
Notwithstanding  these commonalities,  there are impor tant diferences among 
the three countries. Despite comparable population sizes, Czechia’s gross domes-
tic product (GDP) per capita is 3.8 times as much as Bulgaria’s and 1.6 times as 
Hungary’s. Czechia is also a country with net immigration, unlike Hungary and 
Bulgaria, which have known significant emigration since joining the Eu ro pean 
Union. This trend is especially noticeable among healthcare workers, with Czechia 
importing nurses and doctors notably from Slovakia, Ukraine, and Rus sia, and 
Bulgaria and Hungary exporting health workforce to western Eu rope (Hervey, 
2017). Quality of democracy in the three countries difers, too, as shown by a com-
bination of institutional indicators and expert assessment, collected, aggregated, 
and published in the form of the electoral or liberal democracy indices of V- Dem 
(Coppedge et al., 2020). Hungary and Bulgaria are comparable, whereas Czechia 
has better functioning demo cratic institutions, even if demo cratic consolidation 
has declined in all three since 2010. In terms of social policy, Czechia and Hun-
gary combine ele ments of the Bismarckian welfare state with neoliberal policies 
(although neoliberal ele ments have been somewhat attenuated in Czechia by two 
center- left co ali tions in power since 2014); Bulgaria attests to a more clear- cut 
neoliberal type as a result of policy preferences and low state capacity (Bohle & 
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Greskovits, 2012). As expected by Greer et al. (2020),  these diferences in regime 
type, existing welfare state, and state capacity proved significant for the diver-
gence in the three countries’ response to COVID-19, which accentuated, rather 
than modified, existing trends (see also Guasti, 2020).
The swift and decisive adoption of public health mea sures initially revealed 
eastern Eu ro pean populist leaders as “responsible” regarding health. It is of course 
pos si ble that the responsible impulse to protect public health came from a place of 
responsiveness: in March 2020, populations in CEE  were significantly concerned 
about the new disease (certainly more than  later in the year) (National Pandemic 
Alarm, 2020). Nevertheless, instead of minimizing or denying the threat, in the 
manner of Donald Trump or Jair Bolsonaro, the Czech, Hungarian, and Bulgarian 
populists made a distinct choice to prioritize public health over concerns about 
the economy or even, initially, particularistic sectoral interests. Their authori-
tarian tendencies found an outlet elsewhere throughout the COVID-19 crisis: 
in power grabs and attacks on the rule of law and, to a degree less obvious in 
the immediate term, in redistributive issues. In Hungary the pandemic provided 
a key opportunity for even deeper concentration of power; in Bulgaria it acted 
as background for ongoing oligarchic rearrangements and mass protests; and in 
the Czech Republic the parliamentary opposition and civil society successfully 
checked governmental power. In all three countries the governments redistrib-
uted resources in line with their interests, including bonuses to retirees who tra-
ditionally constitute their core constituencies (cf. Bohle & Greskovits, 2012). In 
Hungary the government cut bud gets of po liti cal parties and local governments, 
especially of opposition- led Budapest. At the same time, the level of politicization 
and polarization of COVID-19 as well as economic mea sures along party po liti cal 
lines remained remarkably low during the first wave, especially compared to, for 
example, Brazil or the United States. The seriousness of the health threat, as well 
as the need for strict mea sures and mandatory face coverings, did not become 
objects of po liti cal competition or divide the public in the first months of the 
pandemic. In late summer 2020, face masks and restrictions became controversial 
in Czechia, although not along clearly articulated po liti cal lines. Throughout the 
spring and summer, the three countries witnessed only small, episodic protests. 
Bulgaria was the only country that experienced mass protests in the summer, but 
protesters’ demands  were not related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The responsibility of the three governments could be questioned in the sum-
mer. Czechia and Bulgaria relaxed containment mea sures rapidly in April and 
May 2020 but saw new peaks in cases in July and August 2020, with a major rise 
in cases in September and October 2020. In October 2020 Czechia had the high-
est number of new cases per population in Eu rope, with infections regularly sur-
passing five thousand a day. The governments found it difficult to reimpose even 
relatively minor public health mea sures, although Hungary had maintained some 
containment mea sures throughout the summer and only saw increased infection 
rates in late August 2020. Testing and tracing systems in all three countries  were 
overwhelmed, suggesting the time the three “responsible populists” gained by 
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swift action in March 2020 had been misspent. It is nevertheless difficult to assess 
how not ramping up testing, tracing, and supporting capacities during the sum-
mer had been an adequate response to still relatively low infection rates and how 
far it constitutes a failure of crisis management or structural capacity limits; none 
of the three governments communicated openly or provided detailed rationales 
and scientific evidence for its choices. Indeed, although the populist leaders acted 
responsibly during the first months of the pandemic, they behaved throughout the 
 whole COVID-19 crisis in a highly unaccountable way.
This chapter provides details of the public health as well as social policy and 
economic mea sures in Czechia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, before discussing issues 
of rule of law and broader governance linked to COVID-19 in the three countries 
and broader lessons for po liti cal science and health policy. The focus is predomi-
nantly on the first months of the pandemic  until August 2020.
Public Health Mea sures
Early responses of the Czech, Hungarian, and Bulgarian governments followed 
similar patterns. One of the first mea sures  adopted by all three governments 
involved border closures and extensive travel bans in early March 2020. Czechia 
banned, already in early February, all incoming flights from China, followed on 
March  1, 2020 (when the first positive tests  were confirmed), by flights from 
northern Italy, and  later mandated self- quarantine upon arrival from Italy and 
a list of other EU and Asian countries. In one of the most controversial mea-
sures, Czech citizens and residents  were banned from leaving the country from 
March 16, 2020, (a first since 1989), and no foreigners without a residence per-
mit  were allowed entry (notable exceptions included cross- border workers, espe-
cially with Germany and Austria). When  there  were fewer than twenty infections 
in the country, Hungary canceled flights to and from Iran and Italy, and by the 
time the number of confirmed cases  rose to thirty- nine, only Hungarian citizens 
 were allowed to enter Hungary via air or land border crossings. A focus on bor-
der control was clear in Hungary throughout the spring and summer of 2020, as 
the country continued to impose quarantines on travelers from numerous Eu ro-
pean countries (including, notably, the United Kingdom). In late August  2020, 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announced borders would again close to foreigners 
beginning September 1, and Hungarian nationals coming from abroad would be 
subject to quarantine, although foreign football fans  were granted an exemption 
(Kaszás, 2020c). In Bulgaria, freedom of movement into and out of the country 
was not suspended, but quarantines  were introduced. On March 17, the Ministry 
of Health imposed quarantine for all Bulgarian citizens arriving from several EU 
and Asian countries. During the height of the lockdown, many Bulgarian seasonal 
agricultural and care workers  were flown to western Eu rope, despite the acute 
 labor force shortage within Bulgaria (Weisskircher, et al., 2020). Numerous cases 
of returning gastarbeiters (guest workers) importing the virus to Bulgaria  were 
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documented (“Gurbetchiite, natupkani v busove i leki koli” [“Returning Guest 
Workers, Packed in Buses and Cars”], 2020).
The three governments also introduced lockdowns with relatively few con-
firmed COVID-19 cases: on March  13, 2020, in Bulgaria (24 cases total), and 
March 16 in Czechia (383 cases) and Hungary (19 cases). Schools and universities 
closed, as did most retail shops, restaurants, and theaters, with exemptions for 
essential businesses in all three countries. In Bulgaria, the use of parks, city gar-
dens, sports, and playgrounds, even for health walks, was forbidden, thus making 
the lockdown one of the strictest in Eu rope despite the low numbers of infections. 
Breaking the quarantine rules in Bulgaria became subject to a prison sentence 
of up to three years and a fine between EUR 5 and 25,000 (“Do 10 godini zatvor” 
[“Up to 10 Years in Prison”], 2020). In Czechia and Hungary, apart from isolated 
incidents (“Městská policie” [“Municipal Police”], 2020),  there  were no reports of 
exaggerated police enforcement of the lockdown rules.
The Czech government mandated the use of “respiratory protective devices” 
everywhere outside of one’s home on March 18, 2020. Given the shortage of surgi-
cal face masks and respirators, the decree clarified that scarves and other cloths 
 were acceptable, and within hours the Czech population responded by sewing 
do- it- yourself cloth masks (Tait, 2020). Homemade cloth masks quickly became a 
symbol of national pride, with Czech civil society and politicians promoting their 
use as good practice internationally (ČTK, 2020a). Paradoxically, masks became 
a point of contention in late summer. From July 2020, the health minister lifted 
the obligation to face masks indoors and in public transport (authorities argued 
that masks are less efective in hot weather, without presenting scientific evidence 
to support the claim). In August 2020, the health minister announced a renewed 
obligation to wear masks indoors, but Prime Minister Andrej Babiš softened the 
rules two days  later  after unfavorable public opinion feedback (Brodcová, 2020). 
In Hungary, face mask use was made obligatory in shops and public transport in 
late April 2020 in Budapest and on May 4, 2020, throughout the country (“Buda-
pest Makes Masks Mandatory for Shoppers and Commuters,” 2020; “Itthon” [“At 
Home”], 2020). Bulgaria had seen several volte- faces on face masks: initially made 
mandatory indoors and outdoors on March 30, 2020, and subject to fines up to 
2,500 EUR, the Minister of Health made masks “recommended” but not oblig-
atory on March  31  after public anger at the low availability and high prices of 
masks. Face masks  later became mandatory in public spaces from April 12, 2020, 
to be canceled on May 1 and reintroduced in closed spaces (with notable excep-
tions of cafes and bars) from June 23, 2020.
Testing and tracing systems shared similarities across the three countries. 
Testing relied on a mixture of private and public laboratory provision and test 
financing. In Czechia and Bulgaria, contact tracing relied on regional public health 
bodies, while in Hungary the national- level public health body cooperated with 
local government authorities. The Czech Republic’s early eforts at ramping up its 
testing and tracing system seemed promising. In May  2020, the Czech govern-
ment launched a test- and- trace system called “Smart Quarantine,” which included 
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a Bluetooth- based application developed by volunteers, a collaboration with banks 
and mobile phone operators to share location data to aid contact tracers, and an 
update of contact- tracing pro cesses. Maximum testing capacities, including in pri-
vate, public, and academic laboratories,  were reported at around twelve thousand 
tests a day (“Chytrou karanténou si kupujeme pojištění, tvrdí Jurajda ” [“ We’re Buy-
ing Insurance with Smart Quarantine, Says Jurajda”], 2020); the  actual testing rate 
was about six to seven thousand tests per day (about 0.60 per 1000 population, 
similar to Austria in May), but by the time infection rates began to rise again in 
mid- June, testing numbers  were down to about four thousand a day, which the 
government explained by low COVID-19 incidence. By August, despite re- upped 
testing rates, positive test ratios  were often over 5  percent (Ministry of Health of 
the Czech Republic, 2020a). Regional public health offices, tasked with contact 
tracing,  were overwhelmed and did not make use of data from banks and phone 
operators or the app, whose uptake remained  limited (Pokorná, 2020). This was 
similar in Bulgaria, where understafed regional public health authorities  were 
reportedly failing to trace and notify  people on time in July (“RZI ne uvedomilo” 
[“The Regional Health Inspectorate Did Not Inform”], 2020), and a contact- tracing 
app developed by a private com pany and donated to the Bulgarian government 
for a symbolic price never reached widespread use  because of concerns about 
privacy. Testing levels in Bulgaria grew consistently since March 2020, to about 
0.58 per 1000 population. PCR tests for  people with COVID-19 symptoms  were 
mandatory but not  free— they  were covered by public health insurance only upon 
referral to an infectious disease specialist by the patient’s general practitioner— a 
pro cess that included physically visiting all three providers (“PCR testovete” [“PCR 
Tests”], 2020). Thus, most patients ended up paying for their own tests, which typi-
cally cost between 60 to 130 BGN (EUR 30 to 75), with discounts for group tests. 
Hungary’s official testing numbers  were systematically lower than elsewhere in the 
region, with about two to three thousand tests a day throughout July and early 
August 2020, although privately purchased negative tests had not been tallied in 
official statistics. This changed in late August when Hungary ramped up testing 
numbers up to a maximum of six thousand tests on some days (0.43 per 1,000 pop-
ulation) (“Daily COVID-19 Tests per 1,000  People,” 2020). Accessing testing was 
difficult, even according to government- friendly media (Schőnviszky, 2020). Over-
all, the three countries tested noticeably less than western Eu ro pean countries.
Mea sures within the healthcare sector difered across the three countries. Czechia 
restricted the provision of non- COVID-19 care in March 2020 and required hospi-
tals to allocate bed capacity to potential COVID-19 patients, but reopened routine 
care provision mid- April (Ministry of Health of the Czech Republic, 2020b). In con-
trast, Hungary implemented an unsophisticated, controversial mea sure to increase 
COVID-19- specific care capacity: in April  2020, the minister of  human capaci-
ties, in charge of the healthcare portfolio, ordered hospitals to vacate 60  percent 
of hospital beds within eight days to make space for COVID-19 patients (Pintér, 
2020). The order was implemented hastily and chaotically, resulting in many cases 
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in discharging patients without ensuring adequate home care. Given the low rate 
of COVID-19 transmission in Hungary, the decision was criticized by opposition 
parties as unwarranted. Some observers have put it in context of the government’s 
plans for hospital privatization (Scheiring, 2020). The government also spent EUR 
1.5 billion on COVID-19- related equipment (Urfi, 2020). More than half of the 
bud get (0.86 billion) was spent on approximately sixteen thousand ventilators— a 
figure that manifestly well exceeded the medical need, even as anticipated by Prime 
Minister Orbán himself (“300 milliárd forintért” [“The Government Spent 300 Bil-
lion Forints”], 2020; Haász, 2020).
In Bulgaria, the health minister declared that hospitals in the country have 
7,391 beds to treat COVID-19 patients, with 1,324 beds reserved in anesthesiology 
departments, for a population of seven million. Yet the prob lem in Bulgaria was 
not the number of beds, which is in fact one of the highest in the EU—756.9 per 
100,000 inhabitants (“Hospital Beds,” 2020) but rather staffing levels (similar to 
Hungary and to some extent Czechia).  Because of significant emigration of doc-
tors and nurses to western Eu rope since 2004, Bulgaria has been facing a dramatic 
shortage of health professionals, especially in areas outside the capital, and an 
aging health workforce (“Bez aparatura is lekari v pensionna vuzrast” [“Without 
Adequate Machine and with Doctors in the Age of Retirement”], 2020). Com-
bined with the lack of personal protective equipment, this led to entire hospital 
departments resigning, citing a lack of safety mea sures and adequate COVID-19 
planning (“Masovi ostavki vuv Vtora Gradska Bolnitza sled prevrushtaneto i v 
infekciozna” [“Mass Resignations in the Second City Hospital  after It Was Trans-
formed into an Infectious Diseases Hospital”], (2020). In July 2020, some hos-
pitals, including in Bulgaria’s second biggest city, Plovdiv, and in the historical 
capital, Veliko Turnovo, called for paid and unpaid volunteers to supplant medical 
personnel (Maslyankova, 2020).
Lockdown relaxation was initially gradual in all three countries, starting in 
April 2020 in Czechia and early May 2020 in Bulgaria and Hungary, but accelerating 
as immediate rises in COVID-19 cases did not immediately materialize. However, 
all three countries lacked clear guidance on  reintroducing public health  mea sures, 
which made responses to dramatic surges in cases in July and August 2020 po liti-
cally difficult. The Czech government’s first plan of the lockdown relaxation time-
line respected a fourteen- day distance between easing stages (Government of the 
Czech Republic, 2020) but had been repeatedly accelerated, and many areas of 
social and economic activity opened si mul ta neously. By May 25, much of daily life 
was back to normal, including a reopening of schools and indoor pubs. Similarly, in 
Bulgaria, the government, led by Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, quickly relaxed 
most public health mea sures beginning May  13, 2020, opening shopping malls, 
trade centers, and fitness and sports halls. The Bulgarian government opened 
indoor restaurants, bars, and night clubs on June 1, 2020.
Czechia and Bulgaria had low levels of infection in April and May 2020, which 
hardly justified a continuous strict lockdown, but economic concerns may have 
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played an additional role. In Czechia, a court ruling in late April  2020 poten-
tially exposed the state to damages liabilities. Within hours, the minister of health 
announced a precipitated opening of shops and lifted the ban on freedom of 
movement, including on travel abroad. In Bulgaria, it was considered that Bulgar-
ian tourism, which represents 12  percent of the country’s GDP, would not be able 
to survive continuing public health mea sures. Another force, potentially impor-
tant for electoral politics in Bulgaria,  were football fans: beginning June 5, 2020, 
stadiums  were officially allowed to operate at maximum 30  percent capacity. In 
practice, thousands of football fans celebrated the 2020 Bulgarian cup final in 
close proximity.
In Hungary, a major controversy concerned school reopening. On April  19, 
2020, Prime Minister Orbán announced on Facebook that infections  were 
expected to peak on May 3, one day before the start of the centralized high school 
final examinations. Despite protests from teachers, parents, and students, as well 
as the opposition, the examinations (mandatory for eighty- four thousand students 
and supervised by sixty- five hundred teachers) took place. Indoor restaurants and 
pubs, as well as cultural and tourist establishments, reopened in late May 2020, 
but the ban on gatherings of over five hundred  people remained in place, with a 
tangible impact throughout the summer on the  music festival industry (Kaszás, 
2020a).
Re introduction of public health mea sures proved difficult in Czechia and 
Bulgaria over the summer, despite infection rates higher than during March and 
April 2020 (both countries regularly saw two to three hundred daily new cases 
in the summer), but smooth in Hungary, which had consistently low infection 
rates in July and August 2020 (below one hundred daily). In Czechia, an infection 
outbreak in a coal mine in the northeast in May and June 2020 initially seemed 
controlled by the regional public health body, but by July, the public health office 
noted widespread community transmission and immediately banned events over 
one hundred  people, including an ongoing  music festival. This provoked a two- 
thousand- strong demonstration (ČTK, 2020b). By early September  2020, the 
chief public health officer of Prague publicly apologized for no longer being able to 
trace new infections (ČTK, 2020c). Despite skyrocketing infection rates, few pub-
lic health mea sures  were introduced throughout September 2020, which many 
commentators put in the context of local and Senate elections in early October.
In Bulgaria the government attempted to close down night clubs and disco-
theques in July 2020, only to give in to public pressure and reopen them a few days 
 later (“Praven Svyat” [“ Legal World”], 2020). Hungary maintained public health 
mea sures, notably mandatory face masks indoors, bans on large events, and man-
datory quarantine for visitors and returning residents from numerous EU and 
non- EU countries, throughout the summer, without significant pressure for fur-
ther easing from the afected sector or the public. No major protests followed 
Prime Minister Orbán’s announcement of Hungary’s tightened travel restrictions 
from September 2020 (Bayer, 2020), suggesting an autocratic advantage may well 
be at play.
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In summary, all three countries implemented similar, swift, and far- reaching 
mea sures to protect public health in March 2020, including travel bans and lock-
downs. Where they diverged was in the extent to which  these mea sures  were 
relaxed in the summer. Hungary maintained some restrictions, such as face masks 
and large event bans, whereas Czechia and Bulgaria lifted virtually all mea sures in 
May 2020, and their governments hesitated to reimpose even partial restrictions. 
They also diverged in their adaptation of health systems, with Czechia coping 
with the shock of COVID-19 relatively well (at least  until the severe second wave 
in the fall of 2020), Hungary overreacting by crudely restricting routine care, and 
Bulgaria having to deal with a health system with a high number of hospital beds 
but low number of doctors and nurses.
Social Policy Mea sures
All three countries  adopted social policy mea sures supporting businesses and 
individuals. Support for businesses relied chiefly on guaranteed loans and public 
funding of furloughs and other short work week schemes. In all three countries, 
mea sures targeted at individuals through lockdowns and  mitigating the efects of 
economic downturn in Czechia, Hungary, and Bulgaria have been characterized by 
a relatively heavy administrative burden. Beyond that, however, the responses of the 
three governments difer significantly.
In Czechia, the government’s furlough scheme contributed 60, 80, or in some 
cases 100  percent of wages and social security contributions (capped at average 
gross wage) to employers for employees in quarantine, on caretaker leave, or if the 
business had been reduced or closed as a result of the pandemic or government 
mea sures (Eurofound, 2020). The government further waived the part of social 
security contributions paid by employers for small businesses in June through 
August 2020. In April the government implemented a lump- sum of 500 CZK (EUR 20) 
per day since March 12 for the self- employed. The program initially excluded work-
ers on zero- hour contracts but was retroactively extended, at 350 CZK (14 EUR) 
per day, in July, following criticism by the opposition and the public. In August, it 
proposed (and  later  adopted) a lump- sum of 5,000 CZK (190 EUR) for all retirees. 
The government introduced interest- free guaranteed loans for businesses across 
several consecutive financing schemes. Advance payments on personal and cor-
porate income tax  were suspended for the second quarter 2020 and penalties 
waived for failing to pay property tax and file income tax returns on time, rents for 
businesses  were subsidized and repayments of business and  house hold loans and 
mortgages became subject to a three- to six- month moratorium. According to 
an in de pen dent group of economists, the eventual amount of direct and indirect 
state support to businesses and individuals amounted to about 300 billion CZK 
(EUR 11.4 billion) or about 5.4  percent of GDP; however, only about 100 billion 
CZK (1.7   percent of GDP) had been disbursed by mid- August (KoroNERV-20, 
2020). Businesses notably complained about excessive bureaucratic burden and 
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slow pro cessing of the initial loan programs (Hospodářská Komora ČR, 2020). 
The government approved grants for tourism, notably a voucher system for spa 
tourism (International Monetary Fund, 2020). It further proposed to finance a 
large advertising campaign for domestic tourism, the revenues of which  were to 
benefit progovernment media—it  later retracted the plan following opposition 
criticism (“Návrh kampaně na dovolenou v Česku ministerstvo stáhlo” [“Ministry 
Retracts Proposal for PR Campaign for Holidays in Czechia”], 2020).
Compared to countries in the region, the Hungarian government acted 
relatively late and did  little to decrease the impact of the crisis on the national 
economy. The government provided tax exemptions for the most hard- hit sec-
tors of tourism, catering, entertainment, sport, culture, and transport. It intro-
duced a furlough scheme available from May  1, but only businesses who lost 
30 to 50   percent of employee working time could prove that their  orders have 
not fallen by more than 50  percent and are working  toward the “interests of the 
national economy”  were eligible, if employees worked at least four hours daily 
( later reduced to two hours) and remained in training for another 30  percent of 
their time. The mea sure was  later made more flexible but has been criticized as 
restrictive and belated (Krokovay, 2020). The government did not provide direct 
transfers to employers or employees, except for a one- time payment of about 
1,500 EUR (500 000 HUF) to all healthcare workers, and did not prolong the 
three- month limit on unemployment benefits ( after which health insurance con-
tributions  were no longer covered by the state), one of the shortest in Eu rope. 
In response to criticism from the opposition and civil society, the government 
pointed to its heavi ly criticized workfare program (see, e.g., Szikra, 2014), and 
Prime Minister Orbán suggested that  those who remained without a source of 
income join the military. Pensioners, however,  were promised an extra week of 
pension benefit in the coming three years (International Monetary Fund, 2020). 
Take-up of the furlough scheme was less than expected: about 200,000 employees 
benefited from the scheme by July 2020, as opposed to some 500,000 expected 
beneficiaries. Given the late introduction of the policy, Hungarian trade  unions 
complained that  little had been done for workers who had already been laid of by 
May (Krokovay, 2020). The size of the April economic package is hard to estimate 
 because of the lack of transparency and creative accounting. However, the pledge 
includes an immediate 630 billion HUF (EUR 1.76 billion) to cover the immediate 
costs of the pandemic and an additional 8,370 billion HUF (EUR 23.32 billion) the 
government claims to invest to temper the economic efects of the crisis, although 
it announced an intention to keep the bud get deficit below 2.7  percent, efectively 
amounting to an austerity policy (Csiki, 2020; Scheiring, 2020). One study puts 
the immediate fiscal impulse, as  adopted, at 0.4  percent of Hungary’s 2019 GDP 
(Anderson et al., 2020).
Bulgaria implemented a “60:40” furlough scheme, expected to cost beyond 
EUR 500 million: 60  percent of employee salaries  were to be covered by the state 
and 40   percent by employers (Government of Bulgaria, 2020). Yet only EUR 
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26.3 million  were spent on the 60:40 scheme by end of May 2020; at the same 
time, expenses for unemployment benefits  rose sharply and reached 30.5 mil-
lion EUR (Grigorova, 2020). Many companies applied for support from the 60:40 
mea sure only for some of their workers, usually the top management, while laying 
of other workers. In March, the Bulgarian government pledged to provide 4.5 bil-
lion BGN (approximately EUR 2.25 billion) in guaranteed loans (“Pravitelstvoto s 
ikonomicheski merki za 4.5mlrd. lv. za borba s coronavirusa” [“The Government 
Ofers Economic Mea sures for 4.5 Billion for Fighting the Coronavirus”], 2020). 
Further EUR 250 million  were allocated for covering the increased expenses of the 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defense, and the Interior Ministry, and EUR 100 
million  were pledged to guarantee zero- interest consumer credits up to EUR 750 
for individuals on unpaid leave.
As in Czechia, most of the money allocated for tackling the crisis and reviv-
ing the economy remained unused. The Bulgarian government further  adopted 
several new social policy mea sures targeting individuals (Government of Bul-
garia, 2020), which  were nevertheless often subject to excessively complex 
means- testing. For example, parents could apply for a one- time sum of approxi-
mately EUR 190 but only provided that they could prove satisfying a total of 
nine conditions. Thus, a large part of the population was practically excluded 
from benefiting from the support. Less cumbersome new mea sures included 
the possibility for parents to receive help in hiring a carer for  children, includ-
ing their own unemployed relatives. EUR 25 million  were distributed among 
retired  people with low pensions: pensioners  were to receive EUR 25 extra for 
August, September, and October 2020. Meanwhile, the government of Bulgaria 
pledged to provide EUR 500 extra per month for frontline health workers fight-
ing the virus. Unemployment benefits  were slightly increased (by EUR 1.50 per 
day), and the term for which they could be paid was increased by three months. 
The salaries of social workers as well as standards for financing delegated social 
ser vices  were increased. In the fall, the government introduced a new series of 
social mea sures and direct transfers. Yet, rather than addressing the impact of 
COVID-19,  these late and partial mea sures aimed to decrease social pressure and 
buy support for the Bulgarian government in the context of mass protests and 
approaching elections.
Overall, the social policy response demonstrates diversity, rather than com-
monalities, among  these three countries. Czechia’s social policy mea sures fol-
lowed, in princi ple, broad lines of responses of western Eu ro pean governments 
by ofering unconditional direct transfers to the self- employed and loans to busi-
nesses, as well as furlough schemes for employees, although their efects are still 
up for debate. Bulgaria, in comparison, implemented few mea sures to alleviate the 
economic impact of the COVID-19 for the population, ofering support subject to 
excessively complex means- testing and a furlough scheme with  limited impact. 
Fi nally, the Hungarian government refused to abandon its “workfare society” 
social policy, declining to adjust its restrictive unemployment benefit rules, and 
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implemented a narrow furlough scheme. Notably, however, all three governments 
implemented bonus transfers to pensioners, traditionally their core electorates.
Discussion
If the initial successes of the Czech, Hungarian, and Bulgarian governments in 
containing the spread of COVID-19 stand out in the Eu ro pean context, so do 
two other kinds of actions common to the three countries: the use of the public 
health and economic crises to efectuate power grabs and the opaque, top- down, 
and arbitrary decision- making style of governments and their crisis teams. The 
approach of  these three CEE countries to the COVID-19 crisis can be summarized 
as responsible initially, unaccountable throughout.  Here again,  these governance 
issues afected the three countries to varying degrees.
In Hungary, the government treated the pandemic as an opportunity for fur-
ther executive power grabs. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given Prime Minister Orbán’s 
long- established craftsmanship in using technical pretexts to centralize power, 
Hungary’s government implemented an ostentatious power grab in March 2020. 
Orbán seized the opportunity and relied on his two- thirds parliamentary major-
ity to introduce special provisions, allowing the government to in defi nitely 
rule by decree, despite criticism from domestic opposition parties, EU leaders, 
national, and international observers (Borbáth, 2020). In addition, the legislation 
allowed the government to postpone elections and prosecute  those who delib-
erately “spread misinformation” regarding the pandemic. The latter provision 
was heavi ly criticized and led to high- profile arrests of a po liti cal activist and a 
farmer (charges  were  later dropped) (Kaszás, 2020b). The law was rescinded in 
June 2020, as new regulations  were introduced to allow the government the con-
tinued exercise of some of its special powers. The government further appropri-
ated some of the funding initially allocated for party financing and for local gov-
ernments, arguing with the need to finance the economic recovery package. The 
move was widely seen as a power grab for two reasons: one, opposition parties 
had ascended to power in Budapest and other urban centers in 2019, and two, 
party financing made up a minor part of the state bud get. As an immediate conse-
quence, local governments  were left without funds to mitigate the economic and 
public health efects of COVID-19 despite being designated as first responders. In 
an even clearer power grab move, the 2021 bud get,  adopted in July 2020, appro-
priated further funds from opposition- run Budapest, leading to a po liti cal clash 
with the mayor. As in pre- coronavirus times, decision- making and government 
communication in Hungary remained highly centralized around Prime Minis-
ter Orbán, with  little transparency and public involvement of experts. The main 
channel of information provided by the government was regular press briefings 
by the surgeon general, mainly picking up questions from government- friendly 
media outlets. New mea sures, including, for instance, the economic package or 
organ ization of high school exams,  were frequently announced by Orbán on his 
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Facebook page. Data on testing have been seen as unreliable: in July 2020, Nor-
way excluded Hungary from its list of COVID-19 safe countries on the basis of 
incomplete reporting on testing to the Eu ro pean Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control (Flachner, 2020).
In Bulgaria, abuses of rule of law  were more  limited than in Hungary, but the 
pandemic served as a backdrop to existing cleavages. Decision- making during the 
pandemic was highly centralized in the hands of Prime Minister Borissov. Dealing 
with the pandemic was presented as a  matter for experts. In practice, however, 
Borissov’s government created two expert advisory teams: one supported strict 
lockdown mea sures, whereas some members of the other downplayed the threat 
of the virus and argued in  favor of herd immunity. Borissov frequently played the 
two teams against each other as “opposing experts” to avoid taking the blame for 
decision regarding the virus. Mainstream media invited experts from both teams, 
thriving on the conflict and  doing  little to address the widespread confusion 
caused by the spread of fake news online. All in all, however, COVID-19 seemed 
to have  little importance in Bulgaria’s po liti cal life, which developed in parallel. 
Although the nationalist party Vuzrazhdane or ga nized in mid- May 2020 small 
protests against the lack of economic support, strict lockdown mea sures, and 5G 
(seen in some conspiracy theories as responsible for the spread of COVID-19), 
the massive protests in July  were primarily targeted at the capture of the state by 
oligarchic players. Rather than the government’s  handling of the pandemic, the 
protests reflected the population’s frustration with state capture, which had tran-
spired in a series of scandals before as well as during lockdown (“Anti- corruption 
Protests Enter Thirtieth Consecutive Day in Bulgaria,” 2020). Only in August 2020 
did nurses join the antigovernment protests demanding better salaries and work-
ing conditions. Connections between the protests and COVID-19  were thus 
mainly indirect— reflected in Borissov’s reluctance to reintroduce strict mea sures 
to avoid popu lar anger and in the social mea sures meant above all to appease key 
groups in the electorate in a complex po liti cal situation.
Fi nally, Czechia withstood attempts at executive overreach relatively well. 
Government mea sures  were met with scrutiny by the parliamentary opposition, 
civil society watchdogs, and the judiciary, which proved to be an efective source 
of checks and balances. In May, the Parliament refused to approve a second exten-
sion of the state of emergency, and opposition politicians criticized numerous 
par ameters of individual mea sures: for instance, the restrictive rules for cross- 
border workers. When the government proposed a bill that would make due dili-
gence unnecessary for selected public procurement contracts, the parliamentary 
debate was eventually postponed  until  after the end of the state of emergency 
following pressure from nongovernmental organ izations and the opposition 
(“Korupční zákon i legalizace zlodějin” [“Corrupt Law and Legalization of Theft”], 
2020). Private individuals as well as senators also contested the constitutional-
ity of key government mea sures (notably the travel and shopping bans) via the 
judiciary, including the Constitutional Court. In April 2020 a Prague court ruled 
that the limits to fundamental rights imposed by the lockdown and shop closure 
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 mea sures  were too  great for the mea sures to be issued single- handedly by the min-
ister of health as decrees based on the Public Health Protection Act (“Soud zrušil 
opatření omezující obchod a volný pohyb” [“Court Cancels Mea sures Limiting 
Retail and  Free Movement”], 2020). Instead, the court insisted they be reissued 
by the government based on the Crisis Act, subject to parliamentary scrutiny. 
In fact, the mea sures  were initially, in mid- March 2020, issued  under the Crisis 
Act but canceled only days  later and replaced with identical mea sures  under the 
Public Health Protection Act— possibly  because the state was potentially liable for 
damages  under the Crisis Act (Zíta, 2020). The ruling led to an immediate easing 
of the lockdown. Despite numerous expert advisory teams, the government rarely 
provided detailed scientific rationale for its policies, which at times seemed to fol-
low public opinion and had been criticized for a lack of transparency by experts 
as well as politicians (Bidrmanová, 2020).
Several conclusions can be drawn from the responses of the Czech, Hungar-
ian, and Bulgarian governments to the COVID-19 pandemic. First, structural 
 factors typically assessed in health threat preparedness indexes, such as state 
capacity or health system resilience, may not be sufficient to explain eventual out-
comes. Observing the failures to prevent deaths of several typically high- capacity 
countries such as the United Kingdom and United States led to calls for reinte-
gration of agency, specifically the role of po liti cal leadership, to  future thinking 
about preparedness (e.g., Kavanagh & Singh, 2020). Eastern Eu rope’s experience 
with COVID-19, however, suggests that what is perhaps needed is a nuance of the 
kind of capacity necessary for par tic u lar threats: in the case of COVID-19, the 
appropriate first response to the threat involved crude mea sures such as stay- at- 
home  orders, which hardly correlate with mea sures of government efectiveness 
or regulatory capacity, for example. Building efective testing and tracing systems 
and designing and implementing more nuanced public health mea sures, how-
ever, requires more sophisticated capacity. The dramatic rise in new infections 
and deaths in the region since August 2020 (Shotter & Hopkins, 2020) show that 
CEE countries have not been, and likely  will not be, as successful in the long run 
as in the first months of the pandemic.
Second, leadership  matters, but even leaders traditionally associated with sub-
optimal policies such as populists can adopt responsible policies in a crisis. In 
contrast to other populist leaders, the three prime ministers of Czechia, Hungary, 
and Bulgaria placed surprising emphasis on the protection of public health, con-
trary to assumptions of some of the lit er a ture on the impact of pop u lism on public 
health (Rinaldi & Bekker, 2020). This emphasis surely contributed to halting the 
exponential growth of new infections (although other confounding variables are 
likely to have played a role, notably the presumably low COVID-19 incidence in 
CEE in January and February 2020). Given the low transparency of government 
decision- making in the three countries, it is difficult to determine what prompted 
the adoption of the “responsible” option (i.e., in what aspects was leadership 
of central and eastern Eu ro pean populists dif er ent from, for example, Brazil’s 
 Bolsonaro or the United States’ Trump).
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 There are few indications suggesting the three governments engaged in com-
plex reviews of scientific evidence; it is more likely the initial policies, such as 
lockdowns and border closures,  were the result of learning or emulation of other 
countries.  After the initial swift reaction, however, experience with face masks in 
Czechia or nightclub closures in Bulgaria suggest leaders may become less respon-
sible in terms of infection prevention and more responsive in terms of catering 
to public opinion, which had shifted from scared to unconcerned by June 2020 
(National Pandemic Alarm, 2020).
Third,  there  were some indications in  favor of the authoritarian advantage 
hypothesis in the three countries (Cepaluni et  al., 2020; Toshkov et  al., 2020). 
In Hungary, Prime Minister Orbán, who rules the country virtually unchecked, 
was able to maintain restrictive public health mea sures longer and introduce new 
restrictions easier than Czechia’s Prime Minister Babiš, constrained by efec-
tive parliamentary opposition, in de pen dent judiciary, and active civil society, or 
than Bulgaria’s Prime Minister Borissov, weakened by oligarchic infighting and 
mass protests. However, in the case of early COVID-19 pandemic (Cepaluni 
et al., 2020), the authoritarian advantage should lead to fewer deaths: Hungary, 
despite its low overall case numbers, had a remarkably high mortality rate from 
COVID-19 during the first wave, which the authorities explained by an unusually 
high proportion of transmissions occurring in hospitals. In autumn 2020, though, 
COVID-19 deaths per population seemed to rise slower in Hungary than in the 
other two countries. Furthermore, this advantage is, by definition, accompanied 
by abuses of power and disrespect of rule of law and  limited pluralism in decision- 
making, which may have nefarious consequences on policies, including on health 
(Rinaldi & Bekker, 2020), as day- to- day policy- making retakes pre ce dence over 
the initial period of high uncertainty.
Fourth, unlike, for example, in Brazil or the United States, responses to the 
pandemic need not become a politicized topic in all polarized socie ties, or at least 
not immediately. The three CEE countries are polarized along partisan identities 
(Reiljan, 2020; Vegetti, 2018), but the broad directions of government mea sures 
as well as the severity of the health threat itself  were subject to general cross- 
party consensus. Similarly to other Eu ro pean countries, opposition parties found 
it difficult to contest the incumbent party’s policies, as executive power became 
more impor tant vis- à- vis parliaments (Merkel, 2020). In Bulgaria, notably, anti-
government protests  were efectively decoupled from COVID-19, and  there was 
 little criticism of anti- COVID-19 mea sures along party lines. Face masks became 
a polarizing topic in Czechia in late summer, but no major po liti cal party overtly 
claimed an anti- face- mask line. Similarly, in Hungary and in Bulgaria, po liti cal 
opposition did not oppose public health mea sures introduced by the government. 
One potential explanation for this relates to populists’ monopolization of anti-
establishment sentiments: when populists adopt a responsible policy, competi-
tor parties may not be able, or willing, to credibly exploit antisystem, antiscience 
moods in the population, for fear of alienating their core electorate and failing to 
reach supporters of the populists in power.
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Conclusions
Czechia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and much of the rest of central and eastern Eu rope, 
provide a counter- example to some pre- COVID-19, as well as post- COVID-19, 
received wisdom on the role of structure and agency in crises. Among the old 
ideas, the region’s successful initial containment of the virus questions the 
assumption that higher state capacity leads to better outcomes. Among the new 
ones, it qualifies some of the emerging hypotheses about in efec tive leadership 
of populist leaders, as well as about politicization of the pandemic in polarized 
socie ties. To be sure, the region is certainly not the only case puzzling for theories 
of COVID-19 politics induced from a handful of prominent policy failures (the 
United States) and textbook successes (South  Korea); similar unexpected suc-
cesses have been noted, for example, in Vietnam and on the African continent 
(Dabla- Norris et al., 2020; Pilling, 2020). It is nevertheless in ter est ing  because of 
its par tic u lar combination of successful initial leadership followed by the “respon-
sible” populists’ rule of law abuses, which  were mediated by demo cratic institu-
tions in some countries (e.g., Czechia, Bulgaria) or left unchecked in  others (e.g., 
Hungary), and in all cases opaque and unaccountable.
The subsequent rise in COVID-19 cases in CEE in the summer and fall put to 
test the limits of individual leaders’ agency as a replacement for institutions pre-
pared to tackle the health and societal risks of a pandemic without plying to the 
partisan interests of  those in power. As governments hesitated to impose renewed 
restrictions, new cases overwhelmed test and trace systems, as well as hospitals, 
and COVID-19 deaths  rose to levels on par with the worst- hit western Eu ro-
pean countries during the first wave. It is therefore tempting to conclude that the 
CEE populists’ responsibility in spring 2020 was likely a case of a broken clock. 
The clock shows the correct time twice a day; from time to time, populists act 
responsibly. In the longer run, however, initial responsibility may not be enough 
to compensate for subsequent responsiveness to irresponsible public opinion or 
economic interests. Judging from the experience of a deadly second wave, central 
and eastern Eu ro pean countries are likely to join the ranks of other countries led 
by populist leaders— and end up with poor public health, as well as economic, 
outcomes regardless of their initial successes (Greer et al., 2020).
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 24 covid-19 in the rUs sian federation
 Government Control during the Epidemic
Elizabeth J. King and Victoria I. Dudina
By the end of August 2020,  there  were more than one million diag-
nosed COVID-19 cases in the Rus sian Federation (Rus sian Federal Government, 
2020a), making it one of the countries most afected by the pandemic. However, 
unlike other countries with large case counts, such as United States and Brazil, 
the official statistics indicate that  there  were just over seventeen thousand deaths 
attributed to COVID-19 in Rus sia in the first seven months of its epidemic (Rus-
sian Federal Government, 2020a). The first case of COVID-19 in Rus sia was docu-
mented on January 30, 2020. At the time, the government response was highly 
focused on stopping movement from China and containing the isolated cases 
found among Chinese citizens entering Rus sia and Rus sian citizens returning 
from China. Then, as the virus spread across Eu rope, Rus sia soon  after began 
to see the number of new cases increase starting in March 2020. In par tic u lar, 
cases  were on the rise  after the return of tourists who traveled internationally for 
the March 8 holiday weekend. Moscow, the capital city, has been hit the hard-
est by the epidemic with more than 270,000 cases (Rus sian Federal Government, 
2020a). Although some regions wanted to try to keep Muscovites from coming to 
their cities and towns, the virus continued to spread across the country, and by the 
next month cases  were confirmed in all of the eighty- five federal subjects in the 
country. The Altai Republic in Siberia was the last to document its first confirmed 
COVID-19 case. The epidemic in Rus sia reached its peak in May 2020 and then 
began to decrease. However, in the first half of September the country was still 
averaging more than five thousand new cases a day with a very slow but steady 
increase in the number of new cases.  These official statistics beg the questions of 
how and why Rus sia has done what is has to “flatten the curve” in the country and 
what lessons can we learn for the rest of the pandemic’s trajectory.
It has been difficult to track Rus sia’s COVID-19 epidemic. The data for Mos-
cow are more complete, but we know less about how the epidemic has developed 
in many regions in the vast country with stark geo graph i cal disparities, includ-
ing economic, social, and accessibility of quality health care. Only at the begin-
ning of August 2020 did Rus sia release official information on excess mortality in 
the country; reporting that  there  were 3.1  percent more deaths (or 28,036 excess 
deaths) in the first six months of 2020 compared to the first half of 2019 (Federal 
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State Statistic Ser vice, 2020a). International organ izations have criticized Rus-
sia for hiding the true scope of the epidemic. More importantly,  there has been 
criticism within the country (Verkhovskii, 2020; Zhvik, 2020): for example, from 
Doctors’ Alliance and some in de pen dent journalists, calling Rus sia’s coronavirus 
epidemic a “virus of silence” (Shikhman, 2020).
A constant theme in the Rus sian government’s response to COVID-19 has been 
that the situation is  under complete control in the country. President Putin made 
several speeches addressed to Rus sian citizens and regional leaders to provide 
information about what the federal government was  doing to address COVID-19, 
visited a specialized coronavirus hospital outside of Moscow in March, and hosted 
several world leaders for a delayed Victory Day parade in June.  These public appear-
ances (usually via video conference calls) stressed the fact that the Rus sian govern-
ment had every thing  under control and the country had successfully responded to 
the virus. At the same time, reports surfaced of the risks of hospital staf needing 
to quarantine with patients at the hospitals where  there was a COVID-19 diagno-
sis and ambulances having to wait for hours to check in patients with symptoms 
of COVID-19. Subsequently, much of the COVID-19– related discussion centered 
around the vaccine development and promoting the idea that Rus sia had devel-
oped the first vaccine against the novel coronavirus and would make it available 
en masse by late 2020. This reflected the desire to demonstrate ability to control 
the epidemic in Rus sia and Rus sia’s desire to be seen as a strong influence in global 
health governance. Arguably, for many Rus sians, coronavirus in the spring and 
summer was overshadowed by constitutional reform granting Putin the opportu-
nity to remain in power  until 2036, po liti cal protests in the Far East, the arrests of 
journalists, and environmental disasters in the arctic and Siberian regions.
In this chapter, we describe and reflect on the public health and the social pol-
icy responses to COVID-19, highlighting what was standard but also unique in 
the Rus sian approach. We then reflect on pos si ble explanations for how and why 
Rus sia responded to the pandemic. We draw on government documents and web-
sites, the  limited published scientific lit er a ture, international sources, and Russian- 
language online newspaper, in de pen dent journalism, and social media sources.
Public Health Response
“Бережёного Бог бережёт” [“Better safe than sorry”; lit. God protects  those  
who protect themselves].
— President Putin’s call for regional po liti cal representatives  
to prepare for COVID-19 during a public videoconference  
on Coronavirus. March 30, 2020
Rus sia has a centralized, federally coordinated response to COVID-19, primarily 
led by the president, prime minister, and Rospotrebnadzor (The Federal Ser vice 
for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and  Human Wellbeing). Rus sia 
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launched a centralized website (https:// стопкоронавирус . рф), which includes 
official statistics, health information for the general population, health education 
materials, and official documents. The “Stop Coronavirus” information campaign 
also included a wide social media reach on several dif er ent platforms. However, 
numerous additional policy mea sures  were for governors and mayors to decide 
and/or enforce at the local level. In general, the public health response moved 
from one of strict mea sures to contain the virus in the winter and early spring to 
larger- scale mitigation eforts through lockdowns and travel restrictions in the 
spring, to relaxation of mandated restrictions by summer for most of the country.
Rus sia shares a 4,209- kilometer border with China, and therefore some 
awareness of and concern over the novel coronavirus was evident early on in 
the pandemic. By the end of January 2020, Rus sia closed its border with China 
and banned Chinese citizens from entering the country. Rus sia then watched as 
COVID-19 started to spread in Eu rope in February and March and fi nally made 
the decision to close all international borders on April 4, 2020. Only at the begin-
ning of August 2020 did the federal government start allowing some international 
flights.
The decision to close international borders was not without concern, both for 
Rus sian citizens trapped abroad and for foreign nationals unable to leave Rus sia. 
During the peak of the pandemic in spring 2020, when countries  were closing their 
borders and flights  were extremely  limited,  there  were an estimated thirty thou-
sand Rus sian citizens unable to return home from abroad (TASS Rus sian News 
Agency, 2020a). Rus sia is host to one of the largest populations of  labor mi grants 
in the world, and last year  there  were nearly five million temporary mi grants from 
Central Asia in the country (McAulife & Khadria, 2020).  There  were thousands of 
 labor mi grants from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan attempting to return 
home from Rus sia but not able to get out (“Rodina ne mozhet pomoch’ ” [“The 
Motherland Cannot Help”], 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic appeared to exacer-
bate the vulnerabilities that temporary  labor mi grants are subjected to in Rus sia, 
including poor access to healthcare ser vices, lack of adequate medical insurance 
coverage, fear of discrimination, low- paying jobs in the ser vice sectors (which 
 were cut during the lockdown period), and overcrowded and unsanitary living 
conditions (Nechepurenko, 2020). No data  were made available on the number of 
COVID-19 cases among noncitizens residing in Rus sia. The Rus sian government 
added COVID-19 to the list of “dangerous diseases” for which a foreigner can 
be deported (Rus sian Federal Government, 2020b), which may have had strong 
implications for mi grants seeking testing and care for coronavirus.
Another strategy was to limit movement inside the country. Moscow imple-
mented a system that allowed for travel into the city using digital passes.  There 
 were no federal  orders that restricted internal travel; however, some regions did so, 
and most regional- level recommendations  were for residents to not travel. Both 
air and train travel  were very  limited  because of low demand. In late summer, with 
lockdown restrictions easing up, some Rus sians  were vacationing in resort towns 
that  were seeing new COVID cases on the rise (Chernyi, 2020; Dremliugin, 2020).
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Rus sia promptly implemented strict public health control mea sures  earlier 
in the year.  These included mea sures such as locked quarantine rooms in infec-
tious disease hospitals for  people who tested positive for the virus, obligatory 
isolation stays at designated sanatoriums for  those exposed to COVID-19 or 
who broke home isolation  orders, and an intensive tracking system for home- 
quarantined individuals in Moscow.  These policies could easily be implemented in 
a country with a long- standing infectious disease control approach that  favors the 
public good over worries of infringement on individual rights. In February and 
March 2020, individuals presenting with upper respiratory infection symptoms 
and having traveled to China (and  later Italy was added to the list)  were quar-
antined in isolation wards in infectious disease hospitals. Patients  were forced 
to stay in the locked isolation rooms  until they had two negative results from 
COVID-19 tests. One example that received media attention was a  woman with 
symptoms but no official diagnosis who escaped from lockdown in Botkin Infec-
tious Disease Hospital in St. Petersburg. The  woman was subsequently taken to 
court by Rospotrebnadzor and returned by ambulance to the hospital to complete 
her mandatory quarantine. The Moscow Mayor implemented a “social monitor-
ing” system to track COVID-19 patients who  were in home quarantine (Suntsova, 
2020). They installed an app to their phones, which sent requests for the user to 
confirm their location several times during the day and monitored their location 
via GPS. If the patient did not send a prompt confirmation, then they would be 
subject to a fine (Vasil’chuk, 2020).
By late March 2020, lockdown mea sures began to take efect throughout the 
country. Higher education institutions and schools switched to distance learning. 
State- run day cares and kindergartens closed.  People sixty- five and older  were 
instructed to remain at home across most regions in Rus sia and  were paid if they 
followed the policy of self- isolation in Moscow (4,000 rubles) and St. Petersburg 
(2,000 rubles). President Putin first declared March 28, 2020, to April 5, 2020, as a 
“non- working week” and then extended this to April 30. Starting March 30, 2020, 
residents of Moscow  were mandated to self- isolate and only leave home for essen-
tial trips. At that time, Prime Minister Mishustin instructed all regions to follow 
Moscow’s lead in mandating stay- at- home mea sures. All eighty- five federal sub-
jects implemented some form of “self- isolation” mea sures (TASS Rus sian News 
Agency, 2020b).  These included only leaving home to seek emergency medical 
care, if  there was life- threatening reason, to go to the nearest grocery store or 
pharmacy, to work (if not allowed to work from home), to throw away trash, or to 
walk a pet within one hundred meters from home. At the federal level, the State 
Duma made it an administrative ofense to violate the stay- at- home  orders. Some 
cities, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, implemented additional policies that 
included fines for residents who visited parks or playgrounds,  were walking fur-
ther than their closest grocery store, or not wearing a mask and gloves.
Many large- scale events and cele brations  were canceled or reor ga nized. The most 
notable was the seventy- fifth anniversary of Victory Day. The federal government 
left the decision up to local leaders to cancel the parades and other commemorative 
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events. For the most part the regions followed this recommendation by canceling 
the parades or switching to televised events. President Putin then hosted a grandi-
ose Victory Day parade on June 24, 2020,  after the lockdown period ended, which 
included fifteen thousand troops marching in Moscow and the attendance of some 
foreign heads of state. The next week, the delayed ( because of coronavirus) con-
stitutional referendum took place across the country. Moscow relaxed most of its 
lockdown restrictions starting in late June 2020, as had been the case in most other 
regions as restaurants, museums, theaters, and shopping centers gradually began to 
open with mask wearing and social distancing mea sures. By early September, nearly 
all of the regions  were in the third or fourth stage of reopening, which meant that 
most lockdown restrictions had been lifted.
The federal government emphasized its commitment to strengthening the 
healthcare system to address the novel coronavirus. The federal government com-
mitted 33.4 billion rubles to seventy-seven regions to get enough hospital beds 
ready and to buy necessary equipment to treat COVID-19 patients (Rus sian Fed-
eral Government, 2020c). Another 5 billion rubles  were allocated from the federal 
bud get reserves to buy more ambulances (“Pravitel’stvo vydelilo den’gi” [“The Gov-
ernment Allocated Money”], 2020). Testing has been an impor tant policy in the 
Rus sian response. More than 32 million tests  were completed by early August 2020 
(Rospotrebnadzor, 2020), and the average daily positivity rate was 2.51  percent.
Healthcare reform has been a per sis tent issue in post- Soviet Rus sia.  There are 
regional disparities reflected in rural populations and poorer populations having 
less access to quality health care (Popo vich et al., 2011). The Audit Chamber of 
the Rus sian government reported that most  children’s hospitals across the coun-
try are in “unsatisfactory sanitary and technical condition,” including half without 
hot  water, 30  percent without any  running  water, a third without proper sewage, 
and 40  percent without central heating (Izotova, 2020). Perhaps unique to the Rus-
sian and post- socialist context, doctors are a socially vulnerable population in part 
 because they work in an “overregulated and centralized” healthcare system that 
ofers them  little room for professional autonomy (Litvina et al., 2020). Attempts to 
decentralize the healthcare system left it fragmented, making it difficult to under-
stand the vast channels of financing, decision- making, and management of health-
care provision across the many regions in Rus sia (Danishevski et al., 2006). More 
recent healthcare reform in the country, especially of primary health care, makes it 
centralized at the regional level (Sheiman et al., 2018).
Ultimately, the responsibility fell on regional governments and health depart-
ments to ensure they  were prepared for COVID-19. Many hospitals, not just 
infectious disease hospitals, had to reor ga nize to prepare for COVID-19 patients. 
Kommunarka, a general hospital that specialized in cancer, opened at the begin-
ning of 2020 as the main COVID-19 hospital, where President Putin made a visit 
in a hazmat suit in March to show support for healthcare workers. An additional 
COVID-19– specific, eight hundred- bed hospital was built in about one month 
just outside Moscow and opened in late April 2020 as cases in the city began to 
surge. St. Petersburg turned one of its largest exposition centers into a makeshift 
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 hospital for overflow of COVID-19 patients. However, not all regions in Rus sia have 
healthcare systems able to deal with the number of COVID patients. Dagestan, one 
of the regions hit earliest by the epidemic in Rus sia and with one of the highest 
fatality rates in the country (4.68  percent), did not have the capacity. Doctors from 
Moscow traveled to Dagestan to treat patients. As Moscow and other regions  were 
claiming that they succeeded in “flattening the curve” in early summer, other more 
remote regions  were reporting insufficient number of hospital beds and overflow-
ing morgues (e.g., in Murmansk [Britskaya, 2020]).
The federal government allocated “presidential” bonus payments to Rus-
sian healthcare workers treating patients with COVID-19. However, numerous 
healthcare workers across Rus sia have reported that they have not received this 
compensation (Yakoreva et al., 2020).  There  were also many reports of healthcare 
workers becoming infected with COVID-19, the overall harsh conditions of work-
ing in “red zones” of a hospital, and deaths of healthcare workers. Civil society 
activists or ga nized a memorial wall in St. Petersburg, and a virtual memorial site 
indicates that more than six hundred healthcare workers have died during the 
epidemic in Rus sia (“Spisok Pamyati” [“Memorial List”], 2020).
President Putin announced the symbolically named Sputnik V, the first regis-
tered vaccine against COVID-19 in the world, on August 11, 2020 (“Rossiya opyat’ 
zapustila pervyi v mire ‘Sputnik’ ” [“Rus sia Has Again Launched the World’s First 
Sputnik”], 2020). The president proclaimed the efectiveness of the vaccine; how-
ever, the adenoviral- based vaccine against SARS- CoV-2, developed by Gamaleya 
Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, had not yet gone through 
Phase III  trials. Moreover, the vaccine was registered before any peer- reviewed 
published results from the first phases. The results on the safety and efficacy of 
the vaccine  were published in September in The Lancet (Logunov et al., 2020); 
however, scientists from other countries replied with “notes of concern” about 
inconsistencies, reproducibility, and insufficient details in the data (Bucci, 2020). 
The Rus sian government has supported and publicly praised its vaccine develop-
ment capacity from the start of the novel coronavirus.
As of this writing,  there are twenty- six COVID-19 vaccines  under develop-
ment in the Rus sian Federation; however, they are in the early stages and no sci-
entific papers or data have been produced. This does not mean that the vaccines 
 will not be successful, but it does call into question the ethics and health concerns 
around rushing through clinical  trials. Gamaleya Research Institute announced 
that Phase III  trials are set to take place among volunteers. Nonetheless, the 
Rus sian Ministry of Health has already registered the vaccine. Mass production 
was to begin in October 2020, and medical care workers and teachers  were the 
expected target priority populations in the country to receive the vaccine. How-
ever, many raise concerns about the ethics of carry ing out  these plans. Moreover, 
 there is a  great deal of fear among both doctors and teachers about being forced 
to get a vaccine that has not been adequately tested (Gubernatorov & Filipenok, 
2020; “Net nedostatochno izuchennoi vaktsine” [“No to the Insufficiently Studied 
Vaccine”], 2020).
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Social Policy Response
#МыМожем [#WeCan]
— One of the hashtags among the social media campaigns for the  
government’s plan to address the social and economic  
consequences of the pandemic
The periods of lockdown and the “nonworking days,” of course, came with  great 
financial risk. Like most countries, the Rus sian government implemented a series 
of social policies intended to ofset some of the economic and social consequences, 
at least in the short term, of the pandemic (Rus sian Federal Government, 2020d). 
Rus sia’s social policy mea sures during the COVID-19 pandemic can be grouped 
into the following areas: support of vulnerable populations, including families 
with  children, unemployed,  labor mi grants, Rus sian citizens stuck abroad; finan-
cial compensation for social ser vices and healthcare workers treating COVID 
patients; support for nongovernmental organ izations; help to businesses; loan 
restructuring programs; and tourism promotion.
The Rus sian government primarily focused on social support for families 
with  children, while only minimally subsidizing lost wages during the lockdown 
period. The focus on families is understandable both in the context of President 
Putin’s demographic policies and the fact that young families with  children most 
often take on mortgages and thus  were at heightened financial risk during the 
pandemic. Financial payments  were established at the federal level, including a 
monthly 5,000 rubles per child  under the age of three from April to June 2020 
(President of the Rus sian Federation, 2020a) and a one- time 10,000 rubles per 
child aged three to fifteen years in June (Rus sian Federal Government, 2020e). 
The payment amount is similar to the official minimum cost of a raising a child 
in Rus sia, which is currently 10,721 rubles per month (Rus sian Federal Govern-
ment, 2020f). This financial support was intended for all families, in de pen dent of 
income level and  whether two- parent or single- parent  house hold,  under the con-
ditions that the child is a Rus sian citizen. Unemployed parents received an addi-
tional 3,000 rubles per child  under the age of eigh teen for  those three months. 
 There  were complaints that this universal approach was unfair given that the cost 
of living is dif er ent across the eighty- five regions (Ivushkina, 2020). Thus, addi-
tional support mea sures  were implemented at the regional level.  These mea sures 
ranged from providing additional cash transfers to providing food packages to the 
most vulnerable groups (large and low- income families, single parents,  children 
with disabilities, and low- income pregnant  women) (Pishnyak et al., 2020).
A second impor tant social policy implemented at the federal level was sup-
port to  those who lost their job during the pandemic. In April 2020, the number 
of unemployed in the country was 4.3 million, a 23  percent increase compared to 
March (Federal State Statistic Ser vice, 2020b). In May 2020, the number of unem-
ployed grew to 4.5 million (Federal State Statistic Ser vice, 2020b). The main sup-
port mea sures to address unemployment during the pandemic focused on  those 
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who lost their jobs  after March  1, by providing them 12,130 rubles per month 
(minimal cost of living in Rus sia) in April to June (Rus sian Federal Government, 
2020g). The rest of the unemployed received only a slight increase in the mini-
mum monthly unemployment benefits (from 1,500 to 4,500 rubles) (TASS Rus sian 
News Agency, 2020c). Although  these mea sures provided some relief for  those 
who lost their jobs during the lockdown period, it was viewed as unfair to  those 
who  were already without work and was a hot topic in social media discussions.
State- sponsored foundations launched the volunteer movement #МыВместе 
(#UsTogether, similar to the “we are all in this together” global campaigns) to 
help the el derly and  people with  limited mobility and medical workers (https:// 
мывместе2020 . рф). Nearly 120,000 volunteers across all regions in Rus sia helped 
to deliver medicines and food, and psychologists and  lawyers provided consulta-
tion to  those in need. Both Rus sian and international companies sponsored the 
movement as well.
Two forms of social policy helped to address the pandemic- induced interna-
tional travel restrictions. The Rus sian government allocated one billion rubles in 
funds to the Ministry of Foreign Afairs to help Rus sians stranded abroad, through 
evacuation flights and per- diem payments to  those stranded abroad (Rus sian 
Federal Government, 2020h; Rus sian Federal Government, 2020i). Despite the 
Ministry of Foreign Afairs’ optimistic claims and the government’s social media 
campaign of #СвоихНеБросаем (“we  don’t abandon our own”),  people who  were 
unable to return home complained of lack of assistance, confusion, and hidden 
mechanisms in the se lection of candidates for evacuation flights (Barysheva, 
2020). Given the difficult situation that many  labor mi grants faced during the pan-
demic  because of border closings and job losses, the Rus sian government imple-
mented some minimal social policies to make it easier for foreigners to keep their 
 legal residence documents and work permits.  Under the presidential order, the 
Ministry of Internal Afairs ceased deportations, expulsions, and illegal resident 
status for foreigners; and, no existing documentation, such as visas or residence 
permits, would expire  until September 15, 2020 (President of the Rus sian Federa-
tion, 2020b; President of the Rus sian Federation, 2020c). Employers received the 
right to hire foreigners without work permits during the period from March 15 to 
June 15, 2020 (TASS Rus sian News Agency, 2020d). Despite the easing of regula-
tions to obtain all the necessary documents to live and work legally in the country, 
the situation was still very dire for many  labor mi grants.  Labor mi grants  were not 
entitled to the same unemployment benefits or childcare payments that Rus sian 
citizens received. It was difficult for many of the most vulnerable  people from 
poorer Central Asian countries to have the means to provide safe housing, food, 
and medical care for themselves and their families.
Furthermore, the lockdown mea sures needed to prevent the spread of 
COVID-19 resulted in difficult situations for businesses and employees. The nega-
tive consequences  were especially noticeable for small businesses. More than 
81.1 billion rubles  were allocated to help small and medium- sized businesses to 
retain at least 90  percent of their workforce (Rus sian Federal Government, 2020j). 
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 Businesses  were provided with subsidies corresponding to the minimum cost of 
living (12,130 rubles) to pay employee salaries during the months of April and 
May 2020 (Federal Tax Ser vice of Rus sia, 2020). This is still significantly less than 
the average monthly wage of 43,400 rubles in 2020. Interest- free payroll loans  were 
also introduced. Large, medium, and small businesses, as well as individual entre-
preneurs from the most afected industries could take out an interest- free loan 
from the bank for six months ( until October 1, 2020) to pay salaries to employees 
(Rus sian Federal Government, 2020k). Despite the  limited nature of such mea-
sures, the recipients of loans and subsidies assessed  these mea sures as necessary 
support that helped them through the most difficult period (Satanovskii, 2020). 
An additional mea sure of social policy was to support civil society and nonprofit 
organ izations through the provision of subsidized loans and the deferral of pay-
ment of taxes and insurance premiums. The federal government allocated three 
billion rubles (President of the Rus sian Federation, 2020d) to provide additional 
support to socially oriented nonprofit organ izations that are registered and eli-
gible for federal funding, such as through the Presidential Grants mechanism 
(“Obshchestvennikov podderzhat kak biznesmenov” [“The Social Activists  Will Be 
Supported Like Businessmen”], 2020).
The Rus sian government implemented a law on the provision of “credit holi-
days” (loan payment deferrals) to citizens, individual entrepreneurs, and small and 
medium- sized businesses that have been afected by COVID-19 (Rus sian Federal 
Government, 2020l). Individuals  were eligible for the loan payment deferrals on 
consumer loans if they experienced an income reduction of more than 30  percent 
(Rus sian Federal Government, 2020m). According to the Central Bank, Rus sians 
have submitted about 1.4 million applications for loan restructuring and the larg-
est number of approved applications  were for mortgage loans (“Rossiyane Podali 
1,4 Mln Zayavok” [“Rus sians Filed 1.4 Million Applications”], 2020). Although 
 these mea sures  will help  people to survive short- term financial difficulties, “credit 
holidays” are not  free, and banks  will continue to charge interest on loans. This 
 will increase the amount of debt and could have lasting negative consequences for 
 people, especially if the economic consequences of the COVID-19 epidemic end 
up being long lasting.
As restrictions  were being lifted and as part of the government’s planning for 
post- covid initiatives, the internal tourist season officially started on July 1, 2020, 
in the majority of the regions across Rus sia. The Rus sian government used this 
opportunity to promote tourism. In fact, the COVID-19 social media campaign 
switched from stories about a patient’s life inside a COVID-19 ward and encour-
agement for maintaining self- isolation to promotions of the picturesque tourist 
sites, multinational cuisine, and natu ral won ders across Rus sia. Prime Minister 
Mishustin signed an order allocating 15 million rubles from the Federal Reserve to 
support Rostourism, the federal tourism agency. Rus sian tourists were eligible to 
received cashback savings of 5,000–15,000 rubles for booking domestic vacations 
(https:// мирпутешествий . рф).
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Explanation
Rus sia’s potential success in responding to the pandemic was an opportunity for 
President Putin to demonstrate his efective leadership and show that the country 
was  doing well. Ensuring that COVID-19 was  under control in Rus sia arguably 
came at an impor tant time given the nationwide voting on constitutional reform 
in early July that granted Putin the possibility to remain president for another two 
terms. This was especially impor tant at a time when Putin’s rating among Rus-
sians was falling (Levada Center, 2020a). Thus, a major explanation for how Rus sia 
responded to COVID-19 response was the need to show that the epidemic was 
 under control. Control, or creating the illusion of control, is a demonstration of 
strong leadership that has characterized the entire period of Putin’s presidency 
(Chotnier, 2020; Stanovaya, 2018). The federal government showed its strength 
and leadership (and thus benefited from any successes of the response), but 
regional leaders needed to implement and enforce the policies and recommenda-
tions (and thus  were subject to any blame if  things go badly).
Allowing regional authorities to implement the “self- isolation” policies was 
also characteristic of the “appearance of demo cratic legitimacy” in Rus sia (Chot-
nier, 2020).  There was almost no push- back from regional authorities on any of 
the federal recommendations; this is in line with how authoritarian- like tenden-
cies play out in Rus sia. Unlike what we saw with numerous governors and may-
ors in the United States, regional leaders in Rus sia do not criticize the federal 
leadership but instead show that they are following the recommendations that 
the president and his government have made. Putin’s po liti cal representatives in 
the regions received their marching  orders and  were reminded that “better safe 
than sorry,” implying that quick preparation was necessary to keep citizens “self- 
isolated” and hospital capacity to be enhanced. Lower- level government authori-
ties are the ones who have something to lose from a failed COVID-19 response. 
Local authorities would hold responsibility for outbreaks, lack of hospital beds, 
and high death counts in their regions. Putin and Mishustin both threatened seri-
ous consequences, albeit with vague details, for in efec tive local responses. Thus, 
this created a situation in which it was better for local authorities to report only 
data that show the situation to be  under control rather than publicize any prob-
lems in their towns or hospitals.
President Putin allocated federal funding to increase the number of hospital 
beds and ambulances. He also declared that although regional authorities would 
be responsible for organ izing the response,  there would be a centralized platform 
for reporting COVID-19 data in the country. The federal government would con-
trol the information flow. The official objective is for the government to ensure 
precise and factual information and to attempt to stop the “infodemic” or spread 
of disinformation about COVID-19.
The social policy response to COVID-19  in Rus sia is also characteristic of 
President Putin’s past approaches. The focus on financial support for families 
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with  children is reflective of the “maternal capital” policies implemented in 2007 
to incentivize young families to have more  children to address the demographic 
crisis in the country. The Rus sian government used the halt of international travel 
during the summer of 2020 to promote domestic tourism, including through 
financial incentive to travelers and a social media campaign.
Rus sia has also tried to use the opportunity to strengthen its global image 
and exercise its soft power in the field of global health. Rus sia has emerged a sig-
nificant donor in the sphere of development assistance, pivoting from its position 
as a recipient of global financial aid in the 1990s (Berenson et al., 2014). Rus sia’s 
role in global health governance is complicated: the country has contributed to 
the global response on tuberculosis and noncommunicable disease; however, it 
is also known for spreading misinformation and turning away from evidenced- 
based policies (Morrison & Twigg, 2019).  Earlier in the pandemic Rus sia sent 
humanitarian aid to Italy and the United States, which aside from a demonstra-
tion of goodwill, can also be viewed as seizing the opportunity to demonstrate that 
Rus sia is not only capable of controlling its own epidemic but also  doing better 
than Western countries. During the surge of COVID-19 cases in summer 2020 in 
Kazakhstan, Rus sia sent medical aid to the country. Rus sia has a vested interest in 
maintaining ties with Kazakhstan and competes with China and the United States 
for exercising its soft power through development aid to the country.
Being the first to develop an efective vaccine against COVID-19 would no 
doubt be a major accomplishment, with impor tant public health benefits for Rus-
sians and the world. However, the lack of data and scientific rigor of the vac-
cine  trials resulted in major skepticism both outside (Zimmer, 2020) and inside 
(Vasileva, 2020) the country. The Director of Rospotrebnadzor, Dr. Anna Popova, 
publicly supported the safety and efectiveness of the vaccine, and the Minister 
of Health, Dr. Mikhail Murashko, declared that mass vaccination can take place 
as early as the end of 2020. However, the lack of scientific publications and trans-
parent data challenged their credibility. Scientists across the globe  were racing 
at unpre ce dented speed to discover an efective vaccine. Considering that  there 
 were few signs of global solidarity fostering collaboration among countries, the 
world perhaps needed to rely on competition to foster research and development. 
Although the scientists who developed the vaccine admitted that  there was still 
much more research to be done (Reiter & Ershov, 2020), President Putin  arguably 
launched a global “vaccine race” by announcing that Rus sia has the first registered 
vaccine, Sputnik V. Moreover, Rus sia used the opportunity for global reach with 
plans to conduct Phase III  trials in several countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Philip-
pines, and United Arab Emirates) and negotiations with several countries to pur-
chase the vaccine if scientifically determined to be efective. During their meet-
ing in early September, President Putin promised Alexander Lukashenko that 
Belarus would be the first foreign country to receive the vaccine. In his address to 
the 75th United Nations General Assembly, President Putin commented that in 
response to COVID-19, “We are ready to share experience and continue cooper-
COVID-19 in the Rus sian Federation  447
ating with all states and international entities, including in supplying the Rus sian 
vaccine” (Ministry of Foreign Afairs, 2020) and ofered voluntary vaccination of 
the UN staf.
Unfortunately, the major  factor impeding the Rus sian coronavirus response 
is the lack of trust in the official statistics and information provided by the gov-
ernment about the epidemic. Building an image of a strong state that solves all 
prob lems and never fails requires controlling information. This control includes 
not allowing information about any prob lems or  mistakes into the media or out-
right concealing information that could damage the image of a strong govern-
ment (Kevere, 2020). This “culture of silence” is typical of the disaster response 
approach that existed in the Soviet Union, such as we saw with the infamous 
Chernobyl catastrophe (Abbott et al., 2006). Therefore, inside the country, offi-
cial information is often perceived with skepticism and generates distrust of the 
authorities and what the authorities say (Veselov et al., 2016).
With COVID-19, the federal government has created a centralized website for 
keeping  people informed. They even include this in the list of frequently asked 
questions: “Is the government hiding something about the coronavirus situa-
tion?” to which the answer is, “No. All reliable and confirmed information about 
the situation with coronavirus infection in Rus sia is promptly published on the 
websites of the Ministry of Health and Rospotrebnadzor, and also on the Stop 
Coronavirus website” (Rus sian Federal Government, 2020a). However, many Rus-
sians do not trust the official data and information about coronavirus in Rus sia; 
39   percent of Rus sians only believe part of the information and 27   percent do 
not believe any of the information (Levada Center, 2020b). This is true among 
doctors as well. Nearly 60  percent of doctors surveyed reported that they do not 
trust the official statistics on COVID-19, and about half said that they believe the 
numbers of reported of cases and deaths to be underestimated (Levada Center, 
2020c). Some regions have de cided to switch how they report mortality data from 
monthly to quarterly (Chernyi & Zhilova, 2020). When data are neither transpar-
ent nor readily available, it is difficult to assess the true extent of the COVID-19 
epidemic in Rus sia. This is reflected in the data that Rus sians are split on how 
worried they are about the virus, and 70   percent have said that they have not 
changed their work practices (Levada Center, 2020b). The “virus of silence” is 
most apparent in the extent to which healthcare workers are afraid to speak out 
about hospital conditions, lack of PPE, deaths from COVID-19, and the extent to 
which the virus has afected medical care workers themselves.  There is pressure 
then for regional hospitals to revamp their specializations and become prepared 
for COVID-19 patients and to have enough PPE to protect their staf and patients 
(Amnesty International, 2020; Borozdina et al., 2020; Semenova, 2020). This type 
of pressure led to reports of suicides among healthcare workers (Bakin, 2020; Tsi-
kulina, 2020), hospitals afraid to report that healthcare workers have died from 
COVID-19, and life insurance policies not paid to  family members of deceased 
healthcare workers (Petlyanova, 2020).
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Conclusion
The Rus sian approach to addressing COVID-19 reflects the messiness of classify-
ing “regime type.” Some of the responses used  were more authoritarian in their 
approach, such as quarantining  people against their  will who  were suspected of hav-
ing the novel coronavirus, placing face recognition cameras, and tracking individu-
als through their cellphones. However,  these  were mostly at the beginning of the 
epidemic when the approach was on containing the virus as opposed to mitigating 
the spread.  These  later responses, such as recommended “self- isolation” mea sures 
and promotion of mask wearing,  were more reflective of a demo cratic regime.
The relationship between presidentialism and federalism as played out in Rus-
sia’s response to COVID-19 is also difficult to categorize as completely demo cratic 
or strictly authoritarian. The president and prime minister have made recommen-
dations, but regional leaders  were the ones to implement the health policies to 
stop the virus, indicating more of a demo cratic policy approach. However, this 
relationship between the federal government and regional officials is reflective of 
an authoritarian structure. Although Rus sia is a multiparty system, the country is 
controlled by Putin’s “United Rus sia” party. Thus,  there is  little space for debate 
or discourse about the politics of the COVID-19 response. In fact, we see  little 
evidence of regional authorities criticizing or questioning the federal govern-
ment’s actions, but rather they show that they are following the recommendations 
of the federal government. This system discourages criticism from local officials 
(e.g., heads of administrations, governors and other local officials, chief doctors 
in government clinics), and this lack of critical voice on the ground prevents the 
system from efectively responding to local prob lems. Local prob lems are not 
addressed  until grassroots organ izations or individuals who have  little or nothing 
to lose raise concerns (e.g., ordinary healthcare workers and patients). The idea of 
one- time payments to select populations, especially right before any type of elec-
tion, but with less concern for longer- term impact is also characteristic of Putin’s 
social policy politics (Sokhey, 2020). Also, the lack of discussion and transparency 
around the official statistics and information has also been referred to as authori-
tarian (Martynov, 2020).
If it is true that Rus sia managed to be #postcovid and #выходизэпидемии (exit 
from the epidemic), then what lessons can other countries learn? A greater flow 
of information and more transparency in the data would allow a more complete 
assessment of Rus sia’s response to COVID-19. Creating a “virus of silence,” short-
cutting global standards for vaccine clinical  trials, and not providing disaggre-
gated and timely data make it difficult to evaluate the reasons for Rus sia’s rela-
tively low case count and low fatality rate.  These also place healthcare workers and 
the population’s health at risk. As of this writing,  there is much discussion about 
a “second wave” of COVID-19 hitting Rus sia in the winter of 2020. Having more 
information about the scope of the epidemic and how it was controlled from the 
first six months could provide a valuable foundation for what is to come, both in 
Rus sia and globally.
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On January 25, 2020, Canada announced its first case of COVID-19 
(Ontario Ministry of Health, 2020). By mid- July 2020, the case count had sur-
passed 100,000 and the country ranked fifty- seventh globally in cases per cap-
ita (World Health Organ ization [WHO], 2020). By the beginning of July, which 
marked the end of the first wave of the pandemic in Canada, Quebec and Ontario 
had been the most afected provinces, reporting the highest number of cases both 
as a proportion of total Canadian cases and per capita (Public Health Agency 
of Canada [PHAC], 2020b). At that time,  these two provinces accounted for 
87  percent of cases and 95  percent of deaths (PHAC, 2020b).1
Despite its decentralized federal structure and a welfare state that is mod-
est compared to many Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries, Canada’s governments quickly formulated a pandemic 
policy response that was generally well received across partisan lines, within 
dif er ent  orders of government, and among the public. A single- payer health-
care system, moderately generous social benefits policies, and a po liti cal cul-
ture that values scientific expertise enabled the government to request that the 
public stay home, get tested, and receive treatment when necessary— and to 
trust that residents could and would do so with minimal enforcement. With 
a centrist party in power that was historically committed to social programs, 
the federal government was also well placed to incrementally expand the exist-
ing social benefits architecture. Intergovernmental mechanisms, some of which 
 were expressly introduced  after coordination failures during the 2003 SARS 
epidemic, also helped to ensure a relatively coherent response across the fed-
eration. Nonetheless, the pandemic revealed gaps in Canada’s welfare state in 
the form of  policy delays in the long- term care (LTC) sector and laid bare long- 
standing conceptual disagreements regarding federal authority over health ser-
vices delivery and public health.
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Canada’s Health Policy Response to COVID-19
The early response to the pandemic in Canada aimed to limit the import of new 
cases from abroad (Allin et al., 2020b). Throughout February 2020, the federal 
government introduced increasingly stringent screening, self- isolation, and 
quarantine mea sures for arriving travelers (Department of Justice, 2020; Staples, 
2020), culminating in an advisory against all international travel on March  13, 
2020 (Global Afairs Canada, 2020) and a near- total border closure five days 
 later (Trudeau, 2020). A negotiated border closure with the United States took 
efect March 21 (Public Safety Canada, 2020). Days  later, using the authority of 
the federal Quarantine Act, the Government of Canada ordered self- isolation 
for fourteen days for all persons entering the country, irrespective of symptoms. 
Although enforcement was not as strict as in some other countries, violations of 
 these  orders could result in substantial fines or imprisonment (PHAC, 2020a).
As described in more detail  later, although the federal government plays a role, 
provincial and territorial (PT) governments are responsible for most public health 
mea sures and the delivery of health ser vices. Over a two- week period leading up 
to March 22, 2020, as national case numbers began to escalate, all PT governments 
declared a state of emergency (Allin et al., 2020b). Other mea sures included the 
closure of schools and most community settings, restrictions on mass gatherings, 
and encouragement and enforcement of physical distancing (Boire- Schwab et al., 
2020). Data from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker indicate 
that the strictness of Canada’s containment and closure response was broadly 
similar to that of the average OECD country (Hale et al., 2020b).
Faced with a strain on hospital capacity that predated the pandemic (Canadian 
Institute for Health Information [CIHI], 2016; OECD, 2020b), PTs also worked to 
improve surge capacity by transferring hospital patients to ad hoc or LTC facili-
ties (Allin et al., 2020b; Tang et al., 2020). Elective surgeries  were canceled, and 
where pos si ble, primary care transitioned to virtual settings (Allin et al., 2020b). 
To support PTs, in March 2020 the federal government agreed to a transfer of 
CAD 500 million for health ser vices (PHAC, 2020c). In July 2020 a “Safe Restart” 
agreement was announced that would see an additional CAD 19 billion in fed-
eral transfers to PTs in seven priority areas, including testing and contact tracing, 
and long- term and palliative care (Prime Minister of Canada, 2020b). Federal and 
PT governments also collaborated to support healthcare workers by increasing 
essential worker wages and purchasing additional personal protective equipment 
(PPE) (Allin et al., 2020a; Prime Minister of Canada, 2020b).
Supply constraints also impacted Canada’s testing regime.  Because of a  limited 
supply of diagnostics tests, some provinces introduced narrow testing criteria, 
prioritizing or restricting testing for vulnerable or symptomatic persons (Weeks, 
2020). The response varied across jurisdictions, with governments in Ontario and 
Quebec in par tic u lar struggling initially to implement a comprehensive system of 
testing and contact tracing (Marchildon et al., 2020a, 2020b; Owen, 2020). A fed-
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eral order in mid- March to expedite test availability allowed PTs to increase their 
daily tests and overcome severe backlogs (Health Canada, 2020). Other supply 
and equipment shortages, including PPE and ventilators,  were also felt through-
out the country. In response, the federal government announced a “Plan to Mobi-
lize Industry” to expand availability (Prime Minister of Canada, 2020a).
Canada’s Social Policy Response to COVID-19
The economic impact of the societal lockdown was also addressed by multiple 
 orders of government, with the expansion of existing programs and the introduc-
tion of new ones. The scale of Canada’s economic response was in line with that of 
the average OECD country (Hale et al., 2020b). The most widely available support 
introduced for individuals was the Canada Emergency Relief Benefit (CERB), a 
monthly benefit for  those whose income was afected by COVID-19 that aimed 
to “allow workers to reduce their supply to protect public health” (Government 
of Canada, 2020b; Robson, 2020, p. S7). Additional federal supports for individu-
als included the Canada Emergency Student Benefit, the Emergency Care Benefit 
for workers ineligible for Employment Insurance (EI) sickness benefits, increased 
Canada Child Benefit payments, a goods and ser vice tax credit payment for 
low- and moderate- income  house holds, and targeted programs for specific vul-
nerable groups (Canada Revenue Agency, 2020; Department of Finance, 2020b). 
Federal support for businesses included the Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy, 
interest- free loans, tax deferrals, and rent assistance, among  others (Department 
of Finance, 2020a).
PTs also introduced or expanded programs to provide economic support to 
residents and businesses. Most included income support, rent supplements, child 
care support, deferred tax payments, and targeted support for vulnerable popula-
tions (Nathans et al., 2020). Many also passed mea sures to protect workers and 
tenants from job losses and evictions, respectively (Executive Council, 2020; Gov-
ernment of Prince Edward Island, 2020; Office of the Premier, 2020a). Fi nally, 
economic stimulus plans for the reopening of the economy  later became central 
to PTs’ economic response (Marchildon et al., 2020a).
PTs initiated the first phase of reopening as early as April 24 (Office of the Pre-
mier, 2020b), and as late as June 1, 2020 (Government of Nunavut, 2020). Varia-
tion in the start date of reopening did not reflect case count nor risk. Nunavut 
was the latest to initiate reopening but had no confirmed cases (PHAC, 2020b). 
In contrast, Ontario and Quebec  were among the earliest to ease restrictions, 
despite having recorded hundreds of new cases the day reopening was initiated 
(PHAC, 2020b). Quebec in par tic u lar drew criticism for its perceived premature 
easing of restrictions (Marchildon et al., 2020b). According to the Oxford Lock-
down Rollback Checklist, as of June 1, 2020, Canada did not meet any of the six 
WHO requirements for easing lockdowns (Hale et al., 2020a). However, phased 
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reopening enabled a 10.6  percent recovery of COVID-19- related job and produc-
tivity losses in May (Statistics Canada, 2020).
Explaining Canada’s Policy Response to COVID-19
Policy Choices and Under lying State Capacity
Canada’s welfare state architecture facilitated the rapid expansion of income sup-
ports and buttressed policy choices on infection control by increasing the public’s 
ability to comply with self- isolation, testing, and treatment protocols. At the same 
time, long- standing gaps in regulation and coordination in the LTC sector delayed 
policy action during the pandemic, with catastrophic results.
Canada’s welfare state is modest compared to many other high- income 
countries (Esping- Andersen, 2013; OECD, 2018). In 2017 public social spend-
ing amounted to 17.3  percent of the country’s GDP, below the OECD average of 
20.2  percent (OECD, 2018). The redistributive impact of Canada’s social spend-
ing has declined since the 1990s, amid growing market in equality and a failure 
to adjust policies to new economic risks (Banting & Myles, 2013a). The scale 
and form of redistributive programs also difers among PTs (Banting & Myles, 
2013a). Within Canada’s uneven social protection landscape, its publicly financed 
healthcare system— which more closely resembles a social demo cratic welfare 
regime than other aspects of its redistributive state— has stood relatively firm 
over time (Banting & Myles, 2013b; Tuohy, 2013). In 2019 Canada devoted a pro-
jected 10.8   percent of GDP to health- related expenditures, exceeding the pro-
jected OECD average of 8.8  percent (CIHI, 2019; OECD, 2020a). Notwithstand-
ing pre- existing capacity constraints, the universal accessibility of most (but not 
all) of Canada’s healthcare system influenced what governments could reasonably 
expect citizens to do when it came to compliance with containment mea sures 
during the pandemic. In par tic u lar, the government- funded system meant that 
individuals did not have to pay out- of- pocket for the cost of testing and treatment.
Paid sick leave policies are also essential to ensure that individuals can aford 
to comply with self- isolation requirements, absent themselves from work when 
sick, and take time of to get tested and receive treatment— both during lockdown 
and reopening phases of a pandemic (Heymann et  al., 2020;  Piper et  al., 2017; 
Zhai et  al., 2018). Federal and PT governments share jurisdiction over income 
assistance programs, with income support for long- term, illness- related absences 
administered federally through the broader EI system. For eligible claimants who 
have accumulated 600 insured hours of employment in the previous year, EI ben-
efits normally provide a maximum of fifteen weeks of support at 55   percent of 
their average earnings (up to a capped amount) (Employment and Social Devel-
opment Canada, 2020).
Canada’s pre- existing social assistance policies provided a safety net for some 
workers, but like most high- income countries, the system also had gaps when it 
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came to enabling employees to obey self- isolation policies without losing income 
(Heymann et al., 2020; Heymann & Daku, 2014; World Policy Analy sis Center, 
2019). A consensus across party lines and among dif er ent  orders of government 
regarding the serious nature of COVID-19 enabled Prime Minister Trudeau’s 
minority government to move quickly to address  these gaps (Loewen et al., 2020; 
Merkley et al., 2020; Robson, 2020). The pre- existing social support architecture 
provided a basis for policy shifts that  were initially incremental, using and build-
ing on what was already in place, and only  later saw the introduction of novel tools 
(Robson, 2020). For example, the initial tweaking of EI sick- leave rules in early 
March 2020 was followed a week  later by one- time increases in other income ben-
efits and deferrals of certain financial payments, in recognition of the  pandemic’s 
broadening impact on employment and income (Robson, 2020). As the inade-
quacy of the existing EI system to cope with the economic fallout of the pandemic 
and lockdown became clear, the federal government introduced the CERB in early 
April, using aspects of the existing EI administrative system for implementation 
(Robson, 2020). As part of the “Safe Restart” program announced in July 2020, 
the Government of Canada then allocated CAD 1.1 billion to enable PTs to estab-
lish or enhance job- protected sick leave, granting workers up to ten days of leave 
related to COVID-19 (Prime Minister of Canada, 2020c).
Although Canada’s governments  were able to rely on the country’s healthcare 
system and build on its social architecture to facilitate compliance with pandemic 
policy mea sures, they failed to take sufficient action to contain the virus in the LTC 
sector. Canada’s single- payer healthcare system extends only to physician and hos-
pital expenses, with other ser vices residually funded through financing regimes that 
vary across the country. This includes LTC for se niors. By the end of May 2020, the 
proportion of COVID-19 deaths connected to the LTC sector in Canada stood at 
81  percent— the highest among seventeen OECD countries with available data, and 
far exceeding the average among them (38  percent) (CIHI, 2020). Although some 
provinces reported no LTC- related COVID-19 deaths, Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, 
and Nova Scotia had proportions exceeding 70  percent (CIHI, 2020).
Responsibility for regulating LTC facilities lies with PT governments, reflecting 
the broader allocation of authority over social policy and programs (Estabrooks 
et al., 2020).  There is considerable variation in the balance of public and for- profit/
non-profit private provision, the level of integration with other health ser vices, and 
the regulations governing the system (Béland & Marier, 2020; Estabrooks et al., 
2020; National Institute on Ageing, 2019). Bud getary constraints in the LTC sector 
have led to long wait lists, understaffing, precarious working conditions, and grow-
ing private sector owner ship (Béland & Marier, 2020; National Institute on Age-
ing, 2019). Government spending and staffing per capita in this sector fall below 
the OECD average (OECD, 2017, 2019). Understaffing weakens facilities’ ability to 
meet regulatory standards, and low wages in the sector compel many employees 
to work in more than one fa cil i ty— which has been identified as contributing to 
COVID-19 transmission (Fisman et al., 2020; Holroyd- Leduc & Laupacis, 2020; 
Jansen, 2011; National Institute on Ageing, 2019; Wherry, 2020).
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Within this patchwork and under- resourced system, policy action to contain 
the pandemic was uneven and delayed. Early analyses show that countries that 
instituted mandatory mea sures in areas such as testing, training, PPE, staf sup-
port, and isolation in the LTC sector contemporaneously with the broader soci-
etal introduction of physical distancing mea sures experienced lower LTC- related 
cases and deaths (CIHI, 2020). For example, Australia’s early national action to 
coordinate PPE, staffing, and virus control in LTC facilities has been credited 
with their relatively low rates of cases and deaths in this sector (Low, 2020; McK-
enna, 2020). The province of British Columbia’s rapid action in March 2020 to 
introduce containment mea sures in LTC facilities, including the decision on 
March  26, 2020, to prevent care workers from working at multiple sites, has 
similarly been identified as reducing LTC facility- related deaths (Harris & Burke, 
2020; Hsu et al., 2020; National Institute on Ageing, 2020). Other provinces  were 
slow to introduce limitations on staf migrating among facilities and adequate 
testing  protocols for sector residents and workers (Holroyd- Leduc & Laupacis, 
2020; McKenna, 2020; Wherry, 2020). For example, the governments of Alberta, 
Ontario, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Saskatchewan waited  until well into 
April 2020 to implement directives limiting staf from working at multiple sites, 
and other provinces relied on voluntary actions to reduce multi- site employment 
(Harris & Burke, 2020; National Institute on Ageing, 2020; Stone et al., 2020).
The lack of integration between the LTC and acute care sectors has been iden-
tified as contributing to the inadequacy of PPE and testing in LTC facilities as well 
as the readmission to nursing homes from hospitals of individuals who tested 
positive for COVID-19 (Estabrooks et al., 2020; Holroyd- Leduc & Laupacis, 2020). The 
situation became so dire that the governments of Ontario and Quebec  were com-
pelled to ask for help from the Canadian military amid employee shortages. By 
mid- April 2020, when statistics began showing the large proportion of COVID-19 
deaths related to LTC, the federal government stepped in with new guidance 
(developed with the PT governments) for preventing and controlling infection 
in this sector (Aiello, 2020a). The coordination and preparedness gaps that  were 
laid bare by the delayed policy mea sures led to calls for the federal government 
to ensure core national standards tied to funding in this sector (Estabrooks et al., 
2020; Holroyd- Leduc & Laupacis, 2020).
Policy Coordination and the Role of Federalism
As the previous sections suggest, Canada’s federal structure played an impor tant 
role in the country’s pandemic policy response. Like other federations, Canada 
faced a coordination challenge to or ga nize a more or less uniform response to the 
pandemic. Although other federations have curtailed or  limited the policy and pro-
gram autonomy of subnational governments, this has not been the case in Canada; 
compared to other federations, the pandemic has not been used by the national 
government to centralize the federation (Greer et al., 2020). Rather, Canada relied 
The Politics and Policy of Canada’s COVID-19 Response  465
on enhanced and intensified intergovernmental coordination mechanisms to 
manage the pandemic response.
Canada is a relatively decentralized federation made up of ten provinces and 
three northern territories (Inwood, 2013). Although hospitals are expressly the 
responsibility of provincial governments, in practice health (both public health 
and health ser vices delivery) is an area of shared jurisdiction. PTs fund and or ga-
nize most health ser vices, including hospitals and primary care. They are also 
responsible for organ izing and delivering public health ser vices at the local and 
PT levels. The federal government is responsible for regulating health products, 
funding health research, setting the price of phar ma ceu ti cal drugs, and providing 
conditional funding to PTs for health ser vice delivery and some areas of public 
health. Federal authority also extends to several aspects of public health, includ-
ing quarantine (Marchildon, 2013).
To coordinate their activity in general and with re spect to health in par tic u-
lar, governments in Canada have developed an array of weakly institutionalized 
intergovernmental arrangements. At the apex, the prime minister and his or her 
PT counter parts meet regularly but informally (Schertzer, 2020). Provincial pre-
miers and territorial leaders also meet regularly (without the federal government) 
 under the auspices of the Council of the Federation (Wallner, 2017). The overall 
pattern moves from conflict to collaboration to just ignoring one another and 
is contingent on a host of  factors (Schertzer, 2020). With some exceptions, and 
unlike in other federations, intergovernmental relations in Canada are not par-
ticularly  shaped by partisan conflict, reflecting the nature of the Canadian party 
system and the modest degree of polarization in Canadian politics. Ministers of 
Health also meet regularly to coordinate health ser vices and public health.
Following public health coordination challenges during the 2003 SARS epi-
demic, the Government of Canada created the Public Health Agency of Canada 
(PHAC), which worked with PT governments to establish the Pan- Canadian 
Public Health Network, described as the “beating heart” of PHAC (Fierlbeck & 
Hardcastle, 2020, p. 30). The Network brings together representatives of all PT 
governments. The Council of Chief Medical Officers of Health (CCMOH), which 
is chaired by Canada’s chief public health officer (CPHO) and brings together PT 
medical officers of health, provides another tool to coordinate public health policy 
in Canada. Before the current pandemic, Canada thus had established mecha-
nisms to manage intergovernmental relations and the par tic u lar challenges asso-
ciated with public health emergencies (Fierlbeck & Hardcastle, 2020).
Did it work? Faced with a major pandemic, did the division of responsibil-
ity for public health and healthcare, along with the intergovernmental machin-
ery, enable governments in Canada to efectively respond to the crisis despite 
the coordination challenges characteristic of federations? Would a stronger role 
for the federal government have made a significant diference? On this question, 
opinion is divided and a major driver of disagreement turns on what should be 
expected in a federation faced with a public health emergency.
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 There are two overarching views about the policy and program impact of 
Canadian federalism— a “federal Canada” view and a “national” or “one Canada” 
view. The “federal” view holds that in policy areas that are  under PT or shared 
jurisdiction, it is normal and desirable for provinces to vary in their policy 
approaches (Hubbard & Paquet, 2010).  These diferences are normal  because PT 
governments more or less in de pen dently decide how to address policy and pro-
gram challenges. They are also desirable  because they reflect the under lying diver-
sity of the country, allowing jurisdictions to fashion distinct responses and learn 
from one another over time. In contrast, the “national” view emphasizes the fact 
that Canada remains a single country and that Canadians nationwide should be 
able to expect to be governed in a broadly similar fashion (Digiacomo & Flumian, 
2010). This view has gained strength in the last few de cades as a result of several 
long- term trends, including increasing urbanization and rural depopulation, and 
the advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which emphasizes Canadians’ 
shared rights as opposed to the regional and linguistic diferences that federalism 
is designed to express and protect (Cairns, 1992). This “national” conception of 
federalism is also supported by the fact that Canadians have a weak grasp of what 
it means to live in a federation (Fafard et al., 2010).
 These normative views yield dif er ent perspectives of the impact of federalism 
on the Canadian response to COVID-19. From a more “federal” view, the response 
to the pandemic has been generally positive. PT governments, acting on their own 
authority and aided by a significant increase in federal transfers, responded rela-
tively quickly and adapted a broadly similar set of public health responses to local 
and regional conditions (Schertzer & Paquet, 2020). PT eforts  were also broadly 
similar  because of the  intergovernmental mechanisms that allow for pan- Canadian 
policy coordination. As the pandemic became a major area of concern for the  whole 
of government, the prime minister and his PT counter parts became deeply and 
directly involved in the response management and, to ensure a degree of coordina-
tion, began to meet regularly by teleconference.  There was very  limited explic itly 
partisan disagreement, in marked contrast to other federations such as the United 
States or Australia.  These high- level meetings  were supplemented by regular meet-
ings of health ministers and the CCMOH (Council of Chief Medical Officers of 
Health, 2020; Lecours et al., 2020).  These eforts at coordination resulted in a rela-
tively “coherent response across our federal, provincial- territorial and municipal 
borders” (Schertzer & Paquet, 2020). In marked contrast,  those who take a more 
“national” view of the federation focus on the diferences between provinces, the 
inconsistency in the overall response to the pandemic, and the failures of some 
provincial governments to address the LTC sector, quickly ramp up testing, and 
share epidemiological information with the federal government in a timely and 
efective manner (e.g., Attaran & Houston, 2020; Flood & Thomas, 2020).
One illustration of the contrast between  these “federal” and “national” view-
points concerns the debate regarding the fact that although all provinces declared 
a state of emergency early in the pandemic, the Government of Canada did not 
make extensive use of the federal Emergencies Act. Flood and Thomas (2020, 
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p.  107) claim, for example, that Canada, “stands alone among federated devel-
oped countries in not declaring an emergency or issuing a national lockdown,” 
with proponents of a “national view” perplexed that the federal government had 
not declared a national emergency to date. However,  there are several reasons 
for this, including the self- limiting nature of what can be done  under the Emer-
gencies Act (e.g., implementation requires cooperation by PT governments; dec-
larations must be renewed  every ninety days) (Kirkey, 2020). Most impor tant, 
the federal government is unlikely to be able to make the po liti cal and policy 
case that the response by PT governments is so inadequate that drastic federal 
action is required. Not surprisingly, provincial premiers explic itly rejected use of 
the federal Emergencies Act (Bell, 2020). As a result, any of the perceived ben-
efits of declaring a national emergency would be ofset if not overwhelmed by 
the associated intergovernmental conflict. As Fierlbeck and Hardcastle put it, any 
“intemperate” exercise of federal emergency powers would be seen as “intrusive, 
pernicious, illegitimate, and fundamentally destructive” of Canadian intergovern-
mental relations (2020, p. 46).
Another area of contention on federal coordination during the pandemic 
involves data sharing. Canadians are particularly attuned to this issue  because 
during SARS, the WHO recommended postponing nonessential travel to Toronto 
following the inability of the Government of Ontario to provide accurate data 
on the spread of the virus (National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public 
Health, 2003). In princi ple, the creation of PHAC was meant to address this prob-
lem. In practice, data sharing has to re spect provincial legislation ensuring the 
privacy of health information (Fafard, 2011). The resulting compromise gives PT 
governments the right to be consulted before PHAC releases reports that use their 
data (Wolfson, 2020). Although PT governments have released varying amounts 
of data about COVID-19, data sharing with the federal government is uneven. 
Consequently, as of this writing, the federal government has been slow to release 
a pan- Canadian account of the pandemic that includes microdata on the specific 
characteristics of  those afected (Attaran & Houston, 2020).
Attaran and Houston argue that this “makes accurate epidemiological mod-
elling and forecasting . . .  entirely impossible” and recommend amending federal 
legislation to compel PTs to share the relevant data by making “emergency federal 
relief” conditional on it (2020, p. 100). However,  there are two objections to this 
proposal. First, individual PT governments are responsible for coordinating the 
pandemic response. The benefits of faster and better data for the federal capac-
ity to conduct modeling and forecasting must be spelled out in greater detail to 
evaluate  whether the prob lem is commensurate with the response. Second, the 
proposed reforms are very likely to be deemed an unconstitutional encroachment 
on PT jurisdiction (Robitaille, 2020). As Robitaille (2020, p. 85) further argues, 
the in efec tive ness of Canadian federalism to respond to the pandemic has been 
alleged but not yet demonstrated, and the argument for a major expansion of 
federal authority is based less on careful empirical observation and more on a 
par tic u lar (and in efect, “national”) conception of Canada.
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Policy Compliance and the Role of Public Trust
In addition to the country’s under lying welfare state capacity and mechanisms 
for federal coordination, the character of the state response to the pandemic is 
 shaped by the broader po liti cal culture and, particularly, the level of public trust 
in scientific expertise. Trust plays a central role in public health governance, as it 
“can increase citizens’ tolerance of other wise intrusive government interventions” 
(Blair et al., 2017, p. 91). Trust facilitates cooperation and compliance by reduc-
ing the anxiety surrounding ambiguous or uncertain situations while also helping 
individuals and institutions assimilate novel, provisional, and complex information 
they may not immediately or innately understand (Holmes, 2008; Luhmann, 1989; 
Siegrist & Zingg, 2014).
Securing compliance through public trust is particularly impor tant in liberal 
democracies such as Canada’s, in which authorities typically rely on citizens to 
cooperate with public health eforts by emphasizing collective responsibility over 
punishment. This was evident in the public communication eforts of Canada’s 
provincial medical officers of health, in which collective responsibility emerged as 
an impor tant theme, particularly as cases began to escalate in mid- March 2020 
(Fafard et al., 2020). Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada was relatively 
well positioned to secure citizen compliance with public health eforts  because of 
a po liti cal culture that trusts and values scientific and medical expertise. In the 
2018 Wellcome Global Trust survey (Wellcome Trust, 2019), 88  percent of Cana-
dians reported trusting science “a lot” or “some,” on par with the average among 
OECD countries; however, Canadians  were much more likely than the OECD 
average to report trusting science “a lot” (54   percent compared to 42   percent). 
Respondents from Canada  were also more likely than  those from the average 
OECD country to respond “some” or “a lot” when asked about their level of trust 
in health advice from medical workers (94  percent compared to 91  percent) and 
health advice from their government (78  percent compared to 73  percent), with 
much larger diferences in  those reporting the highest level of trust in advice from 
medical workers (63  percent among Canadians compared to 50  percent in OECD 
countries) and from their government (36  percent compared to 26  percent).
Our survey data from the first few months of the pandemic suggest similar 
levels of trust in scientific, medical, and public health expertise among Canadi-
ans (Kennedy et al., 2020). The majority of Canadians ranked provincial medical 
officers of health as figures who could “be trusted” or “trusted a lot” (72  percent), 
followed by the federal CPHO (70  percent), and the World Health Organ ization 
(69   percent). Canadians  were slightly less likely to indicate  these levels of trust 
in their provincial and federal health ministers (65   percent and 61   percent, 
respectively) as well as their provincial and federal governments (54   percent 
and 48   percent, respectively). Additional (and at the time of writing, unpub-
lished) analy sis of this data reveals that the majority of Canadians viewed nurses 
(86  percent), medical doctors (84  percent), and scientists (80  percent) as figures 
who “can be trusted” or “can be trusted a lot,” ranked only  behind  people’s  family 
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members (90  percent). Canadians’ trust in  these figures surpassed the perceived 
trustworthiness of peers/colleagues (61  percent), neighbors (51  percent), journal-
ists (33  percent), and politicians (19  percent).
The survey also found high levels of support for and compliance with public 
health eforts (Kennedy et al., 2020). The majority of Canadians reported being 
“very” or “mainly” supportive of mea sures such as encouraging  people to stay home, 
canceling public events, and making home self- isolation of COVID-19 exposure 
cases mandatory (94  percent, respectively), as well as closing schools and places 
of worship (91   percent, respectively). Our survey data also saw high reported 
levels of compliance with public health advice. Respondents reported practicing 
hygienic eforts such as washing their hands more frequently (98  percent), cough-
ing into their elbows or a tissue (85  percent), and touching their  faces less often 
(81  percent). They also reported avoiding social gatherings (96  percent), shopping 
for groceries less frequently (81  percent), avoiding public transit (76  percent), and 
staying home from work (70  percent). Although  these are self- reported data, they 
suggest that in the first several weeks of the pandemic, Canadians accepted public 
health actions as credible.  These findings are also consistent with the results of 
thousands of home visits by law enforcement officials, which indicated high levels 
of compliance (Aiello, 2020b; Tunney, 2020), and with findings that  there were 
not substantial diferences among members of the Canadian public of varying 
partisan stripes in their views about the seriousness of and response to the virus 
(Merkley et al., 2020).
Conclusion
As the other chapters in this book demonstrate, unlike some other high- income 
countries, Canada has been unable to prevent relatively high numbers of COVID-19 
cases and a high number of related deaths in LTC. At the same time, again by 
comparison, Canada has done reasonably well in implementing policies to miti-
gate the impact of the pandemic and the resulting economic downturn. Cana-
dian governments responded to the pandemic by  doing more of what they already 
did: they expanded social benefits, increased funding for strained aspects of the 
single- payer healthcare system, and met more frequently to try and ofer a coordi-
nated response. The pandemic made clear the importance of the country’s under-
lying social policy architecture in supporting public health mea sures, mitigat-
ing  economic distress, and enabling the expansion of benefits; the significance 
of intergovernmental coordination mechanisms in creating a relatively coherent 
policy response; and the contribution of a po liti cal culture that values science 
in fostering public ac cep tance of far- reaching public health mea sures. Some PTs 
strug gled to quickly ramp up testing and to contain the virus in the LTC sector, 
and regional variation has raised questions about  whether the federal government 
should exercise more authority in some areas. In general, the overall impact of the 
first six months of the pandemic did not irretrievably stress Canada’s institutional 
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arrangements or public trust in the way that some other countries have experi-
enced. In the context of an unpre ce dented global crisis, this might be considered 
a remarkable achievement. However, it remains to be seen  whether the early con-
sensus  will survive the more fraught questions about lifting and reimposing public 
health restrictions as the pandemic wears on. More importantly, by the fall of 
2020, well over 9000  people had died directly as a result of the COVID-19 virus 
in Canada, and this figure is certainly an underestimate (Government of Canada, 
2020a). Eventually, we  will also learn how many more died as a result of the lack of 
timely access to medical care and other ser vices during the crisis. The families and 
friends of each of  these  people grieve their loss. For them, the Canadian experi-
ence with COVID-19 has been nothing less than tragic.
Note
 1. The material in this chapter primarily covers events from the beginning of the 
COVID-19 outbreak in Canada in January 2020 to August 2020.
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 COVID-19 in the United States
Phillip M. Singer, Charley E. Willison,  
N’dea Moore- Petinak, and Scott L. Greer
In 2019 a consortium of experts led by the Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity ranked the pandemic preparedness of countries around the globe. Although 
the experts found fault with all countries, they rated the United States as the best 
prepared country (Global Health Security, 2019). This optimism was shared by US 
President Donald Trump, who, while endorsing the Johns Hopkins’ color- coded 
map in February 2020, reassured the public that he had made “very good deci-
sions” and that the public’s risk from SARS- CoV-2, or the virus that  causes coro-
navirus disease (COVID-19), “remains very low” (The White House, 2020b).
At the time of Trump’s comment, the United States had fifteen cases and five 
deaths. Five months  later, the United States had the most deaths attributed to 
COVID-19 of any country in the world. As of August 2020, with around 4  percent 
of the world population, the United States was responsible for 23  percent of the 
deaths (Johns Hopkins University & Medicine, 2020), and 122,300 excess deaths, 
the diference between the expected number of deaths in a given year and the  actual 
observed number of deaths (Weinberger et al., 2020). The world’s richest country, 
and supposedly its best- prepared one, turned in a worse per for mance than any 
other rich country and many lower- and middle- income nations.
So, what happened? Understanding the disastrous response to COVID-19 
requires understanding the po liti cal, healthcare systems which provide direct care 
to individuals, and public health systems that prevent disease in the United States 
(Greer & Singer, 2017a). The United States healthcare sector is infamous for its waste, 
in equality, and focus on profit. As a result the United States spent more on health 
care than any other country, while also having nearly 30 million uninsured (Berchick 
et al., 2019). Often, this high spending on health care has come at the expense of 
preventative public health action at the population level, where the United States 
has traditionally underfunded capacity. Spending for the public health infrastructure 
at the federal and local levels has been cut by nearly 20  percent over the past three 
years, which follows a trend of continuous reductions over the past ten years (Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2017, 2019; Krisberg, 2020).
Po liti cal institutions in the United States are highly fragmented and decentral-
ized,  shaped by federalism. Health care in the United States sits at the nexus of 
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 federal and state control, with states overseeing many policy choices and imple-
mentation (Greer & Singer, 2017b).  Under normal circumstances federalism can 
be a virtue for policy making, allowing states to experiment. Yet, in times of crisis, 
the United States public health system depends on the federal government to coor-
dinate policy and distribute resources and expertise to the states (Willison et al., 
2019). Federal action to respond to  these crises depends on the White House, but 
President Donald Trump failed to lead the federal government’s response, instead 
leveraging po liti cal polarization and partisanship, while attempting to deny or 
distract from the pandemic through misinformation. Federalism with an in efec-
tive executive is a vulnerability, which has become more salient as Congress has 
become more polarized and the executive has accrued more power.
The United States traditionally had a strong federal role in disaster relief (Singer 
et al., 2020). A disaster relief bill was one of the first pieces of federal legislation 
passed in the United States (Dauber, 2013). Yet, in an increasingly partisan and 
gridlocked po liti cal system, the ability of the federal government to respond capa-
bly to disasters has eroded and become increasingly dependent on the efective-
ness of the executive. A weak and decaying social welfare system and an increas-
ingly polarized, unequal, and executive- dominated po liti cal system was unable 
to contain the virus. When the federal government eventually began to respond 
to COVID-19, the burden of responsibility to contain and mitigate the virus was 
placed on states, which lack the financial and technical expertise to manage a 
global pandemic absent federal resources and guidance. This has resulted in 
widely heterogenous responses across the United States, exacerbated by polariza-
tion and misinformation.
In this chapter, we analyze the health and social policies that emerged in the 
first six months of the pandemic to combat COVID-19 in the United States.  These 
policies have a complicated rec ord. The United States largely failed in its eforts 
to combat COVID-19 through its public health policies. In the weeks  after the 
pandemic was declared, the United States appropriated trillions of dollars in an 
attempt to strengthen its social safety net. But, as  will be shown,  these eforts 
 were hampered by the policies themselves and the politics that  shaped them. We 
conclude by highlighting the  factors that combined to pattern the failures of the 
US response to COVID-19.
Health Policy
The United States federal government took weeks to act in response to the 
December 2019 reports of a SARS- like virus in China. The primary public health 
agency in the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), implemented public health entry screenings at airports in major cities 
across the United States in February 2020. Just days  later, the first case was con-
firmed in the United States, when a Washington state resident who had recently 
returned from travel in Wuhan, China, tested positive. Without a rapid test, the 
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sample was sent 2700 miles (4345 km) across the country to the CDC for testing 
(CDC, 2020). In response to the positive test, Jay Inslee, the governor of the state 
of Washington remarked, “Based on what we know now, risk to the general public 
is low. Our local and state health departments  were prepared for this contingency. 
They have practiced and drilled for this situation, and they  were ready. The quick 
response also shows the importance of a strong public health system, which we 
have in Washington state” (Inslee, 2020). The governor’s remarks proved eerily 
prescient to the looming challenge of responding to COVID-19: states appeared 
to act in de pen dently, overly confident in local health departments to  handle an 
unknown virus.
At the federal level, the US Department of Health and  Human Ser vices (HHS) 
took the lead on responding to the virus. HHS had been monitoring the disease 
since December 2019 but failed to develop a containment and mitigation policy. 
Instead of using executive power to defer to public health expertise and lever-
age that capacity, the White House named an elected politician, Vice President 
Mike Pence, as “coronavirus coordinator,” eroding disaster response protocol 
and creating confusion over responsibility and coordination between HHS, the 
CDC, and the White House (Cancryn et al., 2020). Although HHS Secretary Alex 
Azar claimed to be in daily contact with Trump (Azar, 2020),  there was a clear 
disconnect with how Trump spoke about COVID-19, stating, “We have it totally 
 under control. It’s one person coming in from China, and we have it  under con-
trol. It’s  going to be just fine” (Owermohle, 2020). Yet, less than two weeks  later 
Trump declared COVID-19 a national public health emergency (US Department 
of Health and  Human Ser vices, 2020).
February  2020 was the most consequential month for the US response to 
COVID-19. The total official case count only increased by seventeen during the 
month, and the first official death did not occur  until the end of the month (CDC, 
2020). Yet, during this period, the virus was spreading unchecked throughout 
communities across the country. Two individuals in California died in early Feb-
ruary, but it was more than two months before their deaths  were attributed to 
COVID-19 (Santa Clara County Public Health, 2020)  because they did not meet 
the criteria for testing, which was still required to be completed at the CDC in 
Atlanta. Even as the federal government began decentralizing testing to the states, 
it was mired in a faulty rollout that did not standardize testing procedures or 
access to testing supplies. Thus, testing kits  were not distributed equally, regard-
less of population size, and localities encountered many delays as a result of con-
taminated testing materials (Silverman & Kelly, 2020).
The challenges of federalism and addressing a pandemic turned February into 
a “lost month” responding to COVID-19 (Shear et al., 2020). The White House 
continued its message of low risk (i.e.,  those who fit the criteria should seek the 
 limited testing that existed) and promoted misinformation about the virus. With-
out clear federal leadership and no deference to federal public health experts, no 
directives  were given to governors to use their emergency powers to reduce mass 
gatherings or adopt other social distance policy that could contain the spread of 
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the disease. The Trump administration made  little attempt to ready the United 
States for spread  until requesting $2.5 billion for PPE, vaccine development, and 
testing resources in late February 2020. On the same day, the president tweeted, 
“The Coronavirus is very much  under control in the USA. We are in contact with 
every one and all relevant countries. CDC & World Health have been working 
hard and very smart. Stock Market starting to look very good to me!” (Trump, 
2020). The eforts to ensure that the necessary equipment was available was too 
late to be efective, particularly as the global pandemic shut down supply chains 
across the world and the national stockpile of critical medical supplies lapsed dur-
ing the Trump administration (Dale, 2020).
By March 2020, the failures of the Trump administration to respond to the 
virus became apparent, with schools and universities, professional sports leagues, 
and many other organ izations shutting down of their own accord or in response 
to subnational regulations. Unnecessary travel was discouraged but not forbidden, 
as was evidenced by the flocks of college students who gathered for spring break 
(Mangrum & Niekamp, 2020). States, not the federal government, have the “police 
powers” needed to take actions such as issuing stay- at- home  orders. However, gov-
ernors’ choices to close their states did not arise solely from a delineation of consti-
tutional powers; state closures happened  because the federal government provided 
neither direction nor coordination. Central to all of  these policy decisions made 
by states was partisanship. Republican governors  were slower to adopt social dis-
tancing policies and moved more quickly, as in the cases of Florida and Texas, to 
reopen their economies, with disastrous results (Adolph et al., 2020). It was not 
 until the end of March that the Trump administration unveiled their “30 Days to 
Slow the Spread” (The White House, 2020a), by which point more than half of the 
states had already instituted their own stay- at- home  orders.
Over the coming months, with  little federal guidance, the US eforts to con-
tain the pandemic  were fragmentary. Southern states, which are largely po liti cally 
conservative, maintained minimal social distancing policies. New York, an early 
epicenter of the disease in the United States had to deposit bodies in refrigerator 
trucks  behind overrun hospitals (Davies, 2020).
Fatigue over following social distancing policies led several states, many gov-
erned by Republicans, to ease restrictions, even as health officials warned that 
it was too soon (Fadel, 2020). President Trump, rather than support states that 
had extended stay- at- home  orders, taunted figures such as Michigan’s Gover-
nor Gretchen Whitmer for adopting social distancing policy (Burke, 2020). The 
administration trumpeted their achievements, declaring victory over the disease 
and highlighting the success of federal policies over COVID-19 (Pence, 2020), even 
as the virus became entrenched in new communities and the epicenter shifted.
Yet the virus was not afecting every one equally. Rather, severe health dis-
parities  were emerging in the disease outbreak. For the first time in its history, 
Doctors Without Borders deployed medical personnel to the Navajo Nation in 
the American Southwest, which was experiencing the worst per capita outbreak 
of COVID-19 in the country (Capatides, 2020), even as mortality data collection 
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eforts undertaken by the federal government largely ignored Native Americans 
(Nagle, 2020). Clinically, Black Americans had a rate of hospitalizations approxi-
mately five times higher than White Americans (with Latinx Americans not far 
 behind at four times higher) (CDC, 2020a) and twice as likely to die from the 
disease (Oppel et  al., 2020). COVID-19 exacerbates existing disparities, which 
disproportionately afect Black Americans, while also exposing  those groups to 
more risk by working in more “essential” jobs, which do not allow them to work 
from home. Risks to Black Americans  were further compounded by increased 
racial vio lence in multiple police killings of Black Americans during the peak of 
the spring outbreak. Black Americans subsequently faced weighing enduring, 
ongoing racial vio lence, or increased COVID-19 exposure to protest police kill-
ings.1 If February 2020 had been the “lost month” and March 2020 the beginning 
of nationwide panic, April and May 2020  were the months in which the glaring 
cracks in the socioeconomic- sociopolitical foundation of the United States, and 
their impact on health, came sharply into view.
Social Policy
The social safety net in the United States is weaker than any of its peer coun-
tries, placing American lives in jeopardy during a pandemic. Although the United 
States appropriated more than $3 trillion to combat COVID-19, with portions 
of  those appropriations earmarked for strengthening the safety net, spending on 
social policy before the pandemic was less robust and less efficiently used than 
many other countries. For example, France spends 31   percent of their GDP on 
social spending, whereas the United States spends 18  percent (Organisation for 
Economic Co- operation and Development, 2020). In addition to a less robust 
social safety net, social policy in the United States is also less efficient, with less 
investment in social policy than other wealthy countries. During times of crisis, 
the United States is not as prepared to quickly adjust social policy to meet new 
demands. Rather it must enact and adopt new programs to fill existing gaps fur-
ther exposed during tumultuous times.
In the first six months of the pandemic, Congress passed four pieces of legisla-
tion to respond to COVID-19. The most substantial piece of social policy has been 
the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, which was 
signed into law on March 27, 2020, and was the largest economic relief package in 
American history (The White House, 2020c).  There are several components of the 
CARES Act that impact social policy for individuals. First, the act appropriated 
$300 billion in direct cash payments, with adults with incomes below $75,000 
($150,000 for married  couples) given a one- time $1,200 payment and $500 for 
each dependent, with 159 million checks sent to  house holds (Internal Revenue 
Ser vice, 2020).
Second, the CARES Act appropriated $250 billion by expanding eligibility and 
benefits for unemployment insurance. In the wake of COVID-19, the unemploy-
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ment rate in the United States more than tripled over the first two months of the 
pandemic, cresting at 14.7  percent in April 2020 (Internal Revenue Ser vice, 2020). 
The Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation adds an extra $600 per 
week to  every unemployment check sent out, a sizable increase to unemployment 
benefits. Before COVID-19, the average unemployment check was $333, although 
it varied substantially across states (Center on Bud get and Policy Priorities, 2020). 
With enhanced benefits, the majority of the unemployed received benefits that 
exceeded their lost earnings (Ganong et al., 2020). The combination of the one- 
time stimulus checks, as well as enhanced unemployment benefits, lifted personal 
income in the United States, with April 2020 seeing the highest increase in sixty 
years (Bureau of Economic Analy sis, 2020).
Third, in addition to direct payments and unemployment benefits, the CARES 
Act included a temporary moratorium on eviction filings and other tenant pro-
tections (Goodman & Magder, 2020). With 44 million renter  house holds in the 
country, the economic disruption from COVID-19 could have detrimental efects 
on the housing market and evictions (Goodman & Magder, 2020). However, the 
moratorium only applied to properties with federally backed mortgages and did 
nothing to stop rent payments from accumulating. So, even with  these actions, 
a housing crisis loomed as federal and state moratoriums began to expire in the 
summer of 2020.
In addition to  these components of the CARES Act focused on individuals, 
the Act also appropriated billions to prop up the economy and businesses. The 
Paycheck Protection Program was funded with $350 billion in appropriations as a 
loan program to help businesses endure the economic downturn from COVID-19. 
 These forgivable loans  were created to provide support for small businesses, 
requiring that the majority of funds received by businesses be spent on funding 
payroll and employee benefits, in an efort to keep unemployment down.
Although  these portions of the CARES Act strengthened an already frayed 
social safety net,  there are clear limitations of the legislation on social policy 
resulting from de cades of failing to address underinvestment in social programs. 
In this way, the initial social policy response to COVID-19 was far more success-
ful than the public health response. Additionally, instead of being constrained by 
an absent executive, social policy was inhibited by de cades of underinvestment 
and fragmentation. Yet the absent federal action required to successfully drive 
COVID-19 public health policies largely positioned the social policy response for 
failure by promoting a state of socioeconomic distress as a result of wildly unre-
stricted disease spread.
Underscoring the severity of the economic collapse in the United States, 
appropriations to the Paycheck Protection Program  were insufficient for demand 
and  were exhausted within weeks of the passage of the CARES Act (Warmbrodt, 
2020). Ultimately, funding for the program required an additional $310 billion 
in April 2020, with more than four million loans approved by the Small Busi-
ness Administration. The distribution of funds was also marred by the haphaz-
ard and confusing administration of the program, with many large and publicly 
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traded companies receiving payments that  were earmarked for small businesses 
(Dunklin et al., 2020). Although the CARES Act underfunded support for small 
businesses, it also included $500 billion for the Exchange Stabilization Fund, 
which gave Trea sury Secretary Steven Mnuchin broad authority to provide 
financial support to banks and other large financial institutions (Congressional 
Research Ser vices, 2020), labeled by Congressional Demo crats as a “slush fund” 
for corporations.
Other constraints notably reduced the success of the social programs for 
many individuals. The unemployment benefits  under the CARES Act  were time 
 limited, expiring at the end of July  2020, even as the unemployment rate hov-
ered above 11  percent. Congressional Republicans  were loath to extend enhanced 
benefits, citing the costs associated with keeping the program  going, as well as 
expressing concerns that the benefits would de- incentivize job- seeking be hav ior 
(Epstein, 2020).  Because of the spike in numbers of uninsured, states’ unemploy-
ment administration systems  were overwhelmed, with nearly half of all unem-
ployment applications through the first six months of the pandemic being denied 
or delayed (Desilver, 2020; Hess, 2020).
Additionally, addressing social policy in the pandemic response largely over-
looked the need for financial support for state and local governments. As the fed-
eral government handed of authority to states to combat COVID-19, the financial 
burden was also taken up by subnational governments. The CARES Act included 
$150 billion in a new Coronavirus Relief Fund that state and local governments 
could use to reduce COVID-19- related costs (US Department of the Trea sury, 
2020). Yet this funding quickly proved to be insufficient to address the needs of 
subnational government. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell signaled that 
he would oppose any more funds for states or local governments, suggesting that 
they could go down “the bankruptcy route” instead, even though states are not 
allowed to declare bankruptcy (Desiderio, 2020) and local governments often 
rely on federal bailouts in the face of extreme financial distress (Anderson, 2013). 
Further, the funds made available from the CARES Act can only be accessed by 
municipalities larger than 500,000 persons, putting smaller municipalities with 
fewer resources and a smaller tax base in jeopardy (Parrott et al., 2020). Without 
sufficient federal dollars in the CARES Act, state and local governments have now 
incurred massive debts. As of July 2020,  these debts have required nearly half the 
states to enact supplemental appropriations to account for the bud get hit from 
COVID-19, while thirteen states have had to draw from their financial reserves 
(National Conference of State Legislatures, 2020).
The CARES Act as social policy also overlooked marginalized populations 
who are at high risk of the disease, while also placing the administrative burden on 
the individual. Receiving financial support through direct payments is predicated 
on an individual having income tax filings and a social security number. Although 
the CARES Act does not place an income floor on eligibility for direct payments, 
relying on income tax filing to deliver direct payments inherently excludes large 
proportions of the population that are si mul ta neously at high risk of COVID-19 
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as well as face economic hardship from the pandemic- related economic down-
turn (Cajner et al., 2020). Populations that are excluded from receiving direct pay-
ments  because they lack the proper documentation include immigrants that lack 
social security numbers and families in which a child is a citizen but other  family 
members are not. This also includes individuals experiencing homelessness, who 
often lack any form of identification, do not file taxes, and often do not have any 
address. Certain groups, including  those with very low income, or who receive 
their income from untaxed sources, such as Supplemental Security Income or 
Supplemental Security Disability Insurance, do not pay taxes, excluding them 
from receiving direct payments. Although non- tax- filers are eligible for receiving 
payments, the onus is placed on their shoulders.
Yet the limitations of the CARES Act as social policy would be blunted if the 
Trump administration had leveraged the time that the money bought to build 
up the public health infrastructure, contract tracing, and testing. Without build-
ing up  those capacities, pressure built on bud gets and businesses to reopen too 
quickly. Once the funding ran out, by design, in the summer of 2020, the limits of 
COVID-19’s social policy became evident.
Explanation
COVID-19 wove many of Amer i ca’s best- known prob lems— health disparities, 
the uninsured, and a fraying social safety net— into a single,  horrible, tapestry. The 
failure to contain and mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic has many explanations. 
The interacting inequalities of race and class have  shaped the politics and policy 
of the nation, influencing voters’ motivations and creating and sustaining highly 
undemo cratic po liti cal institutions. As with other socie ties that  were founded on 
slavery and other forms of racial hierarchy, class appeals or mobilization are con-
stantly undermined by appeals to racial solidarity (Marx, 1998). Indeed, the frag-
mented and decentralized social safety net system was created to impede policy 
benefits given to minorities. This means that politics and policy in the United 
States are  shaped by White  people that receive psychological and economic ben-
efits from white supremacy, even if cross- racial voting and mobilization might 
produce better social outcomes (Maxwell & Shields, 2019; Metzl, 2019).
The development of the US welfare state, anemic compared to other coun-
tries, is influenced by race and class. The welfare state was developed haphazardly 
and lacks generous benefits and programmatic coherence. US po liti cal institu-
tions ensure that this is the case, with multiple veto points, which slow or block 
policy action (Stepan & Linz, 2011) but make it easy to add opportunities for rent- 
seeking or regulatory manipulation (Drutman, 2015). While in a racially hierarchi-
cal and low- trust society, it is easy to oppose social policies on the grounds that 
they  will go to some undeserving group. Even White  people who show  little racial 
animus  will often view Whites as a discrete category with shared interests and 
vote accordingly (Jardina, 2019). The result is that appeals for egalitarian policy 
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are difficult to make, while also encountering the po liti cal systems that work very 
well to impede egalitarian social policy, such as competent public health.
The United States has a high level of elite and popu lar polarization (Caroth-
ers & O’Donohue 2019), which has been exploited by racial cleavages and class 
in equality, media (Benkler et al., 2018), increased partisanship (Azari, 2016), and 
po liti cal institutions. US po liti cal institutions have never been fully majoritarian 
but have become more undemo cratic as urbanization occurs. The combination 
of increasingly undemo cratic po liti cal institutions that reward Whites and the 
wealthy, with a demographically changing electorate, is dangerous for the func-
tionality and legitimacy of the entire po liti cal system. The failure to respond to 
COVID-19 is, in this sense, to be expected: the Trump presidency is built around 
the exploitation of racial animus and undemo cratic features of the po liti cal sys-
tem, not its per for mance in the eyes of a majority of voters.
One institutional dimension linking the United States with some other notable 
failures of COVID-19 response such as Brazil and Rus sia are its combination of presi-
dentialism and federalism. The United States is a presidentialist system, in which a 
directly elected president heads the executive branch and is constitutionally co- equal 
with the legislature.  These systems create conflicts between dif er ent branches of 
government with equivalent mandates, while difusing accountability. Legislators are 
incentivized to acquiesce to the empowerment of the executive  because their pru-
dent route to re- election is to avoid blameworthy votes. In the United States, legis-
latures and legislation had come to  matter less and less, with the executive branch 
constrained mostly by a very partisan federal judicial system (Drezner, 2020).
This presidentialist model was weaponized by Trump, in a way reminiscent 
of how authoritarian regimes control information. Trump created prob lems of 
information flow that are seen in authoritarian regimes: lying and poor informa-
tion flowed within the government, where politicians and officials censored them-
selves to avoid the anger of the leader, and poor information was given to the 
public. For example, Trump saying the virus would just go away and suggesting 
that drinking bleach might cure COVID-19. The CDC, which is a highly credible 
entity of the federal government, was largely invisible  after being sidelined by the 
White House  after comments that contradicted Trump and Vice President Pence 
(Milman, 2020).
To the extent that  there was a bright spot for US po liti cal institutions, it was 
in federalism: the ability of the federal system to compensate for federal failure. 
Many governors acquitted themselves well during the crisis. States’ abilities to 
fix prob lems created by the federal government was nonetheless  limited (Kettl, 
2020; Rocco et al., 2020). Yet state power was handcufed  because of the tightly 
integrated economies that span state bound aries. This led to economic competi-
tion between the states, which  were already weakened by  limited tax bases and 
stringent balanced bud get rules. When faced with the deleterious economic con-
sequences of a pandemic, states had to cut their bud gets rather than expanding 
them to meet the crisis, pressuring them to delay closing economies to secure tax 
revenue. The price of a nationally integrated economy with competition between 
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states and local governments is that we should not expect them to invest much 
in disaster preparedness or public health. The federal government traditionally 
enabled that system by spending money to maintain public health as a public 
good for the nation, albeit an unequal one. As the Republican party lost interest 
in that agenda, the erosion of federal public health capability left a gap no one  else 
could fill. When Trump took charge during the pandemic and opted for denial 
and distraction rather than public health policies,  there was no way governors 
could fill in the gaps.
Conclusion
 There  were many reasons why the United States should have been optimistic 
about their chances at responding to a global pandemic. Although the Trump 
administration had not dealt with an infectious disease epidemic before, experts 
in the federal government had responded successfully to H1N1, Ebola, SARS, 
MERS, and other disease outbreaks across the globe, although COVID-19 eclipses 
 those  earlier outbreaks in size and scope. Additionally, the United States has a vast 
health and public health system and clinical and epidemiological expertise.
Yet a postmortem on the failures of the United States to contain and mitigate 
the damage from COVID-19 highlights how the Trump administration did not 
do itself any  favors. Although the po liti cal institutions that difuse power across 
multiple levels of government in the United States  were always  going to be a chal-
lenge in a pandemic, Trump exacerbated  those challenges through his policy deci-
sions. One example is the Global Health Security and Biodefense unit, which was 
created in 2015 to provide expertise and advice to the National Security Council 
and the president. In 2018, as part of an efort to “streamline” the bureaucracy of 
the federal government, the unit was disbanded and reor ga nized; the top official 
in the National Security Council for pandemics left. Although some members of 
the unit did remain in the National Security Council, the timing of the action left 
the federal government without the expertise and orga nizational structure to help 
respond to COVID-19.
The Trump administration’s failure to lead during the pandemic had debilitat-
ing efects on the United States’ response to the disease. Prior policy responses 
to disease outbreaks have centered on federal leadership and funds. Although 
the federal government has appropriated billions in funding,  those eforts have 
been  limited by policy and po liti cal decisions. The leadership failure has proven 
to be the biggest barrier in the US response to COVID-19.  There are more than 
ninety thousand individual governments in the United States, with stark varia-
tions in their expertise and capacity (United States Census Bureau, 2020). The 
po liti cal institutions are not set up to maximize the provision of public health 
ser vices nor the production of public goods. Public goods, in the United States 
even more than in other federal countries, are best and most sustainably pro-
duced by the federal government (Greer, 2019). Yet Trump actively sought to 
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hinder the response to COVID-19. Early in the pandemic, Trump made it clear 
that he opposed testing  because it increased the numbers of reported cases (The 
White House, 2020a). In June 2020 he told a rally that “I said to my  people, ‘Slow 
the testing down’ ” (Lozano, 2020), and when his communications staf said he was 
joking, he reaffirmed it: “I  don’t kid . . .  By having more tests we find more cases” 
(Forgey, 2020).
Trump’s failure to lead and his disputing of science  behind COVID-19 cre-
ated an environment in which polarization and partisanship  shaped views and 
be hav iors of the disease. The most consistent  factor that drives how individuals 
view COVID-19 and the adoption of social distancing be hav iors is partisanship, 
with Republicans viewing the disease as safe and less likely to engage in be hav-
iors that can minimize its spread (Kushner Gadarian, et al., 2020). Partisanship 
during COVID-19 also informed trust, with Republicans reporting that they most 
trust facts coming from Trump and his administration, while expressing disbelief 
at media coverage, and  were more likely to believe conspiracy theories about the 
outbreak (Mitchell et al., 2020).
Taken together,  there is no quick fix for the United States to improve its 
response to COVID-19, which by August 2020 caused more than 200,000 deaths. 
But  these failures  will reverberate into the  future. Some of the challenges to respond 
to the next pandemic are structural and systemic, difficult, and unlikely to change. 
But much of the failures in the United States rest within the executive branch and 
the presidency itself. When the next pandemic occurs, and it  will occur, hopefully 
the president  will have learned from the failures of Donald Trump.
Note
 1. The protests did not result in increased COVID-19 cases as a result of high rates of 
mask- compliance among protestors (Dave et al., 2020).
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 27 covid-19 in brazil
 Presidential Denialism and the Subnational  
Government’s Response
Elize Massard da Fonseca, Nicoli Nattrass,  
Luísa Bolaffi Arantes, and Francisco Inácio Bastos
Brazil has one of the largest public health systems in the world 
(Paim et  al., 2011). It has successfully responded to epidemics such as  human 
immunodeficiency virus and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), 
hepatitis C, and H1N1 influenza (Fonseca et al., 2019; Nunn, 2008). Brazil has a 
well- developed health surveillance system encompassing  legal frameworks and 
infrastructure. It complies with the World Health Organ ization’s (WHO) Inter-
national Health Regulation, which establishes par ameters for public health emer-
gencies (Franco Netto et al., 2017) and provides guidelines for countries’ rights 
and obligations in responding to potentially border- crossing epidemics.
The capacity of the health system to react during public health crises, how-
ever, may difer from its functioning ability during normal times (Medici, 2020). 
However, it was expected that Brazil would perform well during the COVID-19 
pandemic. According to the Global Health Security Index, a system of mea sure-
ment that classifies countries’ preparedness to deal with public health emergen-
cies across six dimensions and thirty- four indicators, Brazil ranked with the best 
score in Latin Amer i ca (59.7 out of 100) (Nuclear Threat Initiative & Johns Hop-
kins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2019). Why, then, was a country that 
was relatively well prepared for public health crises, that had performed in an 
exemplary manner in previous epidemics, and that has one of the largest public 
health infrastructures in the world not able to respond promptly and efectively to 
the COVID-19 pandemic? What went wrong?
In this chapter, we explore the evolution of public health initiatives during 
the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil, the social policies  adopted to allow  people to 
quarantine, and the po liti cal and institutional  factors shaping Brazil’s response. We 
analyze the negative role played by President Bolsonaro’s denialism and misinfor-
mation while emphasizing that a group of subnational governments led Brazil’s 
response, at times aligned with the Ministry of Health (MoH) but against the presi-
dent’s perspective. We highlight the surprisingly proactive response by state gov-
ernments given that this level of government has had  little involvement in public 
COVID-19 in Brazil  495
health policy. Brazil is a federal system, with a federal government, 27 states, and 
more than 5,500 elected municipal governments. Response to the COVID-19 pan-
demic is a tale of intergovernmental competition, with several instances of blame 
avoidance and credit claiming. Public opinion vacillated, but it appears that Bolso-
naro was able to reap credit for the cash transfer programs put in place during the 
epidemic, despite his initial opposition to increasing social spending.
COVID-19 Pandemic in Brazil
The first case of COVID-19  in Brazil was officially diagnosed on February  26, 
2020, in a man returning from a trip to Italy.  Later studies showed that the virus 
had been circulating since at least early January 2020 (Delatorre et al., 2020). In 
early March 2020, the MoH announced the first cases of community transmission 
(i.e., infections that did not stem from interactions with individuals in foreign 
countries). As of August 14, 2020, the pandemic had resulted in 3,224,876 con-
firmed cases and 105,463 deaths in Brazil (Dong et al., 2020).
At that point, the epidemic was far from being curbed— similar to that in the 
United States and Mexico. As of mid- August, Brazil was still facing a substantial 
epidemic. The curve had flattened somewhat but was plateauing at high levels in 
places such as São Paulo. Infections  were rising rapidly in the southernmost states 
and in most regions of the center- west. In a large country like Brazil, a pandemic 
curve is likely to pre sent dif er ent peaks at dif er ent places and dif er ent times 
(Bastos, 2020), which makes a coordinated response a formidable challenge.
Health Policy
Brazil has a public health system, the Unified Health System (acronym in Portu-
guese, SUS) that cares for 75  percent of the population, with most of the remaining 
25  percent covered by private health insurance companies.1 The country’s health 
policies regarding international pandemics are in alignment with the WHO, and 
 there is a national plan for curbing influenza epidemics (Y. Lima & Costa, 2015; 
Ministério da Saúde, 2010). In late February, thirty- four Brazilian citizens living 
in Wuhan, China (the epicenter of the epidemic at that time)  were repatriated, 
but  there was no quarantine regulation in the country. The Minister of Health, 
Luiz Henrique Mandetta, reacted quickly to get legislation passed on not only 
preparing to receive  these citizens but also preparing for the impending epidemic 
(Law 13.979/2020; Coletta, 2020). Although none of the Brazilian citizens  were 
infected, they  were required to quarantine for fifteen days in a military fa cil i ty in 
Brazil before returning to their homes (“Brasileiros que Vieram da China Deixam 
Quarentena em Anápolis” [“Brazilians Who Came from China Leave Quarantine 
in Anápolis”], 2020).
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The MoH and the state of São Paulo, the most populous region in the country, 
created committees to manage the potential crisis. Several hospitals established 
protocols to deal with suspected cases. The MoH, in anticipation of the winter 
influenza season, was already embarking on its annual influenza vaccination cam-
paign. Additionally, most states and municipalities acted promptly. On March 13, 
2020, Rio de Janeiro became one of the first states in Brazil to close schools and 
shops and cancel large social events. São Paulo— the epicenter of the country’s 
outbreak— did so ten days  later (Rodrigues, 2020).
In contrast with the subnational governments, President Bolsonaro de cided 
not to follow WHO guidelines or evidence- based health policy, apparently 
believing that this would have negative economic consequences for the coun-
try. The president and his supporters (the governors of four states, part of the 
military forces, and some government officials such as the minister of interna-
tional relations and some extreme- right wing groups) advocated for health poli-
cies that reflected pseudoscience at best, and denialism at worst. They suggested 
that COVID-19 was a “small fluˮ and a “fantasy,ˮ while drawing on discredited 
or incomplete “scienceˮ in support of their light- touch approach to combatting 
COVID-19 (“Relembre Frases de Bolsonaro Sobre a COVID-19” [“Remember Bol-
sonaro Phrases About COVID-19”], 2020). For instance, they relied on non– peer- 
reviewed papers and statements to give a patina of scientific respectability to their 
construction of a moral economy2 narrative framed around the right to earn a 
living. Conventional scientific advice, especially where this undermined the abil-
ity of business to earn a profit, was undermined or ignored.
March 2020 was a critical time with regard to both the bourgeoning epidemic 
and the dispute brewing between federal and most subnational governments. As 
the epidemic spread through the country and to the more vulnerable populations, 
the state governors began an aggressive campaign to promote social distancing 
initiatives, which  were aligned with the MoH administration at that moment. 
Both Minister Mandetta and the state governors gained popularity for their scien-
tifically informed guidance on COVID-19. This appears to have enraged President 
Bolsonaro and his supporters, who  were against mea sures such as closing shops 
and schools and paralyzing commerce. Several protests against social distancing 
 were scheduled during a critical period of the pandemic, some of which  were led 
by the president himself.
A crystallizing moment was a virtual meeting on March 25, 2020, between the 
president and state governors. The previous day, President Bolsonaro addressed 
the nation, declaring, “Our lives have to go on. Jobs must be kept . . .  We must, 
yes, get back to normal” (Phillips, 2020). During this virtual meeting, Bolsonaro 
accused the governor of São Paulo (a member of the Brazilian Social Demo cratic 
Party, PSDB, acronym in Portuguese) of using the health emergency as a po liti cal 
strategy for the 2022 presidential election. Bolsonaro is currently not affiliated 
with any po liti cal party but was elected  under a minor, far- right po liti cal party, 
the Social Liberal Party.
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In a presidential, federal system, the decisions to act during a pandemic are 
divided among dif er ent institutions. For instance, the president has the authority 
to close Brazil’s borders. It was only on March 19, 2020, however, that the Ministry 
of Justice closed land borders and on March 27, 2020, that it completely shut air-
ports to incoming international flights from all over the world (Fernandes, 2020; 
Schreiber, 2020). Although the MoH was active in producing mass campaigns to 
educate the population on how to prevent the spread of the virus, the Ministry of 
Economy delayed financial support (e.g., cash transfers) that would allow citizens 
and firms to adhere to social distancing mea sures.
In April and May of 2020, the lack of coordination became even more evident. 
On April 8, the Supreme Court ruled that state governments could implement 
mea sures to respond to the epidemic within their jurisdictions and municipal 
governments could complement decisions taken at federal and state levels. This 
decision was crucial in allowing states to adopt and maintain restrictive mea sures. 
President Bolsonaro responded with  several presidential decrees listing essential 
activities that should continue and businesses that should remain open, includ-
ing religious ser vices, gyms,  construction sites, and industrial activities, among 
 others. In April 2020 the president began an aggressive campaign in support of 
the use of chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine to treat COVID-19 patients. Such 
strong advocacy was against the advice of Minister Mandetta, who was subse-
quently fired and replaced by a respected physician, Nelson Teich (Mazui, 2020). 
 Because of his vehement disagreement with President Bolsonaro’s plans to adjust 
the clinical protocols for COVID-19 treatment, Teich resigned less than a month 
 after taking the position (Verdélio, 2020). Bolsonaro expressed his interest in 
including chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine as part of the MoH’s clinical pro-
tocol for COVID-19, but Teich preferred to wait for adequate scientific evidence. 
Such disputes not only spread contradictory recommendations on how to deal 
with the COVID-19 but also have had apparent po liti cal efects, notably strength-
ening support for state governors.
The president replaced Teich with a military officer, General Eduardo Pazu-
ello, as interim minister. Pazuello had no experience in the health sector, but his 
background in logistics was presented as a core competency for responding to 
the epidemic (Savarese & Biller, 2020). The temporary health minister not only 
yielded to the adjustment of the clinical protocols for COVID-19 but also replaced 
key managerial posts in the MoH with fellow military officers (B. Lima & Cardim, 
2020). This decision was highly criticized by the public health community, such 
as the Brazilian Association of Collective Health (Abrasco), a strong organ-
ization in Brazil since the 1988 reform that introduced the public health ser vice 
(Abrasco, 2020). Pazuello  later took the controversial decision to reformulate 
the disclosure of epidemiological data, announcing only information about 
death and confirmed cases in the previous twenty- four hours rather than accu-
mulated deaths and infections (Machado & Fernandes, 2020). As a response, a 
consortium between Health State Secretariats and a pool of media organ izations 
498  Coronavirus Politics
 established an online e- panel that was updated  every day to monitor and com-
pare the official data provided by the MoH (“Brasil Tem Média de 1.069 Mortes 
por Dia na Última Semana” [“Brazil Has an Average of 1,069 Deaths per Day 
in the Last Week”], 2020). Pazuello’s decision was subsequently repealed by the 
Supreme Court (Xavier, 2020).
Social Policies
Since 2015 economic crises and austerity policies in Brazil severely constrained 
public expenditure and increased in equality (Deweck et al., 2018). In March 2020 
a “state of calamityˮ decreed by the Brazilian National Congress allowed the fed-
eral government to increase public expenditure, which other wise would have 
been frozen in line with the country’s strict laws regulating public spending. In 
addition, in April, Congress approved a bill named “War Bud get,” which entailed 
a constitutional amendment to separate COVID-19– related spending from the 
government’s main bud get. The COVID-19 emergency resulted in the fed-
eral government investing more than US$2 billion in health and social poli-
cies (Agencia Saude, 2020). This would allow Brazilians to quarantine for lon-
ger periods but also posed challenges for Bolsanaro’s anti- statist, free- market 
policies.
Paulo Guedes, an investment banker and minister of economy since 2019, was 
impor tant po liti cally for Bolsonaro. “Guedes may be a naively ambitious advocate 
of free- market policies serving the financial elite, but he provided [President] Bol-
sonaro with the necessary economic ‘seal of approval’ and removed the stain of a 
pos si ble affinity for ‘statism’ created by Bolsonaro’s  career in the military” (Evans, 
2018, p. 50). Economic policy is a crucial aspect of Brazil’s politics. The Ministry of 
Economy is power ful in Brazil (and Bolsonaro defers to the minister of economy 
over decisions on public expenditure)  because no one wants to experience again 
the debilitating efects of hyperinflation. Yet  there are aspects of government 
spending that remain strongly entrenched and have helped  people cope with the 
epidemic. Chief among  these are cash transfer programs.
Brazil has one of the most successful conditional cash transfer programs in 
the world, the  Family Allowance program (Bolsa Familia), with clear benefits for 
the health of impoverished  people (Rasella et al., 2013). Brazil also created a new 
social program to provide salary relief to vulnerable populations: the Salary Relief 
program.3 The creation of this program was a shared decision between Congress 
and the executive government; therefore,  there  were substantial controversies 
and disagreements between  these governmental entities over the contents of 
 these policies. We first explore the existing policies in place, then investigate the 
new Salary Relief Program.
The Continuous Cash Benefit (CCB) program, implemented in 1996, is an 
unconditional cash transfer to the el derly or extremely poor individuals with dis-
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abilities. During the pandemic, the Law 13982/2020 revised the criteria for inclu-
sion in the program from  those who earned a quarter of the minimum wage as 
 house hold income per capita to  those who earned half of the minimum wage. For 
 those waiting to enter the program, the government provided a cash advance of 
R$600 (US$110). This advance was  because legislative reforms in the entitlement 
criteria of the CCB program require regulation by the Social Security Institute, 
which might take several months and not be ready before the end of the pan-
demic (Bartholo et al., 2020). Although Congress intended to assist the el derly or 
extremely poor individuals with disabilities through CCB, as of mid- August 2020 
this had not yet been implemented  because it required further regulatory changes 
on the part of the federal government.
One of the most impor tant social policies in Brazil, the  Family Allowance 
program, was created in 2003. It targets poor families with a per capita income 
below US$40 per month and registered with the Unified Rec ord (Cadastro 
Único). It is the responsibility of the local government to register and implement 
the program, which is then verified at the federal level. The Ministry of Citizen-
ship suspended the penalties of  those families that had not been able to fulfill the 
conditions of the program during the epidemic (such as school or basic health-
care attendance) or  those with insufficient rec ord information. As schools  were 
closed and health ser vices overwhelmed by COVID-19 cases, it proved impos-
sible for families to fulfill  these conditions (Bartholo et al., 2020). The Ministry of 
Citizenship suspended the monthly evaluation of municipalities’ per for mance 
index, which assessed the municipality’s local- level compliance with the rules of 
the program. In addition to the  Family Allowance program some states distrib-
uted vouchers and food stipends to families registered with the Unified Rec ord. 
For instance, the government of Santa Catarina waved the electricity bill and 
the government of Mato Grosso provided food parcels (cesta basica) for poor 
families. One of the consequences of this mix of national, state, and local regu-
lations was that  people living in dif er ent states  were entitled to dif er ent social 
benefits.
Changes to the  Family Allowance program meant that for the first time  after 
more than a year (since Bolsonaro came to power) the waiting list of  people 
wanting to enter the program was reduced from 1.7 million families to 500,000. 
This was thanks to a presidential provisional decree that allocated more than 
R$3  billion (US$578 million) to the program ( because of the lack of funding, the 
Ministry of Citizenship could not expand the number of families in the program 
without this provisional decree).  There was an enormous diference between new 
 Family Allowance concessions to the south and southeast (75  percent), which are 
the wealthiest regions, compared to the northeast, which received only 3  percent 
of new concessions; therefore the governors of  these states filed a lawsuit at the 
Supreme Court against the federal government (Mello, 2020).
In addition to calibrating existing social programs, the federal government 
created a new support, the Salary Relief Program. This was the most impor tant 
500  Coronavirus Politics
social policy initiative during the epidemic  because it covered both recipients 
of the  Family Allowance and unemployed individuals with a  house hold income 
below half the minimum wage. The program was announced mid- March 2020 
 after strong pressure from congressmen on the Ministry of Economy. Initially, 
the executive government announced a R$200 allowance (US$37) per month, 
which,  after a debate in Congress, was increased to R$600 (US$110) (Piovesan & 
Siqueira, 2020). In May the government came  under further pressure to extend 
the allowance for additional months. Again  there was a dispute between the 
Minister of Economy and Congress. The former suggested an increase of the 
allowance by R$200 (US$38) per month for an additional two months. Congress, 
however, kept the value the same but allowed the additional two months (Presi-
dential Decree 10.412/2020). As of July 2020, the program had cost R$113 billion 
(US$22 billion) and aided almost 109 million individuals (more than double the 
initial estimation) (Maximo, 2020). This meant that one in  every three adults 
had received governmental support.  Because of the economic recession, such 
expenditure was pos si ble only  because of the state of calamity and the war bud-
get issued by Congress, which allowed an increase in the executive government’s 
expenditure.
The implementation of the Salary Relief program encountered some obsta-
cles, however. For example, Brazil  adopted a fully online strategy to enroll new 
individuals and not all vulnerable  people had access to the internet or a cell phone. 
Additionally, prob lems with incomplete applications or documentation had to be 
solved in person, which led to long waiting lines in Social Security offices through-
out the country (Veloso, 2020). Despite such issues, the outcomes of the program 
 were impressive: more than 5  percent of residences in Brazil (3.5 million) survived 
this period by relying only on the Salary Relief program. The average  house hold 
incomes of beneficiaries  were 95  percent of what they would have been earning 
in the absence of the epidemic, and for the poorest parts of the population, it was 
103  percent (Bartholo et al., 2020).
 These cash transfers provided a po liti cal boost for President Bolsonaro, who, 
as of mid- August 2020, was considering replacing the  Family Allowance with a 
new program, Brazil Income (Renda Brasil). This program could be a valuable 
asset for Bolsonaro’s re- election campaign in 2022 (Beck & Gamarski, 2020). 
This is ironic given Bolsonaro’s initial reluctance to increase public expendi-
ture and his opposition to mea sures that could require closing the economy. 
However, as social policies  were implemented, the popularity of the president 
increased considerably (37   percent good/excellent, a rec ord during his term) 
(“Datafolha: Aprovação de Bolsonaro Sobe para 37%” [“Datafolha: Bolsonaro’s 
Approval Rises to 37”], 2020). Such policies also helped counterbalance the neg-
ative health policy decisions taken by the president. The polling data suggest 
that Bolsonaro was able to pass the blame onto state governors for unpop u lar 
initiatives while claiming credit for the social policies (particularly cash trans-
fers) during the epidemic.  Whether this was serendipitous or a shrewd po liti cal 
strategy is unclear.
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Explanation
Presidentialism Effect
Brazil has a complex presidential regime, which lies between the model of the US 
presidential system (ceding significant decision- making control to the president) 
and Eu ro pean parliamentarianism, where po liti cal parties dominate government. 
It is impor tant to note, however, that Brazil is not a semipresidential system (such 
as France or Peru), in which cabinet formation requires formal approval from 
Congress. Therefore, the bargaining space between co ali tion members and the 
executives in cabinet formation (including the MoH) and bureaucratic appoint-
ments is the result of the par tic u lar shape of the party-system.
Brazilian presidents are endowed with strong constitutional powers (Amorim 
Neto, 2002). Besides the allocating of positions in the vast federal administrative 
empire, presidents can issue presidential decrees and exercise substantial control 
over bud getary  matter. As in other countries, the president is able to use his or 
her position to speak directly to voters via national radio and televised speeches. 
 These are power ful instruments that allow the president to push forward his 
agenda,  whether for the public good or for par tic u lar interests.
Bolsonaro is a far- right populist president who came into power in 2018 
through an alliance between the economic liberals and social conservatives. Bol-
sonaro, a low- rank congressman who never had  great po liti cal aspirations, was 
seen as an alternative to the Workersʼ Party’s candidate.  After corruption alle-
gations that resulted in the impeachment of President Dilma Roussef and the 
“lawfare” (the use of  legal system against a po liti cal  enemy) against President Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, Bolsonaro was able to take advantage of this opportunity to 
push his campaign forward (Evans, 2018). With a moral discourse against corrup-
tion, during the initial months of his term in the presidency, he refused to form 
alliances with po liti cal parties in Congress. Nevertheless, he appointed Mandetta 
as Minister of Health, which was both a po liti cal decision (Mandetta is a member 
of the PSDB po liti cal party, an impor tant po liti cal ally) and a technical one (Man-
detta is a physician).
As discussed previously, Mandetta threatened Bolsonaro’s po liti cal domi-
nance, his pseudo- scientific rhe toric, and his stance on social distancing and 
plans to open up the economy.  After the second health minister, Teich, resigned 
and was replaced by active- duty Army General Eduardo Pazuello, po liti cal ana-
lysts in Brazil suggested that Bolsonaro was ensuring that if any negative public 
health consequences or pos si ble judicial decisions against the president arose, the 
blame would be shared with the Army (Barros, 2020).
President Bolsonaro’s strong skepticism  toward the science of COVID-19 (if 
not outright denial of it) seems to have been reinforced  after returning from a 
visit to the United States, where he met with American populist president Donald 
Trump to discuss military cooperation. Bolsonaro’s discourse became radical-
ized  toward ignoring and minimizing the pandemic (Teófilo, 2020). Like Trump, 
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Bolsonaro was not keen to “stop” the national economy and gained notoriety for 
supporting protests against government lockdowns, for touting unproven medi-
cines (notably hydroxychloroquine), and for downplaying the seriousness of the 
virus, even so far as vocally opposing state governors’ decisions to impose social 
distancing mea sures. Many of Bolsonaro’s statements contradicting the governors 
 were typically framed in terms of his goal of reopening nonessential businesses. 
Bolsonaro often highlighted the economic consequences and costs of social dis-
tancing. For instance, he stated, “Brazil has to work. The best medicine for any 
disease is work. We have got to work” (Carvalho & Colletta, 2020). As noted 
previously, economic stability is valuable to politicians given Brazil’s history of 
eco nom ically disruptive hyperinflation. Yet, as the consequence of lockdown and 
social distancing globally has been economic recession rather than hyperinflation, 
the po liti cal advantage he may have been seeking was to avoid the blame for the 
recession and to pass it on to regional governors (Ricard & Medeiros, 2020).
Denying, or marginalizing, scientific advice works po liti cally to undermine 
the influence and power of institutions and local or regional governments basing 
their strategies on scientific information and practice. In South Africa,  under ex- 
President Thabo Mbeki— who was infamous for denying the science of HIV patho-
genesis and treatment— such “AIDS denialismˮ was linked to par tic u lar economic 
interests centered around the provision of “alternative” therapies (Nattrass, 2012). 
In Bolsanaro’s Brazil, touting hydroxychloroquine as a “cure,” despite scientific 
evidence that it was in efec tive and could even harm patients (Mehra et al., 2020), 
appeared not to be linked directly to economic interests but rather functioned 
to support his desired rapid return to economic growth as well as his tried- and- 
tested use of misinformation as a po liti cal strategy. Ricard and Medeiros (2020) 
argue that Bolsonaro’s use of antisystem rhe toric accompanied by “massive and 
orchestrated misinformation” functioned as a po liti cal weapon during his 2019 
election campaign. They note a consequence was that “during this period, anti- 
scientific theories that had no relevance in Brazil (for example, flat earth theories 
or negation of climate change) acquired strong advocates on the national level 
and paved the way for the dangerous equivalence between opinion and science” 
(Ricard & Medeiros, 2020, p. 5). Po liti cally, this encouraged Bolsanaro’s followers 
to understand his disregard of science as a courageous break with “the system” 
rather than “ simple populist pyrotechnics” (Ricard & Medeiros, 2020, p. 6). This, 
however, placed him in a tense and contradictory position within the “system” 
over which he presided, especially during the COVID-19 epidemic.
Federalism and the Subnational Government Entrepreneurship
Several studies that have cata logued and analyzed Brazil’s response to COVID-19 
have been unan i mous in describing the lack of coordination between federal gov-
ernment departments and the subnational governments (Cimini et al., 2020). An 
analy sis using the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker coding sys-
tem applied to federal, state, and selected state- capital governments suggested a 
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large disparity between the severity of social distancing mea sures supported by 
federal and subnational governments, with the latter contributing a  great deal 
more to Brazil’s country- level stringency scores (Petherick et al., 2020).
 There are two impor tant aspects to explore regarding the efects of federalism 
in the response to the pandemic: the authority of state governments over health 
policy and their dependence on the federal government for debt relief.
First, the COVID-19 epidemic transformed the politics and authority pertain-
ing to state governance of health. Whereas for almost three de cades, state govern-
ments have had  limited influence on Brazilian national politics given the insti-
tutional powers of the executive and the way that tax resources are distributed, 
disputes with President Bolsonaro over how to respond to the epidemic appeared 
to have unified the regional leaders in a subversion of the “rally- round- the- flag 
efect”4 (Melo, 2020). State governors strongly disagreed with the president on 
the need to enforce social distancing mea sures and to postpone the reopening of 
commerce and other activities. For instance, in April,  after the president’s tele-
vised speech that underplayed the threat posed by COVID-19, the governor of 
Goiás, Ronaldo Caiado, a power ful leader of the agricultural caucus as well as a 
well- known orthopedic surgeon and one- time strong supporter of the president, 
declared, “ There is no more dialogue with this man . . .  Bolsonaro’s decisions to 
limit social distancing mea sures to high- risk populations  won’t reach the state of 
Goiás.” (Berti, 2020). He went on to call on the president to follow scientific advice 
on COVID-19 (Berti, 2020).
The Mandetta health administration strongly supported the subnational gov-
ernments’ decisions to  favor social distancing mea sures and to follow WHO pro-
tocols and scientific guidelines. Despite the president’s preferences, most state 
governments remained firm in their support of social distancing, business clo-
sures, and warnings against drugs and therapies that had yet to be tested. This 
helped inform the population and encouraged compliance with the initiatives 
taken in response to COVID-19.
Bolsonaro took advantage of the division of authority over the COVID-19 
epidemic to adopt a blame- avoidance strategy. Bolsonaro declared that gover-
nors and mayors would have to pay a fine to businessmen for losses resulting 
from quarantine. Additionally, on many occasions, Bolsonaro stated that gov-
ernors and mayors  were responsible for the consequences of quarantine mea-
sures, claiming that regional leaders’ decisions to shut down nonessential activi-
ties would have catastrophic consequences “far worse than the coronavirus” and 
that such individuals would be held accountable, along with the Supreme Court 
(Coletta et al., 2020).  These statements and their language took the stance of an 
attempt to evade blame when epidemiological models and specialists, in real ity, 
emphasized the disastrous consequences of lifting quarantine too soon (Brett & 
Rohani, 2020).
Second,  because of the ongoing economic crisis that had afected Brazil since 
2015, many states  were in severe fiscal debt, particularly with difficulties in paying sala-
ries and pensions, and  were negotiating a relief plan with the federal government. The 
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need to immediately respond to the COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated the 
prob lem. In April  2020, state governors  were able to secure a law in Congress 
that would force the executive government to provide them financial support 
without any conditionality.5 The president of the Senate negotiated new legisla-
tion between state governors and the Minister of Economy in which states would 
receive R$120 billion (US$23 billion), including instituting bailout initiatives to 
honor foreign debts, suspending debts with the federal government, and trans-
ferring resources to the states (Act 173/2020). The only condition was that states 
would not provide the annual salary increase that civil servants  were entitled 
to and resources would be transferred according to the number of COVID-19 
cases in each state, regardless of the capacity of the state to levy taxes. Therefore, 
although states gained impor tant authority to decide on the mea sures to fight 
COVID-19, they remained entrapped by the fiscal transfers and debt alleviation 
initiatives of the federal government.
Nevertheless, the financial support and autonomy gained by governors to 
decide on COVID-19 mea sures allowed the implementation of locally tailored 
initiatives.  These proved particularly impor tant as the spread of the COVID-19 
occurred at dif er ent rates in dif er ent geo graph i cal regions.
Conclusion
We have argued that President Bolsonaro undermined eforts to base Brazil’s 
response on scientific guidelines for both the prevention and treatment of 
COVID-19. Yet our analy sis has also emphasized the importance of re sis tance 
to his policies both within the Health Ministry and among regional governors, 
some of whom supported Bolsonaro in the past. Paradoxically, the president who 
had obstructed an efective health policy response  because of its economic conse-
quences ended up reaping the benefits of additional social spending to assist the 
poor cope with the epidemic. In a federal system, with a decentralized health ser-
vice, it proved strategic for the president to avoid the blame for unpop u lar health 
policies (at the cost of impor tant health communication initiative that is crucial 
during pandemics), while claiming credit for the provision of social policies that 
benefited vulnerable populations.
As of mid-2020, Brazil was the second most afected country by the COVID-19 
pandemic in terms of diagnosed cases and number of fatalities. The most likely 
scenario is a protracted epidemic, with transient ups and downs in dif er ent 
regions of the country and/or populations, with no definitive control in the short 
and medium term.
Under neath the circumstantial politics,  there was a strong, path- dependent 
health infrastructure able to assist Brazil avoid the most catastrophic scenario. 
The country has a well- developed health surveillance infrastructure in place to 
deal with pandemics such as COVID-19. Several state governments  were able to 
build field hospitals that  were essential in treating severe cases of COVID-19 in 
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São Paulo, Manaus, and Recife— all large metropolitan areas. Additionally, Brazil 
has an extensive primary healthcare network, with, as of mid-2020, more than 
43,000  family health teams and 260,000 community health agents.  Because 
80  percent of COVID-19 cases do not develop severe syndromes, primary health 
care is essential in caring for  these patients (Collucci, 2020). Much research 
remains to be done, and  future studies  will hopefully shed more light on  these 
successful aspects of Brazil’s response as well as on recent eforts to purchase and 
produce a COVID-19 vaccine locally.
Case studies of par tic u lar states  will also be useful. For example, Santa Cata-
rina was the first state to fully resume all activities, as indicated by graphic broad-
casts of crowded shopping centers with few masks in sight. Unsurprisingly, the 
state soon experienced a rebound in the number of cases and deaths, with an 
increase of more than 100  percent in the interval of a few days (Holland, 2020). 
Maranhão, by contrast, has been relatively successful at containing the epidemic. 
This has been attributed to the po liti cal decisions to implement the first, timely, 
lockdown in the  whole country and to buy critical equipment directly from for-
eign firms, bypassing the slow paperwork associated with purchases from local 
branches and the much bigger purchase power of the United States and the Eu ro-
pean Union (Carneiro & Seto, 2020) and to strong cooperation with international 
partners, from the US state agencies to private funders, such as the Open Society 
Foundations (US Embassy Press Office, 2020).
As the WHO has advised,  there are other pandemics to come. One of the 
key lessons we can learn from COVID-19 in Brazil and from the AIDS epidemic, 
paraphrasing Buse, Dickinson, and Sidibé (2008), is to know your epidemic, act 
on its politics (p. 572).
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Notes
 1. Private insurers use SUS when in need of expensive treatments not covered by the 
private sector.
 2. See discussion of moral economy in Nattrass (2004) and its application to AIDS 
denialism in South Africa  under Mbeki.
 3. The government also created the Emergency  Labor program, designed to allow the 
reduction of  labor hours for ninety days or temporary suspension of  labor contracts for 
sixty days. During that time the government would  either complement the salary or, in 
the case of contract suspension, it would cover the full unemployment insurance.
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 4. This concept explains the “surge of public approval for the president when the 
nation is involved in an international crisis” (Murray, 2018).
 5. The dispute around this bill was less a contention among po liti cal parties than 
among dif er ent Houses. The bill received seventy- nine votes in  favor among eighty- one 
senators (only one left- wing senator was against and the president of session was not 
allowed to vote) (Tito, 2020).
References
Abrasco. (2020, July 3). Nota pela valorização dos profissionais do Ministério da Saúde 
[A note to support the Ministry of Health Professionals]. Associacao Brasileira de 
Saude Coletiva [Brazilian Association of Post- Graduation in Collective Health] (Abrasco).
Agencia Saude. (2020, April 3). Governo do Brasil libera R$9,4 bilhões para combate ao 
coronavírus. https:// www . saude . gov . br / noticias / agencia - saude / 46651 - governo - do 
- brasil - libera - r - 9 - 4 - bilhoes - para - combate - ao - coronavirus
Alston, L., Melo, M., Mueller, B., & Pereira, C. (2006). Po liti cal institutions, policymaking 
pro cesses and policy outcomes in Brazil. (Inter- American Development Bank Working 
Paper No. 204). https:// dx . doi . org / 10 . 2139 / ssrn . 1814758
Amorim Neto, O. (2002). Presidential cabinets, electoral cycles, and co ali tion discipline 
in Brazil. In S. Morgenstern & B. Nacif (Eds.),. Legislative politics in Latin Amer i ca. 
Cambridge University Press.
Barros, C. (2020, July 19). Bolsonaro finalmente realizou seu projeto de juventude: Colocou 
uma bomba nos quartéis [Bolsonaro’s youth dream come true: Put a bomb in military 
headquarters]. Folha de Sao Paulo.
Bartholo, L., Paiva, A., Natalino, M., Licio, E., & Pinheiro, M. (2020). As transferências mon-
etárias federais de caráter assistencial em resposta à COVID-19: Mudanças e desafios de 
implementação [Federal cash transfers of assistance in response to Covid-19: Changes 
and implementation challenges]. http:// repositorio . ipea . gov . br / handle / 11058 / 10042
Bastos, L. (2020). Cuidados com analises de dados da Covid-19 [Careful attention to 
COVID-19 data]. Retrieved on January 22, 2021, http:// www . statpop . com . br / 2020 / 05 
/ cuidados - com - analises - de - dados - da . html ? fbclid = IwAR29Nq8ezWEzU8rbLotaygR 
_ zK3ty6FzYKeGLVm _ 5HDHhQ1l8nbSq - g9 _ js
Beck, M., & Gamarski, R. (2020, Jun 23). Bolsonaro plans signature social program replac-
ing Lula’s legacy. Bloomberg. https:// www . bloomberg . com / news / articles / 2020 - 06 - 23 
/ bolsonaro - plans - signature - social - program - replacing - lula - s - legacy
Berti, L. (2020, March 25). Crisis unfolding: Bolsonaro loses support from power ful ally. 
The Brazilian Report.
Brasileiros que vieram da China deixam quarentena em Anápolis [Brazilians who came 
from China leave quarantine in Anápolis]. (2020, February 23). Revista Veja.
Brasil tem média de 1.069 mortes por dia na última semana; 10 estados e o DF têm alta 
de mortes [Brazil has an average of 1,069 deaths per day in the last week; 10 states 
and the DF have high deaths]. (2020, July 27). G1. https:// g1 . globo . com / bemestar 
/ coronavirus / noticia / 2020 / 07 / 27 / casos - e - mortes - por - coronavirus - no - brasil - em - 27 
- de - julho - segundo - consorcio - de - veiculos - de - imprensa . ghtml
Brett, T., & Rohani, P. (2020). COVID-19 herd immunity strategies: Walking an elusive and 
dangerous tightrope. https:// www . medRxiv 2020.04.29.20082065
COVID-19 in Brazil  507
Buse, K., Dickinson, C., & Sidibé, M. (2008). HIV: Know your epidemic, act on its politics. 
Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 101, 572–573.
Carneiro, M., & Seto, G. (2020, April 16). Maranhão comprou da China, mandou para 
Etiópia e driblou governo federal para ter respiradores [Maranhão bought from China, 
sent to Ethiopia and circumvented the federal government to have respirators]. Folha 
de São Paulo.
Carvalho, D., & Colletta, R. (2020, March 27). Sem apresentar provas, Bolsonaro diz 
desconfiar do número de vítimas do coronavírus em SP [Without presenting evidence, 
Bolsonaro says he suspects the number of coronavirus victims in SP]. Folha de São 
Paulo.
Cimini, F., Juliao, N., Souza, A., Ferreira, J., Figueiredo, G., Garcia, L., Hargreaves, R., & 
Bagggia, F. (2020). Análise das primeiras respostas políticas do Governo Brasileiro 
para o enfrentamento da COVID-19 disponíveis no Repositório Global Polimap 
[Analy sis of the first po liti cal responses from the Brazilian Government to confront 
COVID-19 available in the Global Polimap Repository]. Belo Horiizonte. https:// geesc 
. cedeplar . ufmg . br / en / analise - das - primeiras - respostas - politicas - do - governo - brasileiro 
- para - o - enfrentamento - da - covid - 19 - disponiveis - no - repositorio - global - polimap/
Coletta, R. (2020, February 6). Bolsonaro sanciona lei que estabelece regras da quarentena 
do coronavírus [Bolsonaro sanctions law that establishes coronavirus quarantine rules]. 
Folha de São Paulo.
Coletta, R., Fabrini, F., & Onofre, R. (2020, April 18). Bolsonaro aponta ao STF e, de novo, 
pede o relaxamento de regras de isolamento [Bolsonaro points to STF and, again, 
calls for relaxation of isolation rules]. Folha de São Paulo.
Collucci, C. (2020, August 12). Municípios com atenção primária forte fazem a diferença 
na pandemia [Municipalities with strong primary care make a diference in the pan-
demic]. Folha de Sao Paulo.
Datafolha: Aprovação de Bolsonaro sobe para 37%, a melhor do mandato, e reprovação 
cai para 34% [Datafolha: Bolsonaro’s approval rises to 37%, the best of the term, and 
disapproval falls to 34%]. (2020, August 13). G1. https:// g1 . globo . com / politica / noticia 
/ 2020 / 08 / 13 / bolsonaro - tem - aprovacao - de - 37percent - e - reprovacao - de - 34percent - diz 
- datafolha . ghtml
Delatorre, E., Mir, D., Gräf, T., & Bello, G. (2020). Tracking the onset date of the com-
munity spread of SARS- CoV-2 in Western countries. Memórias do Instituto Oswaldo 
Cruz, Pre- print.
Deweck, E., Oliveira, A., & Rossi, P. (2018). Austeridade e retrocesso: Impactos sociais 
da política fiscal no Brasil [Austerity and setback: Social impacts of fiscal policy in 
Brazil]. São Paulo: Brasil Debate e Fundação Friedrich Ebert.
Dong, E., Du, H., & Gardner, L. (2020). An interactive web- based dashboard to track 
COVID-19 in real time. The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 20(5), 533–534.
Evans, P. (2018, Fall). An unfolding tragedy. Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies, 
9–13, 49–53.
Fernandes, T. (2020, March 27). Governo brasileiro fecha fronteiras aéreas a estrangeiros 
de todas as nacionalidades [Brazilian government closes air borders to foreigners of 
all nationalities]. Folha de São Paulo.
Fonseca, E. M., Shadlen, K., & Bastos, F. I. (2019). Brazil’s fight against hepatitis C— 
universalism, local production, and patents. New  England Journal of Medicine, 380(7), 
605–607.
508  Coronavirus Politics
Franco Netto, G., Villardi, J., Machado, J., Souza, J., Brito, I., Santorum, J., & Fenner, A. 
(2017). Brazilian health surveillance: Reflections and contribution to the debate of the 
First National Conference on Health Surveillance. Ciência & Saúde Coletiva 22(10), 
3137–3148.
General Pazuello likely stay atop health ministry. (2020, July 15). Valor Economico.
Holland, C. (2020, May 6). Após reabertura do comércio, casos de coronavírus  
triplicam em SC [ After the reopening of trade, coronavirus cases  triple in SC]. G1.
Lima, B., & Cardim, M. (2020, May 5). Ministério da Saúde chega a 25 militares nomea-
dos [Ministry of Health reaches 25 military personnel appointed]. Correio Brasiliense.
Lima, Y., & Costa, E. (2015). Implementação do Regulamento Sanitário Internacional 
[Implementation of the International Health Regulations]. Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 
20(6), 1773–1783.
Machado, R., & Fernandes, T. (2020, June 10). Brazilian ministry of health backs down 
and resumes full disclosure of Covid-19 data  after Supreme Court decision. Folha de 
São Paulo.
Maximo, W. (2020, July 2). No último dia de prazo, 1,9 mi têm auxílio emergencial em 
análise [On the last day of the term, 1.9 million have emergency aid  under analy sis]. 
Agencia Brasil.
Mazui, G. (2020, April 16). Mandetta anuncia em rede social que foi demitido por Bolson-
aro do Ministério da Saúde [Mandetta announces on social network that he was fired 
by Bolsonaro from the Ministry of Health]. G1.
Medici, A. (2020). Informações preliminares sobre o estado de preparação para o 
Covid-19 e outras eventuais pandemias na América Latina e Caribe [Preliminary 
information on the state of preparedness for Covid-19 and other pos si ble pandemics 
in Latin Amer i ca and the Ca rib bean]. https:// monitordesaude . blogspot . com
Mello, M. (2020). Medida cautelar na ação cível originária 3.359 Distrito Federal  
[Precautionary mea sure in the civil lawsuit originating 3,359 Distrito Federal]. 
Retrieved on January 12, 2021, from https:// stf . jusbrasil . com . br / jurisprudencia 
/ 919526556 / referendo - na - medida - cautelar - na - acao - civel - originaria - aco - 3359 - df 
- 0088023 - 3220201000000 / inteiro - teor - 919526620 ? ref​= juris - tabs
Melo, M. (2020, April 13). A sobrevida dos governadores [The survival of the governos]. 
Folha de São Paulo.
Mehra, M., Desai, S., Ruschitzka, F., & Patel, A. (2020). Hydroxychloroquine or chlo-
roquine with or without a macrolide for treatment of COVID-19: A multinational 
registry analy sis. The Lancet, Online First.
Ministério da Saúde. (2010). Plano Brasileiro de Preparação para Enfrentamento de uma 
Pandemia de Influenza [Brazilian Plan of Preparation for Confronting an Influenza 
Pandemic]. https:// bvsms . saude . gov . br / bvs / publicacoes / plano _ brasileiro _ pandemia 
_ influenza _ IV . pdf
Murray, S. (2018). The “rally- ‘round- the- flag” phenomenon and the diversionary use of 
force. In W. Thompson (Ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International 
Relations Theory. Oxford University Press.
Nattrass, N. (2004). The moral economy of AIDS in South Africa. Cambridge University 
Press.
Nattrass, N. (2012). The AIDS conspiracy: Science fights back. Columbia University 
Press.
COVID-19 in Brazil  509
Nuclear Threat Initiative, & Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. (2019). 
Global Health Security Index: Building collective action and accountability. https:// www 
. ghsindex . org / wp - content / uploads / 2019 / 10 / 2019 - Global - Health - Security - Index . pdf
Nunn, A. (2008). The politics and history of AIDS treatment in Brazil. Springer.
Paim, J., Travassos, C., Almeida, C., Bahia, L., & Macinko, J. (2011). The Brazilian health 
system: History, advances, and challenges. The Lancet, 377(9779), 1778–1797.
Party fragmentation reaches a rec ord high in Brazil and becomes a world abnormality. 
(2018, October 10). Folha de São Paulo.
Petherick, A., Goldszmidt, R., Kira, B., & Barberia, L. (2020). Do Brazil’s COVID-19 
government response mea sures meet the WHO’s criteria for policy easing? https:// 
www . bsg . ox . ac . uk / research / publications / do - brazils - covid - 19 - government - response 
- measures - meet - whos - criteria - policy
Phillips, T. (2020, March 25). Bolsonaro says he “ wouldn’t feel anything” if infected with 
Covid-19 and attacks state lockdowns. The Guardian.
Piovesan, E., & Siqueira, C. (2020, March 23). Relator anuncia acordo para auxílio emer-
gencial de R$600 [Rapporteur announces R$ 600 emergency aid agreement]. Agência 
Câmara de Notícias.
Rasella, D., Aquino, R., Santos, C. A. T., Paes- Sousa, R., & Barreto, M. L. (2013). Efect of 
a conditional cash transfer programme on childhood mortality: A nationwide analy sis 
of Brazilian municipalities. The Lancet, 382(9886), 57–64.
Relembre frases de Bolsonaro sobre a COVID-19 [Remember Bolsonaro phrases about 
COVID-19]. (2020, July 7). BBC News. https:// www . bbc . com / portuguese / brasil 
- 53327880
Ricard, J., & Medeiros, J. (2020). Using misinformation as a po liti cal weapon: COVID-19 
and Bolsonaro in Brazil. The Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Misinformation Review, 
1(2), 1–6.
Rodrigues, A. (2020, March 18). Doria anuncia fechamento de shoppings e academias na 
Grande SP [Doria announces closure of shopping centers and gyms in Greater SP]. 
Folha de São Paulo.
Savarese, M., & Biller, D. (2020, September 16). Brazil general named health minister 
 after months as interim. ABC News. https:// abcnews . go . com / Health / wireStory / brazil 
- general - named - health - minister - months - interim - 73061275
Schreiber, M. (2020, March 19). Coronavírus: Brasil fecha quase toda a fronteira terrestre, 
mas mantém entrada por aeroportos [Coronavirus: Brazil closes almost the entire 
land border, but maintains entry through airports]. BBC Brasil.
Teófilo, S. (2020, April 1). Bolsonaro diz que ligou para Trump e tratou sobre o novo 
coronavírus [Bolsonaro says he called Trump and dealt with the new coronavirus]. 
Correio Brasiliense.
Tito, B. (2020, May 3). PLP 39/2020: Um ataque aos trabalhadores do setor público e favo-
recimento do sistema financeiro disfarçado de ajuda fiscal aos Estados e Municípios 
[An attack on public sector workers and favoring the financial system disguised as 
fiscal aid to States and Municipalities]. Esquerda Online.
US Embassy Press Office. (2020, July 23). U.S. to fund field hospital in Maranhão. 
https:// br . usembassy . gov / u - s - to - fund - field - hospital - in - maranhao/
Veloso, A. (2020, April 28). Agências da Caixa voltam a ter longas filas [Caixa branches 
have long lines again]. Extra.
510  Coronavirus Politics
Verdélio, A. (2020, May 15). Nelson Teich pede demissão do Ministério da Saúde [Nelson 
Teich resigns from the Ministry of Health]. Agencia Brasil.
Xavier, L. (2020, June 8). Maia elogia consórcio de comunicação que vai divulgar dados 
omitidos sobre mortes de Covid-19 [Maia praises communication consortium that 
 will release missing data on Covid-19 deaths]. Agência Câmara de Notícias.
 28 coloMbia’s resPonse to covid-19
 Pragmatic Command, Social Contention,  
and Po liti cal Challenges
Claudia Acosta, Mónica Uribe- Gómez,  
and Durfari Velandia- Naranjo
Colombia is a centralized, presidential, demo cratic (although with 
a strong heritage of authoritarianism and war) middle- income country with high 
levels of poverty and in equality among  people and territories.
According to the Global Health Security Index, by 2019 Colombia was among 
the broad group of countries “more prepared” for epidemics or pandemics, with 
a medium response capacity in prevention and mitigation of epidemics but a sig-
nificant lag in the availability of hospital beds in intensive care units (Ministry of 
Health and Social Protection, 2020a, b). The forecasts to face the pandemic  were 
cautious. Seven months  after the beginning of the pandemic, the data reported 
acceptable per for mance by Colombia in managing the pandemic, with lower 
lethality than several of its neighbors and even some higher- income countries. 
The time that has elapsed since the beginning of the pandemic, however short, has 
been long enough to show that the response capacity relies not just on objective 
conditions such as health systems; politics weighs as much or more than policy.
On March 6, 2020, when the first case of COVID-19 in Colombia was reported, 
the national context included (1) a health system with almost universal cover-
age but per sis tent prob lems of access to ser vices and reduced hospital capacity 
 because of funding; (2) a national data collection system for the vulnerable popu-
lation served by its conditional cash transfer programs, although with some short-
comings; and (3) the president’s falling popularity with no upcoming electoral 
contests and mild po liti cal polarization. Given this situation, the forecast for the 
country dealing with COVID-19 was not optimistic.
Colombia had the advantage of the pandemic beginning a few weeks  later than 
Eu ro pean countries and the United States. By March 2020, the government, citi-
zens, and health workers  were already on high alert. In less than two weeks, with 
some tension between local leaders and the national government, the country 
entered a strict and lengthy lockdown.  After several months, this mea sure started 
to loosen not  because the epidemic was  under control, but  because of economic 
and social pressure.
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By September 2020, Colombia reported acceptable per for mance in the region, 
and the health system presented only isolated breakdowns (mainly in remote 
places). The hospital capacity was expanded and the country showed efficient 
epidemiological management. However, the pandemic brought out pre- existing 
regional disparities in health capacity and funding, which required issuing social 
relief aids. How can  these results be explained? The constitutional provision of 
“economic, social, and ecological emergency” allowed the president to make quick 
and autonomous decisions. The key mea sures taken by the president included 
national- regional coordinated actions in public health, rapid realignment of pub-
lic resources to expand hospital capacity, testing system decentralization, highly 
restrictive and lengthy lockdown, and other socioeconomic mea sures (including 
unconditional cash transfers).
President Duque won popularity and media attention. Apparently, the cri-
sis brought out his greatest strength: technocratic capacity. Po liti cal opposition 
seemed to follow a cooperative response: the opposition criticized the president 
and some mea sures, but none questioned the seriousness of the prob lem, used 
massive disinformation strategies, nor suggested noncompliance with the lock-
down. Nevertheless, the po liti cal arena is changing fast, and polarization in the 
debate has returned to the forefront.
As of this writing,  there are still impor tant challenges for national and local 
authorities in the management of the “COVID-19 cases curve” and the contain-
ment of outbreaks in specific territories. The economic crisis, insufficient social aid, 
and corruption  will undoubtedly remain the most pressing challenges in a country 
where mea sures to reduce in equality have not been on the po liti cal agenda.
This chapter reports on the conditions of the healthcare system in the country 
at the time the pandemic started, details the main responses in health and social 
support by the government, and analyzes the po liti cal be hav ior and public debate 
in a deeply unequal middle- income country.
Health Policy Mea sures and the COVID-19 Response
The current healthcare system in Colombia, in operation since 1993, is centrally 
regulated, administratively decentralized, and publicly financed. The backbone of 
the system is the general social security health system (SGSSS, Spanish acronym), 
which provides a market- oriented compulsory universal healthcare insurance for 
individual risks. Collective health risks are territorially managed, with a discon-
nection between public health and healthcare insurance (Ministry of Health and 
Social Protection, 2016a). The Ministry of Health and Social Protection (MSPS, 
Spanish acronym) and its associated agencies are tasked with central command 
and coordination, setting policy agenda, regulation, inspection, surveillance, and 
control of the system.
Functions, resources, and actions related to public health are concentrated at 
district and municipality levels. Local health authorities follow national guidelines 
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to monitor public health, evaluate local health situations, and prioritize needs to 
allocate resources in their respective jurisdictions. For instance, surveillance, pre-
vention, and control of vector- transmitted diseases such as dengue fever, malaria, 
or chikungunya fever are mainly the responsibility of local authorities. Resources 
for public health come to municipalities mainly from earmarked intergovernmen-
tal transfers and other local taxes compulsorily assigned to finance health expen-
ditures (Ministry of Health and Social Protection, 2016a).
In Colombia, in theory, no person is deprived of access to healthcare ser vice. 
The enrollment in the healthcare insurance system is mandatory. Workers (and 
their relatives) are affiliated with the contributory regime and contribute with a 
specific healthcare payroll tax.  People without payment capacity are assigned to 
the subsidized regime. Each person in any regime enjoys the same basic health 
coverage plan (PAB, Spanish acronym) that is regulated and annually updated by 
the MSPS. PABs are handled through public or private healthcare agencies known 
as EPS (from their Spanish acronym), which deliver healthcare ser vices to citizens.
In practice, the system pre sents substantial prob lems of corruption, bureau-
cratization, lack of resources, and disconnection between the structure of the sys-
tem, preventive and promotional health mea sures, and ser vice provision. Since 
2016, by virtue of new national regulations, the health system has tried to reduce 
 those gaps through integral routes for comprehensive delivery of ser vices (includ-
ing promotion and disease prevention), better distribution of resources, transpar-
ency of epidemiological data, and other mea sures (Ministry of Health and Social 
Protection, 2016a). The following issues are of special importance in confronting 
the pandemic: (1) lack of efective access to ser vices for the population; (2) reduced 
hospital capacity; and (3) the enormous inter- and intraregional in equality in hos-
pital capacity and the financial conditions of public and private hospitals.
Colombia has extensive experience with infectious diseases, such as the out-
breaks of measles in 2019, the Zika virus in 2015, the chikungunya fever in 2014, 
and influenza A- H1N1 in 2009. The health minister, Fernando Ruiz Gómez, is a 
competent technocrat, with a solid professional background as well as extensive 
knowledge about public health, the Colombian health system, and the country, in 
addition to experience with infectious diseases. He was appointed in February 2020 
to strengthen the ministry’s technical capacity to deal with the pandemic. He has 
coordinated and directed the healthcare sector, adopting impor tant mea sures 
aimed at improving the health system’s capacity to  handle the increased demand.
The national government of Colombia has injected direct resources for the 
adaptation and renovation of hospitals, increased and decentralization of testing, 
health workers’ training, and improvement of hospitals’ capacity to respond to 
the virus. Supported by extraordinary powers for the executive level, owing to the 
declaration of a “state of sanitary emergency,” the minister has the mandate, for 
example, to order private hospitals to better allocate hospital beds.
The country went from 5,346 intensive care unit (ICU) beds in February 2020 
to 10,606 ICU beds at the end of September  2020 (official microdata is avail-
able at the Minister of Health webpage). Five months  after the beginning of the 
514  Coronavirus Politics
pandemic, the majority of ICUs in the country  were capable of managing the 
emergency. Hospital breakdowns happened in poor and/or peripheral regions of 
the country (highlighting the old under lying prob lem of regional inequity in the 
system).
Another relevant strategy to deal with COVID-19 is data availability: trans-
parent, integrated, and timely, allowing quick and sectorized decisions by local 
authorities, such as the containment of specific neighborhoods or areas and tar-
geted quarantines. From March to May 2020, data reveal a slight increase in the 
number of confirmed cases and deaths. By mid- June 2020, we observed a spike in 
both curves, with a peak in mid- August. Since then, both curves decreased and 
eventually flattened in mid- September but at a high level. As of the end of Septem-
ber 2020, the country recorded around 800,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 
and more than 25,000 deaths. Indicators developed along with the PAHO (Pan 
American Health Organ ization) report lower numbers in Colombia than in some 
OECD countries and other Latin American middle- income peers. With 15,105 
infections per million, Colombia recorded 478 deaths per million while the United 
Kingdom reported 615, France 477, Italy 590, Chile 643, Mexico 570, Panama 525, 
and Ec ua dor 627 (World Health Organ ization, 2020). The transmissibility indi-
cator (Rt, efective reproduction number) used to forecast impact, evaluate, and 
adjust public health response is, as of this writing, 1.06 in Colombia. (The goal is 
to reach an Rt below 1.) By September of 2020, the lethality rate in the country was 
3.2  percent; 93.6  percent of infected  people had recovered at home, 2.7  percent 
 were admitted to a hospital, and 0.27   percent (2,165) needed an ICU (National 
Institute of Health, 2020).
Fi nally, the health surveillance system is centralized and coordinated by the 
national level headed by the National Institute of Health (acronym in Spanish, 
INS). This institute generates COVID-19 data daily that are published by national, 
regional, and local authorities without po liti cal debate. Even so,  limited access to 
testing and delays in notification of results reduce the citizens’ trust in COVID-19 
data (Ministry of Health and Social Protection, 2020a, b).
Socioeconomic Mea sures
Economic in equality perhaps best describes the social condition of Colombians. 
The 2018 census reported that approximately 40  percent of the country’s popula-
tion is eco nom ically vulnerable, whereas another 20  percent sufer some condition 
of multidimensional poverty (e.g., lack of adequate access to health, education, 
public ser vices such as  water or energy). Since the year 2000, the leading social 
welfare program Familias en Acción attends part of the vulnerable population 
through conditional cash transfers, which require the fulfillment of certain health 
and educational obligations. In addition, smaller programs called Jóvenes en Acción 
and Colombia Mayor ofer additional conditional cash- transfer programs. As of 
February 2020, Familias en Acción benefited approximately 2.6 million families 
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(close to 10 million  people). Nevertheless, an impor tant but undetermined group 
of Colombians require public support but are not included in the programs. Also, 
this social support structure pre sents prob lems of uneven distribution among the 
poor who claim for revision.
Decree 417, enacted as early as March 27, 2020, provided additional resources 
for the group of recipients already included in any of the three social programs. It 
also established unconditional cash- transfers called Ingreso Solidario of approxi-
mately US$45 per month up  until December  2020 for the remaining 3 million 
families not targeted by the existing programs (Uribe- Gómez, 2020). Most of the 
 people in this group are informal workers (workers without affiliation to social 
security or welfare benefits; in Colombia,  these workers represent more than half 
of the eco nom ically active population).
The pandemic has shown that poverty is one of the greatest risk  factors to 
contracting COVID-19  in Colombia. In a country where more than half of the 
population sufers from a state of vulnerability, the contagious, lethal pandemic 
has especially afected  those who cannot stay at home  because they must leave 
their homes to make a living. Quarantine, social distancing, and even constant 
hand- washing are luxury practices for specific groups and regions. States such as 
Chocó or Amazonas have been hit hard by this virus; in addition to high poverty 
rates,  there is a lack of potable  water in many of their territories. Similarly, in the 
cities, the most afected areas are precarious settlements.
Also, since the beginning of the pandemic, the Colombian government has 
announced that it  will undertake economic mea sures to alleviate the situation. In 
presidential broadcasts, President Duque has linked the discussion on social aid 
with the need to find adequate resources for this purpose. Two main sources have 
been employed by the government to fund the emergency, the first being the gov-
ernment’s income from the revenue- sharing system (SGP, acronym in Spanish), 
the system of royalties from nonrenewable natu ral resources, mainly petroleum 
and mining (SGR, acronym in Spanish), and the national general bud get (PGN, 
acronym in Spanish). The second source is the central government debt, funded 
by government bonds and loans. In 2020 Colombia  will have the largest public 
debt in its history.
According to the Economic Commission for Latin Amer i ca and the Ca rib bean 
(Economic Commission for Latin Amer i ca and the Caribbean, 2020), by July 2020, 
the fiscal efort in the country to face the pandemic represented just 2.5  percent of 
the GDP when compared with other countries such as Chile (5.7  percent), Brazil 
(7.5  percent), or El Salvador (11  percent). As opposed to the centralized, transparent, 
and available data about the COVID-19 cases and deaths,  there is neither central-
ization nor detailed information about funding sources, destination, and atten-
tion of specific groups. Unfortunately, corruption has been notoriously associated 
with health and social expenditures (Fiscal Observatory of Javeriana University, 
2020).
Both the pandemic and the extension of compulsory confinement have pro-
duced a significant increase in poverty levels. The  future is alarming: “Projections 
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estimate that the country’s poverty rate  will reach 18% to 32%, and extreme pov-
erty  will reach between 4.5 to 16.7%, as a result of the loss of income in the infor-
mal sector, meaning that one- sixth of the country’s population  will earn income 
that is insufficient to aford staple foods” (Sánchez & Chaparro, 2020, p. 1).
A new po liti cal movement of fifty- four parliamentarians (supported by aca-
demics and social organ izations) has proposed the national government approve 
an emergency basic income equal to one minimum wage for five months that 
would benefit 9.5 million families.  Under the argument of stimulating consump-
tion and providing relief to  those who have been most afected by the lockdown 
decrees, this group is leading a call for solidarity (“Editorial,” 2020).
Po liti cal Analy sis (Explanations)
The aforementioned statistics about the pandemic put the national government 
in an acceptable position. As in many other places, COVID-19 has put not only 
the health and social systems but also the governmental authorities and po liti-
cal regimes to the test. Three components can partially explain the po liti cal 
response and its importance in containing the pandemic’s lethality: the techno-
cratic approach of the pandemic, the electoral calendar and cooperative be hav-
ior from the po liti cal opposition, and the strong enforcement of the extended 
lockdown.
President Duque demonstrated one of his professional strengths, his techno-
cratic side, and found in the pandemic a space to regain popularity and increase 
communication with the population. From the beginning, he acknowledged the 
pandemic as a real prob lem that required technical decisions, without denial, 
irreverent attitudes, or blame- avoidance. He appointed as health minister a highly- 
skilled professional, well recognized in the public health sector, to spearhead the 
urgent mea sures in the health system. Mr. Duque started a daily tele vi sion program 
providing information on the pandemic’s evolution and the mea sures taken by 
the government to address it. To face the growing public spending, he opted to 
expand the public debt and extended the environmental and health emergency 
status to maintain tight restrictions on the mobility of the population and social 
distancing with the support of the police force.
The pandemic even brought a temporary improvement in President Duque’s 
popularity, who had sufered from high levels of rejection almost since the begin-
ning of his tenure. By February  2020, his approval rate was 23   percent (“Iván 
Duque,” 2020), and by May 2020, it was 53  percent (“Aumenta el Optimismo en el 
País” [“Optimism Increases in the Country”], 2020). For the first time in office, the 
president experienced more approval than disapproval. By June 2020, his approval 
rate was 38   percent (“Aumenta el Optimismo en el País” [“Optimism Increases 
in the Country”], 2020b). This renewed decline of the president’s popularity has 
been attributed to overexposure, lack of closeness to citizens, lack of transparency 
with public resources, and poor leadership (Lombo, 2020). Duque has used more 
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central power than consensus with local authorities and showed more concern 
about economic  factors than the heartfelt demands of citizens  under lockdown.
Unlike other countries, the po liti cal and electoral calendar has been in  favor 
of containing the pandemic: in 2020, President Duque was in his second year of a 
four- year term, and mayors began their terms in January 2020, which can reduce 
po liti cal aggression.
The country has also been  free from or ga nized media strategies of disinfor-
mation and fake news about the pandemic. Fake news networks cost time and 
money to be implemented. A pos si ble explanation for the absence of  those strate-
gies could be the lack of a structured fake news network already working by the 
time the pandemic began. From the incumbent’s point of view,  there  were no 
clear benefits from implementing fake news, and the challengers did not deny or 
minimize the risk of COVID-19 or reject scientific evidence.
Nonetheless, the country is experiencing strong po liti cal antagonism, repre-
sented by two po liti cal ideologies: Uribismo (Duque’s po liti cal roots) and Petrismo 
(the main challenger), both of which receive electoral support largely defined 
by the voter’s income. Uribismo, a mixture of conservative and neoliberal ideol-
ogy, is associated with the high- income population, whereas Petrismo, a social- 
democratic populist ideology, receives support mainly among middle- and low- 
income groups (Kajsiu, 2020). The most aggressive attack against Duque happened 
in early July 2020, when Senator Gustavo Petro defied the president’s legitimacy and 
encouraged  people to engage in civil disobedience. As the pandemic advanced, 
po liti cal cooperation lost momentum, and the most afected social groups sought 
po liti cal voices to represent them.  Because Petro aligned himself with the extreme 
left of the po liti cal spectrum, it was advantageous for Duque to move to the center 
and avoid extreme aggressive positions. Duque  shaped the debate in technical 
language, without populist rhe toric or denial; his goal was to create the image of a 
trustworthy leader who performed well in dealing with the pandemic.
With its history of internal armed conflict for over half a  century and the 
violent and disruptive presence of drug trafficking, Colombia demanded a high 
level of cooperation among the dif er ent levels of government to maintain public 
order. Duque centralized the public order decisions in the  whole territory and 
decreed a national lockdown without consensus with local authorities, which is 
 legal even though po liti cally questionable. The rigid, across- the- board lockdown 
began on March 22, 2020, and was still in force at the end of July 2020 with the sup-
port of the police force and militarization of specific areas and neighborhoods. 
Individual freedom was considerably restricted for a period of more than a hun-
dred days from March to July. Such level of lockdown (in duration and enforce-
ment) would be unthinkable in many countries, including  those in Latin Amer i ca, 
where  there is a greater tradition of re spect for civil rights.
Last but not least, how did President Duque manage to take so many and exten-
sive mea sures in a short time? The answer lies in the Colombian presidential sys-
tem, characterized by the centrality and disproportionate importance of the execu-
tive at the expense of the legislative and even the judiciary (Gómez Mendez, 2019). 
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In this case, the president, together with all the ministers, enacted on March 17, 
2020, the “State of Economic and Social Emergency” (a constitutional provision) to 
confront the pandemic. Invested with ample powers, Duque made numerous deci-
sions without the need for consultation, debate, or approval by Congress.  These 
decisions included mobility restrictions, social and economic mea sures, direct 
interventions in the health system to increase hospital capacity, increase in public 
debt, and presumption of the president’s hierarchy in the  matters of public order 
overruling  those at the departmental and municipal levels.
As of this writing, the country has been governed “by decree,” but the pan-
demic is still raging, and the po liti cal map is changing rapidly. The debate on the 
approval of an emergency universal basic income was initiated in Congress on 
July 20, 2020, the first day of the new legislature’s sessions, along with proposals 
to reduce the presidential power during the pandemic.
Conclusions
As has been observed in cases such as Brazil or the United States, having a favor-
able history in managing health crises, a robust health system, or resources to 
tackle them does not guarantee that the response to challenges of COVID-19  will 
be adequate and lives  preserved. The COVID-19 emergency has shown that po liti-
cal strategy and government decisions weigh as much or more than such condi-
tions on the outcome. Colombia had medium preparedness in its health system 
to attend to and mitigate the pandemic and significant weaknesses in the supply 
of hospital beds and intensive care facilities.
The government has taken remarkable coordinated mea sures.  There is a clear 
improvement in the supply of hospital beds and the financial standing of hos-
pitals. Transparency and prompt delivery of COVID-19 information are  great 
Colombian strengths. The government has requested a huge social efort from the 
population by way of a highly restrictive quarantine for more than a hundred con-
secutive days supported by the use of public force, instituting mandatory use of 
masks and sanitary guidelines. In parallel, unconditional cash transfers  were cre-
ated for beneficiaries of existing programs and for a large population group that 
subsists on informal activities, such as street vendors,  house cleaners  etc., that are 
highly afected by the pandemic. Such provisions have been funded from a vari-
ety of sources, the main one being international public debt. Some of President 
Duque’s decisions are not popu lar with the Colombian  people. Although po liti-
cal control is a necessity in dire situations, opposing po liti cal forces are already 
calling for the end of the “State of Economic and Social Emergency” that allows 
Mr. Duque to make decisions without Congress’ agreement.
Colombia’s healthcare system has survived the pandemic, but it is also expe-
riencing financial prob lems that seriously afect hospitals and other healthcare 
suppliers. In addition, the pandemic has highlighted regional imbalances in ser-
vice provision and funding. In many cases, poor, peripheral, or inaccessible areas 
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 pre sent the highest infection rates and the main sites of healthcare breakdowns 
in the country. Poverty constitutes a significant risk  factor for the pandemic in 
Colombia.
Public compliance with the restrictive mea sures was supported by uncondi-
tional cash transfer and other aids and strongly enforced by the lockdown. Never-
theless, as of this writing, Colombian citizens are growing weary of the lockdown 
not for ideological reasons but  because of fatigue and economic pressure. The 
long duration and rigidity of the lockdown are only pos si ble in a country with a 
history of war and restrictions on citizen liberties. In a country where profound 
in equality is perhaps the most stable feature of society, the pandemic has opened 
up a rare opportunity: the po liti cal debate about universal basic income.
Polarization of the po liti cal debate already existed before the pandemic. The 
pandemic’s po liti cal wear and tear and the impoverishment of an impor tant group 
of the population require new leadership and innovative proposals to avoid nega-
tive po liti cal ramifications.
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 29 the Politics of the covid-19  
PandeMic resPonse in chile
Claudio A. Méndez
Compared with other Latin American countries, Chile has been seen 
worldwide as an example of po liti cal transition, economic growth, fiscal responsi-
bility, and incremental social policies. The 2019 po liti cal and social crisis, however, 
unveiled flaws in the “Chilean miracle.” Social policies once considered successful 
 were contested by social movements, and the structural reforms for the provision 
of welfare failed in pensions, education, and health systems (Taylor, 2003).
Since March  3, 2020, with the first confirmed case of COVID-19  in Chile, 
po liti cal institutions have been  under public scrutiny. According to the Johns Hop-
kins University Coronavirus Resource Center, one month  later, the country saw 
more than three hundred cases and eight deaths (Johns Hopkins University, 2020). 
In July 2020 the country registered more than one thousand cases in a day, and 
 after that exhibited a steady decline in cases, with twenty- seven deaths in a day by 
September 29, 2020 (Johns Hopkins University, 2020).
Even with a favorable scenario, separating the 2019 po liti cal and social cri-
sis from COVID-19 pandemic preparedness and response was far from being 
resolved through technical decisions. It was the same government incapable of 
making po liti cal and policy changes to alleviate the social unrest, that was respon-
sible for designing and implementing health and social policy mea sures to cope 
with the COVID-19 pandemic.
This chapter explores Chile’s preparedness and response to the pandemic 
from the first confirmed case of COVID-19. In addition, this chapter describes 
how President Piñera’s government, within a scenario of profound distrust and 
disbelief, conducted incorrect early health policies and delayed implementation 
of social policies to address the social crisis due to the pandemic. Fi nally, how the 
National Congress and municipalities played a major role in counterbalancing 
executive power is also discussed.
Distrust and Disbelief in Institutions and Health Policy:  
What Can Go Wrong?
The Chilean health system is one of the older national health systems in Latin 
Amer i ca. Through the last eighty years, the national health system has been con-
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voluted by po liti cal and social clashes that  shaped its current structure. However, 
 these forces did not afect the health system’s roots related to social segmenta-
tion and inequalities. Despite social segmentation, the country has been exhibiting 
lower infant and maternal mortality rates that are similar to  those in developed 
countries (Jiménez & Romero, 2007; Koch et al., 2014). Nevertheless,  there are still 
major inequalities regarding access to health ser vices that are currently leading the 
technical and po liti cal debate.
Two major changes  shaped the current Chilean health system. The first was the 
creation of the Servicio Nacional de Salud, acronym in Spanish (National Health 
Ser vice) in 1952, which was a centralized health system with integrated health 
ser vice goals across the country that expanded health ser vices coverage and the 
number of health professionals (de la Jara & Bossert, 1995; Mardones- Restat & De 
Azevedo, 2006). The second major structural change was  under the military dic-
tatorship in 1979.  After Pinochet took power, reforms  were related to contracting 
public health ser vices as an incentive for expanding private health ser vices, creating 
private health insurance, and conducting a decentralization pro cess (Manuel, 2002).
With democ ratization in the 1990s, the center left- wing co ali tion led  by Patri-
cio Aylwin embraced comprehensive public sector engagement on health policies 
(Bustamante & Méndez, 2014). Mandatory health insurance was strengthened by 
increasing public health financing (Mesa- Lago, 2008). The design and implemen-
tation of the explicit health guarantees in the next de cade (best known as the Plan 
de Acceso Universal con Garantías Explícitas en Salud)—led by President Ricardo 
Lagos—allowed for the expansion of financial coverage for selected health prob-
lems. The Chilean health system has been able to improve universal health cover-
age and equity in access to health care with some restrictions (Frenz et al., 2013; 
Paraje & Vásquez, 2012).
In January 2020 Health Minister Jaime Mañalich announced the Plan de Acción 
Coronavirus COVID-19 (Coronavirus Action Plan COVID-19). This plan was 
based on an early preparation enacted in the Decreto de Alerta Sanitaria (Sanitary 
Emergency Decree; Ministerio de Salud, 2020b) as a result of the “Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern” declared by the World Health Organ ization 
(WHO). The decree allowed for implementation of special mea sures within the 
health system, such as increasing staf and supplies (Ministerio de Salud, 2020b). 
Unfortunately for a government questioned by international  human rights organ-
izations for a lack of credibility, in March 2020 Minister Mañalich declared that 
a referendum for a new po liti cal constitution scheduled for April 26, 2020, could 
be in jeopardy in the event of a negative scenario related to a major SARS- CoV-2 
virus transmission among the population (Infobae, 2020). This announcement did 
not alleviate the wider po liti cal and social distrust of po liti cal institutions.
The plan also considered four phases, following the pandemic stages described 
by the WHO. Phase 1: The country does not have positive cases, and public health 
institutions are taking preventive mea sures for readiness once the first case arrives. 
Phase 2: Imported cases have arrived from the countries with the virus; therefore, 
actions should be focused on isolation and a fourteen- day quarantine for travel-
ers from countries with community transmission. Phase 3: A sustained increase 
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in cases resulting from local transmission from imported cases. Phase 4: A wider 
spread across the country with difficulties identifying the transmission chain.
The protocols  were adapted according to Phase 1 of the Coronavirus Action 
Plan. In this phase, borders  were not closed, and  there  were only a few hospitals 
with real- time polymerase chain reaction (rtPCR) tests. Instead, a Declaración 
Jurada para Viajeros (Affidavit for Travelers) from countries with sustainable 
transmission of COVID-19 was implemented (Ministerio de Salud, 2020k). Thus, 
imported cases emerged from countries that did not show sustainable transmis-
sion, generating local transmission in travelers’ regions of origin or destiny. Phase 
1 could be seen as an early preparation to respond to the first confirmed cases of 
COVID-19 in Chile, but instead it is an example of in efec tive health policy mea-
sures for the two months of preparation.
Phase 2 was enacted based on the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Chile 
on March 3, 2020. Moreover, this new phase included a modified “Sanitary Alert 
Decree” (Ministerio de Salud, 2020f) and a new case definition published on 
March 6, three days  after the first confirmed case. Borders continued to be open 
to travelers, while protocols  were  adopted for identifying and tracking travelers 
from countries with local transmission and detecting positive travelers from air-
ports, harbors, and border crossings (Ministerio de Salud, 2020c, 2020d, 2020e). 
Medical leave for confirmed cases and closer contacts was established, as well as 
a house- based isolation protocol.
Using his constitutional prerogatives, President Piñera decreed on March 18, 
2020, the Decreto 104 Declara Estado de Excepción Constitucional de Catástrofe, por 
Calamidad Pública, en el Territorio de Chile (Constitutional Exception for a State 
of Catastrophe for Public Calamity). The decree was to extend ninety days from its 
publication date and appointed army forces generals as Jefes de la Defensa Nacional 
(national defense chiefs) with executive powers for leading army and public secu-
rity forces in the territory  under their command. Furthermore, direct instructions 
for public servants  were established, including communication of decisions using 
social media channels. However, the national defense chiefs  were to consider the 
policy mea sures from the Ministry of Health (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad 
Pública, 2020). The sixteen Chilean regions  were forced to respond according to the 
guidelines from the Ministry of Health and the executive branch regarding quaran-
tines, reactivation of the local economy, and security enforcement.
On March 25, 2020, the Ministry of Health ordered isolation or quarantine for 
the general population. Mea sures included prohibiting public circulation from 10 
p.m. to 5 a.m. and restricting  people over eighty years old to their homes. Sanitary 
cordons  were implemented for some localities and regions as well as isolation 
or quarantines for certain persons, sanitary customs, and mea sures to protect 
vulnerable populations such as the el derly,  children, and inmates (Ministerio de 
Salud, 2020l). Regarding health conditions with explicit health guarantees, on 
March  30, 2020, the Ministry of Health suspended healthcare guarantees for 
eighty- five health conditions as outlined in law and the sanitary code in the case 
of an  outbreak in any part of the Chilean territory. Drugs for treatment stages 
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and diagnosis and treatment for some cancers, noncommunicable diseases, and 
traumas  were excluded from the suspension (Ministerio de Salud, 2020a). The 
suspension could be requested for one month, with extensions of time if neces-
sary (Ministerio de Salud, 2020a).
Criticism for  these policy mea sures came from the Colegio Médico de Chile 
(Chilean Physicians Union) and the Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades 
(Chilean Municipalities Association). The Colegio Médico’s position on the health 
policy mea sures was based on a lack of inclusion of  unions and other actors at the 
beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak in Chile (Bartlett, 2020a). Although Min-
ister of Education Raul Figueroa and President Piñera avoided announcing any 
mea sures regarding schools, majors from the Asociación started to close schools 
without any coordination. This situation prompted the Asociación to meet with 
Health Minister Mañalich and Education Minister Figueroa regarding school clo-
sures; they initiated online schooling and ensuring the provision of food for the 
most vulnerable students (Garrido, 2020).
The Asociación was also able to overcome the lack of coordination  because the 
media promoted the Asociación’s leadership nationwide. This scenario allowed 
the Asociación to suggest the application of regulations to the central government 
such as fines for the nonuse of masks in public spaces as well as recognizing the 
importance of municipalities for the implementation of national policies in the 
COVID-19 response (Ramírez de la Cruz et al., 2020).
As a response to critics, the Ministry of Health gathered nonpartisan experts 
for a Consejo Asesor para COVID-19 (Advisory Council for COVID-19). The Consejo 
was integrated by Ximena Aguilera, MD; Catterina Ferreccio, MD; María Teresa 
Valenzuela, MD; Gonzalo Valdivia, MD; Pablo Vial, MD; Fernando Otaiza, MD, 
head of the Infection Control Associate to Health Care Delivery; and Yohanna 
Acevedo, RN, head of the Department of Epidemiology at the Ministry of Health 
(Ministerio de Salud, 2020i). The Consejo’s recommendations  were not binding 
on the Ministry of Health nor President Piñera’s decisions on COVID-19 health 
policy mea sures.
In a second move, in late March  2020, President Piñera promoted a Mesa 
Social COVID-19 (Social Roundtable COVID-19) as a mea sure for improving coor-
dination and collaboration, headed by the Minister of Interior Gonzalo Blumel 
and integrated by the Minister of Health Mañalich. Other participants included 
Andrés Couve, PhD, minister of science, technology, knowledge, and innovation; 
Izkia Sishes, MD, president of Colegio Médico; Carmen Castillo, MD, former min-
ister of health (from former president Michelle Bachelet’s second government); 
Ennio Vivaldi, MD, president of the Universidad de Chile; Ignacio Sánchez, MD, 
president of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Fernando Leanes, MD, 
PhD, the Pan- American Health Or ga ni za tion/World Health Organ ization repre-
sen ta tion head in Chile; and German Codina, president of the Asociación Chilena 
de Municipalidades (Ministerio de Salud, 2020o). The initiative was replicated in 
Chile’s sixteen regions; however, the regional programs  were not in the spotlight 
like the Mesa Social COVID-19 roundtable implemented by central government.
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Despite  these mea sures, Brazil, Chile, and Ec ua dor showed a higher Basic 
Reproduction Number (R0) and Efective Reproduction Number (Re) in the earli-
est phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, also sharing the mea sure of fourteen days 
of isolation (Valcarce et  al., 2020). Furthermore, one of the most controversial 
policy mea sures was the “dynamic quarantines,” which  were small lockdown 
areas within cities in the región Metropolitana, the main region of the country 
(Canals et al., 2020). The Colegio Médico and experts raised concerns about  these 
mea sures  because of the difficulty in stopping mobility in a region without clear 
bound aries between cities and a high urban landscape density (Contesse, 2020). 
Indeed, scientific evidence has shown that dynamic quarantines partially worked 
as the Ministry of Health expected (Grebe et al., 2020).
Despite Phase 1 and Phase 2 policy mea sures, from March 14, 2020, daily cases 
started to increase across the country. To cope with this new scenario, the Min-
istry of Health moved to Phase 3. Two days  later, the level was raised to Phase 4, 
closing borders, implementing sanitary customs, sanitary cordons, and a protocol 
for contact tracing including primary health care (Ministerio de Salud, 2020k, 
2020g). In April  2020 the use of masks was mandated (Ministerio de Salud, 
2020m) and health mea sures  were updated, including the Sanitary Alert Decree, 
which included financing for contact tracing in primary health care (Ministerio 
de Salud, 2020g).
In April 2020 the Residencias Sanitarias (Sanitary Residences)  were announced 
as a mea sure of isolation for  people unable to fulfill quarantine at home. Imple-
mented in the sixteen regions, the Residencias strategy was managed by health pro-
fessionals and technicians focusing on  people who tested positive for COVID-19 
with mild symptoms or who  were asymptomatic (Ministerio de Salud, 2020h). 
Daily reports covered beds occupied but did not address  people’s satisfaction nor 
sanitary mea sures to avoid contagion in  people without COVID-19 who started to 
use the Residencias to protect their families.
The health policy mea sures implemented did not include primary healthcare 
centers managed by municipalities; therefore, the pandemic response was central-
ized by the Ministry of Health at the national and regional level. The Secretarías 
Regionales Ministeriales de Salud (Regional Health Authorities)  were responsible 
for epidemiological surveillance in the sixteen regions, and the twenty- nine Ser-
vicios de Salud (Health Ser vices) managed the healthcare network  under their 
responsibility. In was not  until Phase 4 that primary health care was integrated by 
the Ministry of Health for testing, contact tracing, and isolation strategy (Ministe-
rio de Salud, 2020j).
Minister of Health Mañalich received criticism not only for health policy 
mea sures but also for his erratic media response. One of his first communication 
controversies was his concern over the questioned legitimacy of the referendum 
results for a new constitution  because of the coronavirus (Andrews, 2020). The 
statement was a day  after the first case was confirmed on Chilean soil. The second 
controversy was in an interview in the same month, when Mañalich justified not 
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moving to a national lockdown to stop the virus based on the notion that the virus 
could yet mutate into a “better person” (Palmer, 2020).
Regarding public opinion, pools exhibited a negative perception of the govern-
ment mea sures at managing the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2020, 58  percent 
of respondents to a CADEM survey perceived that Chile was less than prepared or 
unprepared for its COVID-19 response (CADEM, 2020a). By May 2020, 62  percent 
disapproved of how the government was managing the crisis (CADEM, 2020b).
In a decision shared by President Piñera and Education Minister Figueroa, an 
attempt was made to reopen schools in May 2020. Teachers, students, and par-
ents had not allowed Minister Mañalich’s mea sures to prevail (Saavedra, 2020). 
Nonetheless, the controversy that pushed Minister Mañalich to resign was his 
own unofficial criteria for counting new cases, disregarding the official infor-
mation from the Departamento de Estadística e Información de Salud (Depart-
ment of Statistic and Health Information), that excluded 30,000 cases from the 
official numbers reported to public (Medrano, 2020). Moreover, by June 2020, 
Mañalich’s erratic health mea sures placed Chile as one of the countries with the 
highest numbers of daily coronavirus cases relative to population size (Bartlett, 
2020b).
To fill the vacant health minister position, President Piñera appointed for-
mer Colegio Médico president Enrique Paris, MD, who was a member of his cam-
paign’s inner circle regarding health proposals. However, Chile was still focused 
on strengthening intensive care units (ICU) by importing ventilators rather than 
testing, contact tracing, and isolating patients as public health mea sures (Benítez 
et  al., 2020). Moreover, communication was still focused on the population’s 
responsibility for preventing contagion (Garcia et al., 2020).
In mid- July 2020, President Piñera and the new minister of health announced 
the Plan Paso a Paso (Step- by- Step Plan) for reopening cities and regions. The plan 
coincided with five confinement and deconfinement phases, according to epide-
miological criteria such as active cases, Re, and ICU bed availability. The phases 
included quarantine (Phase 1), transition (Phase 2), preparation (Phase 3), initial 
opening (Phase 4), and advance opening (Phase 5) (“Presidente Piñera Presenta 
Plan Paso a Paso” [“President Piñera Announces Step- by- Step Plan”], 2020).
From a Health to a Social Crisis: When Health Mea sures  
Do Not Include Comprehensive Social Policies
From the first demo cratic government  after Pinochet’s dictatorship, the agenda 
for public policy has strived to strengthen the social protection system in Chile. 
Unfortunately, the main policy and po liti cal debate is far from a policy option: 
the personal retirement accounts implemented in Pinochet’s dictatorship, which 
privatized the Chilean pension system for most of the population, excluding army 
forces and the police institutions.
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The pandemic has demonstrated the importance of comprehensive and inte-
grated social protection systems to support health policy mea sures. In the same 
way, the crisis has shown how neglecting social policy mea sures can undermine 
the response from the health sector. The po liti cal opposition complained about 
social mea sures that  were mostly undertaken  toward rescuing business rather 
than protecting vulnerable populations. Moreover,  unions and opposition lead-
ers denounced a resolution from Dirección del Trabajo ( Labor Department) that 
allowed employers to not pay salaries if work cannot be done  because of quaran-
tine or curfew (Castiglioni, 2020).
Thus, President Piñera’s government was forced to unfold a first social 
measure— almost a month  after the first confirmed case of COVID-19— known as 
Ley de Protección del Empleo (Employment Protection Law). The new law tempo-
rarily suspended the contract between employees and private sector companies for 
the enforcement of authority, suspension by mutual agreement, and reduction of 
work hours by mutual agreement (Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión social, 2020b). 
This mea sure was mainly centered on private sector financial constraints rather 
than worker stability. In fact, the Seguro de Cesantía (unemployment insurance), 
which is the basis for the mea sure, was highly debated and resisted by employers 
and right- wing parties of the National Congress (Sehnbruch et al., 2019).
 Because the government did not manage the pandemic as a complex social phe-
nomenon, the Ollas Comunes (common pots) started to spread along the country, as 
a reminder that Chile still has poverty and underserved populations. The hunger in 
families already in poverty was neglected  until the government de cided upon a mea-
sure known as the Plan Alimentos para Chile (Food for Chile Plan), based on delivery 
boxes with first- necessity ele ments distributed throughout municipalities. The initia-
tive was a disaster, mainly  because of the logistic complexity of carry ing out such a 
distribution and diferences among municipalities about the timing of delivery of the 
boxes to families in need. Moreover, negative outcomes  were also related to families 
who did not receive the aid and conflicts of interest in the box providers’ contracts.
A second mea sure was the Ley Nº 21.230 Concede un Ingreso Familiar de 
Emergencia (Law Nº 21.230 Grant an Emergency  Family Income Law), enacted on 
May 16, 2020. The Emergency  Family Income Law sought to provide 4 emergency 
incomes per  family with informal earnings from the fiscal bud get: families within 
90  percent of the most- vulnerable population according to the Social House holds 
Registry and families within 80   percent of the vulnerable population according 
to the Emergency Socioeconomic Index (mea sur ing social vulnerability in the 
short term using the latest data provided by the Social House holds Registry, and 
supporting rec ords provided by the beneficiary). Moreover, families  were eligible 
whose eldest  family members did not receive any income from pensions, work, 
salary due, or public benefits related to unemployment insurance or subsidies for 
work disability (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Familia, 2020).  Under the Emer-
gency  Family Income Law, the first three incomes  were adjusted by the number 
of  family members; thus, a  family with one member received a first US$88 and a 
third US$135 income in contrast with a  family with ten members or more with 
COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Chile  529
a first US$670 and a third US$1,030 income (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y 
Familia, 2020).
 Because of complete inaction by the executive power, the po liti cal opposition 
in the National Congress started to play a major role in response to the social cri-
sis. One of the mea sures promoted was to extend the maternity and parenthood 
leave  because of COVID-19. In Chile, maternity and parenthood leave postpar-
tum confers the right to twelve weeks of childcare, and the  mother can return to 
work part- time in agreement with her employer (Ministerio del Trabajo y Pre-
visión social, 2003a). Moreover, from week 7, parents can use the leave upon the 
 mother’s request (Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión social, 2003a).
The Ley Nº 27.247 Establece Beneficios para Padres, Madres y Cuidadores 
de Niños o Niñas, en las Condiciones que se Indica (Law Nº 27.247 Establishing 
 Benefits for Parents,  Mothers, and Keepers of  Children, in Some Conditions) 
(Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión Social, 2020d) was enacted in July 2020, retro-
actively. Thus, parents  were able to access the thirty days of extended leave from 
March 18, 2020, renewable for two periods (Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión 
Social, 2020d).
The National Congress’s milestone was the constitutional amendment, which 
with the support of some legislators from the governing coalition reached the 
necessary three- fifths votes in the bicameral system (Ministerio Secretaría Gen-
eral de la Presidencia, 2005). The amendment allowed Chileans to withdraw up 
to 10 percent of their money in their personal retirement accounts in order to 
mitigate hardships caused by the pandemic.
One of the social and po liti cal crises demands was the end of Pinochet’s dic-
tatorship pension systems based on personal retirement accounts, which even 
demo cratic governments have not been able to change yet. Nonetheless, the social 
crisis due to COVID-19 conducted to a constitutional reform by National Con-
gress initiative. Thus, the Ley Nº 21.248 Reforma Constitucional que Permite el 
Retiro Excepcional de los Fondos Acumulados de Capitalización Individual en 
las Condiciones que se Indica (Law Nº 21.248 Constitutional Reform that Allow 
the Exceptional Retirement of Accumulated Funds of Individual Capitalization 
in Some Conditions), enacted on July 30, 2020, justified as exceptional, sought to 
mitigate social efects resulting from the Estado de Excepcional Constitucional 
de Catástrofe por Calamidad Pública decree related to COVID-19. In the private 
pension system regulated by the decree Ley Nº 3.500 of 1980, affiliates are autho-
rized voluntarily, and for one time only, to request up to 10  percent of the total 
accumulated in their mandatory accounts (Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión 
Social, 2020c). Affiliates can request the 10  percent  until one year  after the date 
when the law was enacted  because the law established a maximum of US$5,934 
and a US$1,384 minimum amount. In the case in which 10  percent of the accu-
mulated funds are less than US$1,383, the affiliate can request up to this amount. 
In the same way, affiliates with less than US$1,384 could request all the funds 
accumulated in their accounts (Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión Social, 2020c).
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Why Did Chile Fail in a Comprehensive Response to COVID-19?
October 17, 2019, changed the po liti cal landscape when primary and high school 
students jumped turnstiles in the Santiago subway system to protest a US$4 fare 
increase during peak hours (Méndez et al., 2020). Protests soon escalated nation-
wide, with crowds gathering in rallies to demand major changes to social protec-
tion policies, including pensions, education, and health. Vio lence erupted and the 
police  were unable to control the situation, despite deploying considerable vio-
lence themselves and engaging in  human rights violations (Méndez et al., 2020). 
President Piñera declared a state of emergency on October 19, 2019, giving the 
armed forces responsibility for restoring order in the Chilean capital and other 
cities and enacting a curfew (Méndez et al., 2020).
On November  15, 2019, members of almost all Chile’s po liti cal parties rep-
resented in the bicameral Congress signed the Agreement for Peace and a New 
Po liti cal Constitution (Hernandez & Gigova, 2019). The agreement includes a 
national referendum for a new po liti cal constitution replacing that enacted dur-
ing Pinochet’s dictatorship. The agreement was first scheduled for April 26, 2020, 
then postponed to October 25, 2020,  because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, 
the Chilean government faced its preparedness and response plan without a solu-
tion for the ongoing social and po liti cal crisis that presidentialism was unable to 
solve.
Presidentialism can be tracked in most Latin American po liti cal systems. The 
concentration of a considerable constitutional power, cabinet conformation and 
administration, only modified by several impeachments or popu lar elections has 
also paradoxically resulted in a strong executive power (Linz, 1990). According to 
Linz (1990), one of the main paradoxes is the dual legitimacy: legitimated presi-
dents need to bargain and overcome conflicts with the also legitimated legisla-
tive branch controlled by the po liti cal opposition—or even its own coalition—in 
short periods of government in countries with no immediate reelection in their 
constitutions (Mainwaring, 1990). Thus, dual legitimacy contributes to a strong 
executive power.
In Chile the 1980 constitution represents the consolidation of a historical 
trend to expand presidential powers (Siavelis, 2000). This can explain why Chile 
failed in a comprehensive response to COVID-19 pandemic. President Piñera 
made decisions on the pandemic response without opposition and public dis-
agreement from his cabinet for the economy, social protection, or health mea-
sures. He governed by decrees rather than taking advantage of his constitutional 
prerogatives regarding sending laws and constitutional amendments to the 
National Congress (Ministerio Secretaría General de la Presidencia, 2005). For 
the COVID-19 response, social mea sures  were delayed  because of the pandemic, 
opening a win dow of opportunity for the National Congress and municipalities 
as main stakeholders for the population’s well- being. The only constitutional pre-
rogative used by President Piñera was the Exception State of Catastrophe for 
Public Calamity.
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Indeed, presidentialism is also exacerbated by centralism. Latin American 
countries have a long- standing tradition of centralism. According to Véliz (1968), 
this centralism tradition was po liti cal, economic, and religious  because of the 
dominant Hispanic tradition in Latin American countries. In the last de cades, 
decentralization has been posed as a po liti cal quest for many Latin American 
countries, mainly understood as a state reform process in administrative, fiscal, 
and political spheres (Falleti, 2005). In Chile the decentralization pro cess does 
not share comprehensive state reform. Chilean decentralization was part of 
neoliberalism- based reforms  under Pinochet’s dictatorship, which sought priva-
tization and financial liberalization (Baton, 2006). In par tic u lar, health and edu-
cation  were transferred to municipalities but not control over revenues (Eaton, 
2006).
In the first demo cratic governments  after Pinochet’s dictatorship, po liti cal 
decentralization was a path for disputing right- wing po liti cal overrepre sen ta tion 
in National Congress as a result of the binominal system, maintaining a centralized 
revenue system (Eaton, 2004b). The status quo was challenged with the Asociación 
Chilena de Municipalidades (Chilean Municipalities Association). The Asociación 
arose in 1994 as a nonpartisan instrument for institutional change regarding decen-
tralization (Eaton, 2004a). Still, centralism is a major barrier for the Chilean state, 
hampering territorial decision- making. Nevertheless, the Asociación Chilena de 
Municipalidades played a key role in the first weeks of COVID-19 pandemic.
The executive powers did not suspend attendance in schools, despite the 
inherent risk of faster COVID-19 spreading. Thus, President Piñera’s government 
was challenged by the Asociación to suspend primary and secondary education 
schools’ activities managed by municipalities. The Pontificia Universidad Católica 
de Chile and the Universidad de Chile, both from the región Metropolitana, which 
contains almost a third of the national population, announced the suspension of 
gradu ate and undergraduate attendance. Days  later, Chilean universities from dif-
fer ent regions did the same.
Conclusion
The Chilean presidentialist system tackled yet exacerbated a comprehensive 
re sponse to the COVID-19 outbreak in Chile. A fragmented and delayed social 
response resulted from President Piñera’s government. The Chilean experience 
has also shown how a po liti cal crisis not only in Latin Amer i ca but also in some 
Eu ro pean countries has undermined strong health systems, social policies, and 
demo cratic legitimacy.
Chile’s long- standing centralization revealed its weaknesses at a time when 
the decision- making for the allocation of territorial- based resources should have 
been delegated to regional governments. Although centralization can be useful in 
the early response to an outbreak, the Chilean case suggests that in  later stages, 
the outcomes are in equality in access to health care and an irrelevant role for 
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regional governments in the response. Moreover, an authoritarian centralization 
with a lack of coordination among the executive branch, regional governments, 
and municipalities does not allow for a comprehensive response  because of ter-
ritorial diferences nationwide.
Nonetheless, the COVID-19 outbreak response in Chile can serve as an exam-
ple for other countries regarding the use of municipalities as first responders. As 
po liti cal incumbents, municipalities have an advantage: they have superior knowl-
edge of their communities, including primary and secondary education controls 
and the necessary primary health care for testing, contact tracing, and isolation 
strategies. Therefore, majors were well positioned to contest the po liti cal central-
ism of decision- making policies  adopted by President Piñera  because of their per-
ceived legitimacy in public opinion as positive leaders for pandemic response.
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 30 PandeMic aMid Po liti cal crisis
 Malawi’s Experience with and Response to COVID-19
Kim Yi Dionne, Boniface Dulani, and Sara E. Fischer
Due to the threat of coronavirus and the urgent need to seriously manage it,  
I have de cided to declare a “State of Disaster” in the country.
— Malawi President Peter Mutharika, March 20, 20201
With  these words from President Peter Mutharika in a national 
address on March 20, 2020, Malawi joined the global trend of invoking special gov-
ernmental powers to introduce mea sures for fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. A 
landlocked country in southern Africa with a largely youthful population, Malawi 
has a heavy preventable disease burden, inadequate public health infrastructure, 
and  limited  human resources for health.  These characteristics concerned analysts, 
who questioned Malawi’s ability to weather a significant outbreak of the deadly 
coronavirus, which has no vaccine nor known cure at the time of writing.2 Fol-
lowing the introduction of basic prevention mea sures in March, Malawi recorded 
its first confirmed COVID-19 cases on April 2, 2020. By April 7, 2020, the coun-
try recorded its first COVID-19 death. The official number of COVID-19 cases 
increased to 4,078 by the end of July 2020, with a total of 114 deaths. This chapter 
outlines the Malawian government’s early response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
citizens’ reactions to proposed mea sures, and how  these interacted within a con-
text of significant po liti cal change.
COVID-19 emerged in the midst of a national po liti cal crisis in Malawi 
(Evans, 2020; Munthali & Wu, 2020; Pensulo, 2020a). Two months before the 
first COVID-19 cases  were diagnosed, Malawi’s Constitutional Court nullified 
the previous year’s presidential election results and called for fresh elections to be 
held within five months. In the months following the disputed 2019 polls, thou-
sands of Malawians protested Mutharika’s victory and called for the resignation 
of the Malawi Electoral Commission chairperson for her role in presiding over 
what many Malawians considered to be mismanaged elections (Africa Center for 
Strategic Studies, 2020; Dionne & Dulani, 2020). Meanwhile, the top two losing 
presidential candidates in the 2019 polls, Lazarus Chakwera of the Malawi Con-
gress Party (MCP) and Saulos Chilima of the UTM party, challenged the results 
in the Constitutional Court, culminating in the nullification of the results in the 
February 2020 ruling and an order for fresh elections (Dionne & Dulani, 2020). 
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A historic pre- electoral co ali tion among opposition parties and a galvanized civil 
society may have served to delay an efective public health response. Mutharika 
lost his re- election bid in the new elections held on June 23, 2020, generating a 
major change in government as the number of COVID-19 cases climbed.
To what extent did the po liti cal upheaval in Malawi early in the COVID-19 pan-
demic shape the politics of response in the country? In this chapter, we describe 
and analyze available data to connect national po liti cal events, government 
response to COVID-19, Malawians’ adherence to protective mea sures, and trends 
in COVID-19 infection. More specifically, our analy sis draws on news accounts 
published by Malawi’s two leading newspapers, public addresses by the president 
and minister of health, official reports and public health communications from 
Malawi’s Ministry of Health and Public Health Institute, and survey data collected 
prior to and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although our primary goal is to 
ofer a rich description of the Malawian experience during the COVID-19 crisis, 
our chapter also aims to contribute to the broader scholarship on how citizens 
navigate both epidemics and state response to  those epidemics. The Malawi case 
ofers a win dow into how states and citizens in a low- or middle- income country 
(LMIC) navigate a pandemic. Furthermore, the Malawian case ofers insights on 
how citizens and the state navigate a pandemic during a po liti cal crisis.
Malawi’s COVID-19 Epidemic
The first COVID-19 case in the African region was confirmed in Egypt on Febru-
ary 14, 2020. Malawi registered its first three cases on April 2, 2020, among the 
last group of African countries to do so (Anna, 2020). The index case was a sixty- 
one- year- old  woman who had returned from visiting  family members in India. 
Two individuals who had close contact with her also tested positive that day.
By late July  2020, COVID-19 cases had been reported in all of Malawi’s 
twenty- eight districts. The highest number of cases was confirmed in the two 
districts with the two largest cities, Blantyre and Lilongwe, which between them 
accounted for half of all confirmed cases by July’s end.3 Many cases  were also 
recorded at the Mwanza border, which is the main entry point for Malawian 
returnees from South Africa traveling by road.4  Because South Africa was a rec-
ognized “hotspot” for the virus (Nebehay, 2020), this had been the largest  factor 
in Malawi’s early jump in COVID-19 case numbers. Prior to this repatriation, 
Malawi had 101 positive cases over two months, spiking to 273  in a single day 
on May 29, 2020, as returnees’ test results  were confirmed (Masina, 2020b). In 
July 2020 alone, cases doubled and community spread surpassed imported cases 
for the first time.
Of 4,078 confirmed cases recorded by July 31, almost half had recovered, while 
114 had died. Most fatalities  were from Lilongwe and Blantyre, with twenty- four 
and fifty- one deaths, respectively (Ministry of Health, 2020). Most (83  percent) of 
the deaths  were of men (Public Health Institute of Malawi, 2020). The average age 
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among recorded COVID-19 cases was thirty- six years, whereas  those who died of 
COVID-19  were on average older, at 56.7 years (Public Health Institute of Malawi, 
2020).
As in other countries, Malawi’s official COVID-19 figures are likely under-
counts (Bariyo & Parkinson, 2020; Baskar, 2020). However, at the time of this 
writing, we have no reason to doubt that  these figures track with the trends in 
infection and death ( Table 30.1).
Malawi’s Response to COVID-19
The WHO declared COVID-19 a public health emergency of international con-
cern on January 30, 2020, and officially characterized it as a pandemic on March 11, 
2020. President Peter Mutharika established a nine- member Special Cabinet Com-
mittee5 on Coronavirus on March 7, 2020, and declared a national state of disaster 
on March 20. The government developed an initial National COVID-19 Prepared-
ness and Response Plan (Malawi Government, 2020a), bud geted at US$20 mil-
lion, and announced several interventions, often during speeches by the president 
or health minister. The membership of the cabinet committee was challenged for 
its lack of inclusivity, both in terms of ignoring the po liti cal opposition and pub-
lic health experts (Kao et al., 2021). Members of the cabinet committee  were fur-
ther accused of seeking to profit from the pandemic by awarding themselves large 
allowances (Matonga, 2020). Following the public criticisms, Mutharika disbanded 
and replaced the cabinet committee with a presidential task force on COVID-19, 
co- chaired by John Phuka, the Minister of Health, and a public health professor 
from the Malawi College of Medicine (“Presidential Task Force on COVID-19,” 
2020). The Chakwera administration kept the task force, and official COVID-19 
announcements continued to be made by Phuka ( Table 30.2).
Although the initial response in Malawi came from the highest levels of gov-
ernment and focused in par tic u lar on public health interventions, we describe 
in this section the broader response to COVID-19, documenting both national 
government response and community and citizen response, including both public 
health interventions and social protection mea sures.
 TABLE 30.1. COVID-19 case, fatality, and recovery numbers by region  
as of July 31, 2020
Region Confirmed cases Deaths Recoveries
North 884 21 394
Center 1,177 32 536
South 1,815 61 772
Mwanza border 202 0 173
TOTAL MALAWI 4,078 114 1875
Source: Ministry of Health (2020).
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Public Health Interventions against COVID-19 in Malawi
Malawi’s public health interventions against COVID-19 primarily included travel 
and border restrictions, health system preparedness, health communications, and 
policies promoting social distancing, and  later, face covering.
The rapid spread of infection in Asia, Eu rope, and the United States in early 
2020 put the Malawian government on high alert for entering travelers. Follow-
ing the disaster declaration, Malawi introduced a compulsory screening protocol 
at borders, requiring that  people entering from high- risk countries self- isolate 
for fourteen days. The government banned public gatherings of more than one 
hundred  people, but this was not enforced, as evidenced by large po liti cal rallies 
held in the months before the June election (Pensulo, 2020d). On April 1, 2020, 
Malawi closed borders and airports, prohibiting travelers from entering, with 
exceptions for repatriating Malawians. The pro cess of screening and quarantin-
ing returning Malawians was in efec tive (Masina, 2020a), and airport worker 
strikes related to the outbreak disrupted COVID-19 equipment supply chains 
(Twea, 2020).
Malawi’s health system lacks essential equipment and personnel to respond 
efectively to emerging disease threats (Manda- Taylor et al., 2017). The original 
national preparedness plan allocated resources to training frontline workers 
and procuring necessary supplies and equipment. Donors attempted to fill gaps 
to alleviate the resource shortage, but fell short.  There  were critical stockouts 
of COVID-19 testing kits following a sharp increase in infections in July 2020, 
requiring health officials to ration tests so that only  people with symptoms could 
be tested (Pasungwi, 2020; Twea, 2020).
Health officials developed and disseminated health communications materials 
on basic COVID-19 information and widely encouraged basic hygiene practices 
 TABLE 30.2. COVID-19 and po liti cal crisis timeline in Malawi
Date Event
January 30, 2020 WHO declares a Public Health Emergency of International  
Concern (PHEIC)
February 3, 2020 Constitutional Court nullifies May 2019 presidential elections
February 14,-2020 First COVID-19 case in Africa (Egypt)
March 20, 2020 Mutharika declares State of National Disaster in his first public COVID-19 
address
April 1, 2020 Borders and airports close
April 2, 2020 First COVID-19 cases confirmed in Malawi
April 7, 2020 First COVID-19 death confirmed in Malawi
April 14, 2020 Attempted lockdown announced
April 17, 2020 High Court  orders stay of lockdown
June 23, 2020 Fresh presidential elections
June 28, 2020 Inauguration of new president, Lazarus Chakwera
July 10, 2020 New social distancing mea sures announced
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such as handwashing with soap; avoiding handshakes; not touching eyes, nose, 
and mouths; practicing cough and sneeze hygiene; maintaining social distance; 
and staying home when sick. Individuals who exhibited symptoms of COVID-19 
 were encouraged to seek medical care, although  there was  little capacity to iso-
late cases even within hospitals (Sonenthal et  al., 2020).  These messages  were 
broadcast in vari ous formats, including print, video, radio, and via social media. 
Malawi’s major newspapers featured health promotion messages on their front 
pages (Figure 30.1). Malawians could also get daily updates on case counts on the 
Ministry of Health’s Twitter or Facebook feeds (Figure 30.2) or by sending a mes-
sage to the Ministry of Health using WhatsApp (Figure 30.3).
Following the confirmation of the first COVID-19 cases, the government intro-
duced additional mea sures to contain the spread of COVID-19. The new propos-
als included a ban on religious gatherings, closure of markets and shops, and an 
abortive proposal to impose a twenty- one- day national lockdown to commence 
April  18, 2020. The lockdown sought to confine all individuals to their homes 
except for designated essential ser vice providers. As we discuss  later, the courts 
intervened, preventing the lockdown from being instituted.
Although large crowds continued to gather for election campaign rallies,  there 
was no mention of masking in early health promotion campaign documents. The 
government had not mandated the use of face masks, but several organ izations 
began to require their use as local transmission increased. Among  these  were com-
mercial banks, the Road Traffic Directorate, the Office of the Ombudsman, super-
markets, and the High and Supreme Courts (Lunda, 2020). On July 9, 2020, the 
Malawi government issued a circular requiring the use of face masks in all govern-
ment offices (Mkweu, 2020).
Figure 30.1. Front- page advertisement promoting 
face covering to stop the spread of COVID-19.
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Social Policy Interventions in the Wake of Malawi’s  
COVID-19 Pandemic
The initial COVID-19 response focused on public health mea sures to prevent the 
spread of infection, and only  later did government eforts include social protec-
tion mea sures. However, even  these  were not broadly applicable to all, or even 
most, Malawians. In a speech on April 4, 2020, when Malawi had only four con-
firmed COVID-19 cases, President Mutharika announced multiple social protec-
tion mea sures that included reduction of fuel prices, instituting a grace period for 
paying taxes, extending a cash loan scheme targeted at urban youth, and directing 
Malawi’s Reserve Bank to have a three- month moratorium on repayment of loans 
for small and medium enterprises. Ten days  later, with sixteen COVID-19 cases 
and two reported deaths (“Malawi Announces Coronavirus Lockdown,” 2020), 
the Minister of Health announced plans to impose a nationwide, twenty- one- day 
lockdown; notably absent in that public address  were any interventions aimed at 
Figure 30.3. Messages to 
communicate COVID-19 statistics  
via WhatsApp.
Source: Malawi Ministry of Health, 
personal communication via 
WhatsApp, July 31, 2020.
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social protection of the majority of Malawians, who depend on daily access to 
 labor and markets to sustain their  house holds’ needs.6
Since Lazarus Chakwera took power as Malawi’s sixth president in late 
June  2020, his administration introduced several social protection mea sures 
aimed at assisting Malawi’s poor.  These included a large increase in the  number 
of  house holds to benefit from the agriculture input subsidy program from 
1  million house holds  under the Mutharika administration to 3.5 million; doubling 
of the tax- free monthly income threshold from MWK45,000 (about US$60) to 
MWK100,000 (about US$135); and an increase from MWK15 billion to MWK40 
billion in appropriations for the Malawi Enterprise Development Fund (MEDF) 
to target youth loans.7 The new administration has further announced plans to 
increase the minimum wage from MWK35,000 per month (about US$50) to 
MWK50,000 (about US$68) (Malawi Government, 2020b).
Response of Average Citizens
Most Malawians had heard of the coronavirus, even when the overall case count 
was relatively low compared to other countries. In a nationally representative 
survey conducted between May  23 and June  5, 2020, of 1,346 adults, only one 
respondent reported having never heard of the coronavirus.8 When asked how 
serious the COVID-19 pandemic is for Malawi, 68   percent of respondents said 
“very serious.” Respondents varied in how much they worried about  whether they 
would become infected, with 19  percent not worried at all, 17  percent not worried, 
29   percent worried, and 35   percent very worried (Institute for Public Opinion 
Research [IPOR], 2020).
Compared to the high percentage concerned about the health risk, even more 
Malawians  were concerned about the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pan-
demic. When asked if they worried that their  house hold’s economic situation 
would be negatively afected by COVID-19, 80  percent of Malawians said they  were 
 either worried or very worried. Even more (87   percent of) Malawians reported 
being worried or very worried about the COVID-19 pandemic’s efect on Malawi’s 
economy more generally (IPOR, 2020).
That same survey ofers insights into Malawians’ willingness to comply with 
health- promoting be hav iors such as social distancing, hand washing, and face 
masking. Malawians reported that despite the COVID-19 crisis, they  were likely to 
continue engaging in social activities (IPOR, 2020). Banda et al. (2020) found few 
Malawians  were avoiding markets or staying at home, although half of their survey 
participants reported avoiding crowds.  There did seem to be universal uptake on 
increased handwashing, however (Banda et al., 2020).
Communities and community- based organ izations have come together 
to coordinate eforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, in 
May 2020, community members in the northern region’s capital city Mzuzu fun-
draised to support a public- access COVID-19 quarantine center on the premises 
of a private clinic (Jali, 2020). A month  later a local Lions Club donated reus-
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able face masks to the Mzuzu Prison to help stop spread among inmates (Chirwa, 
2020). The Dzuka Chilomoni Community Organ ization in Blantyre also distrib-
uted vari ous goods, such as face masks and food, to el derly  people in the commu-
nity (“Malawi Youths Engage in Helping El derly amid COVID-19,” 2020). Mala-
wi’s daily newspapers reported on similar mutual aid eforts across the country 
throughout the early epidemic.
Explanations for Malawi’s Epidemic and Response
Having described the initial epidemic and response in Malawi, we turn now to 
describing the health and sociopo liti cal contexts in which COVID-19 emerged.
Malawi’s Health and Social Context
The most recent census estimates Malawi’s population at 17,563,749, with a rela-
tively high population density, especially in the southern region (National Statis-
tical Office [NSO], 2019). The high population density as well as the burden of 
disease in Malawi— still predominated by infectious and preventable diseases such 
as HIV/AIDS, respiratory infections, and malaria (Institute for Health Metrics 
and Evaluation, 2015)— may contribute to an increase in or complications from 
COVID-19, particularly in certain populations with under lying medical condi-
tions, such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. The age distribution in Malawi is char-
acterized by a majority (51  percent) of the population  under age eigh teen. In the 
context of COVID-19, the youthful population may have been protective  because 
older  people tend to be more at risk for serious complications and death from the 
virus (Diop et al., 2020).
Education in Malawi is lacking, with most  people reporting having attended 
at least some school, but only 5  percent of females and 9  percent of males report-
ing having completed secondary education (National Statistical Office [NSO] & 
ICF, 2017). This has direct implications for health- seeking be hav ior and knowl-
edge around COVID-19 health promotion eforts, as well as employment oppor-
tunities. Additionally, many  people have  limited media exposure, including radio, 
newspaper, and tele vi sion (NSO & ICF, 2017). Together,  these  factors suggest citi-
zens lack the means to access reliable information to protect their social welfare.
Consistent with the overall impact of COVID-19 elsewhere, the pandemic is 
worsening Malawi’s fragile economic situation. Malawi’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita was estimated at around US$390  in 2018 (World Bank, n.d.), 
though monthly earnings are reported to be much lower, at a median of $37 (Min-
istry of Health, 2017). The World Bank (n.d.) estimated that in 2016, 71   percent 
of Malawians lived on less than US$2 a day. Malawi is dependent on commod-
ity exports, and the COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to reduced demand in 
the global market for Malawi’s main agricultural exports, such as tobacco, tea, 
cotton, and cofee (Chilundu, 2020). This reduced demand has resulted in an 
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overall  contraction of the economy, with a negative growth projection in 2020 of 
–3.5  percent against the 5.5  percent growth projection before COVID-19 (Chilundu, 
2020). Meanwhile, the Malawi Ministry of Finance estimated that COVID-19  will 
result in a decline in GDP of approximately US$6 billion (Mangazi, 2020).
As an agriculture- based economy, the  labor force is heavi ly skewed, with 
59  percent of  women and 44  percent of men employed in agriculture, contribut-
ing to nearly 30  percent of the country’s GDP (NSO & ICF, 2017). Additionally, 
the International  Labor Organ ization estimates that about 83   percent of total 
employment in the country is from the informal economy (International  Labor 
Organ ization, 2019). In response to the most recent Afrobarometer survey in 
2017, 68   percent of Malawians said they had no job and  were not looking for 
one, and another 19  percent said they had no job but  were looking for one. The 
high unemployment and underemployment levels make livelihood a high prior-
ity for most Malawians. This has been exacerbated during the pandemic, creating 
strong re sis tance to the possibility of a lockdown. Opposition to the proposed 
lockdown is consistent with Malawians’ continued prioritization of accessing 
basic needs over health risks (Dionne, 2018).  There  were even stampedes when 
the Ministry of Health held recruitment interviews for COVID-19 response jobs 
(Masina, 2020b).
Apart from domestic  labor, remittances also make up a large portion of the 
economy  because of Malawi’s significant emigrant  labor force.  Because of the 
youthful population mentioned previously, coupled with the lack of domestic live-
lihood opportunities, many young  people continue to seek employment outside 
of the country. Most emigration from Malawi remains within the SADC region, 
with the largest percentage heading to South Africa (Ndegwa, 2015). As described 
 earlier, the repatriation of workers from South Africa and other SADC countries 
contributed to the initial spike in COVID-19 cases in the country and likely, sub-
sequent community spread.
Malawi’s Public Health Infrastructure
Health care in Malawi is delivered in a three- tiered referral system, from primary 
care at local and district levels to the central hospitals (Ministry of Health, 2017). 
However, crowding at larger hospitals and a critical shortage of health workers 
mean the health system is over burdened. In terms of critical care capacity, Malawi 
had only twenty- five ICU beds spread across the four central hospitals and only 
sixteen ventilators (Manda- Taylor et al., 2017; Sonenthal et al., 2020). In the con-
text of COVID-19, it was clear that a large outbreak would be impossible to man-
age within the existing healthcare delivery system, and healthcare workers  were 
concerned about the consequences of a pos si ble outbreak (Vidal, 2020).
Malawi’s health sector has experience preparing for and managing prior epi-
demics. For example, Malawi introduced a comprehensive Ebola prevention and 
control plan, although they have yet to register a case of Ebola (Kalimira, 2019; Ziba, 
2019). Malawi could leverage lessons from the HIV/AIDS response efort over the 
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past twenty years, for example, with boosting testing capacity as they did with HIV 
and viral load testing, and tracing potential contacts as they did with partner HIV 
testing. Kavanagh et al. (2020) suggest that African countries— including Malawi— 
should have the capacity to manage adequate COVID-19 testing based on their 
HIV testing capacity.
COVID-19 prevention proved challenging in rural, income- poor areas, where 
the  water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) capacity of many Malawians is inad-
equate. Nearly 60  percent of reported handwashing facilities did not have  water 
or soap, making it difficult to exercise basic precautions such as hand washing 
(NSO & ICF, 2017). Even worse, many health workers contracted COVID-19, fur-
ther depleting essential healthcare providers from an already shallow pool (Phiri, 
2020). Despite  these challenges, Malawi has a relatively successful community 
health system stafed by community health workers (CHWs) known locally as 
health surveillance assistants (HSAs), who conduct mainly health promotion and 
disease control activities, making them key  human resources for health during a 
pandemic.9 This cadre has been educating communities around proper proce-
dures for preventing the spread of COVID-19.
Health spending in Malawi has been unpredictable over the past ten years, 
largely  because of the 2013 “Cashgate” scandal, which led to donor distrust in 
government and a sharp decline in aid (Adhikari et al., 2019). The government 
has slowly increased domestic health spending since then but only spends about 
US$35 per capita (WHO, 2019). Malawi depends significantly on external financ-
ing of health, with contributions rising again  after the initial shock of Cashgate; 
about 60   percent of total expenditure comes from donors. Since the outbreak, 
most of Malawi’s donor partners have committed extra funds (or loans, in the case 
of the IMF) for COVID-19 prevention and control (Cornish, 2020).
Malawi’s government faced challenges from within the health system that 
raised concern about the country’s ability to safely  handle a large outbreak of the 
disease. Health workers have gone on strike in Lilongwe and Blantyre  because of 
the lack of personal protective equipment or risk allowance (“Malawi Coronavirus,” 
2020; Mhango, 2020; Pensulo, 2020b), and they have been stigmatized  because of 
their profession, as fears of the virus spread (Pensulo, 2020c). This makes it more 
difficult for all cadres of health workers— from clinicians to CHWs—to do their 
jobs. It has also shed light on the popu lar perception that leaders are politicizing 
the pandemic. For example, a medical doctor at Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital 
in Blantyre, in an interview with The Telegraph, stated, “I feel like government is 
politicising the pandemic and I’m worried that donor funding for responding to 
COVID-19 might end in politicians’ pockets” (Mhango, 2020).
Malawi’s Embattled Government during the Early Epidemic
Malawi is a relatively young democracy, having won its in de pen dence from British 
rule in 1964, and reintroducing multiparty electoral competition in 1994. Person-
alist dictator and president- for- life Hastings Kamuzu Banda ruled Malawi in the 
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intervening three de cades. Despite alternations in executive power and increased 
civil liberties since his departure from office, Banda’s dictatorial legacy lives on 
(Dionne, 2018). Power in Malawi is concentrated in the executive branch, with 
intermittent checks on overzealous presidents by the judiciary, the legislature, 
and civil society (Dulani & van Donge, 2005; Posner, 1995; VonDoepp, 2006). The 
concentration of power in the presidency raises the stakes for presidential elec-
tions in Malawi.
Two presidents have led Malawi’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic: Muth-
arika and Chakwera. Mutharika was declared the winner of Malawi’s 2019 presi-
dential election on May 27, 2019. Demonstrations from the opposition, alleging 
foul play and fraud, began within days and continued into 2020 (Dionne & Dulani, 
2020; Tostensen, 2019). The Constitutional Court nullified the results in Febru-
ary 2020, calling for a fresh election within 150 days.
The election annulment severely weakened Mutharika’s administration and 
eroded his administration’s capacity to mount an efective COVID-19 response. 
Several decisions made by the Mutharika- appointed Cabinet Committee to lead the 
anti- COVID-19 eforts  were openly ignored by the public (Pensulo, 2020c).10 With 
fresh presidential elections looming, po liti cal parties embarked on extensive cam-
paigns, complete with rallies that ignored restrictions on public gatherings. Ordi-
nary Malawians and opposition po liti cal elites ignored the government’s advice on 
the pandemic, and some openly questioned the existence of COVID-19 cases in the 
country, casting doubt on the veracity of official figures. For example, former presi-
dent Joyce Banda alleged that the government was inflating COVID-19 figures to 
delay elections and attract donor support (“JB Says Malawi Bloating Covid-19 Fig-
ures,” 2020). Other critics contended that the number of cases was being underre-
ported  because of  limited testing— only 4,590 COVID-19 tests had been performed 
by the end of May 2020 (Africa Press Office, 2020).
Although Mutharika made performative eforts to garner support for his govern-
ment’s COVID-19 response plan, the thwarted national lockdown described previ-
ously proved a decisive blow to his ability to manage the pandemic. In the absence of 
clear plans to provide a safety net to support vulnerable  house holds and mitigate the 
efects of a lockdown, the announcement was met with sporadic outbursts of pro-
tests and demonstrations across the country (Pensulo, 2020a). The  Human Rights 
Defenders Co ali tion (HRDC), a grouping of governance civil society organ izations, 
went to the High Court and sought an injunction against the imposition of a lock-
down, which they described as unconstitutional  because it curtailed individual free-
doms. Further, HRDC argued that in the absence of a social safety net provision to 
cushion against the efects of a lockdown, the plan would cause severe harm to mar-
ginalized and poor citizens. The High Court ruled in  favor of HRDC and granted an 
injunction stopping government from implementing the lockdown (Kasanda, 2020). 
The politicization of Mutharika’s lockdown attempt illustrates how po liti cal tensions 
in Malawi significantly afected the government’s early COVID-19 response.
Chakwera’s short tenure at the time of this writing ofers  little opportunity to 
analyze in depth his administration’s COVID-19 response. The Presidential Task-
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force on COVID-19 continued its work  under the same leadership  after Chakwera 
defeated Mutharika in the fresh elections and took office in June 2020. Cognizant of 
the risks of exposure, President Chakwera canceled in de pen dence day cele brations 
on July 6, 2020, when he was also to be inaugurated. Instead, a smaller ceremony 
was held at a military barracks in the capital city of Lilongwe. When infections  rose 
steeply in July 2020, the Presidential Task Force on COVID-19 attempted to institute 
more restrictive mea sures.  These mea sures included closing all open markets and 
pubs and halting religious gatherings. However, the government withdrew  those 
guidelines  because of concerns of their legality given the  earlier court ruling on 
restrictive mea sures proposed by the Mutharika administration (Pasungwi, 2020).
Conclusion
COVID-19 emerged as a threat in Malawi relatively late compared to many other 
countries studied in this volume. Malawi’s tense po liti cal context at the time when 
the pandemic hit the country stifled government response. Despite eforts by the 
embattled Mutharika administration to enact strict, even draconian, public health 
policies, low trust in government led to citizen rebellion and ultimately failure to 
mount an efective response against COVID-19.
Although Malawians celebrated the election of new leadership, infections and 
deaths  rose sharply as the new president, Chakwera, took office. Hamstrung by court 
 orders issued against the previous administration and continued po liti cal polariza-
tion, Chakwera’s new administration strug gled to overcome previously failed poli-
cies and enforce efective mea sures against COVID-19. However, Chakwera enjoyed 
relatively higher levels of public trust compared to Mutharika. In the IPOR survey 
mentioned previously, 39  percent of Malawians said they found Mutharika trust-
worthy, ten percentage points lower than the 49  percent who said Chakwera was 
trustworthy (IPOR, 2020). Chakwera’s greater levels of public trust may translate 
into better observance of COVID-19 regulations introduced by his administration.
Absent the myriad po liti cal challenges, Malawi’s disease burden and under- 
resourced health system together still posed serious obstacles to efective COVID-19 
response. More impor tant, the overwhelming majority of Malawians relying on 
daily earnings to cover their families’ basic needs required pandemic interventions 
aimed not just at public health but also social protection. Even as their government 
strug gled, many Malawians demonstrated resilience and ofered mutual aid, as they 
have in previous pandemics and likely  will continue to do in the face of ongoing and 
 future crises.
Notes
 1. Declaration of State of Disaster by Malawi President Peter Mutharika, March 20, 
2020, https:// malawi . un . org / en / 46778 - declaration - state - disaster - malawi - president - peter 
- mutharika
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 2. Coronaviruses are a type of virus known to cause respiratory disease. This 
par tic u lar strand of coronavirus has come to be known as COVID-19, or the novel 
COronaVIrus Disease of 2019. The official name for the virus that  causes the disease is 
SARS- CoV-2.
 3. On July 31, the Ministry of Health (2020) reported 875 cases in Lilongwe (Central  
Region) and 1,227 cases in Blantyre (Southern Region), which together account for 
51  percent of Malawi’s 4,078 total infections recorded to date.
 4. On July 31, the Ministry of Health (2020) reported 202 cases at the Mwanza port of 
entry.
 5. The Cabinet Committee was led by the Minister of Health, Jappie Mhango, and was 
tasked with overseeing the government’s COVID-19 response.
 6. Lockdowns are universally difficult to implement, but such difficulties are amplified  
in low- resource settings, where governments strug gle to provide the necessary social safety 
net (Coetzee & Kagee, 2020).
 7. On July 31, 2020, US$1 was equal to MWK742.
 8. Likewise, in a phone- based survey that drew disproportionately on Malawians who 
lived in the northern region, only one respondent in the sample of 630 research participants 
reported not having heard of COVID-19 before (Banda et al., 2020).
 9. HSAs have been integral in  earlier pandemic response in Malawi, for example, in 
undertaking critical roles for the HIV/AIDS crisis (Bemelmans et al., 2010; Smith et al., 
2014). Similar CHW cadres have also been critical in pandemic response in other coun-
tries (see, e.g., Bhaumik et al., 2020; Boyce & Katz, 2019).
 10. Two prominent examples include failing to set up proper quarantine facilities for 
returned nationals, and attempting a national lockdown without any assurances for social 
protection.
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in africa
 Lessons from Tanzania
Thespina (Nina) Yamanis, Ruth Carlitz,  
and Henry A. Mollel
Africa’s first case of COVID-19 was recorded in Egypt on Febru-
ary 14, 2020.  After that, the virus spread rapidly throughout the continent, with 
all fifty- four African states reporting confirmed cases just three months  later 
(Cocks, 2020). However, the responses of African country governments  were far 
from uniform. Figure 31.1 depicts the average stringency of government responses 
across all countries during the first seven months of the pandemic. This is a com-
posite mea sure tracking policies such school closures, workplace closures, and 
travel bans, re scaled to a value from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest). We see the range 
from full- scale lockdowns (e.g., Angola, Rwanda, South Africa) to much more 
 limited intervention (e.g., Zambia and Tanzania).
Furthermore,  there is considerable variation within countries in terms of how 
local authorities interpreted guidelines from their governments and international 
organ izations and adapted them to the local context. This chapter explores local 
eforts to control and mitigate the pandemic to provide a comprehensive picture 
of Tanzania’s response.
Tanzania confirmed its first COVID-19 case on March 16, 2020: a Tanzanian 
 woman who traveled to Belgium. The government responded quickly as additional 
cases  were reported, closing schools and universities and developing a contact- 
tracing and testing system, designed based on previous experiences with Ebola 
(Taylor, 2020). Nevertheless, cases continued to rise, as shown in Figure 31.2.
The figure suggests a remarkable turnaround in controlling the spread of 
disease, and indeed Tanzania’s President John Pombe Magufuli declared victory 
against coronavirus at the end of May (Sguazzin, 2020). However, such a claim is 
difficult to assess given that, as of this writing, Tanzania has not published nation-
wide surveillance data since May 8, 2020, when the country recorded 509 cases 
and 21 deaths. On May 13, 2020, the US Embassy warned its citizens to stay home 
except for essential activities  because the risk of contracting COVID-19  in Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania’s commercial capital, was very high (US Embassy in Tanza-
nia, 2020). However, the Tanzanian government did not issue a national stay- at- 
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home policy, and Tanzanian citizens largely went about their daily lives. Indeed, 
Figure  31.3 suggests that patterns of mobility to workplaces had not changed 
considerably.1
Tanzania’s response to COVID-19 can be understood in part as reflecting 
the governance challenges facing many African countries. The 58 million resi-
dents of East Africa’s largest and most populous country are spread over a range 
of climatic zones and inhabit a variety of settlements. Tanzania has a healthcare 
worker shortage, and  those living in urban areas have better access to health 
care than  those in rural areas (West- Slevin et al., 2015). About one- third of the 
population lives in urban areas— with denser settlements along the coast and 
Northern regions (Figure 31.4). According to recent estimates, over half of  these 
urban dwellers reside in informal settlements (Ministry of Lands, Housing and 
 Human Settlements Development, 2016), where widespread community physical 
distancing mea sures may be impractical (Africa Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2020). The country has sustained relatively high economic growth 
in recent years and as of July 1, 2020, the World Bank reclassified Tanzania as a 
lower- middle income economy based on its Gross National Income per capita of 
US$1,080 (Serajuddin & Hamadeh, 2020). However, nearly half of the country’s 
population lives on less than $1.90 per day.












































Figure 31.1. Stringency of African government responses (March to June 2020).

































Source: Data on COVID-19 cases has been compiled by the Johns Hopkins University 
Center for Systems Science and Engineering (Dong et al., 2020).





















Figure 31.3. Mobility changes (workplaces) and stringency index.
Source: Mobility data from Google Mobility Reports (Google LLC, 2020); Stringency 
Index from Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (Hale et al., 2020).
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Tanzania’s response to COVID-19 also reflects the country’s po liti cal settle-
ment. Although multi- party politics  were legalized in 1992, the ruling Chama cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM) party has maintained a firm grip on power, and  there is  little 
separation between party and state (Morse, 2014, 2018). In 2015 the current presi-
dent, John Pombe Magufuli, was elected with 58   percent of the vote. Although 
Magufuli has been praised for clamping down on corruption, improving public 
administration, and more efficiently managing public resources (World Bank, 
2019),  others point to backsliding with re spect to vari ous aspects of democracy 
(Carlitz & Manda, 2016; Manda, 2017; Paget, 2017).
In considering Tanzania’s response to COVID-19, it is also impor tant to under-
stand the nature of decentralized governance in the country. Despite the adoption of 
a decentralization policy in 1998 (United Republic of Tanzania [URT], 1998) aimed 
at creating autonomous local government institutions, the reliance of local govern-
ments on the central government remains high (Mollel, 2010). Thus, although local 




Figure 31.4. Tanzania population density.
Source: WorldPop (2020).
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and below, all staf must be selected and approved centrally (Hutchinson, 2002). 
Nevertheless, local governments have the authority to interpret and implement 
national policies. Regional health management teams supervise and mentor district 
councils, who directly implement national guidelines (Kapologwe et al., 2019). Thus, 
the response to COVID-19 is heavi ly influenced by central government ministries. 
However, the adaptation of national guidelines can still vary based on local context.
We explore the nature and extent of local adaptation through a series of 
interviews with local officials in July 2020 in four purposefully selected regions2: 
Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Morogoro, and Arusha. We selected  these four regions 
 because they vary with re spect to population density and, thus, potential to spread 
COVID-19. Dodoma is the nation’s capital, but,  because it consists of mostly gov-
ernment buildings, it is not very dense in terms of population. Dar es Salaam is 
the commercial capital and is thus very dense. Morogoro is an area with substan-
tial agricultural production and is not very dense. Arusha is a tourist region with 
mountains and national parks, and, as such, is not very dense.
We selected three dif er ent types of local officials to interview: (1) regional level 
officers, such as members of regional health management and referral hospitals 
who  were involved in the implementation of response to COVID-19; (2) district 
level officers, including social welfare and medical officers; and (3) local officials at 
ward (urban)/village (rural), or mtaa (“street,” i.e., urban) levels who  were involved 
in the implementation of response to COVID-19. We interviewed a total of forty 
officials. We asked each respondent about the guidelines they received to respond 
to COVID-19, what activities they implemented, challenges to implementation, 
adaptations they made, and lessons learned. Our protocol was approved by the 
President’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government as well as the 
Office of the Vice Chancellor at Mzumbe University.
This chapter proceeds as follows. We first pre sent an overview of Tanzania’s 
health and social policy mea sures in response to COVID-19 (the next two sec-
tions). We then pre sent our explanation for the policies, including Tanzania’s 
 limited fiscal space, the president’s attempts to minimize fear and obstruct public 
access to information, and, fi nally, the responsibility taken up by local officials to 
protect their communities (the final section). We conclude with a call for more 
research exploring local adaptations to COVID-19 policy mea sures, particularly 
 under decentralized and authoritarian regimes.
Health Policy Mea sures
Federal Response (2020)
On March 17, 2020, the Tanzanian government banned all forms of public gather-
ings, including sports activities, and closed all schools (“Tanzania Bans All Pub-
lic Gatherings, Closes Schools, Suspends the Premier League over Coronavirus,” 
2020). Beginning March 23, 2020, international travelers arriving in Tanzania from 
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COVID-19- afected countries  were required to undergo and pay for fourteen days 
of quarantine in designated  hotels (Taylor, 2020). Unlike its neighbors  Kenya and 
Malawi, Tanzania did not close its borders. Nevertheless, on April 11, 2020, the Tan-
zanian Civil Aviation Authority suspended all international passenger, chartered, 
and private aircraft inbound flights (US Department of State OSAC, 2020).
In March  2020 the Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, 
El derly and  Children (MoHCDGEC) issued a series of standard operating proce-
dures (SOPs) to respond to COVID-19 (MoHCDGEC, 2020). The SOPs detailed how 
health facilities should screen and isolate patients with suspected COVID-19, includ-
ing setting up a treatment unit. The SOPs recommended that all patients entering 
health facilities be screened for COVID-19. If the case definition of COVID-19 was 
met, the patient should be given a mask and sent to an isolation area. Staf  were 
to use PPE to check on isolated patients. Based on guidance from the WHO, the 
SOPs included instructions on how to properly don PPE and decontaminate iso-
lation rooms. They also included instructions for quarantining confirmed cases at 
home or in  hotels and minimizing exposure for  house hold members or  hotel work-
ers.  There was an SOP for providing psychosocial support to individuals afected by 
COVID-19 by reducing stress and addressing stigma and discrimination. Moreover, 
an SOP described how to provide a safe and dignified burial, including using PPE to 
transport the deceased person to a body bag and burial site (Figure 31.5).
The SOPs detailed protocols for community- based prevention eforts, includ-
ing hand hygiene. Within communities, individuals  were instructed to “maintain 
distance of at least 1 meter from any individual with respiratory symptoms (e.g., 
coughing, sneezing); perform hand hygiene frequently; and cover nose and mouth 
with flexed elbow or paper tissue when coughing or sneezing” (MoHCDGEC, 2020, 
p. 68). Masks  were not required for non- sick persons. Within the MoHCDGEC 
SOPs, physical distancing was mentioned in the context of health care, isolation, 
and burials. This is in contrast to the Africa Centre for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC), which recommended that, to reduce transmission, communities 
should engage in physical distancing of one meter between  people as soon as 
community transmission is evident (Africa CDC, 2020).
Many of the aforementioned public health guidelines  were compromised by 
President Magufuli’s actions. On May  3, 2020, President Magufuli suspended 
the head of the national laboratory and called for an investigation into faulty 
COVID-19 tests (“Tanzania Suspends Laboratory Head  after President Questions 
Coronavirus Tests,” 2020). On May 19, 2020, the Tanzania Civil Aviation Author-
ity opened up its air space and allowed international flights. President Magufuli 
declared Tanzania COVID-19- free on May  22, 2020, and ordered students to 
return to schools in June.
Local Adaptation of Health Policy Mea sures
Our interviews revealed how  these actions played out at the local level. Interview 
respondents stated that they received the MoHCDGEC SOPs through leaflets, 
Figure 31.5. Image from Tanzania’s MoHCDGEC Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
for case management and infection, prevention and control, March, 2020, page 4.
Source: Ministry of Health, Community Development, Gender, El derly and  
Children (2020).
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email, and WhatsApp. The district executive officer passed information to the 
ward and street officers, who then disseminated information to the community 
though public meetings. Respondents reported receiving guidance on the follow-
ing: (1) surveillance; (2) case management; (3) health promotion/public education; 
(4) handwashing; (5) testing; (6) emergency preparedness; (7)  handling of travel-
ers; and (8) laboratory.
Nearly all respondents engaged in public education about the virus. One 
regional health official (respondent 22) indicated they reached the public through 
dif er ent platforms such as radio and TV. A community social welfare officer (24) 
conducted community education at bars, churches, mosques, and food vending 
places. Several respondents across levels (13, 14, 18, 21, 29) mentioned using micro-
phones or public address (PA) systems to reach communities in the wards. They 
Figure 31.6. Tweet discussing President Magufuli’s 
refusal to lockdown Dar es Salaam, April 22, 2020. 
(This tweet shows a statement made by President 
Magufuli. The statement translates as: “ There are 
 those giving their opinion to lockdown DSM [Dar es 
Salaam]. That is totally impossible. DSM is a center 
where a large  percent of the national income is 
obtained. It has a population of six million. We cannot 
lock them down. Then, tomorrow, they  will ask that 
we lock down Mwanza. No. We cannot lockdown Dar 
es Salaam.”)
Source: Ayo (2020).
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encouraged the public to engage in prevention be hav iors, including hand washing, 
physical distancing, and mask wearing, and to help lower stigma of coronavirus 
patients. One respondent (14) mentioned involving other stakeholders, who pro-
vided PA systems, leaflets, and brochures.  These stakeholders included the Red 
Cross and the Mkapa Foundation, who provided trained community health work-
ers to conduct contact tracing.
Respondents reported conducting contact tracing, surveillance, case manage-
ment, sample collection, and testing (10, 16, 38, 41, 43). They coordinated with 
dif er ent teams within and outside the regional hospital and mobilized necessary 
supplies. In conducting this work, respondents indicated that they drew on their 
prior experience managing epidemics such as cholera and tuberculosis.
Several respondents played a role in coordinating logistics for isolated or sus-
pected COVID-19 patients (21, 24, 25, 33, 44, 46). For  these  people, respondents 
provided food delivery, transport to the health center, and follow-up with  family 
members to check on  children. District health officers in collaboration with com-
munity social welfare workers provided counseling and support to lower fear and 
stress during the fourteen days of mandatory isolation.  These officials also or ga-
nized visitations by faith leaders to help with spiritual counseling. They worked 
together with faith leaders to encourage coronavirus patients to have faith in 
recovery and not to fear to death.
Local Challenges to Adhering to Public Health Guidelines
Respondents mentioned several challenges they faced adhering to the guidelines. 
They stated that community members had difficulty maintaining physical distanc-
ing of one meter as recommended by the Africa CDC (Africa CDC, 2020). This 
was especially difficult in public transportation facilities (21), as well as congested 
places such as general markets and livestock markets (22). Some respondents 
claimed that citizens  were deliberately ignoring the guidelines. One respondent 
stated that community members had difficulty “avoiding social gatherings in 
refreshment areas like bars. They shared local drinks in the clubs which is danger-
ous for spreading the coronavirus” (20). Respondents also mentioned the chal-
lenge in preventing gatherings during burials. As one respondent stated, “Based on 
traditional values, many  people  were still turning out in large numbers for burial 
ser vices” (26).
Isolating coronavirus patients was also a significant challenge. Several respon-
dents mentioned that  there was insufficient space to isolate them (12, 21) and that 
the facilities  were not designed to admit patients (13, 18, 11, 15). Some of the facili-
ties lacked a self- contained room and toilet, leaving patients to share public toi-
lets (13).  There  were poor waste management and food insecurity in the isolation 
centers (15). Respondents stated that  there had been poor planning for food (12, 15). 
Given  these miserable conditions, some  people tried to escape isolation (18). Iso-
lation centers  were operational from April 5  until June 23, 2020, when all the isola-
tion centers  were closed (Taylor, 2020).
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Nearly all respondents mentioned that community members expressed fear 
of the coronavirus. As one respondent stated, “(COVID-19) is a new experience 
to deal with, and requires building courage” (23). Another respondent (14) men-
tioned that a common challenge was that many  people  were afraid that if they 
tested positive they would not recover. Similarly,  people  were fearful to quaran-
tine  because of the low quality of the isolation centers and the need to leave their 
businesses and  family.
Many respondents mentioned they would have liked more time to raise com-
munity awareness and combat fear of the virus. One respondent mentioned they 
 were only given few minutes while visiting patients to explain their roles and what 
families should do (24). A few respondents mentioned would have liked to tailor 
their education strategies for dif er ent groups ( children, disabled, and el derly) to 
take into account cultural values and practices.
A concern related to fear was stigma. Respondents reported that  those who 
 were diagnosed with coronavirus, or  those who traveled from highly afected areas 
such as Dar es Salaam (25), sufered stigma from  family and community members. 
Social welfare officers reported that the requirement for them to keep a distance 
from a patient or wear PPE made the patients feel stigmatized. Stigma resulted 
in some  people who  were diagnosed with the coronavirus to not want to disclose 
their diagnosis. As one respondent stated, “Stigmatization has huge impacts and 
can result into big fear to patients with so much psychological sufering that can 
trigger other health prob lems such as increasing in level of blood pressure and 
diabetes” (24). Respondents expressed that they also faced stigma  because they 
worked on coronavirus issues, causing “ family social challenges” (15).
COVID-19 surveillance was also a major challenge. Respondents complained 
that testing results  were delayed or never pro cessed by the national laboratory 
(13, 41, 44). They said that the laboratory took one to two weeks to deliver results. 
Another respondent mentioned that sometimes the laboratory results  were con-
fusing in that “a patient tested negative while he/she had critical signs” (11). One 
respondent mentioned that “delayed or not returned results afected the patients 
psychologically and created verbal fights with health personnel” (25). Another 
mentioned that surveillance  officers  were not appropriately persuasive when 
speaking with communities, resulting in  little cooperation among community 
members (33).
A related challenge was dealing with travelers with suspected diagnoses of 
COVID-19. A respondent acknowledged that some citizens  were hosting trav-
elers from dif er ent locations, making it easier for the coronavirus to spread. 
One respondent (22) mentioned that “this was challenging  because  there was no 
guidance on what should be done in case a traveler is found with high tempera-
ture. Similarly, stopping travelers for body temperature testing also delayed their 
schedules.”
Respondents also described the public not taking the coronavirus seriously as 
a challenge (11, 25, 34, 35, 37, 38, 44, 47, 49). One respondent described “commu-
nity negligence thinking the disease.. only attacks . . .  mostly white skinned and 
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rich  people” (25). Several described citizens ignoring advice about hand washing 
and wearing masks (25, 34, 47). Citizens complained that masks  were uncomfort-
able and too expensive.
Twenty- five respondents mentioned the lack of supplies and resources as a 
major challenge to practically implementing the health guidelines: “We have few 
 human and financial resources which constrain our ability to execute the tasks 
specified in the health guidance” (21). Respondents mentioned not having enough 
PPE for health workers who  were treating COVID-19 patients. They stated that 
they had trou ble procuring supplies. As one respondent stated, “We depend on a 
single government system of purchasing all facilities from Medical Store Depart-
ment (MSD). We have few licensed private supplies which results in incon ve-
niences and delay in delivery of supplies” (21).
Respondents mentioned the lack of resources for prevention activities, includ-
ing lack of  water, masks, gloves, and hand sanitizers. They also cited lacking per-
sonnel, transportation, and communication funds to contact trace. In terms of 
how to respond to such an enormous challenge, several respondents suggested 
that local officials should have been given the mandate or authority to develop 
their own guidelines “since we know our environment and  people better. It  wasn’t 
proper for the ministry to develop generic guidelines” (10).
Social Policy Mea sures
In keeping with the  limited federal response to COVID-19, Tanzania has not imple-
mented any major social policies such as income support or debt/contract relief, 
and the government has not announced any economic stimulus spending (Hale 
et al., 2020). Rather,  there has been more of an emphasis on overall health and 
well- being to build immunity. For instance, the MoHCDGEC SOP included nutri-
tion advice for patients with COVID-19, noting, “ People who eat a well- balanced 
diet tend to be healthier with stronger immune systems and lower risk of chronic 
illnesses and infectious diseases” (2020). However, some respondents noted chal-
lenges in ensuring food security for quarantined individuals. In some localities, 
voluntary food assistance was or ga nized by local officials and stakeholders.
In addition, many respondents mentioned the use of traditional remedies as a 
strength in their fight against coronavirus. This is consistent with past approaches 
to emerging and endemic infectious diseases in Tanzania (Gessler et  al., 1995; 
Kayombo et al., 2007). As one stated, “We can be in de pen dent when dealing with 
pandemics like Corona by using traditional ways, prayers and alternative treat-
ments such as kujifukiza (breathing herb- infused steam), the use of lemons and 
drinking of tangawizi (ginger)” (29).
Respondents also discussed the importance of providing psychosocial sup-
port, which appears to have been the focus of trainings for health officials (URT, 
2020). Several respondents mentioned the importance of psychosocial support to 
deal with stigma and fear for  people diagnosed with coronavirus. As one stated 
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“psychosocial support was efective since  people  were provided with sufficient 
knowledge (counseling) to lower fear that being in quarantine is not mean to 
punish them but to protect them and other  people from getting Corona” (25). 
Although many respondents mentioned activities they engaged in to provide such 
support, large numbers also praised President Magufuli for taking bold action to 
reduce fear and stigma related to COVID-19. The president’s actions and influ-
ence are discussed in greater detail in the following section.
Tanzania’s Response in Context
To some extent, Tanzania’s relatively  limited national policy response can be 
explained as a result of weak state capacity and  limited fiscal space. About half 
(twenty- three out of fifty) of the African countries included in the Oxford 
COVID-19 Government Response Tracker database also did not provide income 
support in response to the pandemic (Hale et al., 2020). However, nearly three- 
quarters (thirty- seven of fifty) did provide some form of debt relief (e.g., stopping 
loan repayments, preventing ser vices such as  water from being cut of, or banning 
evictions), and the majority (86   percent) announced some degree of economic 
stimulus spending.3 In general, countries providing income support and debt 
relief  were wealthier,4 and  there is a positive and significant correlation between 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and the amount of economic stimulus 
spending provided. Similarly, Tanzania is one of only four African countries (out 
of fifty in the database) that did not close workplaces, issue stay- at- home require-
ments, nor place restrictions on internal movement (Hale et al., 2020). However, 
 there is no correlation between country income and the extent of containment 
and health policy mea sures.
Rather than see the relatively  limited high- level response as a weakness, 
many of our interviewees (fourteen) interpreted the lack of action as a deliberate 
attempt to minimize the threat of COVID-19 to reduce fear and stigma. In par-
tic u lar, they cited the positive messages of the president and other top officials. 
As one respondent stated, “Top government official leaders’ statements like the 
president help to lower fears and challenges in managing Corona.  These was for 
example, the president’s statement that Corona is just like any other disease we 
are living with and we should simply take all prevention mea sures and use tradi-
tional remedies” (18).
Another noted, “We learned from our top leaders like President Magufuli 
that fear can bring greater impacts than the disease itself” (17). Another stated, 
“Our president de cided not to close borders with other countries, allowing all 
economic activities to take place and reopening of universities and schools. This 
helped citizens to see corona disease as normal, like other diseases.”
The influence of the president and other high- level authorities on the actions 
and statements of local officials is in keeping with the hierarchical nature of gov-
ernance in Tanzania. As noted previously, transfers from the central government 
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fund the majority of local government activities (Carlitz, 2017). In addition, cen-
trally appointed officials serve beside their locally elected counter parts at almost 
 every level of government and have considerable decision- making power (Venu-
gopal & Yilmaz, 2010).
Praise for Magufuli was not uniform among our respondents, however. Some 
respondents acknowledged that the president’s statements “had very big impacts 
both positively and negatively given the trust members of the public accord to 
them” (24). Among the negative efects, a respondent explained, “The govern-
ment’s move to reassure its  people that the disease (COVID-19) does not exist in 
Tanzania has made  people to live carelessly without taking any precautions. This 
could lead to new infections and have serious impacts on  people in our coun-
try” (45). Still another acknowledged that “traditional remedies without proper 
guidelines might threaten  human life. In our ward  there was one death caused 
by traditional remedies where the person’s skin and internal organs burned. 
We request the government to issue safety control mea sures for traditional 
 remedies” (36).
Moreover, several respondents noted experiencing more difficulties in educat-
ing communities  after the president’s statements that COVID-19 was not a threat. 
One respondent noted the difficulty of educating the public  after “high official 
leaders’ statements about reported positive cases of animals and fruits and dis-
couraging the use of masks” (25). This respondent is likely referring to a speech the 
president made in early May 2020 (Ikulu Tanzania, 2020), in which he suggested 
the country’s caseload was overstated as a result of “compromised” test kits result-
ing in false positives. He described having samples taken from animals (a goat, 
a sheep, and a bird) and a papaya and having them labeled with  human names 
and sent to Tanzania’s National Laboratory. He claimed the non- human samples 
tested positive and presented this as evidence that labs  were falsifying positive test 
results. Opposition politicians have suggested this statement was part of a broader 
campaign to minimize the scope of the pandemic in light of the fact that Magufuli 
was gearing up to stand for re- election in October 2020 (Peralta, 2020).
The desire to suppress potentially po liti cally damaging information can also 
explain the government’s hesitancy to release official statistics on the number of 
confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths.5 Such obfuscation is in keeping with the 
Magufuli administration’s broader eforts to obstruct access to public information 
(Carlitz & McLellan, 2020). According to Freedom House (2020), the Tanzanian 
government has increasingly “sought to obstruct access to public information 
in recent years.” An Access to Information Act  adopted in 2016 imposed prison 
terms on officials who “improperly” released state data. Journalists and civil soci-
ety groups who attempt to expose official wrongdoing frequently face punitive 
action by authorities (Dahir, 2020).  Under new legislation from August 3, 2020, 
the public is banned from sharing information about an infectious disease out-
break without government permission (Ross, 2020).
In sum, although po liti cal pressures likely  shaped the responses of the presi-
dent and other top officials, their actions clearly had a mixed efect on local offi-
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cials. Diminishing fear boosted their morale and helped them to address fear and 
stigma. However, some found it more difficult to persuade the public to comply 
with prevention mea sures. With few national protection mea sures in place, many 
respondents took  matters into their own hands by continuing to educate the public 
and adapting national guidelines to their local context.
Local Adaptations
Several respondents mentioned developing their own procedures or guidelines 
that  were separate from the national guidelines. One respondent described this 
pro cess: “We de cided to have our own district council guidelines. For example, the 
general guideline for health ser vice providers required to be full protected with 
PPE when providing medical ser vices to a person confirmed to have the corona-
virus. However,  because of the lack of PPE we de cided to use masks and maintain 
social distancing as a means of protection in order to save  people’s lives” (26).
Moreover, to address fear, stigma, and awareness, respondents engaged in 
several activities. They involved local government officials to reduce community 
re sis tance, as Figure  31.7 illustrates. A respondent gave another example from 
their community: “Community members had the perception that by making their 
health center an isolation station, it  will be a source of bringing COVID-19 to their 
place. Two [district officers] intervened.  Later on, the community agreed and the 
center was made” (23).
Respondents also engaged in direct community outreach. They conducted 
public education in churches, mosques, bars and food ser vice provision areas, 
even sometimes  going “door- to- door for individual  house holds” (26). They involved 
religious leaders to help enforce social distancing (see Figure  31.8), including 
during burial ser vices and mourning days. Several respondents also mentioned 
delivering public education through loudspeakers and public address systems 
while moving around the wards. They mobilized local resources to purchase the 
 loudspeakers. In one ward, a respondent reported that they enforced fines on 
 people who disregarded the health guidelines (20).
Figure 31.7. Facebook post from Plus TV 
describes Dar es Salaam Regional Commissioner 
Paul Makonda encouraging mask wearing in 
public  after WHO announces that COVID-19 
may be airborne, April 18, 2020. (Translation: 
“It is mandatory to wear mask”- RC [Regional 
Commissioner] DSM [Dar es Salaam].)
Source: Plus TV (2020).
574  Coronavirus Politics
Respondents involved non- state actors to address the challenge of low resources 
and supplies. To obtain transportation needed for in- person contact tracing, 
one respondent mentioned obtaining cars from local nongovernmental organ-
izations (23). Seven respondents mentioned manufacturing their own supplies 
for local use, including PPE and afordable hand sanitizer. Another respondent 
mentioned collaborating with the Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology to manu-
facture face shields (18). State actors, such as district level leaders, also provided 
tangible support in procuring cars and fuel (25).
In sum, in the absence of a clear and coordinated national response, local offi-
cials in Tanzania adapted to the coronavirus situation by creating their own guide-
lines and manufacturing their own resources. This suggests that local officials in 
Tanzania have room to maneuver even in the absence of truly devolved power. 
Many of our respondents mentioned that they would like even more authority to 
create locally responsive policies for controlling disease spread. They suggested 
that the government invest more financial and  human resources  toward preparing 
local officials to respond to pandemics.
Conclusion
Relying solely on media reports available in En glish or international data sources 
may lead to the conclusion that Tanzania did not take the coronavirus pandemic 
seriously (e.g., Dahir, 2020). President Magufuli minimized the pandemic and 
encouraged Tanzanian citizens to go about their daily lives. For its level of state 
capacity, Tanzania underperformed on COVID-19 response and containment 
mea sures, relative to other countries in eastern and southern Africa. Citizens have 
mostly accepted the government’s relatively  limited mea sures.
Despite the lack of a strong federal response, our case study reveals that local 
officials, working in regions of varying density, took the outbreak seriously and 
Figure 31.8. Tweet from AzamTVTZ 
announcing the fourteen- day closure of Mtoro 
Mosque in Dar es Salaam to control the 
efects of the novel coronavirus, May 2, 2020. 
(Translation: “Mtoro Mosque in Dar es Salaam 
city is closed. Mtoro Mosque located in Dar es 
Salaam city is closed for two weeks to control 
the efect of spread of Corona.”)
Source: Azam TV (2020).
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responded to the coronavirus pandemic by adapting the national guidelines to 
suit their local contexts. Building on their prior experience with other pandem-
ics, local officials made a concerted efort to respond to the pandemic, despite 
 limited resources and a lack of strong national mea sures. They isolated patients 
who tested positive. Following the president’s lead, they worked in their com-
munities to abate fear. Our results revealed that this leadership was key to the 
country’s success in keeping stress levels down and encouraging  people not to 
panic. Local officials also worked with patients, families, and religious leaders to 
lower stigma. They used local resources to address the need for more PPE, includ-
ing hand sanitizers and face shields. Nevertheless, given the lack of data on case 
counts since early May 2020, we cannot even speculate as to what, if any efect 
 these eforts had on local transmission.
In decentralized systems such as Tanzania, local officials are often more 
trusted than federal officials and have better knowledge of what is happening on 
the ground. However, as our respondents stated, during a pandemic, local pub-
lic health officials need the authority and resources to be able to adapt national 
guidance to their specific context. As of this writing, research is underway to 
examine  whether giving local public health officials more control over local bud-
gets improves overall healthcare quality in Tanzania (Kapologwe et  al., 2019). 
Nevertheless, the overall lack of resources to fight COVID-19 was systematic 
across African countries and cannot be solved by authority alone. One respon-
dent affirmed this message: “The global response plan on managing COVID-19 
was difficult to be executed in Africa given the insufficient supply of necessary 
and recommended resources” (21). More research is needed to explore how 
other countries adapted at the local level in such circumstances, rather than 
solely presenting country responses in terms of national policies or surveillance 
statistics.
Our study is  limited by the fact that we interviewed only public employees. To 
gain a more comprehensive picture of the local response to a pandemic, research-
ers should also interview non- state actors working in communities, as was done 
during the Ebola epidemic in west Africa (Abramowitz et al., 2015). Moreover, data 
on community members’ perceptions of the response system would be helpful 
to reveal challenges to citizen cooperation and trust that, if overcome, could help 
to reduce disease spread (Yamanis et al., 2016).
Fi nally, another limitation is that we cannot link local response eforts to 
COVID-19 morbidity or mortality data given that Tanzania halted COVID-19 
testing and surveillance. It is unclear to what extent  people afected by COVID-19 
 were staying home  because they  were worried that the health facilities  were inad-
equate. Lack of attendance at health facilities could limit the ability to collect 
accurate mortality data, or to infer COVID-19 deaths from overall mortality.
Despite  these limitations and the evolving situation, our findings reveal that 
many local health officials in Tanzania  were taking the pandemic seriously and 
creatively using resources to prevent disease spread in their communities. More 
research is necessary to understand how national policies play out in local con-
texts, especially in decentralized systems, and  under authoritarian regimes.
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Notes
 1. The Mobility Reports are based on aggregated, anonymized data from users of 
Google Maps and show how visits and length of stay at dif er ent places change com-
pared to a baseline (https:// www . google . com / covid19 / mobility / ). As such, the mea sure 
reflects the activities of smartphone users only. As of 2018, mobile internet penetration 
was estimated to be 18.5  percent (Okeleke, 2019). Data from the round 7 of the nationally 
representative Afrobarometer survey shows that urban dwellers  were significantly more 
likely to have internet access on their phones than  were rural residents (42  percent vs. 
17  percent of respondents). This suggests that smartphone users predominate in urban 
areas, and thus  these trends may not be reflective of mobility trends for all Tanzanians.
 2. Tanzania is currently divided into thirty- one regions. Each region is administered 
by a commissioner appointed by the central government. Regions are further subdivided 
into districts, wards, and villages, which are governed by popularly elected councils with 
appointed executive officers.
 3. Other than Tanzania, only six countries (Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Libya, 
Madagascar, and South Sudan) did not announce stimulus spending.
 4. The average GDP per capita (PPP, current US$) for countries that have not provided 
income relief was $9,968 compared to $26,905 that did provide such relief. Countries 
that did not provide some form of debt relief had average per capita income of $13,748 
compared to $24,799 among  those that did.  These diferences are statistically significant 
at conventional levels.
 5. Tanzania had not published nationwide figures since May 8, when it recorded 509 
cases and 21 deaths.
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 32 confronting legacies and  
charting a new coUrse?
 The Politics of Coronavirus Response in South Africa
Joseph Harris
 Under President Cyril Ramaphosa, demo cratic South Africa took 
an aggressive response to COVID-19 that stood in marked contrast to the Mbeki 
administration’s denialist response to HIV/AIDS. The administration was ini-
tially praised for an aggressive nationwide lockdown that was informed by sci-
entific advice. The lockdown provided the country’s healthcare system time to 
prepare and, according to some estimates, may have saved as many as twenty thou-
sand lives. However, as pressure grew to reopen and address the hunger and eco-
nomic devastation the novel coronavirus and resulting lockdown had wrought, 
the administration increasingly found itself on the receiving end of criticism by 
scientists, opposition po liti cal parties, business, and citizens. Against the advice 
of the World Health Organ ization (WHO), the government reopened before the 
epidemic was at its peak. As infections surged and the death toll mounted, the 
novel coronavirus revealed long- standing weaknesses in health system capacity 
as well as deficiencies in the government’s approach to addressing the economic, 
health, and food needs of its  people. As of this writing, the country stands mired 
in the largest coronavirus outbreak on the continent and one of the largest in 
the world, with many of its  people hungry and out of work. The looming efect 
of the pandemic on the country’s large population positive for  human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV) and tuberculosis (TB) is likely to be dire. Although 
increased po liti cal competition helps explain the African National Congress’s 
(ANC’s) greater receptivity to scientific and medical professionals initially, the 
party’s openness to expert advice deteriorated as the crisis intensified and addi-
tional pressures, including a major corruption scandal, led the ANC to come 
 under fire.
Cyril Ramaphosa’s election as president of South Africa in 2019 represented a 
sharp break from the prior two presidential administrations. Insulated from 
po liti cal competition with few serious challengers, the ANC  under Thabo Mbeki 
had resisted the advice and counsel of seasoned medical and  legal professionals 
and instead entertained dissident science, becoming infamous for denying that 
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HIV  causes AIDS; promoting unproven therapies for AIDS, including garlic, 
beetroot, olive oil, and lemon juice; and delaying access to proven antiretrovi-
ral therapy (Harris, 2017)— decisions that ultimately cost the country more than 
330,000 lives (Chigwedere et al., 2008). Jacob Zuma’s presidency was marred by 
corruption, scandals, and an inability to address growing protests over provision 
of basic government ser vices. Although a candidate of the ANC, like Mbeki and 
Zuma before him, Ramaphosa’s experience as a former  union leader and busi-
ness tycoon ofered South Africans the promise of someone who might be able to 
deliver needed reform.
Ramaphosa’s election win marked the first time that the ANC— which has 
governed South Africa since 1994— won less than 60  percent of the vote, with the 
party earning just 57.5  percent of the vote nationally, as opposition parties, such 
as the Demo cratic Alliance and Economic Freedom Fighters, appealed to citizen 
concerns. Ramaphosa’s win came on the heels of the ANC’s poorest showing ever 
in the 2016 municipal elections, in which it lost the capital of Pretoria and Johan-
nesburg for the first time since apartheid ended. Although opposition parties still 
trailed the ANC by large margins, the era of one- party dominance was closing, 
and an era of more intense po liti cal competition was beginning, one that signaled 
the possibility of an ANC that was less insulated from social pressure and more 
responsive to citizen demands.
As one observer noted, “Ramaphosa is the right man for the moment. He is 
a modern thinker who is sensitive to all the constituencies: business,  labor and 
government” (quoted in Winning, 2019). However, although tackling corruption 
and reforming struggling utilities was on the ANC’s agenda  under Ramaphosa, 
neither Ramaphosa nor the ANC knew they would have to navigate the challenges 
or the wide- ranging health and economic consequences that a deadly new dis-
ease presented. The government’s initial response was guided by science at first 
and bought the country’s health system time to prepare for a surge of infections. 
However, an inability to address citizens’ basic economic, health, and nutritional 
needs allowed the government’s eforts to curb spread of the virus to fall victim to 
competing po liti cal and social pressures.
Public Health and Health System Responses
Arrival of the Virus
South Africa’s first novel coronavirus (COVID-19) infection was diagnosed on 
March  5, 2020, with early cases appearing to follow a trajectory of exponen-
tial increase seen in many other countries. The infection took place in the con-
text of a nation still grappling with the deep legacies wrought by apartheid and 
regarded as one of the most unequal socie ties in the world. In South Africa, the 
top 10  percent hold 86  percent of the country’s wealth, with a significant portion 
of this in equality  running along racial lines (Chatterjee et al., 2020). The country’s 
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stark income in equality, in the words of leading analysts, made it “a global outlier” 
(Seekings & Nattrass, 2015).
From the beginning, the government’s response to the virus relied heavi ly 
on science and scientists— a departure from the Mbeki government’s approach 
to AIDS. Government policy was initially guided by epidemiological predic-
tions by the Stellanbosch University’s South African Centre for Epidemiological 
Modelling and Analy sis (SACEMA), in cooperation with the National Institute 
for Communicable Diseases (NICD), a national public health agency that moni-
tors and researches outbreaks.  These early projections suggested that “a slow and 
inadequate response by government to the outbreak could result in anywhere 
between 87,000 and 351,000 deaths” over the course of the pandemic (Cowan, 
2020). The Ramaphosa administration then took decisive action in declaring a 
national emergency on March 15, 2020, which shuttered schools, prohibited large 
gatherings, closed the majority of the country’s borders, and banned visitors from 
countries deemed high- risk (Nordling, 2020a). Schools  were initially closed from 
March  19, 2020 to June  9, 2020 (Debut, 2020). According to the models, even 
 under an optimistic scenario, the country could expect eight million infections by 
mid- August 2020 and 40,000 deaths in total (Muller, 2020). The Actuarial Society 
of South Africa predicted an even higher number of deaths, ranging from 48,300 
to 88,000 (Child, 2020b). Dr. Harry Moultrie, a se nior medical epidemiologist at 
NICD, then put together an expert team, called the South Africa COVID-19 Mod-
elling Consortium, to do more rigorous modelling to try to understand what the 
country was up against. The team included professors, doctors, and statisticians 
from University of Cape Town, Stellenbosch University, and Boston University, 
many of whom had been involved in epidemiological forecasting of the country’s 
AIDS epidemic (Child, 2020b).
The gravity of the impending calamity led the government to deepen its lock-
down mea sures on March 27, 2020.  These mea sures closed the nation’s borders 
and required every one but essential workers to stay at home, except to obtain 
medicine, groceries, or welfare payments (Nordling, 2020a), as well as an alcohol 
and tobacco ban. This policy, originally put in place for three weeks but extended 
to five, was aimed at slowing the spread of the virus. To help cushion the blow of 
the lockdown on workers, the government put in place a program called the Tem-
porary Employer and Employee Relief Scheme in late March that was intended to 
help employers pay workers (Cabe, 2020).
As part of the lockdown, the government developed a five- tier alert system, 
with level one representing life as normal and level five involving the most serious 
restrictions to movement. The lockdown on March 27, 2020, put the country at 
level five (Wild, 2020). By May 2020 the country sat at level four, which allowed 
for  limited operation of industries, the purchase of winter clothes and fast food 
delivery (Wild, 2020). Even at that level of restriction, however, large COVID-19 
outbreaks still took place, some at sites that had notably been places where TB 
and HIV had spread in the 1980s and 1990s: 164 cases at the Mponeng gold mine 
near Johannesburg, which had been working at half capacity,  were reported on 
May 24, 2020 (“Coronavirus in South Africa: Outbreak,” 2020).
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Effects of the Lockdown
Called by some the strictest lockdown on the continent, the government’s lock-
down was overseen by a “militaristic” Minister of Police, who likened the public 
health crisis to war (Seekings, 2020d, p. 4). The lockdown was enforced by a com-
bination of military, police, and private security. As unrest began to flare around 
the globe related to police vio lence against Black  people in the United States, 
the lockdown brought South Africans into greater contact and conflict with the 
police. Overall, two hundred and thirty thousand  people  were arrested during the 
lockdown (Reuter, 2020). More than a dozen  people  were killed by security forces 
enforcing the lockdown, including Sbusiso Amos, who was shot on March  29, 
2020, in front of his four  children, his cousin, and aunt (Bornman, 2020). Police 
used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse crowds of  people not wearing masks 
waiting in line for food (Nyoka, 2020).
Although the national government put a moratorium on evictions during the 
crisis, in practice electricity shutofs and evictions still occurred (Harrisberg, 2020). 
The city of Cape Town used force to remove squatters from city land, in one high- 
profile case dragging one naked man out of his shack, tearing down makeshift 
dwellings, firing rubber bullets, and burning tents and belongings— this despite the 
fact that the municipality was legally required to provide him an alternative accom-
modation  under the constitution (Flans et al., 2020). Police used stun grenades and 
riot shields to force community health workers who came for a meeting at the East-
ern Cape Department of Health to leave  after the man ag er did not show, and they 
lacked money to go home (Nortier, 2020a). This experience highlights both short- 
sighted  human resource policies and community health workers’ ill treatment by 
the police, which began before the lockdown (van de Ruit and Breckenridge, 2019).
The lockdown was instituted on March 27, 2020, on the day that the coun-
try reported its first death and 243 new cases had been reported in a single day. 
 After that, new COVID-19 case numbers dropped rapidly and remained steady at 
between 50 to 70 new cases a day (Harding, 2020; Nordling, 2020a). Even though 
epidemiologists had predicted South Africa’s caseload to grow to 4,000 by April 2 
(Nordling, 2020a), by that date it had recorded just 1,380 cases. By the end of 
April 2020, South Africa had reported 5,647 cases and 103 deaths from COVID-19 
(Ritchie et al., 2020). Many credited the country’s aggressive lockdown mea sures 
for initially helping to “flatten the curve.” As Minister of Health Zweli Mkhize 
reported, the lockdown created “a physical barrier that prevents the virus from 
moving” (quoted in Toyana, 2020). And by some estimates, the lockdown may 
have reduced the infection rate by as much as 60% (Toyana, 2020), saving more 
than 20,000 lives (Evans, 2020). Murders and road accidents  were also down as a 
result of the lockdown (Mbalula, 2020; Singh, 2020).
Aside from the efect of the lockdown, a number of theories for why the pan-
demic did not play out the way experts expected initially included the fact that 
nearly all citizens had been given an anti- TB Bacille Calmette- Guérin (BCG) vac-
cine at birth, the efect of AIDS medi cation on the virus, and enzymes pre sent 
in certain population groups (Harding, 2020). Other theories suggested that the 
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lower epidemiological trajectory could be a product of missing cases  because 
of inadequate testing (Karim, 2020a). However, the lion’s share of praise for the 
country’s having avoided a worse crisis, at least initially, was reserved for the gov-
ernment lockdown that slowed the spread of the virus. The Acad emy of Science of 
South Africa stated that the “strong, science- based governmental leadership has 
saved many lives for which South Africa can be thankful” (Acad emy of Science, 
2020). John Nkengasong, the director of the Africa Centres for Disease Control 
and Prevention, stated, “What South Africa has done is impressive, absolutely” 
(quoted in Mogotsi & Bearak, 2020).
Using the Time to Prepare
Dr. Salim Abdool Karim, the chair of South Africa’s COVID-19 advisory group 
and a veteran AIDS scientist, likened South Africa’s response— unfolding as the 
virus spread across the country—to “sailing a ship while building it” (Karim, 
2020b). The lockdown was the first and most impor tant piece of the response, 
as it “bought us some time to become more proactive” (Nordling, 2020a). South 
Africa used that time to build field hospitals and overflow beds. As infections  later 
began to surge, the Nasrec Expo Centre, originally slated to be a quarantine fa cil-
i ty, was turned into a treatment center with more than one thousand beds, stafed 
by volunteers, with one hundred oxygen concentrators donated by the private 
sector (Smillie, 2020). However, in a country as unequal as South Africa in a crisis 
so large, donations would not be the only way in which the private sector would 
come to play a role in the coronavirus response.
South Africa has shortage of more than twelve thousand healthcare workers 
(Ramaphosa, 2020). Around 70  percent of the country’s intensive care unit beds 
and doctors and half the nation’s health expenditure  were concentrated in the pri-
vate sector, even though it served between 15  percent and 16  percent of the popu-
lation (Benatar, 2020; Caincross et al., 2020). Although more than 80  percent of 
South Africans lack health insurance (or medical schemes) (Karim, 2020b), South 
Africa’s National Health Insurance program envisioned that the country’s citizens 
would one day be able to use the resources of the country’s private health facili-
ties (Harris, 2017). COVID-19 accelerated some negotiations between the govern-
ment and the private sector around, for example, the cost of a critical care bed in 
a private fa cil i ty, at rates that  were reduced for the crisis; however, in the context 
of a crisis that involved immediate needs, the outcome of  these negotiations  were 
not always beneficial to the longer- term proj ect of health equity envisioned by 
national health insurance (Cleary, 2020).
Even though significant questions remained about where the money would 
come from and what happened when the money ran out, the Western Cape 
became the first province to purchase three hundred beds from the private sec-
tor (Cleary, 2020), ofering a “template for other provinces” (South Africa Private 
Practioners Forum quoted in Caincross et al., 2020). Critics, however, called the 
pro cess flawed, and argued that it “adds to, rather than eases, existing challenges 
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to equitable healthcare in our fragile society” (Benatar, 2020). With some pri-
vate practices seeing declines in doctor visits by as much as 80   percent from 
COVID-19, some private providers also sought greater security by proposing a 
plan to medical schemes (the country’s private health insurers) that would guar-
antee at least 70  percent of their 2019 income through 2021 (Gonzales, 2020a).
In addition to its work with the private sector, the government found an 
impor tant role for more than twenty- eight thousand community health work-
ers in the country’s coronavirus response,  going door to door in communities, 
screening more than eleven million  people, approximately 20  percent of the coun-
try’s population, and referring more than seventy thousand for testing (Karim, 
2020b; Wild, 2020). According to Salim Abdool Karim, “Only South Africa has 
done [community testing on such a wide scale]” (quoted in Mogotsi & Bearak, 
2020). The government has also integrated technology into its response, rede-
signing an antipoaching tool to collect data on coronavirus and alert authorities 
with the address of an infected person so that they can begin contact tracing 
(Wild, 2020).
The government also planned for randomized screening in schools and hos-
pitals and trained a small army of community healthcare workers to screen and 
refer patients for testing in the country’s villages and towns in a bid to “stop 
small flare- ups from turning into large wildfires of infection” (Nordling, 2020a). 
It acquired personal protective equipment (PPE) and ventilators (Muller, 2020) 
and received assistance from more than two hundred Cuban doctors, some of 
whom had experience fighting Ebola in other parts of Africa and cholera in Haiti 
(Magome & Meldrum, 2020).
A consequence of having the largest HIV epidemic in the world (at close to 
eight million) and one of the world’s largest TB burdens (with TB the country’s 
leading cause of death), South Africa’s laboratories  were accustomed to perform-
ing more than fifty thousand HIV viral load tests per day (Karim & Karim, 2020). 
When the novel coronavirus arrived, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing, 
originally developed for HIV and TB, became an integral part of COVID-19 test-
ing (Karim & Karim, 2020). A testing system for coronavirus was developed using 
one the country had been using for TB, called GeneXpert (Mogotsi & Bearak, 
2020). The government relied on the laboratory infrastructure that it used to 
monitor HIV and TB for coronavirus testing and hosted more than 180 testing 
sites (Wild, 2020). Contract tracing teams that had originally been formed for 
controlling TB and community health workers working on HIV  were redeployed 
for the coronavirus response (Karim, 2020b).
Challenges in the Response
When the country’s first case was reported, the National Health Laboratory 
Ser vices (NHLS) took over responsibility for testing from the NICD (Mail and 
Guardian Data Desk, 2020). Although 40,000 tests  were performed in March, 
allegations of a testing backlog of around 6,000  were met with blanket denials 
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by NHLS (Mail and Guardian Data Desk, 2020). Targeted testing in Cape Town 
began on April 7 (Wroughton & Bearak 2020). More than 170,000 South Afri-
cans had been tested by April 27 (Magome & Meldrum, 2020) and 340,000 by 
May 12 with 16,000 tests administered daily (Wild, 2020), although this amount 
represented only about half the goal of 30,000  people per day set by the NHLS to 
achieve by the end of April (Mogotsi & Bearak, 2020).  Because of a global short-
age of test kits, substantial testing backlogs developed of around 15,000 in Johan-
nesburg and 11,000 in the Western Cape by mid- to late May (Wroughton & Bearak, 
2020).  After maintaining  there  were no backlogs for weeks, the NHLS admitted 
that the national backlog was more than 80,000 tests (Mail and Guardian Data 
Desk, 2020). The backlog in testing meant that results  were taking from six to 
ten days, which crippled the country’s ability to do contact tracing efectively 
(Wroughton & Bearak, 2020).
Just as significant a prob lem as the lack of testing was the fact that, even with 
the extra time that the lockdown provided to prepare,  because of the global short-
age, some provinces still lacked necessary PPE and remained woefully unprepared 
for the surge in infections. Even  after spending R 78 million (US$4.7 million) on 
PPE, the Eastern Cape still faced a shortage (Mail and Guardian Data Desk et al., 
2020). Nationally, a spokesman for the Demo cratic Nursing Organisation of 
South Africa called PPE availability “extremely poor and disappointing” (Gilili, 
2020). The efect of this lack of PPE on healthcare workers was substantial: by 
July 24, more than thirteen thousand healthcare workers  were infected, and one 
hundred had died (Agence France- Presse, 2020).
A report by Eastern Cape’s COVID-19 Command Council read, “It would 
appear from the data that the lockdown did not produce the required increase in 
capacity” (quoted in Mail and Guardian Data Desk et al., 2020). Amid a surge of 
infections, overwhelmed government clinics in the Eastern Cape’s Mandela Bay 
area closed, with staf not reporting for work at a hospital in Zwide, leading to 
further strain on the health system (Majavu, 2020a). An emergency room doctor 
at Zwide’s Dora Nginza Hospital remarked, “The Eastern Cape Department of 
Health is in crisis. The ship has long sunk.  There are corpses inside the hospital—
it is smelling,  there is no  human dignity. It is overcrowded . . .  Our  people are 
lying like dogs  here inside” (quoted in Majavu, 2020a). More than one thousand 
critical care beds  were still projected to be needed to manage the surge in August 
and September 2020 in the Eastern Cape alone (Nortier, 2020b). One opposition 
member of parliament remarked, “Mkhize told the country the health sector was 
ready for Covid when it  wasn’t” (quoted in Merten, 2020).
In addition, allegations of corruption and mismanagement dogged some 
money intended for coronavirus relief. The Eastern Cape Health Department 
intended to use R 10 million to purchase motorcycles with sidecars for sick 
patients, a move that was immediately criticized for its appropriateness in bumpy, 
rainy terrain. The provincial government then suggested the motorcycles  were for 
tracing teams before awarding a tender for one hundred mobile clinics but then 
never paid for the clinics (Majavu, 2020b).
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Backlash from the Lockdown
Although the National Acad emy of Science had publicly stated its approval for the 
science- based decision- making of the government, by mid- April 2020 concern, 
and  later criticism, over the science that guided the government’s approach began 
to surface. Even though some projections from the original model that guided 
government policy had been leaked to press in mid- March 2020, the chair of the 
Minister of Health’s Advisory Committee, Salim Abdool Karim, ofered no infor-
mation on projected numbers of infections, admissions, or deaths at a briefing 
in mid- April, with the numbers kept from the public “to avoid panic” (quoted in 
Muller, 2020). However, the pre sen ta tion recognized that the “population  will be 
at high risk again  after the lockdown” (Karim, 2020a). As of mid- May 2020, some 
outside analysts  were contending that the government’s coronavirus numbers 
 were “ ‘implausibly’ low” and calling the government out on its lack of transpar-
ency (Wild, 2020). Alex van den Heever, an economist from the University of Wit-
watersrand, remarked, “That is not how you manage an epidemic. You manage an 
epidemic by being more open, more demo cratic and allowing for critical review 
and comment” (quoted in Wild, 2020). It was not  until the end of May 2020 that 
the government began releasing details on its models (Muller, 2020).
Shabhir Madhi, a past head of NICD and a former head of the Medical Research 
Council, argued that “the [initial SACEMA] modelling of how many  people would 
contract Covid-19 and die was ‘flawed and illogical and made wild assumptions,’ ” 
issues he had apparently raised with the modelers at the beginning (quoted in 
Child, 2020a). The frightening initial figures forecast more than 350,000 deaths, 
which was ten times the number of  people who die of TB in South Africa annually 
(28,678 in 2017) (Child, 2020a). Madhi himself projected 25,000 deaths this year 
and 43,000 over two (Child, 2020a). Another updated model in mid- May 2020 
predicted that the country could see as many as 50,000 deaths and 3 million infec-
tions by year’s end (Toyana, 2020).
Social Policy Responses
Debates raged among scientists over the epidemiological projections that informed 
the government’s response in a country where the poor make up half the popula-
tion and which had historically experienced unemployment rates between 25 and 
50  percent. Meanwhile, lockdown of the continent’s most industrialized economy 
also began to provoke strong reaction from society more broadly. Initially, some 
experts projected economic contraction of as much as 6  percent with more than 
a million jobs lost, with other projections half that (Child, 2020a; Zane, 2020). Of 
even greater concern was the lack of indication that the government had formulated 
a plan for critical emergency relief when the lockdown began; school feeding pro-
grams, which had provided meals for nine million  children on a daily basis, simply 
shut down without any plan to fill the gap that was created (Seekings, 2020d, p. 12).
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To address the economic devastation, in late April, President Ramaphosa 
announced a R 500 billion (US$26.64 billion) stimulus package, with approxi-
mately 10  percent of the package earmarked for the poor and unemployed (Cocks, 
2020; Zane, 2020).  These new programs stood on top of the country’s social grant 
system, known to be one of the largest in the world and included increases to the 
country’s existing Child Support Grants, Older Persons’ Grants, and Disability 
Grants, in addition to the introduction of a new COVID-19 emergency grant and 
food parcel distribution (Seekings, 2020a). However, the programs’ slow rollout 
(a bud get was not tabled  until June 24, 2020) and the smaller amount earmarked 
for the program (R 40 billion for social grants, rather than the R 50 billion origi-
nally promised by Ramaphosa) disappointed many (Webster, 2020a). Rapid roll-
out of a new COVID emergency grant fell prey to implementation prob lems, 
with just 120,000 paid out by the end of May 2020 and the scope of the program 
reduced to 3.5 million from 8 million originally (Seekings, 2020d, p. 41). For many 
of the country’s poor, this meant emergency relief hinged entirely on the delivery 
of food parcels, whose total number (including  those financed and distributed 
by civil society groups, which  were the lion’s share) is estimated to have been 
between 105,000 and 1 million, well below the 6 million that  were needed over 
three months (Seekings, 2020c, pp. 18–19, 21; Seekings, 2020d, p. 42).
In mid- June 2020 President Ramaphosa announced a new six- month, means- 
tested coronavirus unemployment grant of R 350 (US$21) through October along 
with the distribution of 250,000 food packages (“Coronavirus South Africa: How 
to apply for unemployment grant,” 2020). Together, the temporary unemploy-
ment insurance program and the new and enhanced social assistance mea sures 
aimed to expand financial support to between one- half to two- thirds of the popu-
lation (Seekings, 2020d). Beset by new funding needs, South Africa applied for a R 
73 billion (US$4.2 billion) loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)— its 
first in twenty- six years; the loan, equivalent to 1.4  percent of the gross domestic 
product would finance  under 10  percent of the year’s bud get, the need for a much 
larger stimulus notwithstanding (Gqubule, 2020).
Economists such as Seán Muller of the University of Johannesburg argued, 
“The most glaring failure of the government in its Covid-19 response was that it 
did not conceive that greater social protection spending would be needed when it 
implemented the lockdown” (quoted in Webster, 2020a). The impact on the coun-
try’s poor and vulnerable also made for particularly pitched  battles among po liti cal 
parties competing for constituents. Julius Malema, head of the populist Economic 
Freedom Fighters, criticized the governing ANC for focusing the aid too much on 
Whites and the wealthy: “Our government . . .  loves to keep white  people happy 
and safe, even at the expense of Africans . . .  Even when they want to be in self- 
isolation, our  people do not have spacious  houses to isolate into  because they stay 
in shacks. Even when they want to keep maximum hygiene . . .  they do not have 
access to clean  water” (quoted in Cocks, 2020).
The most robust estimates of the impact of COVID-19 on employment and job 
loss  were released two and a half months  later in mid- July as part of the National 
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Income Dynamics Study— Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey (NIDS- CRAM). 
The study found that the impacts  were even more catastrophic than  earlier pre-
dictions, with three million jobs lost as a result of COVID-19, 20  percent of them 
permanently (Webster, 2020b). The crisis had pushed nearly a third of  those 
now out of work into poverty, which translated into three million  people when 
their dependents  were included, with Blacks,  women, and the poor hardest hit 
(Webster, 2020b). Moreover, the study found that the COVID-19 Temporary 
Employee/Employer Relief Scheme set up to benefit the unemployed benefited 
just 20  percent of its target population, with domestic workers and farm workers 
among the excluded (Cabe, 2020; Webster, 2020b). Had grants such as  these been 
put in place from the start of the crisis, rather than at April’s end, poverty could 
have been reduced by as much as 40  percent (Webster, 2020b).
Many  were also unhappy with the country’s ban on cigarettes and alcohol as 
part of the lockdown. However, the prob lem of hunger loomed even larger: even 
before the pandemic, up to 14 million  people faced food shortages in South Africa 
(Seekings, 2020b). Hunger is ultimately what led more than 500  people without 
masks to stand in line to receive food parcels in the community of Makause in 
eastern Gauteng (Nyoka, 2020). The lockdown forced food sellers in the informal 
sector, who provided food to many, to close, at the same time that food prices 
 rose (Bassier et  al., 2020). As activist General Alfred Moyo reported, “ People 
no longer cared about sanitisers, toilet paper or  water and soap, they  were now 
worried about stomach and food” (quoted in Nyoka, 2020). Even the chair of the 
South African Medical Research Council, Glenda Gray, lambasted the adminis-
tration over the efect of the lockdown on malnutrition, and Groote Schuur Hos-
pital’s head of infectious diseases and HIV medicine argued that the lockdown 
was “ doing more harm than good” (quoted in Karrim & Evans, 2020). The Health 
Minister’s response to Gray was to issue a detailed point- by- point statement say-
ing that it was “devoid of the truth” (Mkhize, 2020).
By late May, the president conceded that “the current lockdown could not be 
sustained in defi nitely” and announced an easing of restrictions to level three, even 
as the “numbers  will rise even further and even faster,” which they did (quoted in 
“Coronavirus in South Africa: President,” 2020) (Figure 32.1).
At level three, the country’s economy would begin to reopen. However, res-
taurants, hair salons, and bars would remain closed along with restrictions to air 
travel and public gatherings (“Ramaphosa: South Africa Coronavirus Lockdown to 
Ease from June 1,” 2020). Further amendments allowed theatres, galleries, cinemas, 
libraries, and casinos to open with space and capacity restrictions (Mafolo, 2020). 
At level three, more than 500,000  people would be allowed to return to work (Ellis, 
2020). However, some businesses that  were to remain closed, including restaurants 
and cafes, or ga nized protests by opening, supported by the Demo cratic Alliance, 
in opposition to the closure  orders by the ANC; the police fired  water cannons into 
the businesses to close them (Williams, 2020).
The decision to open the economy before the epidemic peaked went against 
the counsel of the WHO (Smith & Coleman, 2020), and the potential for dif er ent 
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regions of the country returning to level four or five restrictions remained (“Rama-
phosa: South Africa Coronavirus Lockdown to Ease from June 1,” 2020). But so 
committed to reopening was the government that it successfully fought a  legal 
challenge that sought to prevent schools from reopening on the grounds of the 
danger posed to students and teachers (Magome, 2020). When the initial phase of 
school reopening began in June 2020 for grades 7 and 12, only students from  those 
grades received meals, despite the school feeding schemes having been fully bud-
geted and planned for (“ There Is No School Feeding,” 2020). This led to a lawsuit 
by Section 27 and the Equal Education Law Centre, supported by an affidavit from 
the Director of University of Capetown’s Centre for Social Science Research, on 
behalf of students and other concerned parties that aimed to force the government 
to reopen food programs to all students,  because access to food and  water was a 
constitutional right (“We Do Not Have Enough Food,” 2020). The High Court of 
Gauteng recognized this right and required the government to bring back the 
National School Nutrition Program, which provided schoolchildren a meal each 
day (Nortier, 2020a). By mid- July, in spite of the sharply rising number of cases and 
against the advice of the Colleges of Medicine of South Africa, new regulations 
issued by President Ramaphosa and the cabinet allowed taxi bus operators to 
take passengers at 100  percent capacity for short distances with ventilation and 
70   percent for long distances (Simelane, 2020). Notably, at this time, scientists 
stood less frequently alongside Ramaphosa at press conferences.
In spite of the administration’s growing disagreements with scientists over 
reopening plans, the country’s main opposition party, the Demo cratic Alliance 
argued that the move to level three came “six weeks too late” (“Ramaphosa: South 
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Figure 32.1. COVID-19 Cases and All- Cause Excess Mortality in South Africa.
Source: Johns Hopkins University Center for Systems Science and Engineering COVID-19 
Data and the Financial Times, 2020.
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decision in early June declared the third and fourth levels of South Africa’s five- 
part COVID-19 restrictions unconstitutional and gave the government fourteen 
days to comply (Mayberry et al., 2020). While the courts  were dissembling the 
government’s ability to impose restrictions and lockdown restrictions  were being 
eased, viral transmission was ramping up, with the country experiencing its larg-
est case numbers to date the first week of June (Scott, 2020). The government 
filed an appeal of the judgment immediately (Rabkin, 2020). The cabinet once 
again closed schools for four weeks, July 27, 2020, to August 24, 2020,  because of 
a rising surge of infections (Macupe & Kiewit, 2020). However, the closure went 
against the recommendations of the chair of the country’s COVID-19 Advisory 
Committee on the grounds that it posed  little risk to them (“Karim Explains Why 
Schools Should Remain Open,” 2020).
Direct and Indirect Health Effects
Like the UK’s original Imperial Model, South Africa’s model originally projected far 
more death and devastation than initially played out.  Toward the end of May, the 
country had the largest number of cases on the continent at 21,343 but had fewer 
deaths than Algeria or Egypt at 407 (“Coronavirus in South Africa: Outbreak,” 
2020). Early on, the majority of cases  were centered in Durban and Johannesburg, 
but over time that began to change (Wroughton & Bearak, 2020). As of mid to late 
May, approximately 60   percent of the country’s cases at that time  were in Cape 
Town, largely a function of exposure to tourists from coronavirus hotspots in other 
parts of the world and superspreading events that had occurred at a phar ma ceu-
ti cal factory and two grocery stores; the working class, predominantly mixed race 
community of Tygerberg and majority black Khayelitsha  were the hardest hit parts 
of the city (Wroughton & Bearak, 2020). By the end of July 2020, Gauteng prov-
ince had the largest number of cases, with Western Cape, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu- 
Natal following; case numbers in the country’s other provinces remained at or 
below 22,000 (Department of Health and National Institute for Communicable 
Diseases, 2020). However, KwaZulu- Natal was quickly becoming the country’s 
new epicenter of the disease, with regular new infections of 3,000 or more daily; 
despite  there being a regulation against them, large funerals— some larger than 
1,000  people— were a driver of spread (Harper, 2020; Smit & Kiewit, 2020).
The inability to stem the spread of infection and the lack of efective testing 
and tracing was eventually reflected in the country’s death toll. A report by the 
South African Medical Research Council found  there to be 17,000 more deaths 
than normal (“excess deaths”) between early May and mid- July 2020, suggesting 
that official statistics that had found approximately 6,800 COVID-19 deaths at 
that time might be dramatically underreporting the true total (Nortier, 2020b). By 
mid- September 2020, the number of excess deaths reported between May 6 and 
September 8 stood at 44,467, whereas the officially reported number of deaths 
attributed to COVID stood at just  under 16,000, suggesting that the true total of 
devastation was much higher than officially reported (Bradshaw et al., 2020).
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With a full fifth of the world’s HIV and TB cases (Mogotsi & Bearak, 2020), 
a significant concern for South Africans was the role that compromised immune 
systems might play in facilitating the spread of infection and death (Toyana, 2020). 
The NIDS- CRAM study found that fear of contracting COVID-19 had led to dra-
matic increases in the number of patients needing acute healthcare who de cided 
to forego it and the number of patients who  were unable to access medi cation and 
contraceptives, as well as a sharp decrease in the number of  women and  mothers 
who visited healthcare facilities (Mmotla, 2020). A separate survey by the  Human 
Sciences Research Council found access to medicine to be a par tic u lar prob lem in 
informal settlements; HIV viral load and TB testing  were also both down, some 
by as much as 50  percent (Gonzales, 2020b; Bekker, 2020). In May 2020 alone, 
in Gauteng province, twelve thousand TB and HIV patients did not collect their 
medi cation (Mmotla, 2020), a development that could not only impact individual 
patients’ health but also contribute to drug re sis tance and the country’s ability to 
finance more expensive second- and third- line treatments.
The disruption of HIV treatment in sub- Saharan Africa more generally was 
projected to lead to a half a million AIDS deaths between 2020 and 2021 (Gon-
zales, 2020b). In addition,  there was a growing possibility that the country would 
face additional threats from other diseases. Fewer  vaccinations for diseases such 
as measles  were also taking place during the lockdown (Child, 2020a).  People 
locked down in crowded conditions also meant the potential for easy spread of 
TB (Blumberg et al., 2020).
Explanation of Policy Choices
The insulation that allowed the ANC to ignore social pressure and promote deni-
alist policies at odds with mainstream science to devastating efect  under the 
Mbeki administration is no longer. In the context of heightened po liti cal competi-
tion, the Ramaphosa administration heeded the advice of scientists and medical 
professionals and took aggressive mea sures to curb spread of the virus initially. 
Although the assumptions  behind the epidemiological models that guided the 
government response ultimately proved to be flawed, the lockdown still bought 
the government time to shore up its health system to respond to the novel threat 
posed by the coronavirus. Some of the shortages in beds, PPE, and workers that 
did become evident are less ascribable to weaknesses in the administration’s 
response, rather than to historical underinvestment in public health infrastruc-
ture and workforce. However, the administration’s lack of plan to address hunger, 
access to medicine, and economic devastation and slow implementation allowed 
pressure for reopening to build. Over time, as more and more pressure built, a 
larger and larger schism developed between the administration and the scientists 
advising it. The decision to reopen before the epidemic had peaked— against the 
advice of the WHO— led to a surge of infections that has mired the country in 
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an outbreak whose epicenter has moved from the country’s largest cities to the 
periphery and, in the  future, likely back again.
Although the party’s increased exposure to po liti cal competition made it more 
receptive to science initially, as of this writing,  these external pressures have not 
yet been strong enough to sustain that receptivity, nor have they been sufficient 
to resolve the party’s susceptibility to corruption, even  under a new leadership 
that had envisioned a decisive break from the Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki eras. 
The country’s coronavirus response itself became marred by major corruption 
scandals that have included the president’s own spokeswoman, with desperately 
needed food parcels and unemployment insurance money being siphoned of to 
po liti cal cronies while citizens go hungry (Chutel, 2020). A lack of state capacity 
and a decentralized federalist system have complicated the response further, mak-
ing a response that has been far from perfect more uneven.
Conclusion
The case of South Africa lays bare the complexities and pressures that leaders face 
who are governing countries in which a significant proportion of the population is 
vulnerable  because of poverty. The additional vulnerability posed by the country’s 
sizable TB and HIV epidemics made the South African population susceptible to 
more fatal cases of coronavirus. Officials had to balance the need for lockdown 
to stem spread of a virus with the need to ensure that the population has access 
to food and lifesaving medicine in the broader context of resource constraints. 
A  great failure of the Ramaphosa government’s response was an inability to plan 
for and then implement rapidly and efectively programs to serve  these predict-
able needs. In fact,  there is some strong evidence that the government’s policy- 
making in  these impor tant areas actually represented steps backward. With the 
closure of school nutrition programs when schools shuttered, the “total volume of 
food distributed to the poor  under three months of lockdown was small compared 
to the total volume distributed ordinarily” (Seekings, 2020d, p. 42, italics added). 
This lack of planning amounted to a “comprehensive failure to ensure that poor 
South Africans could access food during the lockdown,” leaving civil society to 
scramble to address citizen needs in the wake of government failure (Seekings, 
2020c, p. 1).
In this, the Ramaphosa and Mbeki administrations may have more in com-
mon than at first seems apparent. Both leaders recognized the need to address 
issues related to poverty when the country was grappling with the crisis posed 
by a pandemic. Although Thabo Mbeki is rightly criticized for the death and 
devastation his AIDS denialism wrought, he is also known for having been con-
cerned with the relationship between poverty and health and was an advocate of 
the country’s system of social grants, which are among the most sweeping in the 
world. Yet some of the mea sures that would have paid the largest dividends during 
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COVID-19, such as the basic income grant, failed to materialize. Whereas the 
unconscionable delays  under Mbeki related to rollout of AIDS treatment and 
prophylaxis,  under Ramaphosa the unconscionable delays  were in relation to 
making sure food and income replacement  were provided to  people in desperate 
need, a prob lem that itself hurt the country’s ability to maintain the lockdown. 
A universal basic income grant— which had been promoted by the Concerned 
Africans Forum and Black Sash— eventually came to be part of national policy 
discussions but came  later and did so at a difficult moment (Seekings, 2020c, 
p. 9; “South Africa Is Getting a New Universal Income Grant,” 2020). As other 
work has suggested (van de Ruit & Breckenridge, 2019), contentious public 
interest litigation in the courts can be a critical tool for advancing public health 
in both eras. However, the major lesson from  these epidemics is the need  to 
address basic  human needs and public health concerns efectively at the same 
time.
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 33 coMParative analy sis of covid-19 
transMission and Mortality  
in select african coUntries
Kanayo K. Ogujiuba and Uviwe Binase
COVID-19 cases spread inevitably in countries, ever since the initial 
confirmed cases in November 2019 at China. Although the number of COVID-19 
cases and fatalities may still appear comparatively lower in Africa than in other 
world regions, as of this writing, the looming health shock of COVID-19 has 
adversely afected the continent’s already stressed health systems and could 
quickly turn into a social and economic emergency. Beyond health jeopardies, the 
COVID-19 shock to African economies occurred in three waves: (1) lower trade 
and investment from China in the immediate term; (2) a demand slump associated 
with the lockdowns in the Eu ro pean Union and Organ ization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) countries; and (3) a continental supply shock 
afecting domestic and intra- African trade.
In this chapter, the authors selected case studies by estimating the risk of 
African countries importing a COVID-19 case from China using data on the vol-
ume of air travel from infected Chinese provinces to Africa and the proportion of 
COVID-19 cases in the Chinese provinces as of February 11, 2020. Evidence sug-
gests that Egypt, Algeria, and South Africa  were at the highest risk of importing 
a COVID-19 case from China but had moderate to high preparedness and low 
vulnerability (Gilbert et al., 2020).
 There  were several countries in Africa with slightly lower risk of importing 
a case from China, and their levels of readiness and susceptibility varied. For 
example, Nigeria and Ethiopia had moderate preparedness but high vulnerability, 
and their countries had substantially larger populations that could be potentially 
exposed. However, Morocco, Sudan, Angola, Tanzania, Ghana, and  Kenya had 
similar importation risk and population sizes but variable levels of preparedness 
and high vulnerability (except Morocco, which had low vulnerability). All other 
African countries had low to moderate importation risk with low to moderate 
vulnerability and mostly low preparedness, except for Tunisia and Rwanda.
In this chapter, analy sis focuses on Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt. South 
Africa and Egypt had moderate to high preparedness and low vulnerability, 
whereas Nigeria had moderate preparedness but high vulnerability. Furthermore, 
 these countries are the three biggest economies in Africa. They are dissimilar 
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regarding the governmental regime types but similar in terms of state capacity to 
 handle emergencies and pandemics.
The spike in the total COVID-19 cases became evident beginning in June 2020 
in Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt (Figure 33.1).  These countries had taken steps to 
build systems that would ensure prevention and early detection. To comprehend 
the efect of the COVID-19 pandemic, the public health policies and responses, 
social policies, and an evaluation of strategies used to combat COVID-19 are 
examined.
In comparison of COVID-19 confirmed cases in Nigeria, South Africa, and 
Egypt, Nigeria had the least reported cases and had reached only 1,000 reported 
cases by April  24, 2020 (WHO, 2020a). However, by May  31, 2020, Nigeria 
had 10,000 cases, and by June 17, they had 35,454 total cases. Among the three 
countries, South Africa was the first country to reach 1,000 cases (on March 27, 
2020); Egypt reached this mark on April 3, 2020. On August 5, 2020, Nigeria had 
94,875 confirmed cases. From February  15 to March 4, 2020, South Africa had 
no confirmed COVID-19 cases. The first case was reported on March  5, 2020, 
whereas Nigeria had its first case on February  28, 2020. Total cases increased 
dramatically in South Africa: by May 10, 2020, they had already reached more 
than 10,000 total cases and had more than 100,000 cases by June 22, 2020. South 
Africa reached an all- time high of 546,862 reported cases on August 3. This coun-
try saw a decline in COVID-19 reported cases days  after, dropping to 529,877 on 
August 5. This was not the case for Egypt; they had their first case on February 15 
and their second reported case on March  1, as evident from the Worldometer 
data. However, the International Monetary Fund (2020) reported Egypt’s first 
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Figure 33.1. 2020 (February— August) Total COVID-19 cases in Nigeria, South Africa, and 
Egypt.
Source: Worldometer (2020).
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slight  stability in reported cases days  after whereas an increase was prominent in 
South African reported cases. However, by April 15, 2020, South Africa and Egypt 
both had approximately 2,505 total cases (Nordling, 2020). Nonetheless, subse-
quently Egypt had more cases than South Africa. South Africa had the highest 
confirmed total cases for COVID-19, active cases as well as death cases by July 17, 
2020 (Wikipedia, 2020). However, South Africa and Egypt had overlapping cases 
in some instances, with Egypt having the highest reported cases.
Other countries in Africa have reported lower cases than South Africa, Nige-
ria, and Egypt. As of this writing, ten countries account for close to 80  percent of 
the total tests conducted: South Africa, Morocco, Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana,  Kenya, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, and Mauritius.  There are wide variations in testing 
rates, with South Africa  doing the most and Nigeria  doing relatively few per cap-
ita, according to World in Data, a UK- based proj ect that collates COVID-19 infor-
mation (Figure 33.2) (Our World in Data, 2020).
By October 11, 2020, South Africa had performed just over 74 tests per 1,000 
 people, as compared with more than 349 in the United Kingdom and 381 in the 
United States. Nigeria carried out just 2.7 tests per 1,000  people by October 13, 
2020. About half of the countries on the continent had a ratio lower than the 
benchmark of  doing at least ten tests for  every positive case, as recommended by 
the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Moreover, in some 
countries,  there are insufficient data available on testing to know how much was 
done (WHO, 2020c). According to Our World in Data (2020), it is evident that 
Egypt had more active cases on March 21, whereas South Africa had more active 
cases  after that date.  There was a decrease in active cases in South Africa  after 
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Figure 33.2. COVID-19 active cases in Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt (February to 
August 2020).
Source: Worldometer (2020).
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similar, whereas active cases in Nigeria  were low. In South Africa,  there  were no 
noticeable recoveries from the first reported case  until March 21, when  there  were 
240 total cases and 238 active cases with no reported deaths (WHO, 2020b). It 
took South Africa approximately sixteen days  after the first confirmed COVID-19 
cases to report a recovered infected individual. Nigeria had its first case on Febru-
ary 28, 2020, as indicated in the above Figure 33.1; the second case was reported 
on March 9, 2020. On March 15, 2020, one infected patient recovered in Nigeria. 
The number of active cases fluctuated, and the predominance of death from the 
virus was evident.
Statistics suggest that the three countries had a decrease in active cases. The high-
est number of active cases in South Africa was 173,590, by June 20, 2020 (National 
Institute for Communicable Diseases [NICD], 2020a);  these cases declined to 
159,833 on July 22, 2020, but increased slightly to 170,537 on July 27. Thereafter, a 
decline in active cases was evident, dropping to 143,313 active cases by August 5, 
2020. In Egypt, active cases decreased from the July 24 to 54,584 and decreased 
further to 42,763 active cases on August 5, 2020. Active cases decreased to 11,672 on 
August 4, although a slight increase was evident August 5 with 11,798 active cases.
Egypt had more death cases when compared to Nigeria and South Africa from 
February 15, 2020,  until July 7, 2020, as South Africa had more death cases. Nigeria 
had its first death case on March 23, 2020, South Africa on March 27, and Egypt 
on March 8. Nigeria reached 100 deaths on May 6, 2020, South Africa on April 29, 
and Egypt on March  8. By July  17, 2020, South Africa reported 4,804 deaths, 
Egypt 4,188, and Nigeria had 772. Reported COVID-19 related deaths continued 
to increase: three weeks  later, on August 5, South Africa had 9,298 total deaths, 
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Figure 33.3. COVID-19 related deaths in Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt (February to 
August 2020).
Source: Worldometer (2020).
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Public Health Policies and Responses (COVID-19) in Nigeria,  
South Africa, and Egypt
Nigeria
To curb the COVID-19 cases, South Africa and Egypt had a similar approach to 
that of Nigeria. The Nigerian Minister of Health, Dr. Osagie Ehanire, said the min-
istry had taken urgent steps to build a stronger system that would ensure pre-
vention, early detection, and prompt response to COVID-19 (Federal Ministry 
of Health, 2020). An isolation center at the University of Abuja with a teaching 
hospital was equipped with a rapid response team and laboratory equipment for 
emergency control. In Nigeria, Lagos had the highest reported number of cases 
(13,097) by July 17, 2020, followed by Federal Capital Territory with 2,761 reported 
cases (Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, 2020b). As cases started to increase in 
Nigeria, it was evident that very sick persons  were being rejected and abandoned 
by hospitals (Federal Ministry of Health, 2020); as a result many died  because they 
received no attention or  were told that  there  were no beds. One of the indicated 
cases of deaths was that of the waiting period of three to six days for results to be 
released that led to some deaths. A side Lab for GeneXpert COVID-19 diagnostic 
machine, which delivers results within an hour, was to be deployed and activated 
at the National Hospital Abuja and the University of Abuja Teaching Hospitals 
to cut down the waiting time (Federal Ministry of Health, 2020). Health work-
ers  were sent for special training for curbing COVID-19 so that they could all be 
prepared and equipped to protect themselves and scale up testing. Furthermore, 
community health workers  were trained to provide health education to the popu-
lation. They  were positioned to explain and help implement and monitor pre-
ventative mea sures such as social distancing, hand hygiene, and cough etiquette 
compliance. Community health workers  were trained to identify signs and symp-
toms among community members to minimize the magnitude of the outbreak 
(Bhaumik et al., 2020).
The national guideline encouraged a safe and dignified burial for  people who 
died from COVID-19 (Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, 2020a), and  family mem-
bers  were not permitted to perform the final burial rites, such as bathing, touch-
ing, or kissing the dead goodbye (Ajisegiri et al., 2020). The general guidelines for 
the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) in management of suspected cases 
of COVID-19 included wearing of masks by suspected or confirmed COVID-19 
patients during triage and when being evaluated; all doctors, nurses, and health 
workers who worked with the suspected cases had to be scrupulous in donning and 
doffing PPE (National Primary Health Care Development Agency, 2020). Emphasis 
was made on the use of PPE even during physical examinations. In cases in which 
 there  were no PPE, a spatial distance of at least 1 meter had to be maintained. None-
theless, the use of gloves did not replace the need for hand hygiene, and gloves 
 were removed  after touching or caring for a patient (National Primary Health Care 
Development Agency, 2020).
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South Africa
South African strategies are evaluated using the risk adjusted strategy (RAS), 
which has five levels.  Under level 5, drastic mea sures are required to contain 
the spread of the virus to save lives.  Under level 4, some of the activities  were 
allowed to resume subject to extreme precautions required to limit community 
transmissions and outbreak. With level 3, restrictions  were eased, including on 
work and social activities to address a high risk of transmission. The SARS- CoV-2 
was transmitted from one person to another through droplet and airborne trans-
mission (National Institute for Communicable Diseases [NICD], 2020a). How-
ever, the exact contribution of each transmission was not fully understood. The 
NICD (2020a) stated that the viral shedding was greatest during the early phase 
of the illness, and some transmissions may have occurred from persons who  were 
asymptomatic or presymptomatic. For this reason, infection prevention and con-
trol mea sures  were recommended.
The South African National Department of Health, the NICD, and provincial 
health departments have structures for responding to outbreaks of communicable 
diseases;  these  were activated to respond to COVID-19 (NICD, 2020a). The patient 
meeting the definition of a suspected case of COVID-19 was sampled and isolated. 
The contact information as well as the SA National ID number was recorded on 
the specimen submission form.  People who  were in contact with the patient  were 
then contacted immediately. Close contacts  were required to self- quarantine and 
self- monitor themselves for at least fourteen days since the last exposure, using 
a symptom- monitoring tool. In some cases, the district outbreak team chose to 
telephonically monitor the close contacts. If the patient was unreachable by cell 
phone, a home visit was done. If the self- quarantined contact started developing 
symptoms, they  were advised to be tested for COVID-19.  Those infected but not 
needing hospitalization for medical reasons  were advised to isolate in their homes.
Egypt
In Egypt, the Health Ministry published a three- stage plan for coronavirus man-
agement that contained required procedures in preparation for the gradual return 
of normal life in the country. From June  1, 2020, the nighttime curfew was an 
hour less, from 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. instead of 6:00 a.m. Delivering lifesaving 
assistance to  those in need, decreasing public fear related to COVID-19 through 
knowledge and awareness, as well as preventing the spread of the virus by sup-
porting good hygiene formed part of the public health mea sures in Egypt (Plan 
International, 2020). Further, the rigidity in governance was vis i ble in the inter-
vention modes deployed in Egypt, which infringed on some  human rights, unlike 
South Africa and Nigeria (Plan International, 2020). In addition, Renu and Scott 
(2020) also indicated that to prove that Egypt had a deeply authoritarian govern-
ment, the government proclaimed its intent to prosecute anyone spreading fake 
news about the pandemic on social media, which raised questions of  whether the 
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authorities had  things to hide. The lack of transparency would possibly reduce 
Egyptians’ willingness to comply with social distancing.
Social Policy and Responses to COVID-19 in Nigeria,  
South Africa, and Egypt
Nigeria
Nigeria was the first African country to report a COVID-19 case late Febru-
ary 2020; however, as of this writing, it has the third highest number of confirmed 
cases of any country. The outbreak led to travel restrictions, which led to full clo-
sure of all international airports and land borders (Nsisong, 2020). To curb the 
virus, in February the Nigerian government set up the Coronavirus Preparedness 
Group. This group represented the Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH), the Office 
of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), World Health Organ ization (WHO), US 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (US- CDC), Pro- Health International 
(PHI), Public Health  England (PHE), and the staf of the Nigeria Centre for Disease 
Control (NCDC). This group assessed and managed the risk of importation of the 
disease to Nigeria while also preparing for early detection and response. Some of 
the mea sures to curb the virus in Nigeria included encouraging staying at home 
and travel bans to and from high- risk countries with COVID-19. In addition, border 
controls, deployment of rapid response teams to all afected states, state- level train-
ing, and capacity building of health personnel on infection, prevention, and disease 
control  were introduced. Other eforts included case management, intensified risk 
communication, community engagement, heightened surveillance, field epidemio-
logical investigations, rapid identification of suspected cases, isolation, diagnosis, 
contact tracing, monitoring, and follow-up of persons of interest (“Global Humani-
tarian Repose Plan for COVID-19,” 2020; NCDC, 2020b; Tijjani & Ma, 2020; UK 
Government, 2020). Further, Nigeria also banned social and religious gatherings, 
schools and businesses  were shut down, and  there  were restrictions in movement 
for nonessential activities.
South Africa
South Africa had the highest reported cases as well as the total COVID-19- related 
deaths when compared to Nigeria and Egypt. Keeping a distance of at least 1.5 to 
2 meters, more especially in clustered areas, was a key part of the social policy in 
South Africa. The use of alcohol- based hand rubs or sanitizer  were advised, as well 
as frequently washing hands (NICD, 2020b).  People  were advised to follow proper 
coughing etiquette to avoid respiratory droplets falling on high- touch surfaces. The 
use of PPE was encouraged, especially masks. In hospitals, ideally visitors  were not 
allowed; exceptions  were made only for caregivers of admitted  children and close 
 family members of patients who  were extremely ill. Visitors  were advised to wear 
surgical masks and  were instructed on hand and cough hygiene as well as social 
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distancing (NICD, 2020b). As of July 12, 2020, the Department of Co- Operative 
Governance and Traditional Afairs’ amended regulation stated the importance of 
wearing a “a) cloth mask, b) a homemade item or c) another appropriate item that 
covers the nose and mouth as a mandatory mea sure whenever in a public place” 
(SACoronavirus, 2020a).  People  were confined to their places of residence from 
9:00 p.m.  until 4:00 a.m. daily except where a person had been granted a permit 
to perform a ser vice  under alert level 3 or was attending to a security or medical 
emergency. Social visits and gathering  were prohibited as well as interprovincial 
traveling. Exceptions in social gatherings  were made for places of worship with fifty 
 people or less, depending on the size of the venue. Funerals  were conducted with 
specific restrictions, which included social distancing and limiting to fifty  people 
or less (SA Coronavirus, 2020a). Furthermore, South Africa implemented struc-
tures for rapid responses to COVID-19 outbreaks (separation of asymptomatic 
individuals potentially exposed to a disease from non- exposed).
Egypt
In Egypt, a three- stage plan for coronavirus management was initiated to curb 
the spread of the virus. The Egyptian government declared a state of emergency 
for three months on April 28, 2020, with ongoing extension. Egypt introduced a 
curfew varying from 5:00 p.m. to 08:00 a.m. for all individuals and businesses, 
including commercial shops, public and private transportation, banks, and gro-
cery stores. Pharmacies, complete closure of entertainment and amusement 
facilities, including sports and youth centers, parks, beaches,  hotels, bars, cof-
fee shops, restaurants, nurseries, schools, universities, and air traffic  were also 
included in the curfew. However, hospitals, medical centers, media outlets, and 
the transportation of medical supplies, petroleum, and food  were exempted from 
the partial lockdown (Salem, 2020). In Egypt between June 14 and 30, 2020, the 
curfew was relaxed from 8:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. for the above- mentioned busi-
nesses as well as transportation of individuals. In July 2020, a gradual reopening 
of the economy occurred. Air travel resumed, as well as restaurants and cafes at 
25  percent capacity. Stores  were open  until 9: 00 p.m., whereas restaurants closed 
at 10:00 p.m. Public places of worship  were also open for daily prayers (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2020).
Explanation of the Policy Choices
 There are few indications suggesting the three governments engaged in complex 
reviews of scientific evidence. It is more likely the initial policies, such as lock-
downs and border closures,  were the result of learning from or emulation of Eu rope 
and the United States. Accordingly, Odubanjo (2020) stated what was missing in 
Nigeria’s current narrative around COVID-19 was a coordinated response across 
the federation. The Federal Ministry of Health and the NCDC  were supposed 
to be the national coordinators, but the states seemed to be making individual 
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decisions. Adepoju (2020) further argued that the absence of accurate data in 
Nigeria  limited the country’s ability to tackle the coronavirus. In addition, the 
country’s politicization of the pandemic and lack of interinstitutional and public 
collaboration  were emerging key challenges.
By contrast, in the beginning of 2020, South African President Cyril Rama-
phosa put forward the idea of “social compact” as a method to consult and build 
consensus for reviving the country’s ailing economy (Kotze, 2020). The South 
African president used the same princi ple when building the broad consensus 
around the national state of disaster to fight COVID-19. Ramaphosa also empha-
sized the inclusive decision- making that was informed by scientific evidence. The 
inclusive decision- making was a method to depoliticize and rationalize decision- 
making to create more national coherence and allow for post- democratic decision- 
making. This approach received a lot of support from the public during the first 
weeks of COVID-19 crisis, although when the restrictions  were scaled down, 
the consensus no longer existed (Kotze, 2020). Kotze (2020) argued that, at first 
glance, decision- making was  simple and was dominated by government, although 
it gradually became more complex as the implications of disaster management 
became clearer. The long- term consensus is said to require a continuous consulta-
tion and sharing of information to sustain enough support for decision- making. 
“Demo cratic openness makes it difficult to achieve long- term consensus posi-
tions” (Kotze, 2020).
Nonetheless, the scenario in Egypt was dif er ent from South Africa and Nigeria. 
Renu and Scott (2020) argued that the Egyptians  were unlikely to challenge their 
government over COVID-19 disruptions at that moment. In Egypt, flights to and 
from China  were suspended even before the first COVID-19 case. By March 24, 
2020, authorities in Egypt had already imposed restrictions.
Despite the mea sures in place to combat the disease, the government faced 
numerous obstacles in trying to mitigate the impact of the pandemic: the po liti-
cal institutions of Egypt are mostly designed to protect the interest of the narrow 
military elite and are poorly positioned to respond to a massive public health 
crisis efectively. As the negative economic impact begun to unfold,  there  were 
signs of dissatisfaction with government policies (Renu & Scott, 2020). Some 
Egyptians criticized the government’s response in mitigating the burden of the 
poor, while  others argued that the authorities had not done enough to contain 
the virus. However, it was also evident from the public’s opinion data in Egypt 
that a majority of Egyptians trusted the state institutions’ response to the virus 
(Renu & Scott, 2020). However, the Egyptians’ trust in government may not be 
deserved:  there  were indications that the authorities had downplayed the sever-
ity of the outbreak.
Unlike in the United States, policy responses in South Africa, Nigeria, and 
Egypt to the virus did not become a partisan issue. Albeit the three countries dif-
fer along partisan identities, but the general directions of government mea sures as 
well as the severity of the health risk itself  were subject to general cross- party con-
sensus. In South Africa and Nigeria, po liti cal opposition was not directed  toward 
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public health mea sures introduced by the government, but  there  were vis i ble dif-
fer ent voices in Egypt  because of the unpredictable po liti cal nature of the country.
Although many argue that regime type and state health capacity are the major 
 causes of government responses to crises,  these did not appear to be the vital 
 factors afecting how decisively most governments acted to diminish COVID-19 
efects in sub- Saharan Africa. In fact, one of the foremost reasons for comparing 
South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt is that they difer in terms of governance struc-
ture and health capacity of the state. Regarding regime type, Egypt has consis-
tently been characterized as an authoritarian regime, whereas South Africa and 
Nigeria are categorized as demo cratic. When it comes to state capacity for health, 
which we hypothesize along two scopes (administration and fiscal resources), 
 there is a  great disparity across  these three countries. South Africa has a high 
degree of state health capacity, given its level of development and national struc-
ture of decision- making as well access to resources. Egypt and Nigeria have a 
medium degree of state health capacity, somewhat centralized government with 
inadequate fiscal resources. Regime type and state capacity do not explain the 
early relaxation health policy mea sures by governments in all three countries. 
Economic conditions seem to be the key  factor influencing the extent to which 
each country could adopt social policies but also their willingness and ability to 
maintain lockdowns.
Although South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt vary according to regime type and 
state capacity, what they do have in common is a weak healthcare system. As in 
many other parts of sub- Saharan Africa, weak public healthcare systems meant 
that during the COVID-19 pandemic, citizens lacked access to diagnostic tests and 
quality medical care, and medical workers  were particularly vulnerable to infection. 
COVID-19 exposed the fragility of the underdeveloped and neglected healthcare 
systems and established the need for further health systems strengthening across 
the African region. Largely, weak health infrastructure was detrimental to their 
ability to combat COVID-19. Arguably, the weak healthcare infrastructure prior 
to the COVID-19 pandemic and the already precarious economic situation con-
tributed to the surge in cases in South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt. Although  these 
countries  were able to all react speedily early on, the extended lockdowns  were not 
sustainable, and the healthcare systems  were not strong enough to efectively deal 
with the swift upsurge in infections. South Africa had a more decisive leadership 
that stood on sound and contextual scientific, economic, and social advice, not 
po liti cal expediency, which was key to accelerate containment and recovery. This 
scenario played a role in the dif er ent results among the three countries. Further, 
full lockdowns  were not enforced in Egypt and Nigeria, as was the case in South 
Africa. The lockdowns  were not sustained in Egypt and Nigeria for more than a 
 couple of weeks, even with some social protection. Strong willingness to adopt and 
deploy new technologies played to South Africa’s advantage. South Africa estab-
lished early response mechanisms supported by an innovation- friendly regulatory 
framework, sound infrastructure, and adequate funding to operationalize such 
plans. This dimension was not so vis i ble in Egypt and Nigeria.
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Conclusion
Some countries within the region implemented mea sures to keep economies buoy-
ant  because of COVID-19. For example, apart from slightly reducing the supply of 
oil, Nigeria instituted several stimulus packages to abate the efect of COVID-19 on 
the most susceptible sectors of their economy. Similar actions  were taken by other 
countries, including Egypt, Ghana,  Kenya, Senegal, and South Africa. The net fall 
in GDP among  these countries is marginal; however, being among the continent’s 
biggest economies, a small decrease in their GDP had a higher domestic influence 
overall than a larger loss in GDP in smaller economies. Of the six African coun-
tries (South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt,  Kenya, Ghana, and Senegal) with the greatest 
number of registered COVID-19 cases, a significant drop in revenue was observed 
only for Egypt (–10.6%), which is hypothetically an efect of the plunge in oil prices.
The three countries had divergent approaches in containing the spread of the 
virus. Nonetheless, COVID-19 cases increased as well in many other countries 
in sub- Saharan Africa, showing the inadequacies inherent in health infrastruc-
tures in the region. Albeit,  because of intervention modes, the curve gradually 
flattened in Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt more so than in other African coun-
tries. Nonetheless, South Africa had early responses that built strategic stocks for 
healthcare emergencies better than Egypt and Nigeria, which made it stand out 
in terms of per for mance. In all the studied countries the strategies for combating 
COVID-19 are reviewed to ensure that a single integrated view exists that elimi-
nates unnecessary fragmentations and overlapping.  These strategies are evaluated 
based on the efect they have on the economy as well as the number of recover-
ies and deaths. Moving from one level or stage is one of the methods used in the 
studied countries to slightly move to normal. It has been evident in the reported 
statistics that South Africa (NICD, 2020a) had the highest reported cases. As they 
lifted their lockdown restrictions, the cases of COVID-19 increased.
South Africa moved from level 2 to level 1 in their lockdown procedures.  Under 
level 1, most activities resumed with precautions and health guidelines followed at 
all times (SA Coronavirus, 2020b). Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria further eased 
restrictions with maintenance of physical distancing and restrictions on some lei-
sure and social activities to prevent a resurgence of the virus. The procedures for 
curbing the COVID-19 pandemic varied in each of the studied countries, and the 
level of infections in each country difered as well as the number of death cases.
Easing of restrictions in some other African countries saw an increase in con-
firmed cases. The results from the three case studies of Egypt, Nigeria, and South 
Africa indicate that the level of infections in each country and the number of 
deaths was vastly dif er ent, in part  because of the dissimilar procedures for curb-
ing COVID-19. This diference is a consequence of enforcement of health and 
safety mea sures and healthcare capacity of the countries. Thus, the need to rein-
force national public health capabilities and infrastructure became imperative. 
 These  factors remain at the core of global health security,  because they are the first 
line of defense in infectious disease emergencies.
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Summarily, COVID-19 cases tested the capacity of healthcare systems in the 
three countries. COVID-19 meant that all healthcare centers had to adjust to the 
new norm without alienating  those patients that had other under lying sicknesses 
besides COVID-19. The increase in COVID-19 cases as well as deaths brought too 
much pressure to healthcare centers. Healthcare workers had to treat patients and 
follow the necessary precautions for their safety in light of the shortage of PPE 
across South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt. Educating  people thoroughly about the 
impor tant mea sures to curb the virus played a key role in efectively dealing with 
the virus, especially with  those living with existing health conditions and  those 
residing in disadvantaged areas. Greater capacities to test, protect, treat, and cure 
 were essential to success.
On the socioeconomic front, policy mea sures  were needed to cushion income 
and job losses, as well as tackling specific challenges for the weak economy. Beyond 
the immediate response, recovery strategies should include a strong structural 
component to reduce dependence on external financial flows and global markets 
and develop more value- adding, knowledge- intensive, and industrialized econo-
mies, underpinned by a more competitive and efficient ser vices sector.
Specific steps are needed to deal with a pandemic.  After reviewing the cases 
of Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa, the authors of this chapter recommend the 
following for pandemic management:
1. Flexibility (regime type) in governance is encouraged to produce better 
results in pandemics. Countries need to share ideas of procedures followed 
to fight the pandemic.
2. Unity of purpose by all agents of State is the most impor tant  factor during 
times of crisis.
3. Mass education helps curb the incidence of COVID-19 cases.
4. Increasing health capacity and continuing with practicing the healthy pre-
cautions should be mandatory to avoid resurgence. It is evident that South 
Africa had more focus on  these than Egypt and Nigeria. However, all three 
countries did see a decrease in COVID-19 confirmed cases.
5. Crisis management plans should be ready in each African country, and 
involvement of the international community should catalyze such prepared-
ness. Further, promoting multiple helix partnerships to unlock  innovative 
capacity across sectors and exploring the use of emerging technologies have 
become imperative.
6. In the longer term, Africa  will need to build productive capacities to address 
fundamental economic susceptibilities and boost continental competencies 
to manage crises.
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 34 conclUsion
Scott L. Greer, Elize Massard da Fonseca,  
and Elizabeth J. King
All happy countries are alike in their response to COVID-19; each 
unhappy country is unhappy in its own way. The famous opening line of Leo Tol-
stoy’s Anna Karenina about unhappy families1 seems to apply to what we have 
seen in government responses to COVID-19 around the world. A happy coun-
try, in late 2020, was one that had used non- pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) 
such as masking or business closures to tamp down the initial wave of the epi-
demic and then successfully built test- trace- isolate- support (TTIS) systems that 
allowed them to return to normal life with few or no NPIs.  There was  really, it 
became clear, no other path to controlling or eliminating COVID-19 before vac-
cines became available. Unfortunately, that path was narrow and hard to follow.
This should not have been too surprising, given that NPIs and TTIS systems 
had been standard advice from public health researchers for de cades, if not longer 
(some NPIs such as quarantines date back centuries). Unlike with other epidemics 
such as cholera, smallpox, and HIV/AIDS, scientists quickly identified the ge ne tic 
sequence of SARS- CoV-2, its mechanisms of transmission, and strategies to pre-
vent the virus spread. Therefore,  there was relative agreement on what health sys-
tems should do to stop the disease from spreading. Not only  were NPIs and TTIS 
crucial, as de cades of research and experience had shown, but the precise NPIs, 
such as masking and restaurant closures, had been identified within months. The 
long periods of uncertainty and exploration that had marked previous pandemic 
responses  were not found in this pandemic.
Happy countries  were ones that reacted swiftly and with robust health and social 
policies. The unhappy countries responded with a wide variety of approaches, 
some expected and  others unexpected, that have left many of them with surging 
COVID-19 case numbers and astonishing excess deaths in 2020.
 There was fascinating international variation, leading to many dif er ent tragic 
outcomes in countries from the United States to Brazil and from Spain to India. 
Meanwhile, an intriguingly mismatched range of countries such as Vietnam, Mon-
golia, Germany, New Zealand, South  Korea, Taiwan, and Norway, became happy 
cases. By the year’s end, China and Vietnam, with negligible or no COVID-19,  were 
happier than Germany or Canada, where normal life was marred by constant reasser-
tion of NPIs and eforts to shore up TTIS systems in the face of per sis tent community 
spread of the virus. But relative to the diversity of prob lems and outcomes in the 
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unhappy countries, the diferences are small. Countries that built TTIS systems 
and used NPIs well  limited the impact of COVID-19 on lives and deaths. Many 
more failed to do so. Some cases started out well and then became unhappy— 
for example, using NPIs initially but failing, or finding themselves unwilling to 
develop adequate TTIS systems or social policies. Each failure is int er est ing in 
its own way, and they contribute to a wide range of cases for the study of public 
health and politics.
Reflecting on Our Hypotheses
We opened this book with a set of hypotheses about what explains policy responses 
to COVID-19 in the first nine months of 2020, when its management depended 
on NPIs and TTIS systems. The introduction in chapter 1 presented the hypoth-
eses’ theoretical justification and reviewed the evidence in the book. Our authors 
covered the World Health Organization (WHO), comparative analy sis, and coun-
try case studies from Asia, Eu rope, the Amer i cas, and Africa. However, we could 
not cover  every country in the world, and we undoubtedly left out countries for 
which t hese hypotheses warrant further exploration. Higher- income countries 
 were afected by COVID-19  earlier than lower- income countries and thus make 
up the majority of case studies in this book. For example,  future research should 
include a focus on more countries in Africa and Latin Amer i ca.
Social Policy
Perhaps our most impor tant finding for public health, policy research, and po liti cal 
science is the dependence of health policies on social policies. Social policy is not 
just about managing consequences; it is part of the explanation of any emergency 
intervention. The Cask of Amontillado prob lem that we discussed in chapter 1 is 
real. It is just not feasible to close  people into their  houses if that means leaving 
them to die. If  people need to leave their  houses or open their businesses or work 
in order to eat, they  will. It takes an extremely authoritarian state with very impres-
sive coercive power to keep  people at home without corresponding large- scale 
social policy compensations.
Many of the most impressive, or heartbreaking, case studies involved the inter-
actions of social and health policies. In some countries, they  were aligned. Thus 
Germany and Denmark  were able to use social policies to cushion the blows of 
NPIs and pandemic- related demand shocks. They efectively put their economies 
into medically induced comas, using short- time work, unemployment benefits, 
and other income replacement schemes to pay  people to stay at home.  These 
comas meant that  people  were able to stay home from work and reduce mobility to 
good efect. They also reduced po liti cal pressure to reopen  because they ensured 
that businesses could close, ensuring their own safety, without sufering.
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In other countries, it did not go so well. India’s experience was perhaps particu-
larly tragic. Its federal government reacted early with a national lockdown unac-
companied by social policy mea sures (what the plausible social policy mea sures 
might have been is an unexplored question). It turned out that the weak point in 
such a lockdown was poor mi grant laborers from rural districts who inhabited cit-
ies with high COVID-19 infection rates and needed to work  every day to survive. 
The Indian government opted to return them to their villages, seeding infections 
across the country as six million  people returned to rural areas in special trains. 
The result was a massive nationwide outbreak. By August 2020 it was clear that 
India bore the burden of the NPIs without the benefits.
South Africa had a similar experience, with an initially successful national lock-
down in a country marked historically by high levels of  labor mobility. Lacking the 
money, policy tools, and perhaps intent to solve the prob lem, the South African 
government simply ended many of its NPIs for want of social policy support with-
out building a suitable public health response.
Institutions  shaped the interaction between social policy and public health 
outcomes. Social policy interacted with federalism in unexpected ways  because 
of the dif er ent allocations of health and social policy authority to governments 
on dif er ent levels. In Brazil and the United States, both the federal and state gov-
ernments had public health powers to enact NPIs. State governments had some 
resources to enable NPIs and built TTIS systems, but in both countries the fed-
eral government had the resources  necessary for real social policy responses. 
The results  were strange. In both countries, federal social policy over the spring 
and summer was very  supportive of NPIs; the federal government did not enact 
NPIs, leaving them to the states. Once the social policies ended, the result was 
a social and public health disaster, in which US local governments in par tic u lar 
 were faced with a choice as stark as any restaurant or bar between reducing NPIs 
and insolvency. In the United States, as autumn wore on, it emerged that state 
revenues largely depended on taxes from wealthier  people. NPIs consequently 
did not damage state tax revenue anywhere near as much as initially expected. 
State revenues remained relatively intact, while local experiences varied widely 
and politics de cided  whether states opened businesses that contributed relatively 
 little tax revenue but  were po liti cally impor tant. It turned out that, although local 
governments  were mostly trapped, dif er ent state governments  were not forced to 
enact or lift NPIs by their revenue sources; they chose to do so.
Naturally, the ability of states to pay their citizens to stay home and their busi-
nesses to stay closed varies with their fiscal and administrative capacity. Not all 
countries had Denmark’s or the United Kingdom’s fiscal autonomy and capacity. 
We could say that our study shows clearly that rich countries should have paid 
their  people to stay home and businesses to stay closed  until  there  were adequate 
TTIS systems, but the prob lems are obvious. In some higher- income countries, 
such as  those of Southern Eu rope, states have  limited fiscal space as a result of Euro-
zone membership, and their economies depend on tourism. It is hard to imagine 
the economies of Spain, Italy, or Greece without mass travel. In the summer of 
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2020  those countries’ governments, many of which had successfully overcome or 
avoided disaster in the first wave, invited tourism  because that is a core part of 
their economies. The contours of the second wave, in  those tourist economies and 
in the home countries of the tourists,  were predictable.
In lower- income countries, of course, the prob lem was more significant. 
Although dependence on donors means that some resource- limited countries are 
relatively shielded from the per for mance of their own economies, it is nonetheless 
obvious that paying  people to stay home while a TTIS system was built was a chal-
lenge for lower- and middle- income countries. In many of the lower- and middle- 
income countries in our book, fiscal pressures  were obvious prob lems. If expensive 
social policy mea sures  were necessary to maintain NPIs, then NPIs  were clearly 
 going to happen for a short time at best. Furthermore, economic structures meant 
that lower- and middle- income countries had a smaller proportion of white collar 
workers or  others who  were able to socially distance and infrastructure suitable 
for physical distancing. The result was a tendency in many lower- and middle- 
income countries to one- time lockdowns, with drastic impositions of NPIs that 
did not require sophisticated public administration and enforcement, followed 
by reduction of NPIs and resurgent infections (in our book, cases include South 
Africa, India, and Central Asian republics).
It is impor tant to note that international income in equality means that the 
impact of  these issues is hard to analyze at the moment. Testing and even mor-
tality statistics are endogenous to international politics  because they are a func-
tion of state capacity. A country with widespread and efective testing and well- 
developed death recording is also prob ably a high- income country. In a number 
of countries in the world, even life expectancy data are based on random sampling 
and interviews. As a result, at the time of writing we just cannot say how bad the 
pandemic was in many lower- income countries in 2020. In very poor and failed 
states, such as Venezuela, Yemen, or South Sudan, we may never know how much 
mortality changed in 2020 and why.
Authoritarianism, Information, and Effectiveness
Authoritarian governments have  limited contestation or participation. If we imag-
ine regimes as existing in a two- dimensional space of contestation (scope to argue 
for views opposed to the government) and participation (scope to participate in 
decisions, notably voting), then the prob lem with generalizing about authoritar-
ian regimes becomes clear. A two- dimensional space with democracies clustered, 
by definition, at the highest levels of observed contestation and participation,  will 
produce two analytical prob lems. One is that the border is unclear  because both 
contestation and participation are continuous variables: Hungary is less authori-
tarian than Rus sia, which is less authoritarian than China. One category that 
includes them all is likely to be very abstract. The other is that the diversity of 
regimes that are not high in both contestation and participation is wide- ranging, 
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from absolute monarchies such as Saudi Arabia to personalistic autocracies such 
as Turkmenistan to hybrid, competitive authoritarian states such as Rus sia or 
Hungary to complex authoritarian regimes such as Egypt to totalitarian regimes 
such North  Korea to failing states such as Venezuela. To make the prob lem more 
complex, big federations such as the United States, Brazil, Nigeria, India, or 
South Africa often have “authoritarian enclaves” that shape national politics while 
defending local autocracies.
We framed two hypotheses around authoritarianism. One stems from the 
diversity of authoritarian states and socie ties, which vary in authoritarianism 
itself as well as state capacity, institutions, wealth, and interactions between states 
and society. The hypothesis is that only some authoritarian states  will have the 
capacity to efectively make and implement policy in response to an event such 
as the pandemic. Authoritarianism itself does not automatically produce decisive 
or efective government, and some forms of authoritarianism  will reduce both 
decisiveness and efectiveness. The perceived success of China, in par tic u lar, has 
prompted apol o getics for authoritarianism that claim it produces better pandemic 
responses.  There is no reason to believe that China, nor Vietnam, is the norm for 
authoritarian states’ public health responses. Tanzanian or Rus sian responses are 
at least as likely.
The other hypothesis tried to identify a commonality in authoritarian regimes 
 going beyond their definitional characteristics of  limited participation or inclu-
sion. The hypothesis was that they would have prob lems of information flow. 
Internally,  people in regimes without the discipline of public accountability and 
engagement would have incentive to misrepresent or limit the circulation of even 
useful information. Externally, authoritarian regimes, without the discipline of 
electoral politics, would have incentive to misrepresent the situation to their pub-
lics, and their publics might well expect that.  Because participation and inclusion 
are continuous variables, this has to be expressed carefully: insofar as a regime is 
authoritarian, we predicted information flow prob lems.
The hypothesis that authoritarianism does not lead to better, more decisive, 
or more efective responses seems well supported. For  every Vietnam or China, 
authoritarian regimes that stamped out COVID-19 with NPIs,  there is a South 
 Korea or New Zealand, democracies that did the same, and a Rus sia or Tanzania, 
which failed as badly as any democracy. Even within democracies, leaders with 
something of an authoritarian approach— populist radical right politicians such 
as Jair Bolsonaro, Boris Johnson, or Donald Trump— seem to have handled the 
pandemic particularly erratically.
The more adventurous hypothesis that authoritarianism breeds internal and 
information flow prob lems is harder to test,  because it is hard to know if data 
are particularly untrustworthy in  those regimes. Nonetheless  there is at most 
suggestive evidence for it— that regime underlings in a diverse set of authoritar-
ian states hid information that reflected poorly on them and sacrificed efective 
emergency response to clientelistic or purely corrupt goals  under the cover of 
secrecy. Populist radical right leaders in democracies also seem to have sufered 
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internal communications prob lems (they  were told what they wanted to hear) 
and external ones (they discredited their public pronouncements).
We suspect that diversity within authoritarian regimes is more impor tant than 
contrasts of authoritarian and demo cratic regimes. Exploring shared patterns of 
be hav ior across regime types is the productive research direction. For an example 
discussed  later in this chapter, comparative federalism and presidentialism schol-
arship shed in ter est ing light on Rus sia, even if Rus sia, being undemo cratic, is not 
part of the set of cases that  these theories are usually supposed to explain. The 
president of the Rus sian Federation, it turns out, can be studied as a president of 
a federation, as well as an autocrat. Democracy and authoritarianism are made up 
of two continuums, participation and contestation, and  there are real limitations 
when we translate it into an authoritarian- democratic binary distinction.
Presidentialism, Federalism, and the Politics of Agency
Po liti cal institutions did not lead to any clear good or bad outcomes, but they 
clearly  shaped the politics of pandemic response and the way choices  were made. 
We framed the impact of po liti cal institutions in terms of the politics of agency. 
Po liti cal institutions structure who has agency in politics as well as their account-
ability. Presidentialist systems divide authority between an elected president and 
the legislature, with the president usually the more energetic and disruptive force. 
Some po liti cal systems have majoritarian features with the same results, in which 
a party with a strong majority can reside in power even without strong popu lar 
support  because of winner- take- all electoral systems. The case for such kinds of 
governments is often made in terms of decisiveness: the advantages of a clear and 
power ful leader outweigh the loss of representativeness and consensus negotia-
tions. In Colombia, that worked: the president coordinated a national response 
and regained popularity  because of his approach to the pandemic. In France, the 
outcome is less clearly desirable. President Macron was decisive, but some of his 
decisions, especially regarding NPIs,  were erratic. In both countries, the key point 
is that it was up to the president to decide how to wield such power.
In the COVID-19 pandemic, in short, it is far from clear that the strong demo-
cratic leaders performed well. According to this book,  there seems to be  little 
evidence that strong presidents in Brazil and the United States (and perhaps 
Rus sia and Chile) did well. Parliamentary leaders in the relatively majoritarian 
systems of India, Spain, South Africa, and the United Kingdom also  were heavi ly 
criticized for their leadership.
Federalism fragments agency. In federalism, substantial authority is in the 
hands of federal states, with dif er ent levels of government competing or coor-
dinating, depending on the details of politics, programs, and institutions. Many 
claims have been made about federalism: it promotes competition and efficiency, 
it promotes gridlock and vetoes, it makes excessive demands for coordination, 
it enables experimentation and learning, and it creates resilience by diversify-
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ing governments. In general, all of  these  things can be true, but that depends on 
intergovernmental finance, programmatic designs and legacies, and under lying 
economic geography.
In the COVID-19 pandemic, several of  these dynamics  were clearly vis i ble. In 
Brazil, India, and the United States, decentralization did seem to lead to resilience 
insofar as state leaders could to some extent compensate for the health policy fail-
ures of the federal government (policy failures enabled by systems that concen-
trated agency in politicians who happened to be of the populist radical right). But 
equally the resilience was  limited by fiscal and programmatic constraints on state 
governments, although neither politics nor epidemiology made it easy for states to 
diverge for long in NPIs. It also seems that in some cases federalism’s competitive 
dimensions reduced preparedness. In the United States, for example, eco nom ically 
competitive states invested as  little as pos si ble in public health, so the system came 
to depend on the competence and leadership of the federal government. In 2020 
that federal government was in the hands of Republican President Donald Trump, 
and so states  were left to deal with a crisis they  were not prepared to manage.
One of the in ter est ing phenomena, for po liti cal science in general, was the 
interaction between hybrid authoritarian regimes and po liti cal institutions and 
dynamics usually associated with democracy. In many ways the Rus sian regime, 
for example, exhibited a politics of agency reminiscent of other big majoritarian 
federations such as Brazil, India, or the United States, with President Vladimir 
Putin using his agency to alternately centralize and decentralize action, credit, 
and blame. The politics of agency in the Rus sian Federation looked strangely like 
 those of the United States, which supports the case for looking at institutional 
dynamics across authoritarian, hybrid, and demo cratic systems despite their 
obvious, definitional, diferences.
“Successful responses hinge on decisive leadership” was the conclusion of one 
interim analy sis of pandemic response (Forman et al., 2020). But what, other than 
the luck of who is leader, shapes the likelihood of decisive leadership that makes 
good decisions— and for whom? That is the po liti cal question. We found that the 
politics of agency was a promising way to think about the multiple, interacting vari-
ables that afected the COVID-19 response, and therefore a way to think about pol-
itics in the harsh light of this crisis. Much of the po liti cal science research focuses 
on the in de pen dent variable—on the impact of presidentialism or federalism, or 
the ways in which introducing another variable such as party systems afects the 
influence of institutions. We have argued that institutions  matter in relationship to 
each other and to broader po liti cal forces, and so a configurational analy sis might 
make sense for understanding how they  matter. Who gets agency, institutionally?
Public Health Infrastructure
Fi nally, the professional and po liti cal institutionalization of public health had a sur-
prisingly  limited efect on policy. Many, if not most, public health establishments 
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made broad claims to reducing avoidable mortality but had pandemic response 
at their center. This was true regardless of how much of their time and workforce 
 were engaged in monitoring  water quality, restaurant hygiene, or obesity. In the 
greatest pandemic of most  peoples’ lives, though, public health agencies and the 
public health profession  were substantially sidelined by po liti cal leaders, relegated 
to technical functions in many cases, and sidelined altogether in a few. Heads of 
government in country  after country turned to expert groups in which public 
health expertise was  limited.
A look back at the AIDS pandemic, the last novel infectious disease to have any-
thing like such global health impact, suggests that this might not be so surprising. 
In the AIDS pandemic, science has been constantly contested, some governments 
opted for denialist strategies, and public health agencies often are left absorbing 
criticism for decisions they had not influenced. In both pandemics  there is a tone 
of frustration in public health scholarship, frustration that extensive research and 
practical experience on changing be hav ior (condoms and masks) or identifying 
and acting on risky activities has not been used. The frustration of public health 
scholars and policymakers extends beyond communicable diseases; much public 
health lit er a ture also laments the lack of public health influence on areas such as 
noncommunicable diseases.
We might frame the prob lem as being about generalist government and spe-
cialist government, as Dan Fox does (Fox, 2017). Generalist government is about 
allocating across broad competing priorities: guns and butter, health and the 
economy, taxes and spending, war and peace. It is the realm of professional poli-
ticians who are served by a few generalist officials,  typically the officials around 
the executive and the finance department. Specialist government is every thing 
 else, from transportation to space exploration to the army to public health. Gen-
eralist government’s very job is to allocate resources and therefore listen with 
appropriate skepticism to specialist government claims. Even if public health 
agencies and professionals had uniquely valuable expertise in a communicable 
disease pandemic with no vaccine or efective medical treatment, that does not 
mean that we should expect generalist government to simply cede a mono poly 
to them.
It has long been easy to poke fun at public health and its claims. The juxtapo-
sition of big structural critiques of society from its leaders and scholarship with 
very small- scale interventions mostly focused on marginalized groups was always 
awkward. The resulting preoccupation with self- definition, lamentations about 
the  limited role of public health considerations in policy, and arguments about the 
scope of the field  were just facts of life in public health circles. It seemed in recent 
de cades that a model of public health professionalism built on US- style Schools 
of Public Health and “CDCs” modeled on the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention might have cracked the prob lem, creating a model for an efective, 
elite profession, but it merits reflection that exactly that model turned out to lack 
po liti cal strength at a crucial moment.
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New Directions
We structured chapter templates and the book around the hypotheses that we 
developed. Like any good research program, let alone one conducted on and in a 
rapidly changing global crisis, we found other issues arose that merit further study 
and for which the chapters provide suggestive evidence.
State Capacity and Its Use
Although investment in public health agencies, infrastructure, and profession-
alism seemed to have remarkably  little efect on the way countries made policy 
in 2020, overall state capacity did seem to be a  factor whose importance merits 
pursuit— a finding other comparative studies of the pandemic seem to support 
(Capano et  al., 2020; Colfer, 2020; Kavanagh & Singh, 2020). Obviously, some 
very high- capacity states saw serious failures. France, unusually, built a competent 
TTIS system but failed to match it with efective NPIs in other areas. The United 
Kingdom spent a remarkable amount of money on TTIS systems and failed to get 
anything like an efective system for it, while pursuing a wildly erratic strategy on 
NPIs. But for some of the happy countries of the pandemic, such as Vietnam, it 
seems like strong state capacity explained the country’s ability to largely avoid the 
pandemic through power ful NPIs.
 There are two issues  here, which we could frame in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. Unlike in other epidemics such as cholera, smallpox, and 
HIV/AIDS, scientists quickly identified the ge ne tic sequence of SARS- CoV-2, its 
mechanisms of transmission, and strategies to prevent the virus spread. There-
fore,  there was a relative agreement on what health systems should do to stop the 
disease from spreading. The prob lem lay in deciding to do it, and  doing it. It is in 
 these issues that state capacity starts to  matter.
State capacity, it seems, might be a necessary condition for power ful NPIs. 
Weak states must depend on the thin reed of a persuadable, persuaded, and very 
conscientious public. That is a lot to ask, especially since persuasion is more easily 
achieved with a competent state. Some forms of state capacity might be specialist 
and particularly adapted to public health issues, as in some of the African cases, 
but it can also be generalist, taking the shape of a power ful bureaucracy that can 
operate across multiple areas,  whether in Austria, Japan, China, Hong Kong, Sin-
gapore, or Vietnam.
The sufficient condition for response is use of state capacity. As Davies (2012) 
puts it, technical capacity to carry out public health tasks is not the same  thing 
as po liti cal capacity.  There is a virtual industry of capacity analy sis and build-
ing, but the use made of capacity is clearly an impor tant public health issue that 
requires po liti cal analy sis. This book rec ords government  after government that 
might have been able to do better but instead found its own par tic u lar path to 
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unhappiness. Power ful and well- developed states with extensive public health 
expertise, in case  after case, left their state capacity unused or misused. State 
capacity  matters—if it is used. It might well be a necessary condition, and it seems 
it is very fungible, but it is not a sufficient condition.
In equality and Inequity
It is neither surprising nor controversial to find that COVID-19 preyed upon and 
exacerbated existing inequity in socie ties (Bambra et al., 2020; Lynch, 2020a; Pol-
lack, 2020). Crises and health emergencies often do that, for they harm  those 
with the least and prompt a competition for public action that the most power-
ful are likeliest to win. The specific ways in which the pandemic interacted with 
inequalities and politics in society varied with the society, but COVID-19, like 
most pandemics, proved that we  aren’t all in it together. In many socie ties, par-
ticularly the most unequal, the health, economic, and social efects are likely to 
durably increase in equality. Research in health inequalities is highly developed, 
particularly in Eu rope and the United States, and uses sophisticated theories and 
methods. It is already showing the ways in which the pandemic and responses 
afected inequalities.
Our goal is to explain policy choices. For our purposes, one of the most impor-
tant issues is how inequalities, and awareness of inequalities, drove policies and 
politics. The methodological prob lem is that inequalities afect politics via other 
mechanisms such as partisanship, interest groups, sexism, racism, gender identity 
discrimination, caste, and all manner of ethnic, territorial, and economic stratifica-
tion. Making inequity vis i ble does not make it a po liti cal prob lem that  will be solved. 
Discussion of health inequalities per se does not trou ble  people who are not both-
ered about in equality and therefore is not a dispositive argument in politics (Lynch, 
2020b). For example, we would expect governments more responsive to wealthy 
voters or business  owners both to create a trade- of between public health and the 
economy by failing to establish TTIS systems and then to come down on the side of 
the economy. As Mätzke notes (chapter 16, this volume), we would expect govern-
ments with no commitment to gender equality, such as Austria, to choose public 
health policies that are particularly harmful to working  women and not compensate 
in social policy. We would expect blind spots, as in Singapore, where policy- makers 
disregarded mi grant workers; the United States, where racial politics clearly  shaped 
responses; or India, where journalists noted that Narendra Modi’s “government 
and especially his COVID-19 task force, dominated by upper- caste Hindus, never 
adequately contemplated how shutting down the economy and quarantining 1.3 bil-
lion  people would introduce desperation, then panic and then chaos for millions of 
mi grant workers at the heart of Indian industry” (Gettleman et al., 2020).
None of  these mechanisms are  simple. Po liti cal scientists still argue about 
 whether parties  matter to public policy, let alone when and how. Parties and inter-
est groups are mechanisms of interest aggregation and co ali tion management, 
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which means that they are unlikely to be ideologically, scientifically, or other wise 
coherent. In more authoritarian regimes,  there are complex and opaque politics 
within the regime and its key supporters, as the regime’s leaders work out whom 
to co- opt, whom to ignore, and whom to suppress.
COVID-19 has, in most countries, been a power ful engine of in equality. In 
most cases it seems that the interaction of the pandemic and social policy has been 
to exacerbate inequity, comforting the comfortable and afflicting the afflicted. Why 
policies have worked that way in so many dif er ent countries, and what it says about 
politics  today,  will be a crucial topic of study, one that our case studies can inform.
The Politics of Credit and Blame
One recurrent theme throughout the book’s chapters that merits further explora-
tion is the politics of credit and blame (see also Hassenteufel, 2020; Royo, 2020). 
It is close to axiomatic that politicians in any system seek credit and try to avoid 
blame (Weaver, 1986). Sometimes this means taking actions that  will gain credit 
and avoiding blameworthy ones. Sometimes it means claiming credit for some-
body  else’s achievement and shifting blame for your own  mistakes.  These are 
common po liti cal tactics in  every walk of life. In the absence of traceability—in 
the situations in which  there is no good way to attract credit or cast blame— 
politicians  will often opt for “position- taking” tactics in which they draw attention 
to their views on some polarizing big issue outside their responsibilities (Arnold, 
1992). That could mean blaming the WHO or China or mi grants for the pan-
demic, or directing attention to vari ous cultural conflicts.
Dif er ent po liti cal systems structure the tactics that allocate credit and blame, 
and dif er ent events shape their ability to do so. In general, most politicians pay 
more attention to some groups than  others— for example, it is common for demo-
cratic politicians to pay less attention to the interests of groups who  will never 
vote for them. In more authoritarian regimes, the politics of credit and blame are 
performed for a still narrower and less clear set of groups who in some way wield 
power that the regime must acknowledge.
We can see the politics of credit and blame at work in most of Eu rope over 
the spring and summer of 2020, for example (Greer et al., 2020). In almost  every 
country represented, with the pos si ble exception of Sweden, heads of government 
pushed to the fore of the initial response. They commonly centralized author-
ity in their offices at the expense of other  ministers, departments, and agencies 
(including public health agencies). In federations, central governments often took 
on new powers at the expense of regional governments. In some cases, such as 
Czechia, heads of government made decisions almost entirely unilaterally, and in 
most they pro cessed advice and action through ad hoc committees rather than 
established government mechanisms. It was time to be a hero, so to speak, and 
heads of government raced to take the credit for beating the pandemic (or, raced 
to avoid the blame for letting it out of control).
626  Coronavirus Politics
Over the summer of 2020, as cases and mortality across most of Eu rope dropped 
 toward zero, credit for containing the pandemic became less impressive than blame 
for continued NPIs. Closed schools, shuttered restaurants, limitations on gatherings, 
spoiled holidays, and no tourism in the world’s tourist hub all had serious negative 
consequences. Heads of government became suddenly much more reticent, hand-
ing responsibility for the pandemic back to  others, such as regional governments 
and health ministers. A constant diet of crisis and briefings from heads of govern-
ment in most countries gave way to  limited reopenings and the relatively unfamiliar 
 faces of health ministers, regional leaders, or heads of public health agencies. Some 
countries, such as Rus sia, started campaigns to promote internal tourism, while the 
United Kingdom government, astoundingly, set up a scheme to subsidize restaurant 
dining in  England (“Eat out to help out” was the slogan).
When the entirely predictable second wave hit Europe— and hit countries that 
had escaped it, such as  those of Central Eu rope, especially hard— politicians at 
 every level had a prob lem. When would blame for reinstating NPIs exceed blame 
for letting the second wave hit? What would be the most efective way to gain credit 
from reimposing NPIs  after the virus was already  doing huge damage to a tired 
and increasingly cynical population? Who would bear the blame for the policies— 
notably TTIS system failures— that meant the NPIs had to come back? And how 
would  these tactics interact with business and other interests that  were often lob-
bies for avoiding NPIs? Blaming the voters for eating subsidized restaurant meals, 
visiting their grandparents, or enjoying a Spanish beach holiday was unlikely to 
work, and so politicians in most of Eu rope found themselves allocating blame to 
each other in a souring environment where  there was less and less credit to be had.
The Eu ro pean story had echoes around the world. In Brazil, Bolsonaro claimed 
credit for social policies that  were proposed by Congress and shifted the blame 
for unpop u lar social distance mea sures to the states and municipalities. Trump 
did much the same in the United States. A variety of populists around the world 
blamed China and sought credit for responding to the pandemic with xenophobic 
rhe toric and politics. The politics of credit and blame shape much of what we saw, 
and they merit further investigation.
Pop u lism and Science
One recurrent discussion in the pandemic focused on the interaction of pop u lism, 
science, and pandemic response (Falkenbach & Greer, 2021; Peve house, 2020). 
Debates about the place of science, politics, and pop u lism in the pandemic  were 
remarkably ahistorical, with no sense of how much more or less “scientific” deci-
sions had been in previous public health crises, or what it meant to be scientific. 
Epidemiological research finding that masking and social distancing reduce trans-
mission is one kind of finding, but po liti cal and so cio log i cal research on issues 
that afect compliance with masking and social distance can produce dif er ent 
kinds of findings. Epidemiology might lead one to suggest that the police should 
enforce NPIs such as masking mandates, but other social sciences may suggest 
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that would be counterproductive. Epidemiological surveillance technologies 
may seem heaven- sent to  those who want to return to normality, but the politics 
of surveillance involved are extremely impor tant and very complex (in general, 
scholarship pays far too  little attention to the high- stakes politics of surveillance) 
(Greer, 2017; Greitens, 2020; Marx, 2015). To follow the science, as anybody who 
reads any kind of science knows, is to choose the science.
Framing the question of science, politics, and policy this way has two efects. 
On one hand, it focuses our attention on the question of when and how science 
is used by politicians. Science, like law or medicine, is highly po liti cal, but it still 
constrains most of its prac ti tion ers. We can imagine that scientists’ po liti cal pref-
erences (partisan, careerist, a mixture, or other) interact with the clarity of the 
findings. When findings are unclear, then we would expect that individual scien-
tists’ politics would  matter more to their findings, but science is generally good 
at weeding out  people who make po liti cal claims in opposition to well- supported 
findings. The vast range of questions about COVID-19, from the efficacy of masks 
to the efficacy of par tic u lar vaccines, gave us all  great scope to watch the speed 
with which scientists worldwide evaluated findings and cast out  those who seemed 
to be disagreeing with emerging consensus for po liti cal reasons. But that still does 
not mean that  there is “a science” to be followed, which is what created scope 
for disagreement about, for example, Swedish strategy. Heads of government also 
proved, as noted, very reluctant to rely on expert public health agencies for “sci-
ence,” strongly preferring interdisciplinary ad hoc committees for advice.
The other efect of framing in such a way is that it isolates a set of politicians 
who seemed to have a genuine prob lem with science in princi ple. In most cases 
 these  were populists, some of them of the populist radical right (Falkenbach et al., 
2018). The definition of pop u lism includes opposition to elites, such as scien-
tists. It is perhaps no surprise that populist leaders might say and do particularly 
extraordinary  things in a public health crisis in which scientific findings are cru-
cial to policy agendas and decisions. Furthermore, xenophobia is a core part of the 
populist radical right politics, and xenophobia in pandemics is as old as history 
(Dionne & Turkmen, 2020). But we should proceed with caution. Following sci-
ence can mean many  things; leaders who seem unscientific, such as Bolsonaro, 
Johnson, or Trump, can lead governments full of  people committed to science, 
and science changed rapidly over the course of the pandemic. The topic merits 
further inquiry,  because it is not clear how we would test the hypothesis that some 
po liti cal currents are more opposed to “science” than  others.
Also substantially unexplored in lit er a ture on COVID-19 politics to date is 
the interaction of science, religion, and public health. Religion surely already 
 shaped pandemic response,  whether through the personal beliefs of leaders with 
agency or through popu lar responses to policy. It is likely that religious world-
views  shaped receptiveness to dif er ent kind of scientific messages (e.g., White-
head & Perry, 2020); that religious practices and denominational decisions 
 shaped the course of the pandemic (e.g.,  Were some religious persuasions more 
fatalistic?); and that the shock of the pandemic  will, in many countries, change 
the course of religious history.  These efects should reverberate through politics. 
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Exploring the dif er ent ways in which, for example, Catholics and Pentecostal 
Christians dealt with the pandemic at the elite and mass level should be a prior-
ity for understanding not just policy- making but also the further efects of the 
pandemic on society.
Tired and Grumpy: The Politics of Second and Third Waves
The authors of the chapters in this book  were commissioned to end their cov-
erage at the start of September 2020. This was a deliberate editorial decision to 
use the dramatic first wave as the basis for the book’s findings, in full awareness 
of the likelihood of a second wave in the northern hemi sphere in autumn 2020. 
The second wave, which was well underway globally by the time this book went 
into production in December 2020, showed many of the patterns we would expect 
from reading past histories of epidemics and disasters. Governments and  people 
relaxed NPIs too early in most countries; TTIS systems  were very hard to set up in 
most countries, and some never  really tried; the search for new balances between 
economy and public health too often turned out to just mean too few NPIs; and 
 people became tired. It is unsurprising, in historical perspective, to see a pattern 
in which a first wave produces excitement, novelty, and social solidarity such as 
applauding health workers, and a second wave, which is actually worse, and which 
is marked by recrimination, distrust, and noncompliance with NPIs.  There is often 
a third wave, concentrated in relatively untouched rural areas, which happens just 
as urban areas are putting the pandemic  behind them. This third wave can easily 
contribute to rural anger, triggering new prob lems.
The politics and policy of the second wave in the last three months of 2020 
are outside the scope of the book, but what is noticeable, in Tolstoy’s terms, is the 
number of happy families that became unhappy in a new and distinctive way. The 
government of Czechia, which had been led to a relatively strong and efective 
set of NPIs by a private businessman with a model, started listening to a dentist 
with a reopening plan and was rewarded with a terrible wave of infections and 
deaths. Some countries, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, served 
as cautionary tales of what can go wrong when public health policies to curb the 
epidemic are scaled back too early, especially when the healthcare capacity is too 
weak for a surge in cases. A number of governments seem to have just given up, 
even if they had levied impressive NPIs in the first wave.  Others, such as Spain, 
Italy, Britain, and France, re created their previous decisions in uncanny detail as if 
they had learned nothing. Unsurprisingly, popu lar cynicism and po liti cal disunity 
surged in the autumn of 2020 in  these countries.
The politics of the second wave, broadly, are the politics of disenchantment 
and recrimination. We made the first wave the focus of our book  because it was a 
time of emergency, po liti cal crisis, and po liti cal possibility when the United States 
briefly had a social policy reminiscent of Denmark, and Sweden was the darling of 
the world’s libertarians. It was the equivalent of an adrenalin high for the world. We 
expected that the second wave in the northern hemi sphere winter of 2020–2021 
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would be less in ter est ing—an uneven, ill- tempered reversion to the mean that 
would be hard to interpret. The efectiveness of vaccines created hope in this time, 
but that hope was fighting against both popu lar impatience with lockdowns and, 
in country  after country, po liti cal and interest group eforts to create an impression 
of impatience that could be used to their po liti cal ends. The po liti cal economy of 
vaccines became the site of the key decisions, discussed  later in this chapter.
Bringing History Back In
We are not historians, and this is not a work of historical scholarship. But history 
was inescapable and should be at the center of inquiry into the pandemic and its 
lessons. In country  after country, history mattered. For example, it could be that 
relatively high compliance with public health mea sures in East Asian countries 
was due to popu lar and policy- makers’ memories of other respiratory diseases 
such as the first SARS or MERS, and what worked then (a dynamic vis i ble in our 
chapters and in Lee et al., 2020). Masking was far from novel be hav ior in East 
Asia, and po liti cal elites might have had a better sense of what actions to take 
and how to communicate them than elites in other countries with  limited recent 
pandemic exposure.
Likewise, history may be a guide to broader patterns of expectation. For exam-
ple, the difficulty of maintaining po liti cal unity and popu lar compliance with NPIs 
in a second wave was obvious to anybody familiar with the histories of other out-
breaks and even similar kinds of emergencies. So was the likelihood that some 
countries’ leaderships would focus too much on vaccines as a solution. Peter 
Baldwin has gone further and made the  simple, forceful argument that history 
drives responses: that countries reach back into their traditional repertoires when 
facing a disease, so that response to cholera in the nineteenth  century prefigures 
response to AIDS in the late twentieth (Baldwin, 2005a, 2005b). Not all social 
scientists agree (Taylor, 2013), but figuring out what changes from pandemic to 
pandemic and country to country would be very valuable.  There is a systematic 
gap between the historiography of medicine and public health, which is extremely 
rich, and the fields of public health and po liti cal science. Anthropology and soci-
ology often also have contributions that span historiography and current events. 
They are frequently critical of public health reasoning (Dingwall et  al., 2013). 
Developing frameworks for understanding COVID-19’s lessons in relation to his-
tory as well as comparative politics and epidemiology may be an especially valu-
able interdisciplinary endeavor.
 After the Pandemic
Our chapters have the least to say about the long- lasting consequences of the 
pandemic, and a focus on policy alone  will not be able to capture the many ways 
in which class, gender, race, territory, ethnicity, religion,  employment, and other 
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inequalities shape and are  shaped by the pandemic. But we want to underline 
that decisions taken in the pandemic— the crisis phase of which lasted throughout 
2020 and well into 2021— started to become the policy baseline for the  future. 
And so did the social efects. Mätzke, for example, highlights the extent to which 
Austria’s health and social policy responses  were not just efective public health; 
they  were also efective ways to re- establish gender and economic inequalities 
that had been eroding. In many countries, if not all, the “high- touch” ser vice sec-
tor most exposed to NPIs, physical distancing, and economic harm was also the 
dominant employer of  women, mi grant, and other vulnerable populations and 
ethnic, religious, racial, or other minorities. The pandemic, in many cases, dealt 
them a terrible, if temporary, blow.
One of the trickiest prob lems in policy is to understand which temporary 
decisions leave lasting efects.  Will the short American holiday in Scandinavia 
leave a lasting impression on American voters and elites, and what  will that be? 
 Will the  women and minorities of all kinds who lost out significantly in service- 
sector shutdowns be able to return to their previous place, and  will that return, 
or their loss of ground, be po liti cally sustainable? The previous global crisis, the 
financial crisis of 2008–2012, showed that many countries are easily able to sus-
tain increasing in equality without backlash sufficient to worry their elites.  Will 
this crisis have the same result?
Part of the prob lem of identifying temporary efects is that the meaning of “tem-
porary” or “crisis” is somewhat elastic. COVID-19 and the associated NPIs  will, by 
the time vaccines permit herd immunity, have influenced life in most countries of 
the world for years.  There is a long tradition of “lessons learned” papers and “after- 
action reports” in public health and emergency management, with experts and 
policy- makers trying to learn from responses to events such as Ebola outbreaks. 
Journalists’ and politicians’ natu ral instinct is to hold inquiries. But policy deci-
sions made in March or July 2020 had a long time to become part of life and change 
the way systems worked. This is an impor tant point to remember as we enter a 
likely period of long crises, in par tic u lar  those associated with climate change but 
also, for example, antimicrobial re sis tance. Po liti cal scientists have spent de cades 
trying to develop a theoretical language for understanding institutional change. 
Understanding and explaining the scale and direction of institutional change in 
2020–2021  will be a challenge and opportunity to test  those ideas. And in  future 
crises, including amorphous ones such as recurrent large- scale wildfires, storms, 
or floods, it  will be a practical challenge to make policy without a sense of what is 
truly temporary and exception and what  will become normal.
Likewise, po liti cal agendas and actions  after the pandemic  will re- allocate 
many serious burdens in a way that  will shape life chances and po liti cal co ali tions. 
For example, what  will happen to proprietors of small business, or  women, or 
minorities? What  will happen to  people living in areas that have been tipped into 
long- term decline as a result of economic changes? How  will policy allocate bur-
dens among, for example, renters, landlords, and the landlords’ banks?  There has 
been a slow repoliticization of the welfare state  after de cades in which the conven-
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tional wisdom was that welfare states  were essentially stable. Policy changes, or 
failures to adapt policies to prob lems made clear by the pandemic,  will be crucial 
in shaping socie ties. They  will be highly po liti cal, but  whether they are equally vis-
i ble  will be a dif er ent question.
Vaccines: Power and Po liti cal Economy
In December  2020 the image of a ninety- year- old  woman receiving the first 
COVID-19 vaccine as part of the United Kingdom’s nationwide immunization 
campaign made the news worldwide. The speed of vaccine development and 
production has been one of the most dramatic parts of the COVID-19 pan-
demic response. As of this writing, as research  toward discovering vaccines for 
COVID-19 continues to pro gress, attention is increasingly turning to the chal-
lenges of ensuring afordable access to  these products on a global scale. Crucial 
challenges include unequal vaccine allocation, the issue of vaccine production on 
a worldwide scale, and diferences in regulatory capacity around the world.
Given the uncertainty in spring 2020 around the likely efectiveness of dif er-
ent COVID-19 vaccines, countries  adopted dif er ent strategies to secure access 
to  these products. Wealthy nations and supranational organ izations such as the 
United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the EU have engaged in 
unilateral negotiation with vaccine developers to secure a variety of products, 
some of which  were in production and distribution at the end of 2020 and  others 
which  were still in clinical  trials. Most notable is the US Operation Warp Speed, a 
public- private partnership to accelerate access to multiple vaccines with dif er ent 
technologies.  These unilateral decisions have led to a concept known as vaccine 
nationalism (Bollyky & Bown, 2020; Fidler, 2020), in which countries seek to pro-
tect their own citizens ahead of anyone  else, limiting the already scarce supply of 
vaccines as a result (to the unhappy countries).
Learning from what happened during the H1N1 pandemic, in which rich 
nations purchased the initial supplies of the vaccines, the WHO has promoted 
the COVAX initiative to coordinate more equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines. 
The COVAX fa cil i ty is a pooled procurement mechanism that aims to deliver at 
least two billion doses of vaccines by the end of 2021. It includes a diverse portfo-
lio of products, and countries have dif er ent purchasing options to complement 
their national strategies. The COVAX Advance Market Commitment uses donor 
funds to provide vaccines at close to zero cost to ninety- two low- income coun-
tries. As pointed out by Kavanagh et al. in this book, the WHO strategy has been 
challenging given the unilateral decisions taken by wealthy countries, the duplica-
tive pooling strategies promoted by regional blocs such as the EU and the Afri-
can Union, and the fact that this coordinated initiative received dif er ent levels 
of support from world leaders (with the United States and Rus sia being notably 
absent). Therefore, how countries make sense and adhere to  these global initia-
tives requires  future investigation.
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Another crucial challenge for supplying COVID-19 vaccines on a global scale 
is production. Although in previous epidemics (such as HIV/AIDS) intellectual 
property protection acted as a limitation to access to innovative therapeutics 
 because of the high cost of patented drugs (Sell, 2007), at this moment, the critical 
bottleneck for ensuring access to COVID-19 vaccines is mass production and dis-
tribution. Vaccine developers willing to establish global production networks have 
searched for partners with local production capabilities, which are based mainly 
in middle- income countries (Fonseca et al., 2020). For example, AstraZeneca has 
established technology transfer agreements in Brazil, Argentina, and Thailand, 
whereas Sinovac and Rus sia’s Gamaleya Research Institute have agreements in 
Brazil and India.
For novel technologies, companies may need to transfer the manufacturing 
capacity as well as the knowledge about how to make  these products in the first 
place, including information that is not contained in patents or other public docu-
ments (Price et al., 2020). Technology transfer has enormous po liti cal and  legal 
challenges (O’ Sullivan et al., 2020), including agreements on the knowledge trans-
fer content, the product’s price,  whether intellectual property is shared, and other 
issues. Given  these challenges, governments  will have an essential role in provid-
ing incentives for sharing needed technologies or alternative paths to them. What 
do  these agreements look like? To what extent are they coordinated with uptake?
Fi nally, an essential area for  future investigation is how national regulatory 
agencies perceive and respond to risks in the context of scientific  uncertainty. Mar-
ket approval as well as patent registration are highly contested activities and con-
tingent on national institutional arrangements (Shadlen, 2017; Vogel, 1995, 2012). 
Vaccines must be authorized for use in each country where the industry intends 
to commercialize its product.  Because governments have dif er ent pathways for 
approving and licensing phar ma ceu ti cals (Simpson et al., 2020), we should expect 
products to enter the market at dif er ent speeds. In the case of COVID-19 vaccines, 
a particularly impor tant regulatory concept is the mea sure ment of efficacy. It has 
been established by the WHO that the minimum acceptable efficacy is approxi-
mately 50% point estimate (Krause et al., 2020). However, po liti cal and economic 
pressures for rapid approval of a COVID-19 vaccine could result in distributing a 
product that is only weakly efective. The consequences may be devastating and 
may worsen the pandemic. Widespread distribution of a weakly efective vaccine 
could interfere with the evaluation of other vaccines (the control group in clinical 
 trials would include individuals previously vaccinated rather than  those who only 
received a placebo), for example, or  people could relax their compliance with NPIs 
(Krause et al., 2020).
In regulation of COVID-19 vaccines, the dif er ent levels of regulatory capac-
ity among countries could create very dif er ent po liti cal economies of product 
regulation. A small group of countries— including the United States, Canada, the 
countries of the EU, and Japan— are classified as stringent regulatory authorities, 
that is, found ers of the International Council for Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for Phar ma ceu ti cals for  Human Use (ICH), a network of regulatory 
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agencies and drug producers that discusses regulatory convergence in the phar-
ma ceu ti cal sector.  There are also countries with some regulatory capacity that are 
not a part of the ICH (or only recently joined), such as Brazil, China, Chile, and 
Argentina. Fi nally, low- income countries have  little to no regulatory capacity.
Although the US Food and Drug Administration is known for its high regula-
tory capacity, the agency has been subjected to public pressure from the president 
to quickly approve a vaccine so that he could reap po liti cal gains at a par tic u-
lar point of the electoral cycle (LeBlanc, 2020). In the United Kingdom, many 
have expressed concerns about the speed with which the British regulator granted 
approval to the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine (Manskar, 2020). Notably, Britain has 
recently exited the Eu ro pean Union, and therefore it does not need to wait for the 
decisions of the power ful Eu ro pean Medicines Agency for vaccine approval. On 
the other hand, Rus sia, China, and United Arab Emirates began administering 
vaccines even before the conclusion of clinical  trials (“Eyes of the World Are on 
Medicines  Regulators,” 2020). Countries such as Chile, Brazil, and Argentina did 
not have accelerated pathways for vaccine and drug regulation such as emergency 
use or rapid assessment; therefore, they have mimicked what other agencies are 
 doing or relied on the guidelines of international harmonization networks such as 
the ICH. Yet how international guidelines are implemented and thus become local 
rules depends on domestic politics (Shadlen, 2017; Weyland, 2007). Therefore, 
we must take into account agents, their interests, and institutions to be able to 
understand how countries approach risk assessment of COVID-19 vaccines. Low- 
income countries who have nascent or under- resourced regulatory agencies can 
use the WHO Emergency Use Listing Procedure as guidance for vaccine approval 
(World Health Organ ization, 2020). However, the extent to which they do so and 
how they do so warrant further investigation.
 These are some of the po liti cal economy aspects that should be investigated in 
 future analyses. Other issues may include the capacity of health systems to deliver 
vaccines and the uptake of  these products in the context of increasing vaccine hesi-
tancy. This  will be a challenge for all of the fields involved, for an interdisciplinary 
inquiry into the po liti cal economy of vaccines  will have to combine research in 
politics, economics, and health policy that runs on very dif er ent tracks.
Conclusion
We do not yet have a complete and subtle understanding of “what worked” in 
response to COVID-19. The excess mortality and longer- term consequences of 
the social, economic upheaval  will take years and likely de cades to fully compre-
hend. However, it was not too early to test hypotheses and draw conclusions about 
coronavirus politics in 2020. This book aims to draw conclusions about how and 
why governments responded the way that they did. This collaborative research 
endeavor also aims to break down disciplinary silos and demonstrates the signifi-
cant contribution to global health of a group of international scholars thinking 
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about politics, public health, and the social sciences as we grapple with under-
standing the COVID-19 pandemic.
We did find a strong policy case for better coordination between social and 
health policies, such that no health policies are made without consideration of 
social policy supports and efects. Social policy is not just a way to manage the 
efects of the pandemic; it is also necessary if NPIs are to work outside the most 
coercive settings.
In scholarly and policy terms, we also still need to “bring state back in” 
(Skocpol, 1985). Public health in most countries was born as an arm of the state 
rather than as an autonomous academic enterprise, and perhaps the determinedly 
apo liti cal way in which public health scholarship describes the state and po liti cal 
issues is a legacy of that history. Po liti cal institutions  matter, and we need more 
po liti cal analy sis to better understand and prepare countries for  future health cri-
ses. Clearly, general state capacity is a necessary, not a sufficient condition (it is 
unclear  whether specific public health investment is even a necessary condition, 
judging by the sidelining of public health agencies in so many countries). It was 
the decisions of politicians, decisions that can be modeled in the ways we dis-
cussed in this book, that made key diferences.
Third, we need to understand regime types. Too much of the conversation 
about regimes has focused on their interaction with democ ratization and demo-
cratic breakdown, rather than asking how dif er ent regimes and institutions shape 
policy. Too much of the focus on the comparative politics of health has only asked 
 whether democracy is good for health. Moving forward, scholarship in politics 
and public health should address the context and diversity of authoritarian and 
demo cratic regimes and their allocations of agency.
Fourth and fi nally, as Kavanagh et al. and Brooks et al. make clear (chapters 2 
and 13 this volume), and the po liti cal economy of vaccines  will make more clear, 
 there are serious coordination prob lems in global health governance. We are 
already starting to sort through and evaluate the per for mance of dif er ent organ-
izations such as WHO and the public- private co ali tions that flank it, but we also 
need to be clear about the realistic ambitions and standards for such organ izations.
As we send this book into production at the end of 2020, the pandemic contin-
ues and the number of “unhappy countries” increases with the second and third 
waves of the virus at the end of 2020 and beginning of 2021. The comparative 
aspects of their unhappiness should be of  great interest to a wide range of scholars 
of public health and politics, in regard to COVID-19 as well as any  future pandem-
ics. Yet as 2020 came to an end,  there was also  great hope that many countries  will 
be able to change their trajectory in the COVID-19 pandemic. Vaccines showed 
promise that surprised most informed observers. They created hope amid the 
disarray seen in many countries. But even if vaccines solve humanity’s COVID-19 
prob lem, neither the challenges of new infectious diseases nor politics  will go 
away. As the scientific community builds the evidence on efective interventions, 
including non- pharmaceutical and phar ma ceu ti cal, the politics of coronavirus 
 will persist in how governments choose to implement health and social policies.
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Note
 1. “Happy families are all alike;  every unhappy  family is unhappy in its own way.” Leo 
Tolstoy, Anna Karenina (1887).
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